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Introduction: Critical dialogues of urban 
governance, development and activism 
in London and Toronto
Susan Moore, Susannah Bunce, Nicola Livingstone, 
Loren March and Alan Walks
Cities and urban change have been among the most visible manifestations of the 
evolution of processes of globalisation, neoliberalisation and population expan-
sion. Global cities, in particular, are at the cutting edge of such changes and are 
often the first to experience policy experimentation and to spur a host of commu-
nity political actions in response. This book examines changes in governance, prop-
erty development and urban political change and community activism, in two key 
global cities – London and Toronto.
Why Toronto and London?
Taking these two cities as empirical cases, this edited volume engages in construc-
tive dialogues about the contested and variegated built forms, formal and infor-
mal governmental mechanisms and practices, and policy and community- based 
responses to contemporary urban concerns in London and Toronto. But why these 
two cities? Colonial history, politics and path dependencies might evoke part of 
the answer, but there is more to the contemporary condition of urban existence, 
and the governance of such existence, in these two cities that seems to bind them 
as mirrored reflections onto one another. To be sure, certain symmetries exist 
between Toronto and London – both are considered amongst the most multicul-
tural cities in the world, both are the dominant economic powerhouses in their 
national contexts and both have highly diversified knowledge economies, exhib-
ited in recent years by the development of major tech- driven or - oriented urban 
quarters (e.g. King’s Cross London and now shelved Sidewalk Labs in Toronto). 
But there are also significant asymmetries. The City of Toronto is roughly 2.8 mil-
lion people and the population of the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) hovers at 
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London as a city has a population of 8 million, and Greater London approximately 
10 million. Toronto was/ is known as Tkaranto by the Mohawk First Nations and 
was formerly named York in 1790, after being colonised as a military and political 
outpost of British expansion into Canada and based upon oppressive processes 
of taking Indigenous land for colonial settlement. Toronto was incorporated 
as a city in 1834 and since that time has reproduced its colonial ties to Britain 
through the adoption of similar forms of governance, planning and architecture, 
cultural norms and waves of immigration from the UK. In many ways, Toronto 
can be viewed as a puritanical version of London. The history of British colonial 
settlement in the city was one led by an austere and religious ‘family compact’ 
of British lawyers, military leaders and politicians, who shaped periods of tem-
perance, norms of social obedience and its long- lasting moniker of ‘Toronto the 
Good’, in spite of Toronto’s problematic colonialism. London, by contrast, is over 
2,000 years old, receiving its first Royal Charter in 1067 and becoming the capi-
tal seat of England in the twelfth century. London has entrenched its role as a 
centre of politics and commerce over centuries. Much more recently, and as we 
note in more detail in this Introduction, London and Toronto have emerged as 
comparable global cities, with both cities acting as key financial entrepôts, politi-
cal capitals, social and cultural centres, and places for large and diverse waves of 
transnational migration and settlement.
This is the space in which our conversation began, initiated admittedly more 
pragmatically than deliberately, via a choreographed academic workshop. In early 
summer of 2017 a group of urban scholars from the University of Toronto (UofT) 
visited UCL to take part in a workshop to discuss and debate issues of ‘afford-
able housing’ in London and Toronto. The workshop demonstrated the seemingly 
near- universal urban problematics affecting policy and governance in both cities, 
including a lack of affordable housing, the increasing financialisation of real estate 
development and investment, unsustainable urban growth and sprawl, auster-
ity and the rolling back of the welfare state, social inequality, and uneven public 
engagement in urban regeneration and development processes, to name but a few. 
Despite many similarities in vocabularies, laws and policy frameworks, we identi-
fied key differences in the practices of engagement and operational cultures of 
urban development and governance in Toronto and London.
None of us on that first day could have anticipated what was to unfold the fol-
lowing morning, which would put our academically oriented discussion into stark 
contrast with the lived realities of the urban condition in our respective contem-
porary cities. On 14 June 2017, the world awoke to scenes of horror and disbelief 
as Grenfell Tower, a 24- storey residential block situated on a recently ‘refurbished’ 
housing estate in the affluent Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea in London, 
burned uncontrollably, killing 72 people and leaving hundreds dispossessed. The 
poignancy of this event coinciding with the coming together of scholars who do 
research on urban housing financialisation, neoliberal governance, gentrification, 




In the weeks, months and years following the blaze, evidence of the multiple fail-
ings of governance and the vagaries of the dominant models of urban regenera-
tion in cities has not just infiltrated the psyche of urban sociologists, geographers 
and planners, but has also awakened a renewal of broad- based urban activism and 
civically engaged academe too. Resistance to rampant displacement via state- led 
gentrification in the guise of large estate regeneration or the new urban quarters in 
the post- industrial parts of many cities has altered the degree, scale and nature of 
opposition to neoliberal capitalism and austerity politics. London and Toronto are 
at the palpable centre of this new urban reality. This volume seeks to unpack the 
contested governmental rationalities, development and planning ‘cultures’, and 
the local and neighbourhood- based politics of both cities, and to bring them into 
critical dialogue with each other with the aim of generating new spaces for debate, 
learning and possibilities for reform in both contexts.
Critical dialogues as part of the comparative gesture
The book is inherently comparative, albeit not in the traditional sense. It does not 
seek to deliver a like- for- like comparison of the legal, administrative and politi-
cal ‘systems’, contrasting the complexities of the English centralised, discretionary, 
non- constitutional system with that of the regulatory system enacted through the 
power of provincial legislation in Canada. Nor is it a descriptive journey through 
research projects from each city. Rather it seeks to draw out critical lines of urban 
reflection from the trans- disciplinary perspectives of planning, real estate and 
urban geography research emerging from the work of leading urban scholars from 
the UofT and the Bartlett School of Planning, UCL.
Our analytical framework draws on recent calls for nuanced approaches to 
comparative urbanism prompted by the work of Robinson (2016), Ward (2010), 
Healey (2012), Friedmann (2005) and others. Such approaches privilege the 
relational contexts of geographical, social and material assemblages in enabling 
understandings of urban transformation and governance in a diversity of locales 
and scales (McFarlane 2011). Studies of urban assemblages identify key patterns 
and trends in what Robinson refers to as the ‘strongly interconnected genesis of 
often repeated urban phenomena’ (2016, 6). By focusing on London and Toronto 
independently and in contrasting narratives of reflection, the result is a ‘genera-
tive’ (Robinson 2016) dialogue that prompts international debate on existing and 
emergent theorisations of these repeated phenomena of global significance and 
concern (e.g. the neoliberalisation of urban governance and policy). We seek to 
build on the idea of understanding cities ‘as sharing diversity, differentiation and 
contestation’ (Minnery et al. 2012, 861). As such, each chapter of the book engages 
critically with the dominant discourses fuelling urban transformation in London 
and/ or Toronto, but also crucially reflects on the wider implications for compara-
tive urbanism, some more explicitly than others.
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The aim of the book is to provide an original intervention focused on the 
comparative understanding of the transformative processes incited by urban 
development and governance rationalities and the formal and informal political 
response to them. This dialogue traverses the contested terrains of housing and 
real estate, the impacts of governance and regulation and the mobilisation of 
community- based action and activism in the contemporary period. The less tradi-
tional approach to comparative framing seeks to understand London and Toronto 
from a nuanced perspective. It promotes critical reflection on the experiences and 
evaluative critiques of each urban context, providing insight into each city’s urban 
trajectory and engaging critically with wider phenomena and influences on urban 
governance challenges beyond these two cities. Composing comparative dialogues 
of two cities in the global north interrogates the degree of speculated convergence 
in the type and nature of urban challenges affecting and affected by the built envi-
ronment and its governance. The ways in which such challenges are both manifest 
and mediated at the urban level are complex, fluid and variegated. This book draws 
attention to the contextual specificity of each city, the varied scope and scale of 
formal and informal governmental responses and the spectrums of influence and 
power enacting the dominant development rationalities.
We see the contribution as part of the ‘comparative gesture’, following 
Robinson (2011), albeit not one that fills the gap in comparative work on cit-
ies across the north–south divide, nor indeed that spans the poor–rich divide. 
Robinson provokes us to consider how much this book, or similar edited volumes 
which ‘take care to juxtapose case studies from different parts of the world’, still 
fall short of ‘allowing them to engage either with each other or with more general 
or theoretical understandings of cities’ (2011, 2). We have attempted to enliven a 
space for critical dialogue on three ‘big’ issues in contemporary urban studies – gov-
ernance, real estate and housing, and community, activism and engagement – but 
theorising the comparative tropes (strategies and causalities) is indeed more chal-
lenging. In short, this comparative project must be seen to extend beyond the pages 
of this book. We are making no claims for the definitive value of our comparative 
investigation of two already independently well- researched urban metropolises, 
but we are pointing to a lack of contemporary comparative studies of these two 
cities. In fact we struggled to find any contemporary urban studies book titles look-
ing comparatively at Toronto and London when proposing this volume. Despite the 
tendency for comparative studies to coalesce around cities with shared or common 
economic and political national contexts, it still broadly means a restricted number 
of cities tend to get compared.
Universities as part of the community of city builders
Entering into a productive dialogue with what was initially a small group of schol-
ars who attended the original workshops was only the start of something much 
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larger and much more fulfilling. So, yes, UofT and UCL may have prioritised a stra-
tegic link between the two institutions, but this alone of course did not prompt us 
to write this book. It is perhaps illustrative to pause for a moment to reflect on why 
our institutions were so keen to partner. In short, each sees the other as its reputa-
ble equal – as an international hub of research and higher learning in a global city; 
both attract thousands of international students each year; both publish influential 
and acclaimed research; both have esteemed faculty; and both are situated cen-
trally in the core of their respective cities, experiencing rapid growth and urban 
transformation. It is this last point that is most significant to us as editors of this 
volume, a key facet of why these critical dialogues matter so much now.
UCL and UofT are both well placed to consider themselves as genuinely 
‘urban’ learning laboratories. And indeed both institutions have endeavoured to 
embody this positionality through establishing vehicles for improving outreach and 
knowledge production and circulation beyond the disciplinary silos of academia. 
The UCL Urban Laboratory was established in 2005 as the university’s first urban- 
focused cross- disciplinary research centre, and more recently the UofT established 
the School of Cities in 2018 as a hub for urban research and outreach for multi-
disciplinary urban faculty. But the so- called laboratorising of cities is not without 
ethical, methodological and pedagogical complexities – the drawing of boundaries 
around what is part of the ‘laboratory’ can indirectly reinforce the ‘divide between 
the knowledge community and the surrounding neighbourhoods rather than inte-
grate these in new ways’ (Karvonen and Evans 2014, 415). Ultimately this can lead 
to instances of distrust of universities by local stakeholders (Melhuish 2015).
Being a ‘living lab’, or part of one, means more than teaching ‘about’ cities 
by default of being located in one. Increasingly, universities and other institutes of 
higher education globally are called to account for their role in the local community 
and the wider impact of their presence in place- making and the social sustainabil-
ity of the towns and cities where they are located. Universities are often promoted 
as agents of urban regeneration ‘because they are seen to generate economic activ-
ity and produce skilled localised workforces to power the knowledge economy, 
while offering stability and “sticky capital” as anchors of development with a long- 
term commitment to place and community participation’ (Melhuish 2015, 13). 
These debates intensify when the institutions decide they need to expand their 
campuses in order to remain competitive or project a new or improved globalised, 
modernised image. Often substantial landowners in cities, universities and college 
campuses tend to occupy separated precincts, districts or contiguous parcels of 
land in cities and towns (Bromley 2006), set apart from ‘the rest of the city’, often 
both physically and symbolically. For a long time this meant that city politics hap-
pened to the city and that academics in their ‘ivory towers’ merely responded when 
approached by media, industry or government, or encouraged their students to go 
out and ‘engage’ in ethnographic case studies of the experiences of those directly 
‘affected’. In part this was normalised through the twinned pursuits of higher edu-
cation – teaching and research – goals which much of the time have relatively little 
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to do with local contexts and needs (Fernandez- Esquinas and Pinto 2014; Addie 
et al. 2015). But as universities are increasingly pitched at the forefront of debates 
regarding their role as cultural ‘anchors’ of urban regeneration schemes or tech 
hubs linked to enterprise zones (Melhuish 2015), and as speculative developers of 
new academic buildings or student housing complexes, the politics of gentrifica-
tion, displacement and financialisation cannot be seen as external to our academic 
(and economic development) pursuits.
Toronto and London have both dealt with the expansion plans of universities 
in their administrative borders and both have had to reckon with an increased scru-
tiny of their plans and their potential impact within the wider neighbourhood or 
community. Some of these plans have been controversial and the public response to 
establishing a new campus or demolishing existing buildings and constructing new 
ones has been hotly contested. UCL was at the centre of such a debate beginning 
in 2011 with its eastward expansion into a new campus located in Stratford, east 
London (known as UCL East), a site within the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park. The 
University of Toronto has faced criticism since the 1970s of its development plans 
around its downtown campus (leading to efforts by the then- Toronto City council 
to downzone university- owned land and prevent the university from demolishing 
old housing), while its two ‘suburban’ campuses, in Scarborough to the east and 
Mississauga in the west, have been viewed by some as having a ‘concrete curtain’ 
(referring to their modernist concrete buildings) between campus activities and 
the experiences of neighbouring communities. This has changed in the 2000s, with 
an increasingly concerted effort on all three campuses to engage with their sur-
rounding areas through teaching and research with and in local communities.
Acknowledging the university as a ‘local stakeholder’ involves, as Bromley 
(2006) puts it, ‘enlightened self- interest not only in improving their own campuses, 
but also in improving the neighbourhoods around their campuses and in strength-
ening the economy and image of their municipalities and regions’ (11). Meaningful 
outreach and engagement with community groups, industry and governmental 
bodies is a critical endeavour for universities to fulfil their role as political stake-
holders and part of the community- building apparatus of contemporary cities. 
Building civic engagement into all aspects of academic life is now a primary goal 
for most urban institutions. Part of this deliberate recasting of higher education 
institutions is obviously a function of them being more visible as major speculative 
urban developers, alongside which emerges a complex array of new partnerships 
and ‘a gradual blurring of public/ private and for- profit/ not- for- profit distinctions’ 
(Bromley 2006, 20). The challenge for both UofT and UCL is to  counterbalance the 
trajectory of their own branding and marketing, for as an institution becomes ‘more 
globally oriented, the more detached it can be from the local context’ (Fernandez- 
Esquinas and Pinto 2014, 1467).
Though not explicitly a theme of this edited volume, the role of universities 
and other institutions of higher education as political stakeholders in community 




of this book directly relate to the experiences of scholar- activists in Toronto and 
London. Chapters  1, 8, 13 and 16 all engage to varying degrees with the work 
of JustSpace, an informal alliance of academics (UCL), community groups, cam-
paigns and concerned independent organisations which formed as a grassroots 
voice in response to major planning strategy processes in London. Chapters  15, 
17 and 19 (in Part III) likewise demonstrate varying degrees of academic activ-
ism occurring in and with Toronto’s hidden, under- represented communities and 
displaced groups. This book is not exhaustive in its coverage of the action- oriented 
and community- engaged scholarly work being undertaken by urban researchers 
in Toronto and London – our colleagues in other departments, universities, urban 
laboratories and institutes in both cities (and beyond) also need to be acknowl-
edged. But what we do hope is that this book will be a catalyst for readers to gain an 
insight into what are the driving concerns in each city and to investigate the variety 
of progressive research emerging simultaneously from both urban contexts. The 
comparative gesture is again here positioned as a generative one, ‘enabled by the 
bringing together of different singularities, or cases, into conversation’ (Robinson 
2016, 18), inspired in this instance by problems associated with urban governance, 
property and activism. This is a primer for an enduring critical dialogue between 
Toronto and London. We start with three dialogic lenses for better understanding 
the comparative urban condition in Toronto and London as we work towards con-
cluding on the implications for richer conceptualisation of the comparative imagi-
nation of global cities.
Dialogic lenses of the comparative urban condition in Toronto 
and London
governance in the global city
Among the myriad issues besetting global cities such as London and Toronto, ques-
tions around the changing forms, processes and outcomes of governance are of 
utmost importance. Global cities are at the cutting edge of what Allen Scott (2011) 
calls ‘third wave urbanization’, that is, post- Fordist forms of urban change in which 
industry has largely decanted to developing nations and low- wage regions, while 
processes of financialisation, globalisation and neoliberalisation direct develop-
ment pressures on the largest, most globally connected cities, especially their inner 
cores. As the ‘command and control’ centres of a global economy, global cities such 
as London and Toronto concentrate the headquarters of transnational firms as well 
as financial firms, while also maintaining competitive advantages in key specialised 
services that attract labour of varying skills from around the world (Sassen 2001). 
As a result, London and Toronto are among the most diverse cities on the planet, 
with high levels of immigration, concentrations of racialised communities and high 
levels of income and wealth inequality. Demand pressures from those with high 
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incomes, coupled with high levels of in- migration, lead to high housing costs, espe-
cially in the inner cores where the financial sector is concentrated, promoting gen-
trification and displacement. And because of the need to remain connected to other 
global cities, but within a context of severe land pressures which promote high- 
density residential and employment development, global cities contain unique 
challenges related to the governing of infrastructure development. Although other 
cities also face a number of similar pressures, their intensity and combination in 
global cities such as London and Toronto require a number of simultaneous inter-
ventions, and these present their own unique challenges to governance.
As scholars have noted (Raco 2016), the neoliberalisation of public policy has 
involved a shift from government to governance. Instead of accountable state activ-
ity directed by public bodies responsible to elected representatives and funded by 
taxes (government), states have increasingly contracted out functions and respon-
sibilities for service delivery, monitoring, financing and even policy- making to a 
diverse and fragmented ecology of quasi- public and private actors/ firms with vary-
ing levels of direct public accountability (governance). This has been implemented 
on ideological grounds  – to encourage market- based solutions to public policy 
problems and to promote the private sector as the key driver of economic growth – 
as well as for pragmatic reasons  – as national and especially local state budgets 
come under strain, the impetus to search for solutions requiring less direct expend-
iture rises. It has led to the so- called post- political city (Swyngedouw 2009), in 
which political issues of access and accountability are depoliticised and rendered 
as technical issues of efficiency. Governance is the result of both ‘roll- back’ forms 
of neoliberalisation (the attack on the welfare state and the privatisation of public 
resources and services), and ‘roll- out’ forms of neoliberalisation (the promotion 
of market- based models of service delivery and access) (Peck and Tickell 2002). 
Governance includes not only the normal (and increasingly residual) state func-
tions of government, but also the activities and interests of the many quasi- public 
and private firms that are involved in organising and influencing firm and resident 
behaviour, development and everyday life.
The shift from government to governance presents its own challenges, not 
least because it becomes more difficult to understand what each actor is doing and 
how they relate to other actors and to stated public policy objectives. The rise of 
governance is associated with both increasing policy innovation and greater poten-
tial for chaos and unintended consequences. Furthermore, as Peck (2010) notes, 
under neoliberalism the tendency is to ‘fail forward’ – that is, to point to failures 
of governance, including those resulting from market- based models, as justifica-
tion for further and deeper neoliberalisation and privatisation. Because of this the 
neoliberal shift away from government to governance has been characterised by 
a forward momentum under positive feedback loops in which deeper and more 
 fragmented governance is seen as the only solution to the challenges besetting frag-
mented governance. In this context, many states – even those ruled by left- leaning 
political parties – have adopted hybrid ‘roll- with- it’ forms of neoliberalisation (Keil 
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2009) in which some aspects of marketisation have been added into the larger gov-
ernance mix, producing assemblages of policy experimentation and innovation 
that overlap with established institutions and political cultures.
London and Toronto have been at the vanguard of such policy experimen-
tation and governance innovation. In addition to facing the most extreme pres-
sures from development, rising inequalities, financialisation, gentrification and 
economic change, global cities are also often the national (or sub- national) capital 
cities. As the seats of power, they are highly visible to policy- makers and have a dis-
proportionate concentration of political actors, parties and groups, as well as media 
outlets, universities, think tanks and other ‘knowledge producers’. Global cities are 
therefore often the first to be targeted for governance reforms and experiments by 
upper levels of the state, and because of the myriad challenges they face, they are 
often the first to innovate their own policy solutions at the municipal level, includ-
ing in the realm of land use planning. Both London and Toronto, for instance, had 
their well- respected regional governments (the Greater London Council, and the 
Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto) disbanded by Conservative- led governments 
elected to upper levels of the state (by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives in the 
case of Greater London in 1986, and by the Mike Harris- led Ontario Conservatives 
in the case of Metropolitan Toronto in 1998). However, with the dynamic econo-
mies resulting from their connections to global processes, global cities often have 
more resources and higher tax bases with which to experiment and to monitor the 
outcomes of such policy innovation. In both London and Toronto, the central cit-
ies have pursued policy innovations with the intention of dealing with, and partly 
making up for, the political whims of upper levels of the state, although munici-
palities in London retain more autonomy than do municipalities in Toronto, where 
according to the Canadian constitution, municipalities are always ‘creatures of the 
Province’. Global cities appear as the ‘natural’ test sites for the neoliberalisation of 
urban policy.
London and Toronto, as the pre- eminent global cities of the UK and Canada 
respectively, thus make for a compelling, and telling, comparison in governance. 
As the chapters in Part I  of this volume attest, both urban regions have been at 
the forefront of targeted policy experimentation in planning and governance, both 
those that pre- date (by decades) the rise of neoliberalisation and those that were 
(often unwillingly) the result of neoliberal shifts in ideology. Both urban regions 
exhibit the highest levels of immigration, diversity and racialisation in their respec-
tive nations, and both have witnessed extreme development pressures and pres-
sures on their housing markets in recent decades. Furthermore, interestingly, both 
cities have witnessed major fluctuations in the ideological approach of their elected 
municipal regimes, at roughly the same times, and municipal politics in both cit-
ies have acted as realms for political experimentation among neoliberal politicians 
who then moved on to lead upper levels of the state where the power really lies. 
For instance, London went from electing one of the most left- leaning mayors in the 
UK (Ken Livingstone) to one of the more eccentric and controversial Conservatives 
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(Boris Johnson in 2008), and the latter went on to become Prime Minister in 2019. 
Toronto, similarly, went from the equally left- leaning mayorship of David Miller 
to the equally eccentric and controversial Conservative Rob Ford (in 2010) (see 
Walks 2015). Although Rob Ford passed away in 2014, in 2018 his older brother 
Doug Ford, who was a municipal councillor during Rob’s mayoral tenure, became 
Premier of the Province of Ontario (the province where Toronto is located) in 2018.
Yet it is also notable that cities in the UK are often seen as poster- children 
for the kinds of fragmented forms of private governance noted by scholars (Raco 
2016), whereas Toronto has acted as a model of the ‘public metropolis’ in histori-
cally avoiding the delegation of political decisions to unaccountable bodies and 
instead maintaining strong democratic institutions and levels of public account-
ability, even at the risk of policy inefficiency (Frisken 2007). Although Toronto 
has also witnessed the shift from democratic government to governance, usually 
as a result of initiatives of the Province of Ontario attempting to make the politi-
cal process more ‘efficient’ (such as the amalgamation of six former boroughs into 
the new City of Toronto in 1998, and the Doug Ford government’s reforms of the 
City Council in 2019; see Boudreau 2000; Boudreau et al. 2009; Rider and Kopun 
2019), cities all over Canada still often look to Toronto for guidance on ways of 
maintaining democratic input. These two metropolises thus constitute an excel-
lent comparison for examination and discussion of the evolution of governance in 
contemporary global cities.
real estate and housing
Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the overriding trajectory of the real estate 
and housing markets in both London and Toronto has been one of ‘growth’, as 
both cities are key financial centres with diverse and increasing populations. This 
growth has been founded on neoliberal approaches to governance, with each city 
ever more reliant on market- led, profit- driven private sector actors to reproduce 
the real estate and housing markets. The real estate and housing markets in both 
London and Toronto illustrate the tensions that are currently emerging across both 
cities in their commercial and residential markets, tensions and antagonisms which 
are dynamic, transformative and constantly in flux, and it is clear that the narra-
tives of positive growth are not always beneficial to everyone.
Since the last decades of the twentieth century, the real estate and housing 
markets of established global cities pursuing an agenda based on growth have 
become increasingly accessible, transparent and attractive propositions to both 
investors and developers in search of lucrative financial opportunities. Capital 
flowing into global cities can now be distributed across a varied spectrum of invest-
ment vehicles, as the real estate and housing markets have become increasingly 
financialised under neoliberalism in order to accommodate the ‘wall of money’ 
(Aalbers 2016) moving across markets in pursuit of maximum profits and strong 
returns. Investment into commercial and residential real estate can now be carried 
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out in myriad ways, in addition to the traditional approach of direct property own-
ership. Listed vehicles such as real estate investment trusts (REITs) and unlisted 
property funds provide contemporary methods of investing indirectly into com-
mercial and residential real estate as assets becoming increasingly subject to pro-
cesses of financialisation, where ‘the increasing dominance of financial actors, 
markets, practices, measurements and narratives, at various scales, [is] resulting 
in a structural transformation of economics, firms, states and households’ (Aalbers 
2017, 544). Real estate offers an investor exposure into unfamiliar markets with 
risk- based returns, and in the last decade global REITs have achieved returns of 
11 per cent,  outperforming other asset classes (JLL 2019).
Although direct and indirect real estate investments differ in terms of char-
acteristics, there are clear reasons for investing in real estate and housing as asset 
classes: real estate is typically seen as a sound hedge against inflation, with attrac-
tive risk and return profiles and diversification benefits, especially if considering 
investing or developing internationally (Baum and Hartzell 2012). Driven by 
London, the United Kingdom’s commercial real estate market is ranked at number 
one for global real estate transparency, which is ranked via six measures relating 
to sustainability, performance, transaction processes, market fundamentals, regu-
latory and legal systems and governance (JLL 2018). Canada sits at fifth position 
in the transparency index out of 100 global markets (JLL 2018): both cities have 
strong underlying economic fundamentals and performance potential. In 2019, 
London was the fourth most liquid real estate market globally, with $22.3 billion 
of real estate transacted, and real estate sales volumes in Canada increased by 9 
per cent, with Toronto one of the key performers (JLL 2019). The governance and 
policy frameworks active within the London and Toronto markets have facilitated 
processes of financialisation and actively encouraged continued investment into 
the real estate and housing markets, from both domestic and international actors, 
where locally distinctive practices and outcomes are mediated by global practices 
of investment, development and cycles of capital flows.
As the London and Toronto markets have become increasingly attractive and 
viable propositions for investors and developers, land values have escalated due 
to factors such as market competition and demand economies, exacerbated by the 
spatial boundaries within each city, restricting supply. As a consequence of these 
influences, both London and Toronto have experienced increasing deindustrialisa-
tion as industrial/ employment land is sacrificed for the purpose of housing, to the 
detriment of the local economy, even though demand for such space is increasing 
(CAG 2017; Toronto City Planning 2019). Although additional housing may be cre-
ated, negative impacts of the loss of industrial land include loss of employment 
spaces, which no longer contribute to the local economy, and the prioritisation of 
other uses over industrial spaces. The prioritisation of housing may not be a sur-
prising market trend, as both cities are experiencing ongoing housing crises due to 
varied reasons ranging from the economic to the political and the social: examples 
of these include supply and demand imbalances, increasing spatial and income 
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inequalities, the assetisation and financialisation of housing and challenges in land 
supply. Politics, at a local, regional and national level, clearly impacts the demand 
and supply of housing and the funding for its provision, as elected mayors and 
political representatives struggle to balance out challenges with social and pub-
lic housing provision in an era of austerity and budget cuts for local authorities. 
Policy mechanisms, such as those included in the London Plan and Section 37 of 
the Planning Act in Toronto, have related to the systems by which planning gain 
and financial contributions can be captured by the local authorities when hous-
ing is being developed. However, questions arise over the financial viability of 
such developments and whether sufficient value is being extracted through these 
policies by local government:  often developers will argue over the viability and 
profitability of particular sites, and due to the discretionary planning systems in 
operation, the private sector often develops housing that has minimal affordable 
units. The housing crisis is one of access and affordability, and both the London and 
Toronto markets have seen substantial rises in rental values concomitant with the 
growth of the private rented sector (PRS) and burgeoning gentrification processes 
in each market. Although densification debates point to ways in which housing pro-
vision can be increased in effective and progressive ways, there are political vul-
nerabilities to approaches that rely on densification, a situation made even more 
salient by the COVID- 19 pandemic, which has disproportionately affected dense 
areas of interconnected cities such as London and Toronto – in particular those that 
are home to usually racialised and lower- income residents who continue to work 
on various front lines of the pandemic, are at greater risk of exposure and are often 
more likely to suffer from serious illness.
Synergies of near- universal urban problematics emerge through the real 
estate and housing markets in our two study cities, which demonstrate how city 
form and urban environments are perpetuated and consistently reconstituted 
through interactions and interconnections both between and within markets. The 
processes occurring in London and Toronto demonstrate how fluid global processes 
have impacts at local levels: generally, the commercial markets of each city are well 
established and exhibit strong performance fundamentals in terms of investment 
and development. However, the negative impacts of growth can be seen in the 
crisis- ridden housing market, dominated by questions relating to financial viability, 
the politics and policies of planning obligations and development, and social issues 
relating to affordability and increasing spatial inequalities.
Community, activism and engagement
London and Toronto are cities of neighbourhoods; indeed, most of the every-
day life that occurs in both cities happens at the neighbourhood scale and is set 
within the unique terrains of, and place attachments to, the very local. London’s 
neighbourhoods and communities have emerged and been shaped over centuries, 
with distinctive urban dialects, social, cultural and spatial geographies, and an 
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understanding of their often- changing position in relation to the landscape of the 
city. London’s East End has historically been socially separated by class, culture and 
politics from the city’s West End (Glynn 2005), although over the past few decades 
the East End of London has become a place of rapid gentrification, drawing influxes 
of people attracted by relatively cheaper rents and housing and expectations of a 
grittier urban ‘authenticity’. Toronto is officially called a ‘city of neighbourhoods’ 
by its local government, which has demarcated 140 neighbourhoods across the city 
as socio- cultural units and in turn has used these areas to highlight and market 
the city’s social history and diversity, as well as the uniqueness of these particular 
areas. As is the case in London, Toronto’s more affluent neighbourhoods exist pri-
marily in the central, west and north of the city, with very small areas of the centre 
and pockets of the north- west and the east being home to residents with lower 
incomes as well as a higher proportion of immigrants (Hulchanski 2010, 2015).
London and Toronto have been key receptor cities for immigrants from across 
the globe, which has added to the dynamism and cultural make- up of different 
communities and neighbourhoods in both cities. Indeed, immigration (and inter-
nal migration) has added a great deal to the social and economic infrastructure 
of both cities. Nearly half (47 per cent) of Toronto’s residents were born outside 
Canada and thus arrived as immigrants or refugees (City of Toronto 2017), while 
35 per cent of Londoners were born outside the UK, with this figure including 
migrants from EU countries (Migration Observatory 2020). Patterns of immigra-
tion are clearly experienced in the social life of communities and neighbourhoods, 
in working life and in the different socio- cultural practices that permeate everyday 
spaces in both cities. In these ways, Toronto and London are constituted by trans-
national communities that are intricately woven across each city and are closely 
connected with diverse countries of origin. Interestingly, in both cities the colonial 
and postcolonial ties to places across the globe are readily apparent, with Toronto, 
as a colonial city, attracting immigrant communities from former and current 
British colonies in the Caribbean, South Asia and Africa in a similar way to London. 
This has produced complex associations between colonial histories and current de- 
/ postcolonial contexts. London’s and Toronto’s thriving Jamaican communities, 
for example, have intrinsically contributed to and shaped the cultural dynamism 
and social fabric of both cities. Yet these communities also bear the problematic 
outcomes of a history of colonial racism that is evident in spatialisation processes 
and income disparities across both cities, where racism is embedded in the cities’ 
uneven development and impacts the equitable location of housing and communi-
ties, access to services and political agency, among other issues (see Dwyer and 
Bressey 2008; Hulchanski 2010, 2015; Gilroy 1991; Paradis et al. 2008). London 
and Toronto are cities that, while reliant on immigration, have yet to effectively 
grapple with and find real solutions to the multiple and entwined issues of socio- 
spatial inequity and racialisation.
Historical and emergent activist practices have sought to address these issues, 
however, and both cities have long histories of anti- racist and social justice activism. 
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In London, the Notting Hill Riots that first started in 1958 and continued at differ-
ent times into the 1980s, and the Brixton Riot in 1981, were significant events that 
brought anti- Black racism to the forefront of public discourse and underlined the 
connections between racial discrimination and issues such as targeted  policing, 
social cutbacks and inadequate housing. These events became inscribed in the 
social imaginaries of different communities:  in community solidarity, in art and 
music and in possibilities for activism that would bring together issues of race and 
class. The legacies of these events are noticeable in contemporary community- 
based activism in London, through the efforts of organisations such as Focus E15, 
who represent diverse racialised and newcomer residents to fight against eviction 
and displacement in east London, and those that explicitly work against racist poli-
cies, such as Lewisham Anti- Racist Action Group. Never ones to be afraid of tak-
ing to the streets in protest, Londoners tend to leave indelible prints of activism 
in the form of rallies and direct actions that now increasingly connect issues of 
racial, social and environmental injustice together. The climate action protests by 
Extinction Rebellion in 2019 that closed down London streets, railway stations and 
Thames river bridges raised awareness about the interrelationships between these 
injustices and articulated calls for an emergent community- based and global cli-
mate justice activism.
Similarly, in Toronto, activism is increasingly shaped by a focus on the multi-
ple forms and scales of injustice and calls for justice as a praxis- based and aspira-
tional process. As in London, activism for social, environmental and racial justice 
is emerging as a vital force for change in Toronto, with organisations working 
together and across more specific mandates. Toronto’s activist history has laid the 
groundwork for this intersectional activist approach through the coming together 
of different organisations to protest singular issues since the 1960s, with the city 
being a key place in Canada (and globally) for anti- nuclear, anti- apartheid and 
anti- poverty rallies and other actions. While specific and targeted activism is cer-
tainly an integral part of activist culture in Toronto, as in the work of groups such 
as the Ontario Coalition against Poverty and Parkdale Organize in relation to issues 
of housing injustice, homelessness and evictions in the city, this is noticeably set 
within a larger conversation about injustice and the need for equity and justice 
more broadly. In Toronto, this is also placed within an important and necessary 
public discussion and activism for Indigenous rights to land, political agency and 
environmental protection, among other issues. Emergent activism for climate jus-
tice is closely linked with Indigenous activism in Toronto, with both issues being 
important to Toronto’s communities and across Canada. This has been notice-
able in the recent joining together of multiple activists and organisations across 
Toronto neighbourhoods to protest against plans for a gas pipeline on Indigenous 
(Wet’suwet’en) territory in western Canada.
London and Toronto share similar characteristics as cities with long, interest-
ing and dynamic histories of activism and engagement and with vibrant and diverse 
communities and neighbourhoods, although the types of activism and engagement 
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may differ according to localised contexts and issues in each city. In both places, 
emergent and hopeful actions are occurring in response to the problems that face 
each city, including the defining urban moment of the twenty- first century – the 
COVID- 19 global pandemic; at the time of press we had yet to see the other side of 
post- peak outbreak urban governance reforms, development recovery plans and 
neighbourhood resilience and self- sufficiency agendas. Scholars and journalists 
have already speculated that the legacy of the coronavirus may well be a digital 
one (see Safi 2020), imprinted on collective ideas of privacy and surveillance. It is 
likely too, perhaps, to be similar to the post- 2008 global economic recession period, 
when activists and lobbyists as well as politicians and the general public started to 
ask whether or not it is a moment to do things differently, an opportunity to rethink 
the sustainability of dominant regeneration, development and governance models. 
High- profile, controversial projects, such as Sidewalk Labs in Toronto’s industrial 
waterfront, have already collapsed in the wake of COVID- 19. Toronto- based urban 
scholar Roger Keil was recently quoted in The Guardian as saying: ‘there is no one 
path for all great cities to follow … this is a negotiated process. It’s one we have 
some agency in’ (Safi 2020). It is perhaps too early to speculate on the reality of 
a post- pandemic urbanism, but there is scope for optimism, in no small part evi-
denced by the neighbourhood- level activism and improvisational support network 
formations emerging in the absence of clear government guidance and policy.
Structure of the book
The book is organised into three parts, drawing on recent work of the contributing 
authors, with chapters from both London and Toronto included in each part, fol-
lowed by a commentary written collaboratively by one London- based scholar and 
one Toronto- based scholar from the editorial team. The purpose of the commen-
taries is to enhance the ‘dialogue effect’ we are intending to achieve through joint 
consideration of the key narratives, lessons and generative directions for further 
research and theorisation.
The seven chapters in Part I, Perspectives on governance, deliver a conceptual 
engagement with the key themes of governmental imaginations and political net-
works of development influence and power, unequal urban outcomes in the built 
environment, ambiguities in property regulation and questionable policy shifts. 
The commentary by Raco and Walks draws attention to the challenges associated 
with integrating changes in the global political economy into national and local 
governance during periods of austerity and variegated urban pressures, as they 
consider Toronto and London as global cities.
Both cities are the focus of the financial services industries and are seen as 
key to sustaining global economic competitiveness and advantages, which are 
also important to the local and national scale and predicated on neoliberal poli-
cies and reforms. The role of the planning system in governance, and its varied 
 
Crit iCAL DiALoguES of urBAN govErNANCE ,  DEvELopMENt AND ACtiv iSM16
mechanisms for addressing tensions across the two cities, is to find a (somewhat 
precarious) balance between supporting neoliberal, private, market- led actors in 
the market and public and community interests. Chapters  4 and 6 discuss pres-
sures on city infrastructure and transit- oriented developments, accounting for the 
influence that political perspectives have on their development and the uneven 
impacts of such developments across London and Toronto. Certain parts of the city 
become more accessible to some, enhancing connectivity and accessibility, while 
other parts of the city fail to benefit from such infrastructure – exacerbating social 
injustice, polarisation and inequality in terms of transport and accessibility, and 
compounding other issues such as the challenges in housing provision. Another 
issue relating to accessibility in the city is discussed in Chapter 5, which consid-
ers the governance of formerly public parks. As management of these spaces has 
become quasi- privatised and is no longer the responsibility of local authorities, 
these spaces are now differentiated in terms of their governance and their multiple 
understandings of ‘publicness’.
Chapter  1 discusses the political rhetoric and ambiguities surrounding the 
planning and delivery of housing in London, where private developers are increas-
ingly influential and ambiguities emerge in regulatory and political approaches. 
Further questions are raised over the capacity for local governments to provide 
affordable and accessible housing, which is both effectively produced and regu-
lated (Chapters 1, 2 and 3). Moreira de Souza’s Chapter 3 reflects on the disjointed 
approaches to governing the PRS through inconsistent licensing across boroughs, 
and Brail and Vinodrai incorporate similar discussions relating to ‘ghost’ regimes 
for market sectors in Chapter 2 on Toronto. Their chapter raises questions about 
the inclusivity of Toronto, as although the city’s technology and innovation sec-
tors are booming, and the labour market supports a diverse economic base, spa-
tial inequalities persist in relation to the governance of housing, infrastructure and 
community benefit agreements.
Part II, Real estate and housing, develops the empirical foundation for criti-
cal debate on the drivers and outcomes of various governmental mechanisms 
employed to address the crisis of affordable housing (and related concerns) in 
London and Toronto. The six chapters discuss the challenges of competing land 
uses, the public benefit derived from land value capture mechanisms, the insti-
tutional drivers of the housing crisis and the implications of urban densification 
agendas. Bunce and Livingstone’s commentary (Chapter  14) reflects on the key 
themes emerging from the chapters in line with market- led developments, the 
de/ re- regulation of the state and the relational practices which form the cities.
As both London and Toronto are financial centres, with continually growing 
populations and ever increasing pressure on the housing and real estate markets, 
a number of chapters in Part II (Chapters 9 and 11) discuss the impacts of neolib-
eralism, financialisation and assetisation processes. Such processes can be dem-
onstrated by the growth of investment vehicles whose values are underpinned by 
housing and real estate assets, assets that have been securitised and exchanged on 
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global markets which are becoming increasingly deregulated. Practices of deregu-
lation and the ‘rolling back of the state’ contribute to the urban development and 
transformation of London and Toronto, and Chapters 8, 12 and 13 illustrate how 
these processes are embedded at city level through changes in policies which influ-
ence investment practices and how the planning systems operate at a national and 
local scale. The outcomes of these practices for the real estate and housing markets 
are relational and emerge across diverse scales, from challenges relating to small- 
scale ‘soft’ densification processes (Chapter 12), the integration of mixed- use hous-
ing and industrial property (Chapter 8), differentiated experiences of short- term 
rentals and the growth of Airbnb (Chapter 11), to large- scale, longitudinal issues of 
the creation of ‘housing bubbles’ (Chapter 9) and the inconsistencies in the capaci-
ties of planning mechanisms to successfully capture benefits from developments 
(Chapters 8, 12 and 13).
One of the key issues interwoven through all the chapters in Part II relates to 
the affordability, or lack of affordability, currently being experienced in the London 
and Toronto housing markets. Walks (Chapter 9) discusses the causes of the hous-
ing bubble and affordability concerns in Toronto, coupled with the decline in social 
housing provision, and Gabrieli (Chapter 10) concentrates on the significant afford-
ability differences between London boroughs, reflecting on the impact of house 
price growth for first- time buyers. These housing challenges are considered in line 
with the growth of the PRS and concepts such as ‘affordable rent’, coupled with 
the continual escalation of land ‘values’ and the ways in which developments are 
assessed for financial viability and planning obligations. Policies at play in the mar-
kets which are inherently connected to the cities’ housing markets include those 
related to density bonusing in Toronto (Chapter 13 by Biggar and Siemiatycki), the 
current consideration of the London Plan’s density matrix for housing (Chapter 12) 
and the ‘no net loss’ approaches to London’s industrial land in the newest iteration 
of the London Plan (Chapter 8).
Part III, Community, activism and engagement, shifts attention to the actions 
and actual existing practices of non- state actors engaged in urban transformations, 
often via local initiatives that critically respond to governmental reforms and urban 
development processes. The prevalence of community- based activism in opposi-
tion to ‘top- down’ public urban regeneration efforts, the retraction of funding for 
neighbourhood- level programmes and the challenges of social and environmental 
injustices in both cities are explored. Trends such as the emergence of community 
land trusts, do- it- yourself (DIY) communities of social change and ambient forms 
of public engagement are critically presented and evaluated in the chapters and 
further debated in the commentary written by March and Moore (Chapter  20), 
which asks, ‘Who is activist now?’
Again, as in Parts I and II, the question of housing, and how it could be better 
provided, is interwoven into the discussions across a number of chapters. Penny 
(Chapter 16) focuses on ideas around the financialisation of housing in a period 
of ‘austerity urbanism’ in London and evaluates how local boroughs are becoming 
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ever more entrepreneurial and creative in their provision of housing (by forming 
public–private partnerships for example). Activist responses to displacement, dis-
possession and associated negative impacts relating to housing under austerity 
urbanism in London are explored by Sendra and Fitzpatrick (Chapter 18), which 
demonstrates how empowered local communities can shape decision- making 
processes, political agendas and policies. Other approaches to revitalising neigh-
bourhoods and counterbalancing gentrification impacts in local areas in a move 
away from ‘top- down’ urban regeneration are discussed in Bunce’s Chapter 19 on 
activist- oriented community land trusts in Toronto and London, recognising the 
opportunities this approach offers local communities to act collectively towards 
effective land stewardship. Responses from communities are also explored in chap-
ters by both March and Ostanel (Chapters 15 and 17), with the former exploring 
how a culture of organisational collaboration has developed in Parkdale, Toronto, 
and the latter considering ideas around creative place- making and the important 
role of DIY workspaces in the city. Both Ostanel and March focus on how activism 
and social change can be spatially and temporally particular to specific areas of a 
city, while remaining connected to (and often in conflict with) broader agendas of 
institutional and market- led changes.
In the conclusion to the book, we reflect on the patterns that have emerged 
through our collaborative work and about what the comparisons between our 
two urban regions tell us about urban governance, real estate and housing pro-
cesses, and communities, engagement and activism in contemporary global cit-
ies, at least as they have evolved up to the time the COVID- 19 pandemic hit. The 
dialogic approach taken within this book has helped us identify three key conclu-
sions, which contribute to a more nuanced understanding of contemporary urban 
development processes, not only in London and Toronto but in cities more gener-
ally, and to a conceptualisation of the comparative imagination of global cities.
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Capital flows in the capital: Contemporary 
governmental imaginations in London’s 
urban development
Mike raco and Nicola Livingstone
Introducing systematic ambiguities: Questioning the planning, 
politics and perceptions of London’s real estate market
Much of the critical literature on neoliberal urban development, and many of 
the policy frameworks that shape planning systems, characterise the real estate 
and investment sectors in a relatively simplified way. They are often presented, 
implicitly or explicitly, as a unified interest with a clear subjectivity built around 
fast returns from investment decisions, a lack of consideration for broader public 
interests, outlooks dominated by the conversion of places into profit- maximising 
investment spaces and counterproductive approaches towards citizens and govern-
ment authorities who potentially seek to disrupt their programmes and projects. 
Such characterisations are becoming increasingly important as regulators in major 
cities such as London and Toronto are calling for the introduction of new policy 
technologies and techniques to try to exert greater territorial control over increas-
ingly fluid investment flows, real estate actors and other institutions within cities. 
Through this chapter we will challenge these preconceived notions relating to real 
estate actor behaviour and demonstrate their more nuanced, integrated and essen-
tial role within London’s politics of planning. Just as the urban form is a social 
product (Harvey 1979, 196), we need to better understand how the creation and 
ongoing dynamics of our built environment are impacted by the social (and not 
purely economic) form of market actors and regulators actively mediating the com-
mercial and residential landscapes of the city.
This chapter draws on a content and discourse analysis of contemporary 
planning documents, political statements and speeches in London to examine 
the conceptions and imaginations of the development and investment sectors that 
exist within policy- making processes, and their apparent manifestations in the 
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networks of real estate and planning actors who are mediating the flows of capital 
into London’s commercial and residential market, demonstrating that there is a 
process (often asymmetrical but symbiotic) at play through the ‘rules of the game’ 
present within the local market context, policy environment and political perspec-
tive. The chapter will assess dominant understandings and diverse interconnec-
tions between market actors who are actively creating and mediating London’s 
urban environment, and the analysis will demonstrate that systematic ambiguities 
lie at the heart of the political narratives and the planning system’s characterisa-
tions and imaginations of the real estate and housing sectors.
On the one hand, they are infused with a critical view that portrays large 
developers and investors as overly powerful actors whose activities need to be 
tamed and restricted in order to meet a broader public interest. These actors are 
often presented as prioritising economic impacts of their behaviour over the social 
implications, whose actions can only be regulated through the deployment of hard 
financial incentives and regulations rather than through negotiated forms of softer 
regulation that could seek to establish more ethical and/ or more community- 
oriented forms of intervention. There are also calls for a broadening of the diversity 
of investor and developer typologies, with smaller firms viewed as being more pub-
licly oriented and socially progressive than the larger firms that disproportionately 
dominate the building of new housing, real estate and infrastructure; the latter are 
often perceived as purely driven by the prospect of financial benefits. There are 
also conflicting perspectives at play in relation to the scale of internationalisation 
in London as an investment and development market, as questions arise relating to 
the global nature of real estate actors and their potential (or lack of) connections 
to the city.
On the other hand, the chapter will illustrate how the rolling out of a market- 
led planning system means that the implementation of broader objectives requires 
the active and privileged cooperation of major private sector actors and their skills, 
expertise and resources. In planning fields ranging from the provision of affordable 
housing to energy and infrastructure management, private actors are increasingly 
called upon to work in harmony with the planning system and governing agen-
cies to deliver public policy priorities. In the core strategic planning blueprint, 
the London Plan (LP) (GLA 2018), developers wishing to implement projects 
are expected to draw up proposals to (amongst other things): boost training and 
employment for young people; ensure that heritage standards are maintained; mit-
igate the impacts of developments on local urban environments; ensure the pro-
vision of green spaces; develop local utility infrastructure networks; and develop 
recycling and waste management systems. Market- led policies thus generate new 
forms of dependence on private sector resources and this, in turn, limits the scope 
and scale of regulation and political interventions.
The analysis will also show that there exists a clear knowledge gap that helps 
to generate and institutionalise these ambiguities. There is a relatively weak under-
standing of the investment landscapes that now shape urban environments and the 
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systematic changes that have been underway in the form, character and structure 
of the real estate sector in recent decades, particularly in the wake of the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008 (Baum and Hartzell 2012). We draw attention to the lack 
of knowledge and the contradictions active within the London market, by evaluat-
ing the antagonistic characterisations of institutional real estate actors, the lack 
of reflexivity in the governance and regulation of such actors through the plan-
ning system, and the importance of knowledge- laden networks in producing the 
city’s built form. The chapter begins by unpacking some of the relevant literature 
relating to the planning system, real estate and housing markets, before presenting 
an analysis of these ambiguities. A concluding section outlines some of the impli-
cations of current trends for the (effective) regulation of the real estate sector in 
global cities such as London and Toronto, and the directions for further research 
in the future.
Dominant representations of real estate developers and 
investors in planning
Within much of the critical urban studies and planning literature, contemporary 
real estate developers and investors are represented as a relatively undifferentiated 
group of capitalist institutions. As Rachel Weber (2015) argues, much of this work 
has been dominated, on the one hand, by neoclassical framings of market systems 
and corporate practices and, on the other hand, by critical economy approaches. 
Weber maintains that both approaches are ‘debilitated by their lack of attention 
to the action of actors and institutions that mediate between demand and supply’ 
(2015, 30). The latter are found within ‘urban political economy, cultural stud-
ies and geography traditions [in which] capital is often characterised as perpet-
ually dynamic and naturally expansionary while the actors and institutions that 
make capital mobile are deemed irrelevant and unexamined’ (Weber 2015, 30). 
Influential writings and models that draw on neoclassical interpretations suffer 
from similar limitations, with their focus on idealised and abstract models of action 
and practice of the management and ownership of urban land and real estate 
assets. Both real estate developers and investors are often represented as seeking 
fast returns from investment decisions, lacking an ethical concern with the impacts 
their development may have on broader public interests and/ or the sustainability 
of places and communities. Since the beginning of the twenty- first century, writ-
ings on financialisation of the city have reinforced some of these inscriptions and it 
is an approach that stands in stark contrast to studies of social movements and non- 
governmental organisations, many of which highlight the variegated and place- 
specific nature of organisational structures and outlooks. Part of this explanation 
arises from the globalisation and/ or internationalisation of the real estate sector 
and a degree of convergence and monopolistic behaviour between firms (Theurillat 
et  al. 2015). Simplifications are especially evident in planning documents and 
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policy frameworks, with Adams et  al. showing that planning frameworks often 
‘reveal only scant awareness of both the structure of the development industry and 
the varied characteristics of individual developers’ (2012, 2593; see also Campbell 
et al. 2014). Too often plans are built on simple assumptions about the practices of 
private firms, their outlooks, their ethical frameworks and their views of planning 
and regulation (see Imrie 2010).
There is only a basic understanding of the internal structures of investment 
and development companies, the tensions that exist between different types of 
private sector institutions, the greater importance given to knowledge production 
within the private sector, and the reflexive nature of actor subjectivities, networks, 
systems and practices. Ownership structures and models also vary, along with 
managerial practices and systems, firm traditions and outlooks towards investment 
ethics and attitudes to sustainable urbanism. This knowledge gap, the chapter 
argues, has under- researched implications for both the effectiveness of planning 
interventions and understandings of the types of investment that are now shap-
ing London’s built environments. Such knowledge gaps are becoming ever more 
significant as, under conditions of contemporary globalisation, we are also seeing 
the emergence of new investment landscapes underpinned by a plurality of insti-
tutions and actors. Projects are now funded by complex investment vehicles with 
finance sourced through foundations, charities or even public sector authorities 
(including local governments and quangos) and representing non- traditional real 
estate investors. Neither developers nor investors can be easily defined or catego-
rised, due to their diverse strategies, motivations, scale, size and capital structures.
The previous section emphasised how the perceptions of complex real 
estate actors are limited in planning and (to an extent) urban studies literature. 
Relatively little attention is paid to the institutional organisation of the sector and/ 
or the extent to which the real estate processes of developing and investing possess 
specific difficulties and challenges vis- à- vis other forms of investment. Property 
trading is also a resource- and capital- intensive process when compared with, for 
instance, the buying and selling of stocks and shares. Development itself is also 
inelastic in the short term, requiring a highly regulated and lengthy production 
process, and its position as an asset is always shifting in terms of governance land-
scapes. As Baum and Hartzell (2012) note, direct property as an investment asset 
is relatively illiquid, entirely heterogenic and fixed to a location, making it difficult 
to diversify without the invention of financial vectors and innovations, combined 
with significant amounts of capital. The high degree of ‘spatial fixity’ in real estate 
assets means that investments are particularly place dependent and vulnerable to 
market shifts that are outside the control of site owners, encapsulating both sys-
tematic and specific types of risk.
However, how this is manifest and expressed is contingent on the investor’s 
perception of risk as well as the particular real estate asset being considered, and 
it is reflected through its specific physical characteristics, its security of income 
and wider economic influences (such as interest rates). For example, large- scale 
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residential investment was often seen as an unattractive real estate proposition in 
the UK market; however, with the emergence of the niche student accommodation 
sector and built- to- rent markets, institutional investors are becoming increasingly 
interested in diversifying into the housing market due to attractive longer- term 
returns and the opportunity to concentrate capital. All real estate is a constantly 
deteriorating asset that needs to be maintained, again creating longer- term uncer-
tainties and risks (Graham and Thrift 2007) which need to be managed by inves-
tors. Data within the real estate market is always seen as weakly developed in 
comparison with other investment fields (such as the stock market), but informa-
tion accuracy and accessibility continues to improve in mature markets. Irrespective 
of the challenges associated with direct property as an asset generally, investment 
and development continue to boom in London as there are clear benefits to being 
an active presence within the city’s real estate market. As well as being perceived as 
a ‘safe haven’ for capital (Fernandez et al. 2016), offering attractive and consistent 
returns to investors, London is also the most transparent city market globally (JLL 
2018a), with knowledge- rich, networked actors contributing to improving liquid-
ity through efficient transaction and brokerage processes (Devaney et al. 2017).
Investment landscapes themselves are also becoming increasingly complex 
with the emergence of new investment players, including public sector actors and 
new types of investment funds, adding to market uncertainties and complexities. 
Some English local authorities, for instance, are now major property speculators and 
investors, as are publicly owned organisations with land assets such as Transport 
for London (TfL) and Network Rail (Findeisen 2016). The Global Financial Crisis of 
2008 has also led to a wide- scale restructuring of the sector itself and the growth in 
importance of international hedge funds. In many instances there has been greater 
specialisation within the property sector and the emergence of clear distinctions 
between housebuilder developers, commercial property developers, landowners 
of different types and multiple forms of investor. As Beauregard notes, these spe-
cialised sectors possess ‘different micro- logics’ (2005, 2431), with authors such as 
Coiacetto (2001) identifying six types of firm: passive local  property-owning devel-
opers, ‘means to a mission’ developers, specialised client developers, showpiece 
developers, value- adding opportunity developers and, finally, eye on the street 
builder- developers. To these (and more non- traditional investors) we can add spe-
cialist real estate investors and actors, such as listed Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
unlisted private equity funds, property investment companies, Property Authorised 
Investment Funds (PAIFs), Property Unit Trusts, family offices, Sovereign Wealth 
Funds and pension funds. There is significant granularity within the real estate 
investment and development sectors; however, this is underpinned by institutional 
processes which reflect spatially and temporally concentrated relations of net-
worked knowledge, connections and interpretations actively shaping the increas-
ingly international London market.
Both the London and Toronto markets can be viewed as a constellation of 
systems which broadly reflect ‘interaction characterized by a specific institutional 
Crit iCAL DiALoguES of urBAN govErNANCE ,  DEvELopMENt AND ACtiv iSM28
framework, that is, by a set of rules defining certain restrictions on the behaviour of 
market participants’ (Vanberg 1986, 75), as defined by the planning and regulatory 
systems as well as the motivations of market actors themselves. Such ‘rules of the 
game’ are reflected through a response ‘or action of some prevalence and perma-
nence, which is embedded in the habits of a group’ (Hamilton 1932, 84) and can-
not be viewed from a purely economic or one- dimensional perspective. Although 
institutional behaviour and expert knowledge can become both established and 
embedded as market functions are fulfilled within the realms of the law, the ‘rules 
of the game’ through which such processes are expressed are nuanced, dynamic 
and particular to real estate (be it commercial, residential or infrastructure assets). 
The behaviour of networked real estate market actors, although habitual and 
locally embedded, is not static and is central to the emergence of these complex 
new investment landscapes, contingent on governance mechanisms and planning 
systems in global cities. Within the UK there is an apparent and potentially ever- 
increasing disconnect between the complex embedded knowledge, strategic sub-
jectivities and dynamic market processes guiding real estate investor/developer 
decision- making, and current policy and planning frameworks.
Capital flows in London: Embedded knowledge, challenges 
and market trends
Recent decades have seen ever increasing flows of capital into London’s com-
mercial real estate markets, as both domestic and international actors seek to 
capitalise on property investment and development opportunities across such 
an internationalised, highly desirable global market. Transaction volumes were 
up 14 per cent in London year- on- year in 2018 to $36.3 billion, and the city was 
the largest recipient of cross- border investment globally (JLL 2018b). Within the 
commercial and residential real estate market, private service providers (such as 
real estate agents, valuers and planners working for JLL, CBRE and Cushman & 
Wakefield) have become increasingly important in terms of the diverse skill sets 
they offer and have concomitantly become globalised (De Magalhães 2001). In 
addition to increased transparency and improved brokerage practices globally, 
there are ‘more robust and better- governed investment platforms covering most of 
the world’s real estate markets’ (Aussant et al. 2014, 3). Such platforms are medi-
ated not just by the investors, developers and policy- makers, but also by those 
with specialist local knowledge working within private sector providers who con-
tribute to the creation, interpretation and perpetuation of institutional processes 
and networks.
The professional companies that support the investment and divestment of 
domestic and international capital into and out of London can be considered to be a 
type of institution themselves and are part of a global network which enables actors 
to ‘move capital through the built environment, articulating arguments for its free 
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dampened by the political uncertainty due to Brexit, the commercial real estate 
sector within London remains resilient and relatively buoyant, reinforcing the per-
spective of London as a safe haven and one of the key global markets, as investment 
opportunities are still sought constantly. As previously mentioned, post- 2008 the 
residential/housing sector within the UK has become a much more attractive prop-
osition, not just to smaller retail investors but also to global institutions that have 
turned their attention to purchasing housing and entering the private rented sec-
tor (PRS). Although the UK has historically embraced owner- occupation of hous-
ing, the growth of institutional and international investors ploughing capital into 
new residential development and investment opportunities, coupled with the costs 
to buyers of accessing mortgage finance, limited supply pipelines and the decline 
of socially provided housing, has resulted in the emergence of ‘generation rent’, 
which further exacerbates the ongoing housing crisis of affordability in the capi-
tal (Minton 2017; Edwards 2016; Beswick et al. 2016; Whitehead and Williams 
2011; see Chapter 10 by Gabrieli for more on London and Chapter 9 by Walks for 
a Toronto perspective).
As of 2018, the house price index (HPI), which relates the median house price 
to gross annual resident-based earnings, sat at 18.43 in the London local author-
ity of Camden, 33.44 in Westminster and 14.88 in Wandsworth (ONS 2018). This 
cannot remotely compare to an average HPI in England of 8.0 (ONS 2018), and 
although house prices showed signs of declining or stabilising in 2019–20, rents 
are rising (GLA 2019). Global investors, especially those at smaller- scale level, are 
often perceived negatively as dominant networked elites, with London’s residential 
sector in particular ‘being made for money, and the monied’ (Atkinson et al. 2017, 
2443). However, less critique has been levied at the institutional investment flows 
into housing in the city’s PRS market (e.g. Sigma Capital, M&G, Legal & General), 
although Gallent (2019) argues that the fixing of both institutional and smaller- 
scale capital into London’s residential markets has been fostered by the withdrawal 
of the state from housing production and the deregulation of the market. This 
chapter argues that it is the latter and other governance mechanisms, coupled 
with the misunderstanding of the complexities of real estate processes within the 
planning and policy frameworks, which creates systematic ambiguities between 
market actors who are actively mediating the urban landscape across the capital. 
How such ambiguities and disconnects find expression in London is explored in the 
following section.
Contemporary governmental imaginations and the realities of 
real estate in London: Narratives and the politics of crisis
From a planning perspective, the lack of available housing to buy and rent in 
London and the city’s affordability crisis have become the most significant issues 
facing the mayor and the 32 local boroughs. The victory in the 2016 mayoral 
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election of Labour’s Sadiq Khan was in part down to his proposals to tackle the 
city’s housing problems and to challenge the perceived hegemony of international 
investors and developers. As he claimed during his campaign:
There is no point in building homes if they are bought by investors in the 
Middle East and Asia … I don’t want homes being left empty. I don’t want 
us to be the world’s capital for money laundering. I want to give first dibs to 
Londoners. (Khan 2016, 1)
Such statements set a clear tone for ‘Londoners’ and against international investors 
shoring up their capital in the city’s residential market. This prioritising of London 
residents has been institutionalised through new arrangements and partnership 
agreements that include larger- scale housebuilders, such as Berkeley Homes and 
other major builders and housing associations. Under the agreement, London and 
UK residents have first option to purchase homes under £350,000, at the lower end 
of the market (however, whether this is affordable considering current levels of the 
HPI remains questionable). Housebuilders have agreed not to market their proper-
ties internationally or sell them to non- UK residents for three months after comple-
tion (Mayor of London 2018b). Although such steps can be construed as a clear 
and constructive effort to influence the market- led housing market, even without 
international marketing the capacity of global real estate investors to operation-
alise the complex vehicles and channels available to them to ensure purchase of 
assets cannot be underestimated.
The complexities of investment structures, which can potentially provide 
alternative routes to investment, could still meet the criteria of the mayor and the 
housebuilders depending on their form and structure. Indeed, the mayor’s criti-
cisms raise not insubstantial concerns about market transparency, especially in 
relation to foreign buyers, and he goes further, as the rhetoric and tone of planning 
politics has become hostile to major developers, particularly international develop-
ers and investors:
44% of all the UK properties owned by overseas registered companies are 
located in London … [the mayor] has long believed the legal and beneficial 
ownership of companies and other entities that own UK property should be 
more transparent, to help prevent offences such as tax evasion, theft and ter-
rorist activities … (Khan 2018, 1)
There is a clear territorial narrative that makes simple connections between inter-
national developers and investors through overseas-registered companies and 
these illegal practices. International investors, rather than domestic regulations, 
are being blamed for the fact that ‘Londoners born and raised in our great capi-
tal have struggled to rent and stood little or no chance of owning a home in their 
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own city’ (Khan 2017, 1). Housing in this context is presented as a right that it is 
the planning system’s obligation to meet (Madden and Marcuse 2017), but one 
which is being restrained due to the presence and potentially dubious activities of 
international investors, even if those investors are acting within the realms of the 
law and in response to the deregulated, market- led system of governance in the 
UK. Ambiguities emerge in interpreting the current crisis and where the apparent 
liability for such a crisis lies.
These ambiguities are reinforced through a set of additional simplifications 
over the size of firms and how the promotion of more diversity would make a differ-
ence to the form and character of residential development in London. It is claimed 
that building is too concentrated in the hands of a small number of larger firms. 
A  number of piecemeal approaches have been proposed; for example, under a 
‘Small Sites Small Builders’ programme the mayor is prioritising development on 
10 small sites owned by TfL with the aim of completing only 111 homes (Mayor 
of London 2018c), a tiny impact on the proposed target of 65,000 new homes 
per year.
Reductions in local government finance mean that the mayor, as with local 
governments across England, is increasingly reliant on business rates drawn from 
the commercial real estate sector and other forms of finance to generate revenue. 
One initiative, launched in February 2018, saw the mayor negotiating an arrange-
ment with central government under which 100 per cent of the growth of business 
rates would be allocated to the Greater London Authority, raising an additional 
£114 million. It was announced that this would help underpin a £140 million invest-
ment programme to boost London’s economy. The scheme has a particular focus on 
support for a diversity of uses and acknowledges the continual erosion of spaces 
for small businesses and ‘alternative’ activities in the wake of recent development 
projects, a direct critique of the impacts of projects by large developers on the city 
and its residents (Mayor of London 2018a). While such initiatives clearly depend 
on the generation of more activity, they also represent an attempt to establish some 
autonomy and develop planning agendas for a broader range of needs and interests.
The mayor has been promoting greater liberalisation of planning to allow for 
an expansion of supply, an agenda that mirrors that of major housebuilders in the 
city. At the same time, after coming to power, the mayor also claimed that planning 
rules that prevented development were a significant barrier to new development 
and pledged that he would be:
ripping up existing planning rules and calling on homebuilders to develop 
sites at higher housing densities to substantially increase capacity in the capi-
tal. … the Mayor has set out how he will ask homebuilders to maximise the 
use of valuable land in the city – and that means developing sites with more 
homes on them than existing developments nearby that would have had to 
follow previous guidelines. (Mayor of London 2017a)
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While such plans impose additional demands on developers, the call for increased 
densities and more flexibility in design reflects the broader dependence of the 
public sector on market- led forms of planning gain and value capture, while also 
increasing opportunities for profit maximisation by developers (for more on den-
sification in London’s housing market see Chapter 12 by Short and Livingstone). 
Therefore, in some respects, the needs of the market, and private actors within 
it, are being equated with the needs of the public sector and to an extent can be 
considered mutually beneficial. But at the same time as there is something of a 
reification of the ‘diversity’ of the private sector and actors within it (even in the 
light of the negative connotations discussed earlier), the form and character of an 
entrepreneurial planning system structurally privileges the role and resources of 
major developers through four key dynamics.
Firstly, planning arrangements are systematically seeking out the develop-
ment of major sites as the basis for tackling the housing crisis and boosting supply. 
This focus, in turn, privileges those developers and investors with the resources to 
bring complex and large- scale sites to fruition. The mayor’s transport agency, TfL, 
for instance, has launched a Property Partnerships Framework that has brought 
into the pipeline six major development sites, all to be delivered by major house-
builders. The construction of the major cross- London Crossrail project provides 
sites for 12 ‘major property developments over and around the new stations along 
the railway and other key locations’ (TfL 2016, 1). Francis Salway, Chairman of 
TfL’s Commercial Development Advisory Group, has pointed out that ‘TfL has 
some of the best assets in London and over the coming years we will be working 
together with these developers to ensure that we are delivering for Londoners’ 
(TfL  2016,  1). TfL is now an active player in the ‘identification of development 
opportunities’ and has submitted some of London’s largest planning applications 
in partnership with international investors and housebuilders for major sites such 
as Nine Elms, Northwood and Parsons Green. As TfL (2016, 1) states:
it is anticipated that the three sites will generate over £100m for reinvest-
ment in London’s transport network as well as delivering more than 600 new 
homes, a new step- free London Underground station at Northwood, new 
workspaces, retail units and high- quality public spaces. The three sites will 
also support the creation of more than 500 new jobs.
While promoting new arrangements for smaller firms and developers, the biggest 
projects are being implemented through partnerships with large developers, as 
listed in Table 1.1.
Secondly, this drive to develop partnerships with major national and inter-
national firms is de facto, if not de jure, reinforced by the weight of the LP’s obliga-
tions on real estate developers. Applicants will only be granted planning permission 
for their proposals if they contribute directly to a growing array of planning objec-
tives – in line with the broader restructuring of the planning system towards entre-
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particularly in fields such as education and training or investments in the crea-
tion of new urban spaces, would traditionally be undertaken by public agencies. 
Instead, under austerity cuts and planning gain- led arrangements, it is anticipated 
that developers and their funders will meet these objectives on behalf of the state. 
For instance, the LP calls on local boroughs ‘to investigate with developers the pos-
sibility of providing local businesses and residents the opportunity to apply for 
employment during the construction of developments and in the resultant end use’ 
(GLA 2018, 173). In relation to public transport, ‘appropriate developer contri-
butions are also needed to deliver public transport improvements to support the 
Table 1.1 Firms signed up as TfL property development partners
Balfour Beatty PLC
Barratt Development PLC/London and Quadrant Housing Association 
(Consortium)
Berkeley Group PLC
The British Land Company PLC
Canary Wharf Group PLC
Capital and Counties PLC
U+I/ Notting Hill Housing Group (Consortium)
Land Securities Group PLC
Mace Ltd/ Peabody Trust/ DV4 Ltd (Consortium)
Mount Anvil Group Ltd/ Hyde Housing Association Ltd
Redrow Homes Ltd
Stanhope PLC/ Mitsui Fudosan Company Ltd
Taylor Wimpey UK Ltd
Source: TfL (2016)
Table 1.2 Key planning objectives that proposals must meet in the London Plan
• Public transport improvements
• Enhancements to public places
• Mixed- use developments and affordable housing
• Sustainable development programmes for Opportunity Areas
• Heritage planning
• Training and skills development
• Urban greening
• Noise reduction and the building of quality infrastructure
• Primary care infrastructure
• Helping to tackle climate change
Source: Information synthesised from GLA (2018)
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proposed intensification of residential use’ (GLA 2018, 358). The implication, as 
with the more ambitious planning projects across the city, is that larger (possibly 
international) developers and investors who possess the expertise, knowledge and 
financial resources to meet these obligations will be in a stronger position to obtain 
planning permission than the ‘smaller’ and ‘more diverse’ firms that the LP and the 
mayor ostensibly want to support and nurture.
Thirdly, there is relatively little understanding given in the new planning 
frameworks of the differentiations within and between different types of house-
builder, investor and developer and this also counts against smaller firms. Unnamed 
and ill- defined ‘institutional investors’ and ‘greater institutional involvement’ will 
help to solve shortages of rented property in the city as they will bring ‘more profes-
sional and less fragmented management, greater stability, high quality standards 
and, potentially, longer term rental periods and affordable homes for rent’, thereby 
helping to create more stable neighbourhoods across the city (Mayor of London 
2018, 115). Real estate developers and landowners are expected to ‘partner’ with 
local authorities to protect town centres across London and ensure that any pro-
posals they submit are ‘closely integrated with investment in supporting social, 
environmental and physical infrastructure’ (GLA 2018, 75). At the same time as 
mainstream housing developers are criticised in public and political discourse, the 
DLP makes it clear that major companies are the only ones able to help the mayor 
meet objectives such as the provision of residential environments for older resi-
dents, and planners are required to ‘encourage mainstream housing developers to 
extend their product range to meet specialist needs’ (GLA 2018, 112). It is antici-
pated that smaller developers will be unable to deliver on these social objectives to 
the same extent.
Most significantly in the context of London’s housing crisis, the LP and the 
London Housing Strategy see real estate developers as key to delivering social and 
affordable housing and suggest they must ‘provide development appraisals to dem-
onstrate that each scheme provides the maximum reasonable amount of affordable 
housing output’ (GLA 2018, 123). It is in relation to housing that some of the ambi-
guities are at their most evident. Underpinning the mayor’s reforms is a critical 
challenge to the private sector to build more housing units that will help meet the 
city’s crisis of affordability. The focus is mainly on the category of ‘developers’, with 
occasional references to a more generic group termed the ‘development industry’ 
and ‘landowners’, although it is not always clear if these are the same institutions 
or what their capacities might be to meet extra planning obligations. The Housing 
Special Planning Guidance (Mayor of London 2017b, 20) warns developers that
the requirement to deliver investment in other infrastructure will generally 
be set out in the development plan, relevant planning frameworks and CIL 
[Community Infrastructure Levy (London)] charging schedules. It should 
be taken into account by the applicant and the land owner, and should not 
 necessarily lead to a reduction in affordable housing. 
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However, the mechanisms through which to meet these multiple priorities remain 
ill- defined.
Yet at the same time, the requirement to deliver development and for this 
to be implemented by private companies is structurally inscribed into the city’s 
planning frameworks. The plans expose the financial weaknesses on the part of 
state institutions – and how they are structurally dependent on the resources and 
practices of private companies – yet they show little awareness or understanding 
of how private companies operate, what their priorities are, or their capacities to 
deliver financial resources to public projects and budgets. There is a constant ten-
sion between the mayor’s threat to ‘call in’ and challenge development proposals 
if he is ‘not satisfied with the viability information submitted by the applicant, the 
assumptions that underpin the information, or the level of scrutiny given by the 
local planning authority’ (Mayor of London 2017b, 12), and the political reality 
that in order to deliver on election pledges, too many of these challenges might 
result in fewer successful applications and a clear public governance failure.
The fourth dimension of the representations made of private firms is that 
they are perceived to be economic agents responding to economic incentives and 
priorities. Firms are not viewed as reflexive social organisations or as a differenti-
ated sector. Thus there is a tension between, on the one hand, seeing developers 
as ‘co- producers’ of the urban landscape who are willing and ready to use their 
resources to contribute to planning objectives and (indirectly) defined public 
interests, while on the other hand opening up opportunities for them to ‘fast- track’ 
investments to generate profits and giving ‘good developers’ the opportunity to 
limit obligations if they meet their housing targets (of 35 per cent affordable hous-
ing). If they are unwilling to contribute to broader policy objectives, then it is 
unclear how they will be policed given the reliance on market dynamics to deliver 
on policy objectives.
Conclusions
Future research on urban planning should focus less attention on the stated inten-
tions, aims and objectives of public policy fields, and give more weight to the analy-
sis of the frames of reference and types of knowledge that shape governmental 
imaginations and perspectives. Regulatory structures in cities such as London are, 
in part, built on these imaginations and specific understandings of how social and 
economic processes operate. Yet there is little evidence that policy- makers and regu-
lators understand the institutional structures that shape real estate development 
and investment practices, and such lack of understanding has emerged as one of the 
key weaknesses of a market- led system. Deregulation in the UK market has encour-
aged global capital flows into the London real estate market, which is a dynamic 
and constantly evolving network of actors and vehicles producing knowledge in a 
complex system.
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However, this burgeoning knowledge is not sufficiently integrated into gov-
ernance, planning and regulatory framings, which are slow to understand and pro-
cess real estate market knowledge even though there is an opportunity for greater 
connectivity between the public and private sectors to foster positive outcomes for 
the city. Rather than viewing the actions of real estate investors and developers 
with scepticism laced with purely economic assumptions, the planning system in 
particular could improve its functionality by facilitating burgeoning and positive 
relationships between public and private sector actors, so that actors have both 
abstract knowledge and concrete connections to the processes at play in London’s 
markets: market actors should strive to learn each other’s ‘rules of the game’. Such 
efforts could be developed in other global cities, considering the significant flows of 
capital into real estate assets across the world. International developers and inves-
tors cannot and should not be considered as separate entities to local or national 
actors, due to the blurred lines between definitions of ‘overseas’ and ‘domestic’, as 
our understandings move towards eradicating notions that may demonise interna-
tional actors. Efforts to ‘incentivise’ the right types of activity or to generate differ-
ent forms of subjectivity among investors and developers need to be founded on a 
broader and deeper knowledge base and a recognition of the types of diversity that 
exist across the real estate sector. Regulatory powers and interventions would be 
significantly strengthened by a deeper understanding of the role that property, land 
use and other assets play in the portfolios of different types of investment actor.
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The elusive, inclusive city: Toronto at 
a crossroads
Shauna Brail and tara vinodrai
Introduction
We have entered an urban era where the combination of heightened concentra-
tion of innovation- based economic activity and best- practice urbanism is leading 
to increasingly polarised and unequal cities, especially within global cities. This 
relatively small number of globally oriented, so- called superstar cities benefit dis-
proportionately from employment and income growth when measured against 
national counterparts (Sassen 2001; Manyika et  al. 2018; Kemeny and Storper 
2020). However, within global cities, the clustering effects that drive growth are 
also leading to deep intra- urban inequality and do not benefit all workers equally 
(Marcuse and van Kempen 2000; Brenner and Keil 2006; Lee and Clarke 2019). 
By examining an emerging urban narrative in which a growing number of thriv-
ing, economically vibrant cities are experiencing dual, connected challenges that 
align economic growth with socio- economic and spatial polarisation, this chapter 
explores the urban dynamics characteristic of prominent cities in the early twenty- 
first century.
Emblematic of twenty- first- century urbanism, global cities in advanced 
economies face significant challenges. In these cities, a lack of affordable housing, 
growth in homelessness and food insecurity, poor transit access for low- income 
residents and weak employment prospects particularly for racialised groups exist 
side by side with prominent city centres characterised by expansive real estate 
valuations, investments in downtown properties and even entire neighbourhoods 
by multinational firms, and a rising concentration of wealthy households. This 
form of winner- take- all urbanism presents serious challenges for civic and business 
leaders, politicians and community activists who care deeply about the prospects 
for inclusive city building. Toronto and London are no exception, and these cit-
ies face similar challenges and opportunities (cf. Sassen 2001; Walks 2001, 2011; 
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poverty in outer London are in deep contrast to economic development  strategies 
that prioritise investment attraction to central London. Likewise in Toronto, 
income inequality is expressed geographically. This is particularly acute in the City 
of Toronto, with high- income neighbourhoods closer to the core and transit corri-
dors surrounded by middle- and low- income neighbourhoods (Hulchanski 2015). 
Over time, the middle- income portions of the city have shrunk, while the high- 
income areas concentrated in the urban core and close to the subway have grown, 
as have the low- income areas in which access to transport, employment and life 
opportunities is limited (see map in Figure 2.1). The disparities between wealth 
and poverty in Toronto have continued to grow over the past several decades and 
threaten the city’s and the region’s future.
A long- standing literature on global cities identifies the challenges of multi-
national investment and the pursuit of economic competitiveness (see Sassen 
2001; Marcuse and van Kempen 2000; Brenner and Keil 2006; Boudreau et  al. 
2009). More recently, observers have articulated concerns that the urban inequali-
ties identified in places such as London and Toronto are heightened in an era of 
tech- based urban development, driven by the investments and activities of global 
technology firms (Florida 2018; Zukin 2019). Indeed, as Berridge (2019, 141) 
notes, ‘global digital companies are now major forces in the modern city, and cit-
ies have not figured out how to deal with them’. These firms, including Amazon, 
Apple, Facebook and Google, have extraordinary market valuations that enable 
real estate dominance wherever they choose to invest (Langley and Leyshon 2017). 
Therefore, technology firms in particular have an impact on urban land use and 
Figure 2.1 Neighbourhood income change: City of Toronto, 2015 vs 1970 
(Hulchanski 2017)
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exclusion. Zukin (2019) identifies the phenomenon of the ‘urban tech landscape’ – 
an environment in which the physical presence of technology firms in world cit-
ies is increasingly evident. While such tech investment generates benefits to cities, 
there are also disadvantages, which accrue unevenly to local residents in the reor-
dering of urban space associated with the expansion of multinational technology 
firms. Juxtaposing the reality of oftentimes unrealised economic development 
promises associated with large- scale tech investment against the displacement of 
low- income and racialised populations in urban spaces, Zukin (2019) laments the 
lack of equity and sharing of local benefits from the growth of global tech firms (see 
also Ash et al. 2019; Grisdale 2019).
As cities such as Toronto and London become increasingly desirable places in 
which to invest, live, work, learn and play, this chapter examines whether there are 
public policies and collaborative strategies that can better address unequal urban 
outcomes. To do so, this chapter explores the potential for inclusive development 
in Toronto at a time when growth and investment in the city may be exacerbating 
inequality and increasing socio- economic divides. The chapter identifies initiatives 
that address inclusion, broadly defined as any initiative that reduces barriers to 
access or attempts to make opportunities available to a wider population, espe-
cially those in marginalised groups. Initiatives related to housing, transport and 
economic development are examined vis- à- vis their capacity and potential to result 
in a city that is both thriving and inclusive. None of these efforts are led by munici-
pal government alone. Rather, and as is increasingly common, the role of partner-
ships among government, civil society and industry feature prominently in efforts 
to address each challenge.
Toronto: Canada’s largest city
As Canada’s largest city and metropolitan region,1 Toronto plays an important role 
in the national economy and acts as a global financial hub. Toronto houses the 
Toronto Stock Exchange and has the largest concentration of lenders and finan-
cial headquarters in the country, including all the major Canadian banks. It is the 
second largest financial centre in North America, and, with almost 275,000 work-
ers, it has a higher proportion of employment in the financial services industry 
than other global financial epicentres such as London and New York (Edenhoffer 
2018) and the sector has grown faster than in other global financial hubs, with 
the exception of Shanghai and Beijing (Edenhoffer 2018). Data on gross domestic 
product (GDP), investment attraction and jobs underscore Toronto’s position in the 
Canadian economy. In 2013, Toronto’s census metropolitan area (CMA) contrib-
uted nearly one- fifth (18.6 per cent) of Canada’s GDP (Statistics Canada 2017b). 
Between 2015 and 2018, firms located in the Toronto region received just over 
$3.5 billion in venture capital investment, making it the highest-ranked Canadian 
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119 deals amounting to $1.4 billion (CVCA 2019). Toronto is also the employment 
capital of the country, with approximately 18 per cent of all Canadian jobs located 
in Toronto.
Economic activity, including activity related to the global financial industry, 
is highly concentrated in the downtown core of the city proper, which accounts 
for just 3 per cent of the city’s land area yet represents one- third of the city’s jobs, 
one- quarter of the tax base and is also home to 240,000 residents (City of Toronto 
2014a). The concentration of population and economic activity in a small area 
within the regional economy means that planners and city builders are challenged 
to find appropriate local policies, including land use policy and zoning, that bal-
ance economic growth and development goals alongside provisions that ensure 
housing affordability and broader liveability and social inclusion. Such interven-
tions are made more challenging, since local- level decision- making is constrained 
by senior levels of government. Notably, provincial governments in Canada have 
the authority to override municipal powers.
A diverse regional economy
The Toronto regional economy is highly diversified. After the end of the Second 
World War, the region established itself as a major manufacturing hub and subse-
quently evolved to become a centre for high- order business and financial services, 
as well as a dynamic hub for cultural and creative industries, advanced manu-
facturing, the tech sector and other research- intensive activities. This economic 
diversity has helped the city weather economic shocks and downturns over time 
(Bourne et al. 2011; Wolfe and Bramwell 2016).
While the Toronto regional economy is diverse, the region has developed a 
number of strong sectoral specialisations. The City of Toronto’s economic devel-
opment plans and strategies have consistently identified a series of globally com-
petitive high- value economic sectors that are important drivers of growth and 
innovation. These include: biotechnology; culture; design; education and training; 
film and digital media; financial services; food and beverage; green/ renewable 
energy; information and communications technology (ICT); and professional and 
business services (City of Toronto 2013).
The dynamism of Toronto’s industrial clusters can be measured quantita-
tively. Figure  2.2 shows the relative economic performance of selected clusters 
in the Toronto CMA by measuring specialisation (location quotient, or LQ, on the 
x- axis), 10- year compound annual employment growth rates (y- axis) and employ-
ment (the size of each point).2 Figure 2.2 emphasises the growing importance of 
activities related to high- order business services and the creative economy. The 
clusters located in the top right quadrant have high levels of specialisation (LQs 
greater than 1) and positive compound annual employment growth rates between 
2006 and 2016. Clusters that are growing include those related to the construction, 
higher education, ICT services, food and beverage, business services, biomedical 
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and life sciences, creative and cultural, and finance industries. Indeed, growth in 
the finance industry, which accounts for 8.3 per cent of Toronto’s employment and 
13.6 per cent of Toronto’s GDP (Edenhoffer 2018), underscores Toronto’s position 
as a global hub. In contrast, clusters located in the bottom right quadrant, while 
demonstrating regional specialisation (LQs greater than 1), have negative growth 
rates, meaning that employment declined between 2006 and 2016. These include 
clusters related to the automotive, plastics and rubber, textiles, ICT manufactur-
ing and logistics industries. With the exception of logistics, these industries reflect 
the traditional and legacy industries that have historically been an important part 
of Toronto’s economic base. While the logistics cluster continues to be important 
since Toronto acts as a key distribution centre for the broader region, it is possible 
that employment decline is related to automation in these industries.
While exploring the intra- regional geography of these activities in the Toronto 
region, Blais (2018) corroborates these patterns, showing the hyper- concentration 
and growth of economic activity in the downtown area, especially in knowledge- 
and design- intensive industries. Downtown Toronto contains concentrations of 
financial services firms, healthcare and educational institutions, government, 
retail, and arts and cultural activities (City of Toronto 2014b).
This sectoral and spatial distribution of jobs is influenced and supported by 
both the city’s economic development strategy and city policy on employment lands. 
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land, the separation of incompatible uses in a way that protects employment areas 
and the development of higher- density office uses in proximity to public transit 
infrastructure, and it supports the growth of retail and institutional land uses serv-
ing the regional population (Blais 2018; City of Toronto 2018).
Within the Toronto region, policy related to the development and pres-
ervation of employment lands remains a contentious issue tied to shifts in the 
 structure of the regional economy and desires to increase the supply of housing. 
Given that the proportion of manufacturing activity in the city has declined and 
that the remaining manufacturing activities are ‘cleaner’ and less noxious, there 
is a sense that many employment uses in areas zoned for manufacturing do not 
require full separation from other types of land uses. Thus, there are calls for the 
city to relax employment lands zoning policies to enable or encourage greater 
opportunities for mixed- use redevelopment, including housing, in these areas. 
Proposed shifts in land use policy are connected not only to economic change and 
employment restructuring, but also contribute to addressing the city’s housing 
affordability challenges that are tied to housing supply, and the desire to better 
utilise transport infrastructure, especially public transit (Boudreau et al. 2009; 
Greenberg 2017).
The desire to convert employment lands raises tensions. City planners are 
tasked with ensuring that the city has sufficient land designated for a diversity 
of employment types over the long term. Making physical changes to the urban 
landscape can be slow due to the local planning process, and also such changes 
have permanence. Decisions to reduce employment capacity by changing land 
use designations can have detrimental long- term impacts. It is difficult to imagine 
how land rezoned to residential or mixed use could be returned to manufacturing 
uses in a timely manner, should economic restructuring necessitate different and 
unplanned land uses. Nevertheless, there was almost a 10 per cent reduction in the 
proportion of land zoned exclusively for employment between 2006 and 2018 in 
Toronto (Dingman 2018). Moreover, city planners assume that designating land 
for mixed use will result in a mix of housing types, prices and social characteristics. 
However, recent evidence in Toronto suggests that these lands are more likely to 
be converted to owner- occupied condos targeted at a narrow demographic (Rosen 
and Walks 2014)  and that mixed use may not lead to greater access across the 
income spectrum (Moos et al. 2018). As the city’s population continues to grow 
alongside shifts in industry, the subject of protecting employment lands exclusively 
for industry is likely to persist.
A global tech ‘superstar’ city?
Toronto has long been home to a concentration (or cluster) of ICT firms; Toronto’s 
ICT cluster is consistently identified as one of the largest in North America (Denney 
et al. 2018). While defining the tech industry can be challenging, recent estimates 
suggest that Toronto’s tech labour force accounts for over 400,000 jobs (Tech 
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Toronto 2016). This concentration of tech- based activity can be attributed to a 
variety of factors, including the large talent base generated by publicly funded uni-
versities and colleges, other public investments in knowledge infrastructure and 
the presence of a number of anchor firms and other institutions (Wolfe 2018; CBRE 
2018b).
Tech sector employment and investment is also on the rise. Toronto has 
been identified as the fastest-growing tech market in both 2017 and 2018, adding 
28,900 jobs in 2017 (CBRE 2018a). There are both venture capital- based invest-
ments in start- up firms and inbound investment from major global players. For 
example, ride- hailing firm Uber has made the city a key site of investment and 
employment in its global network (Brail 2020). In 2017, Sidewalk Labs (owned by 
Alphabet, the parent company of Google) was named the winning partner on a $1 
billion bid for a smart city development along Toronto’s waterfront; Amazon short- 
listed Toronto as one of 20 North American cities for a second headquarters (HQ2) 
site slated to employ 50,000 high- skilled workers and invest $5 billion in capital 
expenditures; and the launch of the Vector Institute, a $150 million partnership 
between the University of Toronto, federal and provincial governments and private 
corporations including Google and Shopify, highlighted Toronto’s role as a leading 
centre of artificial intelligence. While the Sidewalk Labs project was subsequently 
cancelled and Amazon did not select Toronto for HQ2, there were other substantial 
international tech investments in Toronto, including over $1.4 billion by Microsoft, 
Uber and Shopify (Sheppard 2018).
These recent tech investments have solidified Toronto’s position as a global 
technology hub, bringing additional investment, profile, jobs and talent to the 
region. Moreover, these investments coincide with the rapid development and 
expansion of the local tech start- up scene. There is evidence that some of these 
home- grown firms are becoming globally competitive and scaling in size (Denney 
et al. 2018). One challenge for locations benefiting from the investment and growth 
of global technology firms is the emergence of ‘techlash’, the backlash against 
 powerful technology firms. This has included growing frustration with large, multi-
national technology firms due to their influence on labour markets and a number of 
high- profile cases citing privacy breaches and unethical behaviour. This extends to 
how technology firms are shaping cities. Technology firms are increasingly choos-
ing central city locations. A US- based study found that start- ups prioritise locations 
in proximity to transit, regardless of their industry (Credit 2019). While the allure 
of the city is celebrated by some, the urban location preferences of technology 
firms along with above- average salaries for high- skilled workers are credited with 
driving up real estate prices, promoting gentrification and negatively impacting 
housing affordability (CBRE 2018b; Florida 2018; Grisdale 2019). This raises an 
important question regarding tech- led urban development: can cities benefit from 
the growth of firms and the ensuing investments in talent and place while also 
ensuring equitable, inclusive access to housing, transport and jobs for those who 
do not benefit directly from this growth and change?
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Challenges facing Canada’s largest city: inequality and governance
As the above discussion makes clear, Toronto has a dynamic regional economy 
and has been a beneficiary of the global shift towards a knowledge- based, 
cognitive- cultural economy. The City of Toronto’s primacy both regionally and 
nationally contributes to its increasing desirability as a place to live and work. 
However, this status as a desired location for businesses and talent is accom-
panied by challenges. The Toronto region continues to struggle with questions 
of equity, affordability, accessibility and how to share the benefits of the city- 
region’s success more broadly (Walks 2001, 2011; Boudreau et al. 2009; Bourne 
et al. 2011). And in turn, this situation has led to a housing affordability crisis 
that pushes people to make suboptimal housing decisions. The City of Toronto is 
the inequality capital of the country, its neighbourhoods are increasingly divided 
based on measures of income and race and the region’s transport infrastructure 
is inadequate. Moreover, inequality is deepening in the surrounding suburban 
municipalities in the region.
Addressing these challenges is by no means straightforward and they are 
compounded by existing urban and regional governance structures. The Toronto 
region is composed of many municipalities, each with its own government, elected 
city council and mayor. According to the Canadian constitution, written in 1867 
when the country was overwhelmingly rural, municipalities are considered ‘crea-
tures of the province’. Provincial governments have authority over essentially all 
elements of municipal power, including municipal boundaries, revenue tools and 
council size. New meaning was brought to this statement in 2018 when the pro-
vincial government introduced legislation to reduce the number of councillors 
in the City of Toronto from 44 to 25, in the midst of the 2018 municipal election 
campaign and without prior consultation. The lack of autonomy and inability to 
make decisions without the threat of being overridden by the provincial govern-
ment is one example of the fragmented environment in which decision- making 
and governance operates. Fragmentation and weak decision- making powers are 
compounded by the politics and challenges of cooperation and coordination across 
a large number of local governments in the region (Boudreau et al. 2009; Wolfe 
and Bramwell 2016). Various initiatives have evolved to work around these chal-
lenges, such as the creation of arm’s- length agencies or independent organisations 
dedicated to coordinating a particular dimension of urban development, such as 
investment attraction or newcomer workforce development.
The city proper has fewer financial constraints compared with other munici-
palities in the region due to the City of Toronto Act (2006). The Act allows the city to 
generate revenue through financial tools, such as vehicle registration or land trans-
fer taxes, yet these have been controversial and underutilised. For example, a vehi-
cle registration tax introduced in 2007 was cancelled in 2010 with a change in local 
government. The city’s inability or unwillingness to raise revenue beyond prop-
erty taxes creates additional barriers and limits in terms of amassing the financial 
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resources needed to, for example, provide sufficient, high- quality subsidised hous-
ing or provide economic and social supports to help integrate newcomers.
Overall, the Toronto city- region faces a serious conundrum. On the one hand, 
the city is a dynamic hotbed for innovation and economic development, attracting 
both highly skilled talent and investment. Yet these very activities are exacerbating 
underlying social issues and threaten the very foundations of this prosperity. These 
challenges are compounded by existing municipal finance structures, political 
choices and urban and regional governance structures. Herein lies the great chal-
lenge for Toronto: what policies and actions can governments and other stakehold-
ers implement to ensure that cities can be both economically vibrant and socially 
inclusive?
Questions about how best to address the wicked urban challenges associated 
with inequality are among the most vexing problems faced by municipal govern-
ments worldwide. It is commonly understood that governing a twenty- first- century 
city requires a rethinking of the role of government and the ways in which it oper-
ates. With this in mind, the remainder of the chapter examines urban experiments 
and pilot projects primarily located within the City of Toronto that offer potential 
solutions to address some of the most pressing questions related to inequality. This 
is not to suggest that pilots do not exist in the suburban communities in the rest of 
the Greater Toronto Area. We focus on initiatives that are well developed and that 
address issues that are congruent with the challenges faced by global cities else-
where. Initiatives in the realms of housing affordability, transport equity and eco-
nomic opportunity are highlighted to explore the possibility of a more inclusive city.
Piloting the possibilities for the inclusive city
Government, business and civic leaders in the Toronto region have experimented 
with mechanisms to address the very challenges that test the balance of prosper-
ity and inclusion. Despite complications associated with systems and structures of 
governance and seemingly rapid and threatening urban change, cities have dem-
onstrated an ability to respond to shifts relatively quickly, often through the use of 
pilot projects. Pilots (or trials) are an increasingly popular way for governments 
to test out whether and how an idea might work in practice, in a low- threat envi-
ronment. They can be limited in terms of geography, and also can have a limited 
period of time in which testing is conducted. Over the past decade, cities have 
piloted programmes as a means to regulate emerging sectors, increase the supply 
and quality of affordable housing, improve public transport, spur redevelopment 
of post- industrial land and reorient streets and other public spaces. In cities includ-
ing New York, London, Paris and Toronto, initiatives first launched as pilots have 
been the testing ground needed to create more significant, scalable, lasting change. 
Below, we identify and discuss a series of pilots and experiments that primarily 
focus on the City of Toronto, where the challenges of urban development are acute.
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increasing the supply and quality of affordable housing in toronto
Toronto is far from alone in facing the challenges of an affordable housing crisis, 
precipitated in part by increases in housing prices that exceed increases in house-
hold income, and combined with years of inaction and disinvestment. Access to 
affordable housing is crucial to a city’s ability to ensure that its residents can thrive, 
and also critical to ensuring that cities can continue to function. Other high- cost, 
global cities have sought to address the challenges of housing provision and afford-
ability with some success. For example, Paris – one of the world’s most expensive 
cities – has used funding and regulatory mechanisms and has leveraged land values 
in a financialised real estate market to increase housing production and affordabil-
ity. Since 2015, the Paris metropolitan area has doubled annual housing produc-
tion to 70,000 units/ year. This was accomplished through reforms led by multiple 
levels of government and involved new funding, utilisation of public land, zoning 
amendments and a requirement that municipalities ensure more affordable hous-
ing for low- and moderate- income households (Freemark 2019).
In Toronto, housing affordability has reached a crisis point. While more 
than 180,000 new residential units were added between 2009 and 2018, hous-
ing affordability challenges, previously concentrated in lower- income households, 
have grown to encompass both low- and middle- income households in the city 
(Kalinowski 2019). One study found that nearly 90 per cent of renter households 
with annual incomes lower than $30,000 spend more than 30 per cent of their 
income on housing (CCEA and CUI 2018). In 2019, the average monthly rent (a 
figure used to calculate eligibility for affordable housing) for a two- bedroom apart-
ment in the Greater Toronto Area reached $1,492 – 21.7 per cent higher than five 
years previously (City of Toronto 2019c); two- bedroom condo rentals reached an 
average of $2,868 per month (TREB 2020). Homeownership, either in the form of 
a single- family home or in a multi- unit building, was assessed to be unaffordable 
for most households in a majority of the city’s neighbourhoods (Winsa and Bailey 
2019). Two pilot initiatives that improve and expand the supply of affordable hous-
ing are underway, each focused solely on the City of Toronto rather than the sur-
rounding suburban municipalities.
As the second largest provider of public housing in North America, the City 
of Toronto holds responsibility for the provision of deeply subsidised public hous-
ing. Through the Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC), the City 
owns real estate valued at over $10 billion and houses over 110,000 residents in 
nearly 60,000 units (TCHC 2019). TCHC is reorienting towards an entrepreneurial 
approach to public housing redevelopment. TCHC is engaged in a number of large- 
scale, public–private partnership redevelopment schemes to revitalise public hous-
ing in Toronto. Their largest project is the redevelopment of Regent Park, a 69- acre 
neighbourhood in Toronto’s downtown core. From the 1950s to the early 2000s, 
Regent Park was home exclusively to low- income residents living in public housing, 
leading to a neighbourhood of concentrated poverty (August 2014). Since 2006, 
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Regent Park has been undergoing a wholesale transformation, which will take 
nearly 20 years to complete. Once finished, the neighbourhood will include 1800 
public housing units, 5400 market units and 200 affordable housing units (Brail 
and Kumar 2017). Similar to the approach in Paris, TCHC, in partnership with 
the City of Toronto and a private development partner, has leveraged land values 
to finance redevelopment in Regent Park. While the Regent Park redevelopment 
has encountered challenges, including resident displacement during construction 
and tensions regarding resident access to new neighbourhood amenities such as 
the aquatic centre, it is now a model for redeveloping other public housing sites 
in Toronto and globally. For example, the United Nations recently announced the 
opening of a UN Urban Pavilion in Toronto, which will serve as a hub that informs 
similar housing revitalisation initiatives globally.
Repairing and replacing dilapidated public housing units is insufficient to 
address the city’s affordable housing needs. Another pilot, aimed at increasing the 
number of affordable rental housing units in the city, is being led by CreateTO, a 
city agency that manages over 8000 city- owned properties. CreateTO is leading 
an effort, Housing Now, to identify city- owned properties that can be redeveloped 
to accommodate affordable housing for a range of income groups. Support for 
Housing Now is embedded in the city’s HousingTO 2020–2030 Action Plan and – 
if fully realised – will facilitate the addition of more than 10,000 new residential 
units in the city. The city and agency are currently in the early stages of planning, 
with 11 sites activated (City of Toronto 2019b). Some critics have charged that to 
succeed, Housing Now requires not only publicly owned land but also the relaxa-
tion of existing planning regulations (Bozikovic 2019). While it is too soon to eval-
uate the impact of this effort, both the phased pilot approach and Housing Now’s 
contribution to the range of housing initiatives being undertaken by the city hold 
some promise.
transport
‘The best transportation plan is a good land use plan’ has become an accepted tru-
ism among urban planning and economic development professionals. Current best 
practice in land use and transport planning is to connect development plans with 
transit planning. In 2018, 88 per cent of residential units and 77 per cent of non- 
residential units proposed or under development were within 500 metres of higher- 
order transit in the City of Toronto (City of Toronto 2019a). Research on Toronto’s 
changing neighbourhoods indicates that in 1970, most neighbourhoods in the cen-
tral city with subway access were characterised as low- and middle- income neigh-
bourhoods. By 2010, however, an inversion occurred and most central city Toronto 
neighbourhoods with strong transit access had become high- income neighbour-
hoods (Hulchanski 2015). Low- and moderate- income households in Toronto have 
been forced to move away from the core, which is served by subway and light rail, 
as real estate prices rise.
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Toronto has an extensive suburban bus network, with frequent service times 
that are far superior in comparison with its US counterparts (English 2019). 
Although the city has struggled to achieve political agreement on efforts to expand 
its subway system, it is beginning to invest smaller sums of money and political 
capital to improve bus travel. In autumn 2017, the city launched a streetcar rapid 
transit project on a 2.6- kilometre stretch of the city’s busiest surface transit route. 
Limiting cars and privileging transit sped up peak hour commute times by 33 per 
cent for morning commuters travelling eastbound and by 44 per cent for afternoon 
commuters travelling westbound (Toronto Transit Commission 2019). Within 
eight months of making the downtown transit pilot permanent, the Toronto Transit 
Commission (TTC) announced that it would explore the potential of adding five 
new priority bus routes, all located in the city proper’s suburban neighbourhoods 
serving lower- income residents (Toronto Transit Commission 2019). The TTC 
acknowledges that equity considerations in transit planning can positively impact 
individuals’ access to economic opportunity and employment. New infrastructure 
development is underway, including a new light rail service which will serve resi-
dents living in low- income neighbourhoods, reducing travel times and improving 
service levels.
Economic development
While many of Toronto’s economic development initiatives have raised controversy 
because of their potential downsides (e.g. Amazon HQ2 bid), city planners and 
other actors have also actively considered strategies that support and preserve 
industries traditionally offering a supply of middle- or high- skill jobs with strong 
wage prospects and that create (or minimise displacement of) jobs across the skill 
and income spectrum.
Toronto has historically been a centre for manufacturing (Bourne et al. 2011; 
Wolfe and Bramwell 2016). Yet industrial restructuring leading to manufacturing 
disinvestment alongside pressures to release land for housing development has led 
to a situation where employment lands have been rezoned for condominium devel-
opment (see above). In some areas, especially those within the city’s boundaries, 
this repurposing of land has raised serious concerns about the loss of production 
space for artisanal, craft and other manufacturing. In some areas of the city, these 
issues are also tied to concerns around the outcomes of gentrification. For exam-
ple, in the City of Toronto’s Queen West neighbourhood, low- rise light industrial 
buildings and warehouses have been converted into condominium developments, 
reflective of a broader trend towards condo- ism in the city (Rosen and Walks 2014). 
However, a recent development in this same neighbourhood indicates a potential 
shift towards more inclusive forms of economic development.
A site at 440 Dufferin Street became the source of controversy as it was 
slated for redevelopment, leading to the displacement of many artists, makers and 
craft manufacturers. City planners brokered a deal with the developer to create 
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a mixed- use development that preserved 60,000 square feet for light manufac-
turing, including a 14,000 square foot light manufacturing incubator and rental 
apartment housing. This marks a departure from previous neighbourhood devel-
opments, which were exclusively oriented towards owner- occupied condominium 
development. City staff tendered the incubator space; the winning bid is organised 
around a partnership between George Brown College, MaRS Discovery District, 
Refined Manufacturing Acceleration Process and the City of Toronto. While mixed- 
use zoning for individual land parcels may lead to unintended outcomes that do 
not promote mixed- income or occupational communities (Moos et al. 2018), the 
project represents a small step towards more inclusive development.
Elsewhere, initiatives have addressed some of the most pressing issues 
related to inclusive economic development more directly. For example, Inclusive 
Local Economic Opportunity (ILEO) is a Toronto- based partnership led by the 
CEOs of United Way and the Bank of Montreal. By bringing together corporate, city 
and community leaders, ILEO is working to develop a model that prioritises com-
munity economic inclusion in low- income neighbourhoods undergoing large- scale 
redevelopment across the Toronto region. ILEO is piloting a model of corporate–
city–community collaboration in the Golden Mile neighbourhood, working to 
ensure that the area’s upcoming redevelopment (preceded in part by new transit 
infrastructure investment) provides economic benefit and opportunity for existing 
residents and community- based businesses. It remains too early to evaluate ILEO’s 
impact. However, the purpose is directly connected to the acknowledgement that 
growth and investment can facilitate displacement, but that intentional planning, 
action and collaboration may result in improved economic outcomes for more 
people.
Realising the inclusive city?
This chapter has explored the economic dynamics of the Toronto region and has 
identified some of the serious challenges that the region faces. Building on the 
extensive body of scholarship on Toronto and other global cities, we have sug-
gested that, without deliberate intervention, the pursuit of economic develop-
ment and competitiveness in the Toronto region does not lead to shared, inclusive 
prosperity. However, with intentional policy change and collaboration between 
government, the private sector, the community and civil society organisations, it 
may be possible to support growth while also redistributing the benefits of growth. 
The pilots and experiments outlined above provide examples of how this might be 
achieved, although it is too early to evaluate the extent to which they will have a 
long- standing impact on inclusive development and outcomes. Moreover, many of 
these projects sidestep the governance issues associated with scaling such efforts 
beyond a single municipality. Yet all involve complex, cross- sectoral partnerships 
representing a range of actors and interests.
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The inclusive city remains elusive. This chapter demonstrates that addressing 
cities’ most complex challenges requires a new approach. It is incumbent on pub-
lic, private and non- profit actors to work collaboratively towards identifying and 
understanding change – whether in Toronto, London or other global cities. Cities 
need to continue to find effective and just ways to redirect opportunity.
Notes
 1. The Toronto region can be defined in a number of ways. This chapter focuses on the Toronto census 
 metropolitan area with a population of 5.92 million (Statistics Canada 2017a). The CMA includes the City 
of Toronto and 23 adjacent municipalities, including Mississauga (the sixth largest city in Canada with a 
population of 721,599), Brampton (the ninth largest Canadian city with 593,638 residents), Markham (the 
sixteenth largest) and Vaughan (the seventeenth largest).
 2. Clusters are defined using a method developed by Spencer et al. (2010).
References
Ash, James, Kitchin, Rob and Leszczynski, Agnieszka. 2018. ‘Digital Turn, Digital Geographies?’. Progress in 
Human Geography 42(1):25–43. https:// doi.org/ 10.1177/ 0309132516664800.
August, Martine. 2014. ‘Challenging the Rhetoric of Stigmatization: The Benefits of Concentrated Poverty in 
Toronto’s Regent Park’. Environment and Planning A 46(6):1317–33. https:// doi.org/ 10.1068/ a45635.
Berridge, Joe. 2019. Perfect City. Toronto: Sutherland House.
Blais, Pamela. 2018. Planning the Next GGH. Metropole Consultants and the Neptis Foundation. Accessed 17 March 
2019. http:// www.neptis.org/ sites/ default/ files/ planning_ the_ next_ ggh/ neptis_ planningthenextggh_ 
report_ dec4_ 2018.pdf.
Boudreau, Julie- Anne, Keil, Roger and Young, Douglas. 2009. Changing Toronto: Governing Urban Neoliberalism. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Bourne, Larry S., Britton, John N. H. and Leslie, Deborah. 2011. ‘The Greater Toronto Region: The Challenges 
of Economic Restructuring, Social Diversity and Globalization’. In Canadian Urban Regions: Trajectories of 
Growth and Change, edited by Larry Bourne, Tom Hutton, Richard Shearmur and Jim Simmons, 236–68. 
Toronto: Oxford University Press.
Bozikovic, Alex. 2019. ‘Toronto Needs Housing Now  – and the Planning to Match’. The Globe and Mail, 
23  November. Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// www.theglobeandmail.com/ canada/ toronto/ article- 
toronto- needs- housing- now- and- the- planning- to- match/ .
Brail, Shauna and Kumar, Nishi. 2017. ‘Community Leadership and Engagement after the Mix:  The 
Transformation of Toronto’s Regent Park’. Urban Studies 54(16):3772–3788. https:// doi.org/ 10.1177/ 
0042098016683122.
Brail, Shauna. 2020. ‘World cities of ride- hailing’. Urban Geography, 1–22. https:// doi.org/ 10.1080/ 
02723638.2020.1775030.
Brenner, Neil and Keil, Roger (eds). 2006. The Global Cities Reader. New York: Routledge.
CCEA (Canadian Centre of Economic Analysis) and CUI (Canadian Urban Institute). 2018. Toronto Housing 
Market Analysis:  From Insight to Action. Accessed 22 July 2020.https:// www.toronto.ca/ legdocs/ mmis/ 
2019/ ph/ bgrd/ backgroundfile- 124480.pdf.
CBRE. 2018a. Scoring Tech Talent in North America 2018. CBRE Research. Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// www.
cbre.com/ research- and- reports/ Scoring- Tech- Talent- in- North- America- 2018.
CBRE. 2018b. 2018 Tech 30 – Measuring Tech Industry Impact on North American Office Markets. CBRE Research. 
Accessed 22 July 2020. http:// hightech.cbrevancouver.com/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2018/ 10/ CBRE- Tech- 
30- Report- 2018.pdf.
City of Toronto. 2013. Collaborating for Competitiveness: A Strategic Plan for Accelerating Economic Growth and 
Job Creation in Toronto. Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// www.toronto.ca/ legdocs/ mmis/ 2013/ ed/ bgrd/ 
backgroundfile- 55511.pdf.
City of Toronto. 2014a. Comprehensive to the Core: Planning Toronto’s Downtown. Accessed 31 July 2020. https:// 
























Crit iCAL DiALoguES of urBAN govErNANCE ,  DEvELopMENt AND ACtiv iSM52
City of Toronto. 2014b. Downtown Toronto: Trends, Issues, Intensification. Accessed 1 August 2020. https:// www.
toronto.ca/ legdocs/ mmis/ 2014/ te/ bgrd/ backgroundfile- 69192.pdf.
City of Toronto. 2018. City of Toronto Official Plan Indicators, Attachment 1. Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// www.
toronto.ca/ legdocs/ mmis/ 2018/ pg/ bgrd/ backgroundfile- 117549.pdf.
City of Toronto. 2019a. Annual Report, City Planning. City of Toronto. Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// storymaps.
arcgis.com/ stories/ 5b01fbd4f14548ca8749553201c1c861.
City of Toronto. 2019b. Implementing the ‘Housing Now’ Initiative. Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// www.toronto.
ca/ legdocs/ mmis/ 2019/ ex/ bgrd/ backgroundfile- 123663.pdf.
City of Toronto. 2019c. Current City of Toronto Average Market Rents & Utility Allowances. Accessed 22 July 2020. 
https:// www.toronto.ca/ community- people/ community- partners/ social- housing- providers/ affordable- 
housing- operators/ current- city- of- toronto- average- market- rents- and- utility- allowances .
Credit, Kevin. 2019. ‘Transitive Properties: A Spatial Econometric Analysis of New Business Creation around 
Transit’. Spatial Economic Analysis 14(1):26–52. https:// doi.org/ 10.1080/ 17421772.2019.1523548.
CVCA. 2019. Venture Capital Canadian Market Overview: YTD Q3 2019. Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// central.
cvca.ca/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2019/ 12/ CVCA_ EN_ Canada_ VC_ Q3- 2019_ Final2.pdf.
Denney, Steven, Southin, Travis and Wolfe, David. 2018. The Evolution of Toronto’s ICT Cluster: Breakthroughs 
and Challenges. CDO Partnership Meetings, Vancouver, Canada. Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// munk-
school.utoronto.ca/ ipl/ files/ 2018/ 04/ S2- Denney_ Wolfe_ Southin_ Toronto- ICT_ Final_ AP2018.pdf.
Dingman, S. 2018. ‘Toronto Land Zoned for Employment Use Is Shrinking’. The Globe and Mail, 25 September. 
Accessed 1 August 2020. https:// www.theglobeandmail.com/ real- estate/ article- toronto- land- zoned- for- 
employment- use- is- shrinking .
Edenhoffer, Klaus. 2018. Toronto on the Global Stage:  2018 Report Card on Canada and Toronto’s Financial 
Services Sector. Ottawa: Conference Board of Canada. Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// cdn2.hubspot.net/ 
hubfs/ 4372260/ Toronto%20on%20the%20Global%20Stage%20- %20for%20TFI.pdf.
English, Jonathan. 2019. ‘Toronto’s Secret Success: Suburban Buses’. The Globe and Mail, 25 October. Accessed 22 
July 2020. https:// www.theglobeandmail.com/ opinion/ article- torontos- secret- success- suburban- buses.
Florida, Richard. 2018. The New Urban Crisis. New York: Basic Books.
Freemark, Yonah. 2019. ‘Doubling Housing Production in the Paris Region: A Multi- policy, Multi- jurisdictional 
Response’. International Journal of Housing Policy. http:// doi.org/ 10.1080/ 19491247.2019.1682233.
Greenberg, Ken. 2017. More than a Desk and a Parking Spot: Tapping into the Region’s Employment Lands. CBI 
Policy Paper, Ryerson City Building Institute.
Grisdale, Sean. 2019. ‘Displacement by Disruption: Short- term Rentals and the Political Economy of “Belonging 
Anywhere” in Toronto’. Urban Geography. http:// doi.org/ 10.1080/ 02723638.2019.1642714.
Hulchanski, Davis. 2015. Toronto’s Social Divide – Update on 3 Cities. Accessed 22 July 2020. http:// neighbour-
hoodchange.ca/ documents/ 2015/ 11/ toronto- social- divide- update- on- 3- cities.pdf.
Hulchanski, Davis. 2017. Neighbourhood Income Change: City of Toronto, 2015 vs. 1970. Neighbourhood Change 
Research Partnership. Toronto: University of Toronto.
Hunter, Paul. 2019. The Unspoken Decline of Outer London:  Why Is Poverty and Inequality Increasing in Outer 
London and What Needs to Change? Smith Institute. Accessed 22 July 2020. http:// www.smith- institute.
org.uk/ book/ the- unspoken- decline- of- outer- london- why- is- poverty- and- inequality- increasing- in- outer- 
london- and- what- needs- to- change.
Kalinowski, Tess. 2019. ‘Toronto Has Seen Huge Growth in the Last Decade. The Challenges Ahead Are Just as 
Huge’. Toronto Star, 27 December. Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// www.thestar.com/ news/ gta/ 2019/ 12/ 
27/ toronto- has- seen- huge- growth- in- the- last- decade- the- challenges- ahead- are- just- as- huge.html.
Kemeny, Thomas and Storper, Michael. 2020. Superstar Cities and Left- behind Places:  Disruptive Innovation, 
Labor Demand, and Interregional Inequality. Working Paper 41, International Inequalities Institute. 
London: London School of Economics and Political Science.
Langley, Paul and Leyshon, Andrew. 2017. ‘Platform Capitalism:  The Intermediation and Capitalization of 
Digital Economic Circulation’. Finance and Society 3(1):11–31. https:// doi.org/ 10.2218/ finsoc.v3i1.1936.
Lee, Neil and Clarke, Stephen. 2019. ‘Do Low- skilled Workers Gain from High- tech Employment Growth? 
High- technology Multipliers, Employment and Wages in Britain’. Research Policy 48(9). https:// doi.org/ 
10.1016/ j.respol.2019.05.012.
Manyika, James, Ramaswamy, Sree and Birshan, Michael. 2018. ‘What’s Driving Superstar Companies, 
Industries and Cities’. Harvard Business Review, 25 October. Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// hbr.org/ 2018/ 
10/ whats- driving- superstar- companies- industries- and- cities.
Marcuse, Peter and van Kempen, Ronald (eds). 2000. Globalizing Cities:  A New Spatial Order? Malden, 
MA: Blackwell.
Moos, Markus, Vinodrai, Tara, Revington, Nick and Seasons, Michael. 2018. ‘Planning for Mixed Use: Affordable 
for Whom?’ Journal of the American Planning Association 84(1):7–20. https:// doi.org/ 10.1080/ 
01944363.2017.1406315.
Rosen, Gillad and Walks, Alan. 2014. ‘Castles in Toronto’s Sky: Condo- ism as Urban Transformation’. Journal of 



































thE ELuSivE ,  iNCLuSivE C ity:  toroNto At A CroSSroADS 53
Sassen, Saskia. 2001. The Global City:  New  York, London, Tokyo (2nd edition). Princeton, NJ:  Princeton 
University Press.
Sheppard, Veronica. 2018. ‘September Brought over $1.4 Billion in International Investment for Toronto’s 
Tech Ecosystem’. MaRS, 1 October. Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// www.marsdd.com/ news- and- insights/ 
september- brought- over- 1- 4- billion- in- international- investment- for- torontos- tech- ecosystem.
Spencer, Gregory M., Vinodrai, Tara, Gertler, Meric S. and Wolfe, David A. 2010. ‘Do Clusters Make a Difference? 
Defining and Assessing their Economic Performance’. Regional Studies 44(6):697–715. https:// doi.org/ 
10.1080/ 00343400903107736.
Statistics Canada. 2006. Census of Population: Custom Tabulations. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
Statistics Canada. 2016. Census of Population: Custom Tabulations. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
Statistics Canada. 2017a. Focus on Geography Series, 2016 Census. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
Statistics Canada. 2017b. ‘Gross Domestic Product at Basic Prices, by Census Metropolitan Area, 2009 to 2013’. 
The Daily, 27 January. Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// www150.statcan.gc.ca/ n1/ en/ daily- quotidien/ 
170127/ dq170127b- eng.pdf?st=hWzdw0oe.
TCHC (Toronto Community Housing Corporation). 2019. 2018 Annual Report – Investing in Our Future (Draft). 
Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// www.torontohousing.ca/ events/ Documents/ GCHRCC/ April%2015%20
2019/ Item%203%20- %202018%20Annual%20Report- Letter%20to%20SH.pdf.
Tech Toronto. 2016. How Technology Is Changing Toronto Employment. Accessed 1 August 2020. https:// munk-
school.utoronto.ca/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2016/ 10/ TechTO_ Report2016.pdf.
TREB (Toronto Regional Real Estate Board). 2020. TREB Releases Q4 2019 Condo Rental Market Stats. Accessed 
22 July 2020. http:// www.trebhome.com/ index.php/ market- news/ rental- market- report.
TTC (Toronto Transit Commission). 2019. Next Stop, Even Better: 2020–2024 and Beyond. Accessed 22 July 2020. 
https:// www.ttc.ca/ About_ the_ TTC/ Commission_ reports_ and_ information/ Commission_ meetings/ 
2019/ December_ 12/ Reports/ Attachment%201%20TTC_ 5_ year_ SP_ web.pdf.
Walks, R. Alan. 2001. ‘The Social Ecology of the Post- Fordist/ Global City? Economic Restructuring and Socio- 
spatial Polarisation in the Toronto Urban Region’. Urban Studies 38(3):407–47.
Walks, R. Alan. 2011. ‘Economic Restructuring and Trajectories of Socio- spatial Polarization in the Twenty- 
first- century Canadian City’. In Canadian Urban Regions: Trajectories of Growth and Change, edited by Larry 
Bourne, Tom Hutton, Richard Shearmur and Jim Simmons, 236–68. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
Winsa, Patty and Bailey, Andrew. 2019. ‘Here’s What You’d Need to Buy a Mid Priced Home in Your Toronto 
Neighbourhood’. Toronto Star, 5 July. Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// www.thestar.com/ news/ gta/ 2019/ 
07/ 05/ heres- what- youd- need- to- earn- to- buy- a- mid- priced- home- in- your- toronto- neighbourhood- and- 
what- a- typical- family- there- earns- hint- not- nearly- enough.html.
Wolfe, David. 2018. Creating Digital Opportunity for Canada. Brookfield Institute on Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship and the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy. Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// 
munkschool.utoronto.ca/ ipl/ files/ 2018/ 04/ UTMK028- Digital- Opps_ V6.pdf.
Wolfe, David and Bramwell, Alison. 2016. ‘Toronto’s Fourth Era: An Emerging Cognitive- cultural Economy’. In 
Growing Urban Economies: Innovation, Creativity, and Governance in Canadian City- Regions, edited by David 
A. Wolfe and Meric S. Gertler, 51–81. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Zukin, Sharon. 2019. ‘The Origins and Perils of Development in the Urban Tech Landscape’. The Architect’s 


























Regulating property conditions in the 
private rented sector: The complex 
geography of property licensing in London
tatiana Moreira de Souza
Introduction
Since the turn of the milennium, the UK housing market has been shaped by a 
resurgence in private renting. During the 1980s and 1990s the proportion of 
households renting from a private landlord in England hovered around 9–10 per 
cent, but since 2013–14 this proportion has increased to approximately 19 per cent 
of all households in the country (MHCLG 2019a). Today, the private rented sector 
(PRS) is the second largest housing tenure in England, accounting for 4.5 million 
households (MHCLG 2019a). In London, the proportion of renters is even higher. 
The latest figures show that approximately 29 per cent of households rent from 
a private landlord and it is forecast that one in three households will be renting 
privately by 2025.
The recent growth of the PRS is not unique to London or England. Since the 
2008–9 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), many global north countries have witnessed 
a rise in private renting, with this rise being more pronounced in Anglo- Saxon 
countries with liberal markets (Kemp 2015; Crook and Kemp 2014a). Explanations 
extend beyond current trends in household formation and the weakening of the 
economic position of working populations. They reflect a multitude of factors, such 
as reduced accessibility to mortgage finance, austerity politics in response to the 
GFC – which have also negatively impacted the production of subsidised housing – 
the financialisation of the residential sector, rent liberalisation and reduced tenant 
protections (Pawson et al. 2017; Hochstenbach 2017; August and Walks 2012).
In many countries, notably those in which the sector is loosely regulated, 
there is substantial variability in the quality of housing and management of pri-
vately rented properties, with substandard accommodation commonly being 
found at the lower end of the sector. The impacts of poor housing on health have 
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shown how some landlords take advantage of reduced tenant protections and the 
precarious situation of some tenants – such as recipients of housing benefits, ethnic 
minority groups and undocumented immigrants – to reduce spending on repairs 
and property maintenance (Desmond et al. 2015; Grineski and Hernández 2010). 
Others have highlighted the lack of interest from landlords in investing in property 
maintenance in areas of high housing demand (Ambrose 2015), and recent studies 
in the United States, Canada and Germany have connected the growing financiali-
sation of rental housing to reduced spending from investors on property mainte-
nance as part of a wider strategy to reduce costs and increase tenant turnover in 
order to raise rents (August and Walks 2018; Fields and Uffer 2016).
Issues related to poor property conditions have generally been tackled through 
the provision of direct subsidies for housing improvement and through a regulatory 
approach. This is generally done through the prescription of minimum standards for 
privately rented housing and/ or through the requirement that landlords register or 
license their rental properties. Examples range from national landlord registration 
schemes, such as in Scotland and Wales, to legislation introduced by city, state or 
regional governments, such as in the case of Toronto, where a by- law passed in 2017 
introduced minimum property maintenance standards and the requirement for reg-
istration of certain types of purpose- built rental properties. In England, there is no 
minimum standard of housing condition in the PRS. Instead, property conditions 
are assessed by a system of risk assessment that identifies hazards to occupants. 
Local authorities are responsible for enforcing housing standards. They have a duty 
to license certain types of private rental accommodation and they also have discre-
tionary powers to implement licensing schemes for other types of rental properties 
under certain conditions. This approach to licensing, however, due to its targeted 
focus, results in considerable variability in terms of regulation and of enforcement 
activity when local authorities are compared with one another.
This chapter explores the complex and fragmented regulatory landscape 
that is forming in London as a result of the various discretionary licensing schemes 
operating in Greater London’s 32 boroughs. The study draws from the analysis of 
licensing schemes currently in place in each local authority, the analysis of two par-
liamentary inquiries into the sector and interviews conducted between September 
2017 and February 2018 with eight enforcement officers and policy- makers in 
charge of private sector housing and enforcement in 11 of these local authorities. 
The chapter reveals that this fragmentation results from the combination of central 
government’s aversion to regulation, austerity politics and differing local political 
willingness to implement licensing schemes. This results in substantial variation 
across London in the amount of intelligence held about the sector and in significant 
disparities in the terms and conditions of schemes as well as in enforcement, affect-
ing both tenants and landlords, with wider impacts to the local community. Finally, 
it considers how this inconsistent regulatory landscape interacts with the current 
mayor’s plans of introducing rent controls based on information gathered from a 
London- wide landlord register.
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The chapter starts with an overview of the PRS in England and in London, 
followed by an overview of the regulatory framework that governs property condi-
tions and landlord management and of how the PRS is problematised by different 
levels of government (central and local). It then gives an overview of the licensing 
schemes operating in London and discusses the wider implications of these differ-
ent licensing approaches and capacities. It concludes with a discussion of the views 
expressed by local authority enforcement officers on the Mayor’s proposal for a 
London-wide register, which highlighted the need to reduce regulatory complexity 
in order to increase compliance.
A brief overview of the PRS in England and in London
The PRS in England has been growing since the late 1990s due to a combination 
of deregulatory policies introduced by the 1988 and 1994 Housing Acts which 
removed rent controls and introduced shorter tenancy agreements, and new 
financial products that have allowed homeowners to buy additional properties to 
let (Buy- to- Let mortgages). Much of the sector’s growth has been due to tenure 
change rather than to new housing construction (Crook and Kemp 2014b), with 
estimates that over 500,000 privately rented dwellings were originally social hous-
ing properties sold under ‘right to buy’ (Rugg and Rhodes 2018). Decades of under-
supply in housing markets, coupled with easy availability of credit, contributed to 
house prices rising, while the decline of the social housing stock has resulted in 
social housing being allocated to those most in need. Since the onset of the GFC, 
the PRS has rapidly changed from being a marginal tenure – housing mainly stu-
dents, young professionals, recently arrived migrants and newly formed house-
holds (Rugg and Rhodes 2008) – to becoming ‘the new normal’ (Reynolds and de 
Santos 2013). This has led to the phenomenon of ‘Generation Rent’, as many more 
people are renting for longer in their lives and see no prospects of ever changing 
their housing tenure status (Hoolachan et al. 2017; McKee et al. 2017). In London, 
where the housing crisis is most acute (see Penny, Chapter 16), rents have been ris-
ing substantially faster than earnings, surpassing the average mortgage payment. 
Londoners already spend on average 42 per cent of their income on rent (MHCLG 
2019b)  – with 25 per cent of them paying more than half of their wages (GLA 
2018) – and welfare reforms introduced by central government have significantly 
impacted the ability of low- income families to afford rents in the capital.
Differently from countries such as Canada, which has a long history of insti-
tutional and corporate investment in purpose- built privately rented housing, the 
PRS in England has a larger share of older properties and is dominated by small- 
scale landlordism. Ninety- four per cent of landlords are private individuals, with 
45 per cent owning one property and only 17 per cent owning more than five 
(MHCLG 2019b, 5). Despite active support from central government for institu-
tional investment in the sector – through subsidies for purpose- built developments 
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solely for private renting, called ‘build to rent’ – this segment of the PRS is still in 
its infancy. As of 2019, approximately 32,000 units had been built and another 
111,000 are under construction or in planning across the UK (Savills 2019). This 
predominance of private individual landlords has been associated with great vari-
ability in the quality of PRS properties and standards in property management 
being endemically poor, due to a large proportion of landlords being unaware of 
their responsibilities (Rhodes and Rugg 2018; Faulkner and Saxena 2016).
Thus, compared with the owner- occupied and social rented sectors, the PRS in 
England has the highest proportion of housing in poor condition. The latest figures 
show that over a quarter of PRS homes fail to meet the Decent Homes Standard,1 a 
proportion that is well above what is found in the owner- occupied and social rented 
sectors (19 per cent and 13 per cent respectively) (MHCLG 2019a). Although the 
proportion of non- decent housing has reduced over time – from almost 47.7 per 
cent in 2006 (MHCLG 2018) to 25 per cent in 2018 – in absolute terms this figure 
has increased from 1.29 million to 1.35 million (Rugg and Rhodes 2018, 139). In 
London, the proportion of non- decent homes in the sector also stands at 25 per 
cent. Between 2015 and 2016, almost 4,000 serious health and safety hazards in 
privately rented dwellings were identified by local authorities (Pidgeon 2016). 
A study by Rhodes and Rugg (2018) showed that almost all vulnerable households 
living in PRS accommodation in the capital experience problems of unaffordability 
or overcrowding (living without a sufficient number of bedrooms) due to living in 
a non- decent home.
The deregulatory measures introduced in the 1980s and 1990s are also partly 
to blame for property standards and management being poor, because they sig-
nificantly weakened the position of tenants. The standard tenancy agreement in 
England usually lasts six months to one year, after which the landlord has the right to 
repossess the property at two months’ notice by serving a Section 21 eviction notice – 
which allows landlords to evict tenants without a reason once a fixed- term tenancy 
agreement expires. Over the years, cases of landlords evicting tenants who complain 
about housing conditions have been widely documented by housing charities and 
the media. In response, the Deregulation Act 2015 introduced protection for tenants 
by prohibiting landlords from serving such notices for a period of six months after 
receiving an improvement notice from a local authority.2 Although this has been seen 
as an improvement, it reveals that tenants are highly dependent on the quality of 
enforcement provided by local authorities once they make a complaint.
The power imbalance between central and local government 
and its impacts on London
The main tools available to local authorities for enforcing housing conditions in 
both the PRS and the owner- occupied sector were introduced by the New Labour 
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earlier deregulation of the sector initiated by the Conservative Party and created 
regulation targeting only the underperforming portion of the PRS (Lowe 2007), 
after it was acknowledged that the sector contained a disproportionate amount of 
housing in poor condition and a sizeable portion of landlords providing poor man-
agement and profiteering from tenants (DETR 2000). This new regulatory frame-
work comprised a system for assessing housing conditions – the Housing Health 
and Safety Rating System, a risk- based assessment that identifies 29 categories of 
hazards attributable to property conditions and the degree to which they can affect 
the health and safety of any potential occupier and visitor – and a new licensing 
model comprising three forms of licensing. The first is mandatory licensing for large 
Houses in Multiple Occupation (HMOs),3 which then applied to HMOs with three 
or more storeys (including cellars, basements and loft conversions) and occupied 
by five or more people forming at least two households.4 The other two forms of 
licensing are discretionary and include (i)  additional licensing, which applies to 
smaller HMOs, and (ii) selective licensing, which initially applied to all privately 
rented properties located in areas of low housing demand but currently includes 
areas with high rates of properties in poor conditions or that are experiencing a 
rapid increase in PRS properties, inward migration or high levels of deprivation 
or crime.
However, it is widely known that decision- making and the systems in place 
for funding public services and local government in England are highly centralised. 
It has been argued that this high level of centralisation impacts on local democracy, 
as local authorities are generally seen by ministers as ‘agencies for the provision of 
services in accordance with national policies rather than as local government meet-
ing the needs and aspirations of local communities and citizens’ (Stewart 2014, 
846). Despite central government’s signalling to devolve more powers to local gov-
ernment through the Localism Act (2011) and through legislation that will allow 
local authorities to retain business rates and council tax, in reality, the latter often 
have to abide by rigid terms and conditions which limit their ability to take ini-
tiatives and innovate. Their situation is exacerbated by the fact that since 2010 
they have been severely impacted by austerity measures implemented by central 
government which have resulted in cuts of nearly 50 per cent to local authorities’ 
budgets without any reduction in their statutory obligations to provide services 
(NAO 2018). The enforcement of housing standards is funded by local authori-
ties’ environmental health budgets and these have been reduced by an average of 
30 per cent despite the rapid growth of the PRS (LGA 2018). Consequently, many 
local authority enforcement teams have been reduced to a handful of officers and 
have just enough resources to provide basic statutory service, thus lacking capacity 
to take complex cases to court, particularly given the often protracted nature of the 
enforcement process.
The discretionary powers given to local authorities were not free from rigid 
conditions. On the contrary, they can only implement discretionary licensing 
schemes if they provide evidence that licensing is the most appropriate response 
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to problems in the PRS and conduct extensive public consultation. Once imple-
mented, discretionary schemes can only run for a maximum period of five years 
during which their need must be occasionally reviewed. In 2010, the need for 
additional and selective licensing schemes to be reviewed by the Secretary of 
State was abolished. However, in 2015, in a move that resembles Stoker’s (1991, 
150)  description of the Thatcher government ‘setting for local authorities arbi-
trary and non- negotiated goals and targets’, central government reintroduced this 
requirement for selective licensing designations covering more than 20 per cent of 
a local authority geographical area or more than 20 per cent of its privately rented 
housing stock. This change was in response to four London boroughs and Liverpool 
City Council rolling out district- wide selective licensing schemes. Despite much 
criticism for interfering in local democracy, central government defended its posi-
tion, stating that:
as its name implies, selective licensing should be targeted to deal with specific 
local problems. Blanket licensing of all landlords may impose unnecessary 
costs on responsible landlords, which would be passed on to tenants in the 
form of higher rents. (MHCLG 2018b, para. 72)
This change in legislation has particularly affected London as some boroughs have 
attempted to either implement or continue with large or borough- wide selective 
licensing schemes to deal with a rapid increase in private renting in their areas. 
Soon after the legislation was passed, Redbridge Council was barred from intro-
ducing a borough- wide selective licensing scheme despite it arguing that licensing 
would allow it to respond more effectively to significant and persistent problems 
with anti- social behaviour in the PRS, crime and inward migration (Phillipson and 
Baker 2016). In 2017, the London Borough of Newham’s application to continue 
with its borough- wide selective licensing scheme was approved with modifica-
tions by the Secretary of State.5 Despite the outcome being considered a success 
because Newham’s new selective licensing designation still covers 97 per cent of 
the borough, the decision- making process was severely criticised by the borough 
mayor, who stated that ‘local people showed their overwhelming support for a 
borough- wide scheme and these decisions should be taken on the ground by local 
authorities who know their local area rather than ministers sitting in Whitehall’ 
(Hopps 2017).6
The examples discussed above highlight the importance of examining the 
effects on Greater London of the different approaches to property licensing taken 
by London boroughs as these create spatial disparities in terms of housing qual-
ity, enforcement response and landlord obligations. Despite the mayor having little 
power over housing and no statutory powers over the PRS,7 the housing crisis is 
London- wide, as evidenced by the fact that housing increasingly plays a central 
part in mayoral elections. London- wide measures to improve housing conditions in 
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that private renting had risen by 75 per cent between the 2001 and 2011 censuses. 
Although these initially relied on voluntary action by landlords – such as Labour 
Party mayoral candidate Ken Livingstone’s proposal to set up a not- for- profit 
London Lettings Agency (Mulholland 2011), and former mayor Boris Johnson 
(Conservative Party) creating the ‘London Rental Standard’, a voluntary set of 
rental standards which was severely criticised for accrediting only 1,800 landlords 
in the capital – in the 2016 mayoral election, some candidates (particularly from 
the Labour and Green parties) pledged to take a more interventionist approach 
towards the sector. The winner and current mayor, Sadiq Khan, has so far fulfilled 
his pledge to create a London- wide database of criminal landlords,8 has been play-
ing a coordinating role with London boroughs to share best practice in terms of 
enforcement of housing standards and, most importantly, has been lobbying cen-
tral government for more powers to introduce rent controls and increase tenant 
security. These were unveiled in his blueprint for reform of the PRS (GLA 2018) 
which calls for devolution on the basis that ‘London’s housing market self- evidently 
presents particular challenges’, and in other global cities such as ‘Paris, Berlin, and 
New York, it is common for these powers to be devolved to a city, state or regional 
level to allow for appropriate local decision- making’ (33).
Mayor Sadiq Khan’s strategy revolves around the introduction of rent controls 
informed by a light- touch universal register of landlords intended to collect accu-
rate data about PRS properties and rent prices. The register is supposed to work 
in tandem with licensing, as explained by the Mayor’s Housing Strategy:  ‘land-
lord registration helps to ensure landlords are fulfilling their legal duties, while 
property licensing ensures the homes themselves meet relevant legal require-
ments’ (GLA 2019, para. 6.25). By doing this, it is clear that the mayor wants to tip 
the power balance towards the metropolitan level without interfering with local 
authority autonomy over licensing schemes. It is to these schemes that the chapter 
will now turn.
The complex geography of licensing in London
There are multiple property licensing schemes operating across London and when 
these are seen together, a complex and fragmented regulatory landscape emerges. 
Overall, three situations are found across the capital: (i) local authorities that do 
not run any discretionary licensing scheme, (ii) local authorities that run either 
additional HMO or selective licensing schemes and (iii) local authorities that run 
both additional HMO and selective licensing schemes (see Figure 3.1). This frag-
mentation is also materialised by differing prices and the way fees are calculated,9 
terms and conditions, types of HMOs that qualify for additional licensing, dates 
that licences start and cease to operate and, most importantly, their spatial cov-
erage. While some licensing schemes cover entire boroughs, others cover wards, 
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additional licensing scheme covers only two main roads in the borough while the 
London Borough of Tower Hamlets’ additional and selective licensing designations 
cover three wards. The complexity of this regulatory geography is evidenced by 
the large amount of online forum discussion and advice on the topic, as well as the 
existence of a website,10 ‘London Property Licensing’, solely created for those look-
ing into, as its slogan puts it, ‘making sense of property licensing in London’.
The interviews revealed that this fragmented licensing landscape reflects 
substantial disparities in the amount of intelligence held about the sector across 
London. Currently, licensing is the only instrument that allows local authorities to 
directly gather detailed information about the location of private rented properties 
and those in charge of managing them (landlords or managing agents). Without it, 
local authorities have to rely on stock condition surveys produced from aggregated 
data obtained from council tax returns, housing benefits and other sources to esti-
mate the size of the sector and location of properties. At the time of the interviews, 
some of these surveys – which are commissioned to external consultancies – were 
Figure 3.1 Map of all licensing schemes operating in London (based on data 
from London Datastore 2017)
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over three years old and did not capture recent fluctuations in the sector. These 
disparities were also reflected in the human, financial and technical capacities of 
private sector housing teams as the local authorities that operated schemes – espe-
cially of the selective type – were able to hire staff to work on matters related to 
licence registration and data analysis with the income generated from licensing, 
which is ring- fenced to its function only.
Regarding enforcement, the findings bear a resemblance to the results of a 
survey conducted by London Assembly member Caroline Pidgeon (Pidgeon 2016) 
which showed significant variation in enforcement activity across London, with 
much more vigorous work taking place in local authorities that ran borough- wide 
selective licensing schemes, such as the London Borough of Newham, responsible 
for more than two- thirds of all prosecutions in London. The interviews with officers 
working for local authorities that did not run discretionary schemes revealed that 
their teams were generally only able to carry out their statutory duty of responding 
to complaints: ‘they’ve been a very reactionary team. They are just about keeping 
their heads above water.’ Conversely, those working for local authorities that ran 
licensing schemes, particularly selective licensing, were able to conduct enforce-
ment in a proactive manner as they were able to more easily identify non- compliant 
landlords, as noted by one officer: ‘everyone that didn’t license became conspicu-
ous by their absence’.
Thus it can be argued that this fragmented licensing landscape is also creating 
a ‘postcode lottery’ in London in terms of tenant protection, landlord obligations 
and the overall quality of neighbourhoods. Landlords, particularly those who have 
more than one property, might have to license their property and adhere to certain 
conditions in one borough, or in one area within a borough, but not in another, 
and they might be fined or face prosecution if they fail to license a property in an 
area that requires a licence. Besides improved housing standards, tenants living in 
areas subject to licensing will be better protected against unfair use of a Section 21 
eviction notice as these are invalidated if the landlord does not have a licence in 
such areas. Lastly, since licensing allows local authorities to impose certain condi-
tions related to property standards, management, use and occupation,11 officers 
spoke of a noticeable improvement to certain neighbourhoods due to a reduction in 
overcrowding, criminal activity in the PRS and fly- tipping as a result of more active 
enforcement in areas where licensing schemes, particularly selective licensing, are 
in operation.
What would the future of licensing be if the mayor’s plans come to frui-
tion? In the interviews, local politics played a significant role in local authorities’ 
responses to the increase in private renting in their areas. In certain local authori-
ties, officers reported that some councillors believed in ‘not burdening land-
lords’ with any type of discretionary licensing despite being aware of problems 
related to poor housing conditions and management in their areas. Conversely, 
interviews with officers working in two local authorities that had borough- wide 
licensing schemes revealed that there was ‘a push from the top’, referring to local 
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councillors reaching a consensus over the need to improve conditions in the PRS 
and setting aside a considerable amount of funding to initiate the licensing pro-
cess despite cuts to their budgets. For this reason, there was strong support from 
officers for a system of compulsory registration of landlords with a universal 
set of terms and conditions, which most officers believed should be nationwide 
rather than London- wide.12 In the absence of a national system, many supported 
the idea of a London- wide approach, with the responsibility of registration fall-
ing to the Greater London Authority and enforcement being conducted by local 
authorities. The removal of regulatory complexity  – rather than the introduc-
tion of regulation – was seen as crucial to increase compliance and produce more 
effective enforcement. The view was that a system of landlord registration would 
render licensing redundant, exactly because of the fragmentation of rights and 
 obligations that it currently produces as a result of central government legislation 
and the different terms and conditions imposed by local authorities. However, 
since the proposal for a register is not accompanied by a minimum standard for 
property conditions and management, some of the improvements to PRS proper-
ties found in licensing designation areas – which also have spillover effects to the 
wider community – could be potentially lost.
Conclusion
This chapter has given an overview of the regulations governing property stand-
ards in the PRS in England and its impacts on London, where the housing crisis 
is most acute and where one in three households are renting privately. It argues 
that central government’s targeted approach to regulation – focused on regulating 
accommodation either at the bottom end of the sector or in problematic areas – is 
producing a patchy licensing landscape in London. This is producing a complex 
geography of rights and obligations and creating disparities in the intelligence 
held by local authorities on the sector and their enforcement activities, with wider 
implications for the mayor’s ability to implement his rent control policy.
The interviews also highlighted that local politics as well as austerity play 
an important role in local authorities’ decisions to use their discretionary powers 
over licensing schemes – whether or not to roll them out, as well as their type and 
reach. If the system continues as it is, with time, the already noted disparities in 
terms of data and enforcement activities might become even more accentuated, 
as local authorities that run licensing schemes can build more capacity since the 
income from both licensing registration and civil penalties are ring- fenced to their 
respective departments.
Although one could argue that this loose and disjointed licensing landscape 
can be found elsewhere in England, the challenges imposed by the London hous-
ing market and the rapid increase in private renting in the capital undoubtedly call 
for a more London- focused response. If this response comes in the form of more 
powers to the mayor to introduce rent control and increase security of tenure, it 
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is important that property and management standards and their enforcement are 
also consistent across the capital in order to reduce possibilities of disinvestment 
in maintenance.
Notes
 1. The Decent Homes Standard was introduced in 2000 to provide a minimum standard of housing conditions 
in the social rented sector. In 2006, it was updated to include the Housing Health and Safety Rating System, 
introduced by the Housing Act 2004. The Standard only applies to the social rented sector but is used to 
compare property conditions in all tenures.
 2. Central government recently carried out consultation on abolishing Section 21 eviction notices after 
it was announced that the end of a tenancy through Section 21 notices is one of the biggest causes of 
homelessness.
 3. HMOs are residential properties where facilities such as toilets, kitchens and bathrooms are shared by more 
than one household. These generally fall under the category of bedsits, shared flats or houses and house-
holds with lodgers (Lowe 2007).
 4. In 2018 the three- storey condition was scrapped, and requirements were added for minimum room sizes for 
sleeping accommodation and for the provision of refuse disposal.
 5. Newham was the first council in England to implement such a scheme and it has been highly successful in 
disrupting criminal operation, reducing overcrowding and anti- social behaviour, and increasing tax collec-
tions from landlords’ rental income (Collinson 2017).
 6. Whitehall is a street in London where many government departments are located and thus is a metonym for 
the UK government.
 7. The mayor’s role is mostly confined to setting the overall amount, type and location of new housing across 
London in their Housing Strategy, to distributing some funding for affordable homes and to calling in plan-
ning applications that are of potential strategic importance to London – generally those with 150 residential 
units or more.
 8. The Rogue Landlord and Agent Checker (https:// www.london.gov.uk/ rogue- landlord- checker) was 
launched in December 2017 and shows information from all London councils about private landlords and 
letting agents who have been prosecuted or fined.
 9. This calculation is based on the costs of operating licensing schemes, which vary according to borough. For 
example, while the London Borough of Enfield charges a flat fee of £650 for mandatory licences, Bromley 
charges £185 per unit of accommodation at the time an application is submitted, followed by £75 per unit 
of accommodation once a licence is granted. This means that a mandatory licence for a five- bedroom HMO 
in the borough would cost £1300 ((185 x 5) +(75 x 5)).
 10. See http:// www.londonpropertylicensing.co.uk.
 11. Examples include the imposition of limits on the number of occupants in a dwelling, and the requirement 
for the licence holder to provide details of the arrangements in place to prevent or reduce anti- social behav-
iour and for repairs and property management.
 12. Many officers drew parallels to drivers being required to have a driving licence or business owners needing 
to register their businesses.
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Metromobility and transit- led urbanisation 
in London and Toronto
theresa Enright
Mass transit systems have long played multiple roles in urban development. This 
trend is captured by the concept of metromobility, a reference both to the social sys-
tems of metro rail and to the metropolises they bring about (Enright 2016).1 A key 
socio- technical institution shaping modern cities, mass transit indelibly shapes 
regional space and is an important vehicle in the transformation of the built envi-
ronment, land use and governance. In this chapter, I consider various dimensions 
of metromobility in London and Toronto with a focus on mass transit’s capacity to 
render cities global. Not only do urban rail systems influence local territories and 
populations, but increasingly they are vectors of global engagement, providing the 
material and symbolic supports for extra- local connections and flows. Through this 
analysis of the ‘worlding’ practices (Roy and Ong 2011) enacted on and through 
mobility systems, I identify transit as a key institution of contemporary urbanism.
London and Toronto represent two different pathways of globalising cities. 
Whereas London has long been an imperial power and its contemporary authori-
ties have explicitly developed urban strategies to assert and maintain global 
dominance, Toronto is better understood as a settler- colonial city turned ‘acci-
dental metropolis’ (Berridge 2019) where global integration has proceeded in an 
incremental and haphazard manner. In both of these cases, however, mass tran-
sit is central to these development trajectories and is a pivot upon which recent 
worldly ambitions turn. In London, transit was explicitly leveraged in pursuit of 
global competitiveness and was a driver of post- industrial urban transformations. 
In Toronto, in contrast, transit frequently lagged behind massive spatial reform, 
which remained wedded to the automobile, and only recently has been envisioned 
as a necessary precondition for new capital projects. Examining recent trends of 
transit- led urbanisation in each city reveals transit as a key institution of urban 
reform, and it clarifies how global pathways and networks rely upon distinct and 
contingent patterns of engagement and connection.
This chapter has two main aims. First, it identifies the various practices 
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it compares the experiences of London and Toronto in order to suggest that the 
global repertoires of transit- led urbanisation are best understood as place- and 
space- specific. Understanding the contingent political economic dynamics of 
metromobility clarifies some of the ways in which contemporary global cities are 
being built and reordered.
Global regimes of metromobility
The provision of mass urban transit has become a key policy agenda in large urban 
regions around the world based on the widespread consensus that passenger rail is 
a vehicle of development and prosperity. Improving transport through the construc-
tion of new or extension of existing urban rail systems is one of the primary means 
for cities to manage growth, organise vast and diverse spaces, integrate popula-
tions, enhance economic productivity, facilitate intergovernmental coordination 
and improve quality of life (Dittmar and Ohland 2004; Grescoe 2012). In response 
to the now well- established woes of automobility, transit- oriented development 
(TOD) has become a best practice (though by no means universally accepted prac-
tice) of contemporary planning. The intensified promotion and investment in rapid 
urban rail projects around the world is testament to their rising importance across 
a range of cities (Cervero 1998; see also http:// www.urbanrail.net).
In comparison with other emerging modes of urban mobility (e.g. bicycle, 
scooter, tram, gondola), urban rail has an unprecedented capacity to dramati-
cally reconfigure metropolitan space. Beyond their most immediate function to 
meet local commuter travel demands, urban rail networks are vast socio- technical 
complexes that bring together multiple economic sectors and political institutions 
at various scales (Dupuy 2008). They are, as Wiig and Silver (2019, 913) argue 
of infrastructure networks in general, ‘where globalized circulations  – people, 
goods, and information – enter and reconfigure urban spaces, creating, facilitat-
ing or exacerbating spatial figurations and cities integrated into global capitalism’. 
Just as the metropole invokes local urban territory as well as the place of a city in 
world- spanning networks, metromobility, as a set of political, economic, cultural 
and social relations, has this dual character. In this chapter I look to the practices 
through which cities articulate global ambitions and to the processes by which 
deterritorialised global flows become territorialised and embedded in local urban 
contexts (Peck and Tickell 2002; Sassen 2001). As transit plays an active role in 
local and global circuits, it is a particularly useful site from which to understand 
these power- laden worlding engagements (Roy and Ong 2011).2
Broadly speaking, rapid urban rail is frequently used as a tool to deal with 
urban expansion and to manage the economic and social contradictions of rapidly 
transforming city- regions (Kantor et al. 2012). Urban rail also plays more active 
roles in generating growth, acting as a map to guide investment and to signal prior-
ity areas for development. In the context of competitive global urbanisation, many 
urban authorities are seeking priority investment in select infrastructure – such as 
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rapid urban rail – as a means to enhance the attractiveness of regional territory, to 
anchor investment and to integrate into transnational value chains (Brenner 2004; 
Enright 2016). Through explicit TOD, or through more implicit growth impera-
tives or tax incentives, urban rail systems are essential to infrastructure- driven eco-
nomic and territorial restructuring.
In a world of neoliberal imperatives, transit is particularly prized for its abil-
ity to produce urban rent. Urban transport schemes seeking global city status 
 unabashedly aim to unlock potentials and to raise the value of land in underper-
forming regional territories through targeted developments. Most prominently, 
major transit initiatives seek to link international airports with regional hubs of the 
new economy, thereby projecting the city into global networks at the same time 
that they dramatically transform metropolitan space. In these spatial and social 
restructurings, transit is a vehicle of uneven development, the ‘splintering’ of urban 
space (Graham and Marvin 2001) and the entrenchment  – and even heighten-
ing – of existing class hierarchies and relations of domination. Tied to the physical 
and normative models of financialisation, transit is implicated in the gentrifica-
tion, spatial polarity and racialised inequality that are hallmarks of the global city 
(Enright 2016; Hulchanski 2018; Massey 2007; Sassen 2001).3
In terms of its concrete geographies, it is notable that this uneven produc-
tion of global city space occurs not only in central areas but also through complex 
dynamics of polycentric and post- suburban territorial restructuring (Soja 2000; 
Phelps and Wood 2011). Keil (2018, 84), for example, emphasises the importance 
of suburbs in these processes, stressing that peripheries play a key role in ‘defining 
globalization both through their importance to globalizing economies and due to 
their socio- demographic diversification’. It is also in these suburban spaces – where 
transit is not well integrated – that conflicts over transit, and the urban values it 
represents, become most pronounced.
Processes of suburban and regional transit planning and policy- making also 
offer a particularly useful lens onto the reconfiguration of governance because 
they necessarily involve the interaction of diverse stakeholders traversing multiple 
administrative boundaries. In this sense, the emergence of metromobility is inex-
tricable from shifts in urban politics beyond the state and beyond the traditional 
territorial borders of the city. Preliminarily, these shifts in politics and governance 
include development models based on megaprojects and public–private part-
nerships (Flyvbjerg et  al. 2003; Siemiatycki 2009), multilevel and collaborative 
governance arrangements (Brenner 2004; Pinson 2009), multi- scalar and multi-
sectoral ‘networked’ urbanisms (Dupuy 2008), new transit- led regionalisms and 
nationalisms (Enright 2016; Wachsmuth 2017) and diffuse patterns of contentious 
politics (Attoh 2012; Caldeira 2013). This leads to new experiments in collective 
action as well as inter- institutional and civil society battles over who controls, man-
ages, finances, owns, operates and uses transit systems.
If in its economic, spatial and political functions urban rail forges physical 
connections between and among territories, the extra- material dynamics of transit 
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networks concretise cities’ ideological commitments to globality and globalism. 
Underground transit networks, as much as vertical skyscrapers, are gleaming 
icons to progress and modernity. The messages, stories and aesthetics of metro-
mobility convey collective dreams and desires, sometimes in line with, but often at 
odds with, a transit network’s technical functioning (Easterling 2014; Siemiatycki 
2006). Metros are a permanent stamp of urban legitimacy, and the integrity of a 
city’s urban rail system is a metric of its arrival to ‘true’ city- dom. Real or proposed 
transit systems thus frequently function as tools to present and project utopian 
images of a better society and an improved future on which current plans are to 
be based. A transit network is a particularly salient tool for inward- and outward- 
facing rebrandings as it promises to solve economic, social and environmental 
problems simultaneously. Even when they fail – and the tangible benefits of transit- 
led development are unpredictable – urban rail projects do important work in artic-
ulating global and regional development and sparking territorial transformation.
The influence of metro systems on urban development can be seen globally, but 
individual metropolises and metro networks are rendered global very particularly. 
Mass transit moves people, places, ideas and capital in ambivalent, contested and 
contingent ways. What results from the growing prominence of metromobility is not 
a smooth frictionless world, or the same patterns of mobility everywhere, but a var-
iegated and uneven global urban landscape. An analysis of London’s and Toronto’s 
respective trajectories reveals the contextual nature of these general trends.
Mobilising London as a global city
London’s historical development has long been shaped by its transport and infra-
structure systems. Its iconic bridges, docklands, railways, airports and highways 
have responded to London’s evolution and have transformed the city’s role within 
the United Kingdom and in the world. From the construction of the Metropolitan 
Railway in 1863 through to the extensive multimodal rail networks of Transport 
for London (TfL), rapid urban rail has been central to London’s development from 
imperial metropole to alpha global city.
If the Underground rail network has indelibly shaped London’s develop-
ment (Bownes et  al. 2012), the planning of the global city as it relates to mass 
transit emerged in 1996 with a document by the central public authority, London 
Transport, titled Planning London’s Transport to Win as a Global City. Claiming that 
London’s ‘greatest strength’ is its status as a world city (London Transport 1996, 1), 
the report analyses how transport can best support and enhance this position in the 
years ahead to help London adapt to changing conditions and maximise its com-
parative advantage. The central claim of the report is that ‘in order to maintain its 
status as a world city London requires a modern efficient transport system which 
meets the needs of its residents, businesses and visitors while respecting and improv-
ing the environment’ (1). While the report aims at all transport modes, particular 
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attention is given to the promises and shortcomings of London’s Underground and 
urban rail networks in meeting existing and future travel demands.
The spatial strategy outlined by London Transport relies on a number of 
interconnected goals. These include connecting downtown and suburbs, linking 
the centre of the city to international corridors and amenities and enhancing the 
quality of travel conditions ‘serving increasingly affluent and discriminating pas-
sengers’ (London Transport 1996, 27). In these changes, transit should facilitate 
four priority world city sectors: creative and cultural industries, finance and busi-
ness services, tourism, and power and influence (15). The report emphasises mass 
transit’s role in generating regional coherence, promoting international rail and 
airport links, attracting elite users and growing priority sectors of a post- industrial 
economy. Maintaining and improving mass transit, and urban rail in particular, 
was identified as an imperative and urgent need. ‘Promoting the competitive posi-
tion of London as a world city is the top priority for this transport strategy, because 
the future of London depends on it and because of the importance of London’s 
invisible earnings to the economy of the UK as a whole’ (23).
The desire and seeming requirement to become global by following this 
market- oriented development path was further supported by the ‘Four World 
Cities Transport Study’ in 1999, which put London in comparison with New York, 
Tokyo and Paris in order to identify comparative advantages of London as well as 
best practices to be learned from perceived competitors (London Research Centre 
1999). Comparing London with other similarly positioned cities vying for global 
influence, the report found that London’s main weaknesses lay in the overcrowd-
ing of the current system and in a lack of long- term vision and investment. This 
concretised the priorities and values that would set the path for transit planning 
into the twenty- first century.
In 2000, as part of the institution of the regional Greater London Authority 
(GLA) (replacing the Greater London Council), responsibility for urban- regional 
transit was shuffled from the central government agency London Transport to the 
new Transport for London corporation. London’s transport system was named as 
one of the Mayor of London’s four key policy areas and was seen by Ken Livingstone 
(and his successors Boris Johnson and Sadiq Khan) as key to realising sucess for 
London as a whole (GLA 2001; Johnson 2013). Indeed, as a regional body the 
GLA has responsibility over transport, land use and economic development and 
the three are considered interdependent. Since its origin, the mandate for TfL’s 
transport and transit planning is to ‘unlock’ development potentials in regional 
sites while responding to the city’s growth needs. At the same time, then, that the 
state was rescaled to the regional level, the GLA and Department of Communities 
and Local Government adopted a narrative about development and globalism see-
ing world market integration as the solution to the problems plaguing the city at 
the turn of the century. Successive London Plans (see especially Mayor of London 
2004) would later provide the broad development framework for the city based on 
these values.
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Transit was absolutely essential to the various post- industrial strategies 
employed by London’s governing elites to create the world city. The immense pro-
ject to revitalise Canary Wharf and the London Docklands, for example, would 
have been impossible politically and materially without the extension of the 
Jubilee line of the London Underground and the construction of Docklands Light 
Rail. While the Docklands held a central position in local and national debates 
over strategic development priorities, debates over what kind of transit should be 
built, where and for what purposes were at the heart of virulent struggles over the 
city’s future more generally (Massey 2007). New transit links were imperative in 
the transformation of the fading imperial city into a new centre of international 
finance (Massey 2007) and they invariably contributed to the devastating social 
and spatial problems inherent in such a transition.
Throughout the early 2000s, notions of transit’s world- class potential were 
closely aligned with the British urban policy of ‘urban regeneration’, a norma-
tive concept to deal with urban decline, decay and transformation through ter-
ritorial restructuring and welfare provision (Cochrane 2007; Couch et  al. 2003; 
Imrie et al. 2009). Regeneration was a local social and spatial policy, but it was 
also embedded within ‘the broadcloth of international relations and transnational 
processes relating to the capital’s position as a global city and as a pre- eminent 
player in the global economy’ (Imrie et  al. 2009, 4). Transit solidified regenera-
tion by assuring the capital’s economic competitiveness at key economic hubs and 
through jump- starting land and property markets. In addition to Canary Wharf, 
twenty- first- century regeneration megaprojects such as Paddington Basin, King’s 
Cross, Thames Gateway and Stratford Olympic Park have been achieved through 
vast investments in new and improved urban rail. Transit was thus a significant, if 
often unacknowledged, participant in the neoliberal deregulation, commercialisa-
tion and financialisation of urban life that has defined the recent history of London.
The Crossrail, London’s newest railway, is the latest project to cement the 
city’s growth- first regional and national development priorities (see Cochrane 
2007). The vast network (renamed the Elizabeth Line) is expanding the scale of the 
city while bringing Heathrow and other international infrastructure hubs (includ-
ing the Royal Albert Docks, also the new site of China’s Belt and Road network; 
see Wiig and Silver 2019) in connection with each other and with major employ-
ment hubs. Crossrail promises to completely transform movement throughout 
London by providing a high- speed east–west link and by increasing the capacity of 
London’s rail transit by 10 per cent (Crossrail 2018). Even more impressively, the 
Crossrail is exemplary of property- led transit regeneration, characterised by the 
stimulation of regional office parks, retail centres and telecommunications districts 
along the network. It has been a major catalyst for large- scale gentrification across 
London and the South East. Building on this rent and realty focus of the Crossrail, 
TfL (which will eventually take over operations of the line) has recently launched 
a much broader programme to leverage its land assets in financial markets and to 
offset shortfalls in public revenue (Financial Times 2018).
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Not merely a technical megaproject, the Crossrail has ‘world- class design’ at 
its heart (Crossrail 2020) and investment in this immense infrastructure has been 
paired with notable programmes of heritage, arts and culture. From impressive 
starchitecture to blue- chip arts installations along the central portion of the rail-
way known as ‘the Culture Line’, the railway is generating support for metromobil-
ity while reworking what Asher Ghertner (2015) calls ‘world class’ aesthetics. This 
yoking of culture and infrastructure, along with the cultivation of the Underground 
‘superbrand’ (Bownes et al. 2012, 227), exemplifies how imaginative changes are 
essential to transit’s role in development. A highly cultivated imaginary network 
supports ideals of transit urbanity, while also consolidating urban identities and 
selling the physical network abroad. Building on its brand recognition and pres-
tige, TfL has also vastly expanded its international consultancy wing and is becom-
ing an influential global policy actor in its own right (Transport for London 2018).
Toronto
Not unlike London, Toronto’s history can be written through its infrastructures 
of transport. Yet in contrast to the rich historical legacy of London’s railways and 
Underground, Toronto’s mass transit system has a more modest history. Urban 
dynamics remain dominated by automobility (Filion 2003, 2010; Walks 2014, 
2015). While a recent consumer- led civic renewal in the city has created a market 
for Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) paraphernalia and sparked nostalgia for the 
city’s beloved streetcars, transit – and, in some cases, its absence – is more often 
than not seen as an obstacle to Toronto’s global ambitions and not its wellspring 
(OECD 2010; Toronto Board of Trade 2009). Nevertheless, metromobility has not 
been absent from Toronto’s recent development and it is useful to understand tran-
sit’s role in what J. P. Addie (2013, 198) calls ‘Toronto’s growth from provincial city 
to global metropolis’.
The TTC subway network emerged in the 1950s following citywide battles 
over transport that cut across urban–suburban and partisan viewpoints on how the 
city should develop. In its early days, the TTC rail network was used by reform-
ist politicians to support infrastructure- led growth through a Fordist- Keynesian 
regime of growth and collective consumption. In contrast to many North American 
cities where planning was sacrificed to the car, Toronto at this time gained a favour-
able reputation for visionary planning that emphasised mass transit alongside, if 
not in place of, the private automobile. The TTC’s early planning was driven by 
social reproduction as much as by economic rationales. By the late 1980s, however, 
the system had not kept pace with the population or the sprawling urbanisation of 
the Greater Toronto region and began to be seen as a hindrance both to daily travel 
and to sustained growth.
The dynamics of the city’s mobility systems  – and in particular contests 
between auto- and metromobility – would prove central to Toronto’s post- Fordist 
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transition and entry into the twenty- first century (see especially Walks 2015). In 
Toronto, urban neoliberalisation originally featured a disinvestment in mass transit 
in favour of continued support for the automobile and automobile manufactur-
ing. When Mike Harris was elected Premier of Ontario in 1995, for example, his 
‘Common Sense Revolution’ viewed transit as an unnecessary service cost. Rather 
than positioning mass transit as a lever to restore growth to the province and sup-
port his large- scale state restructuring, and with a decidedly anti- urban bias, mass 
transit was downloaded from the province onto the City of Toronto, effectively 
halting the roll- out of ambitious capital projects and regional schemes.
Through what Julie Anne Boudreau and co- authors (2009, 61) call a ‘reluc-
tant global city strategy’, Harris and his Progressive Conservative government were 
antagonistic toward urban issues yet ‘consistently pushed Toronto as a location 
for international capital accumulation’. Transit was not part of the framework for 
urban boosterism that otherwise fuelled commitment to large- scale development 
and regeneration activity. As Toronto’s version of neoliberalism had been ideologi-
cally and politically expressed along the lines of automobility (Walks 2015), entre-
preneurial and global regimes of metromobility did not have a strong pull. The 
somewhat paradoxical strategy of emphasising regional and global competitive-
ness, while disinvesting in infrastructure, however, eventually proved untenable.
Following the Harris reforms, business leaders as well as reformist politicians 
responded to the lack of investment, the poorly integrated network and the draw-
backs of intergovernmental conflict. Although they differed in aim and approach, 
repeated attempts by business and progressive city- politicians to implement com-
prehensive overhauls of the transit system cohered around the need to build new 
rapid links, especially to the underserved suburbs. The Toronto Board of Trade 
(2001) wrote a publication outlining their ‘Strategy for Rail Based Transit in the 
GTA’ in which they saw mass transit as a way to project the wealthy city- region 
onto the world stage and into world markets. The Board of Trade had an ambitious 
regional vision for transport, with an emphasis on rail over bus service, stressing 
the importance of connections between supra- local circuits of transport rather 
than local transit in its own right. They also demanded a governing body at the 
metropolitan scale that would be capable of arranging such a service. Transit, write 
Keil and Young (2008), had become ‘a bottleneck to the very economic competi-
tiveness that largely drives public policy in the region’ (181).
At the same time, progressives under Mayor David Miller put forward a holis-
tic plan in 2006 called Transit City that also sought to use transit as a lever for 
radical urban transformation. Featuring 120 kilometres of Light Rail Transit (with 
a rapid route to Pearson International Airport), Transit City aimed primarily to 
weave a dense mesh of local links, with priority given to underserved areas of the 
city, especially the inner suburbs. Transit City did have extra-local connections, but 
its main purpose was to equalise territory within the existing City of Toronto. This 
plan, however, never received funding and was overturned in 2010 when Rob Ford 
became mayor. With this stalling, a lack of adequate transit provision is a central 
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element in Toronto’s entrenched urban social spatial inequity (Boudreau et  al. 
2009; Hertel et al. 2015; TTCriders 2012).
For its part, in its ‘Ridership Growth Strategy’ the TTC (2003) also did not 
seek to create a new global network or lead the global city charge. Rather, it 
adopted a ‘defensive strategy’ of service improvements, fare initiatives and small- 
scale improvements (Keil and Young 2008, 741). Strikingly, in the last two dec-
ades of TTC annual reports, there is almost no mention of worldly ambition, global 
vision or international competitiveness.
The discourses of competitive metromobility, however, did rise in promi-
nence and influence after the provincial government of Dalton McGuinty estab-
lished a new regional body with significant powers for planning and management 
of transport in the Greater Toronto region in 2008. This authority, later to become 
Metrolinx, explicitly sought to build Toronto’s regional competitiveness. With the 
speculative development and the creation of regional growth poles guiding their 
‘Big Move’ Regional Transport Plan (RTP), Metrolinx crystallised mass transit’s role 
as a driver of urban development and verified the link between Toronto’s regional 
transformation and global ambition. ‘The RTP will not only reclaim our region’s 
traditional transport advantage, but also bolster our global competitiveness, pro-
tect the environment and improve quality of life. For the first time, like so many 
of our competitors, we are truly thinking like a single region’ (Metrolinx 2008, i). 
While Metrolinx frequently mentions international connections, competitiveness 
and regional prosperity in the same breath, the discourses of the global city are far 
less developed than they are in London and competition is only one of a number of 
other priorities and goals.
Overall, a less reluctant global city strategy began to take shape through 
infrastructure- led growth coalitions. All three levels of government used signature 
projects – both ‘soft’ cultural initiatives such as arts and cultural investments, and 
‘hard’ endeavours such as waterfront restructuring – to drive renewal and regen-
eration projects in Toronto. The revitalisation of Union Station (the keystone of 
the regional Metrolinx Big Move initiative) is particularly notable here on both of 
these fronts. These renovations were leveraged as a selling point in advance of the 
Pan American Games in 2015 and as a launching pad for a potential 2024 Olympic 
bid. With extensive design and cultural programming associated with the rebuild, 
a major aspect of upgrading the station is to convince residents of Toronto as well 
as investors and tourists that the city’s transit network is a state- of- the- art amenity 
fit for the world- class city it aspires to become (Enright 2018).
The creation of a new privately operated airport connection, the Union 
Pearson Express (UP Express), also exemplifies an emerging globalising rational-
ity – and its limits. The UP Express was created to provide high- speed connections 
between Pearson International Airport, located in the suburb of Mississauga, and 
Union Station in the centre of Toronto. It opened in 2015, but from the outset plans 
for the link were plagued with controversy. Residents along the proposed route, 
for example, were concerned about the environmental impact of the link and 
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questioned the choice of diesel over electric rail cars. Community organisations 
in Weston village were also concerned about how the line would cut through their 
neighbourhood. Residents in Weston – home to many airport workers – were even-
tually given a new station along the line as a compromise. Despite this, many were 
not able to use the new ‘premium’ train as the fares were priced out of their reach. 
Indeed, due to its exorbitantly high fares (especially when compared with other 
TTC options), the UP Express ran well below capacity throughout its first years of 
operation. The debacle over UP Express shows the continued disconnections from 
the world, despite global world- class imaginaries and marketing.
Nevertheless, a more explicit – if tenuous – political consensus on the impor-
tance of urban rail to urban prosperity and global urbanisation after 2010 facilitated 
the completion of transit projects, such as the TTC’s Spadina subway extension and 
Metrolinx’s Eglinton Crosstown Express, and it prompted new leadership, includ-
ing the appointment of Andy Byford (formerly of TfL) as CEO of the TTC in 2011. 
New flagship stations along the Spadina extension and elite art, architectural and 
design features announced an era defined by ambitious vision. Despite ongoing 
obstacles to long- term renovations and growth of the network, these changes 
appeared to be a bold new direction for a city that is repeatedly criticised for lack of 
ambition and action (Levine 2014; Lorinc 2012).
The provincial government of Doug Ford has also recently embraced a very 
particular variant of metromobility, mobilising subways to ‘open up’ Ontario for 
business. Through a re- upload of the subway system from the City of Toronto in 
2019, they have proposed an aggressive strategy of attempting to take back control 
over Toronto’s key infrastructure network and use it as a scaffolding for massive new 
private developments. Transit in Toronto thus continues to be a highly contested 
point of convergence for many aspects of Toronto’s development.4 Competing plans 
to balance metromobility and automobility, and to determine the guiding values of 
these mobility systems, are at the heart of ongoing struggles between various levels 
of government and between civil society actors.
Conclusion
Mass urban transit is today a crucial aspect of spatial and economic planning. 
This chapter has considered the emergence of metromobility systems in London 
and Toronto and the way that mass transit is bound up with worlding practices. 
Through attention to urban rail infrastructures as complex social systems, it has 
argued that transit mediates global and local connections and is the structure 
whereby internal space comes to align with the role of cities in the global economy. 
Moreover, as metromobility systems are extensive and topological, these cities can-
not be thought of as isolated from one another but must be seen as part of the same 
networks of personnel, corporations and ideological agendas. The comparison 
between Toronto and London is not a story of standardisation, nor is it offered to 
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claim either city as a ‘success’ or ‘failure’ along a given pathway to global city status. 
Rather, these cases demonstrate the varied and ambivalent functions of transit in 
global urban development.
Notes
 1. By metromobility I refer primarily to mobility systems (Urry 2007) centred on metros (or subways) and rapid 
passenger urban rail (including commuter trains and light rail transit). In the North Atlantic, metromobility 
is emerging alongside and often in competition with the dominant system of automobility.
 2. Urban rail systems are involved in worlding processes insofar as they comprise what Roy and Ong (2011, 
312) describe as ‘practice[s] of centering, of generating and harnessing global regimes of value’. The focus 
in this chapter is primarily on the meso- level political economy of transit- led urbanisation, but this is under-
stood to be embedded within a broader range of world- making practices that occur in and through transit 
networks (see e.g. Chattopadhyay 2012; Datta 2012).
 3. Mass transit today is also, of course, a key tool of liberation, redistribution and democratisation. It is integral 
to a city’s quality of life, essential for collective urban access and can be mobilised in the pursuit of univer-
sal social welfare and collective spatial justice. Due to the networked importance of transit infrastructures, 
as well as their significance in everyday life, growth- maximising economic imperatives often dovetail with 
more social and environmentally oriented city building practices.
 4. Doug Ford’s subway upload goes against previous conservative policies of service downloading. Yet it gives 
the province unprecedented control over regional governance and land use planning. The precise futures of 
this plan and his proposed ‘Ontario Line’, however, remain uncertain and embroiled in controversy.
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The governance of urban public spaces 




This chapter discusses forms of urban public spaces governance that are emerging 
in London out of a rearrangement of governance responsibilities between local gov-
ernment, communities and private interests. Beyond the so- called privately owned 
public spaces (POPS)1 – the privately owned and managed parts of the physical 
public realm – there has been an increasing takeover of the management of parks 
and other public areas by not- for- profit organisations from the voluntary, commu-
nity and private sectors, as well as the emergence and multiplication of Business 
Improvement Districts (BIDs).2
This is not a phenomenon peculiar to London. However, the city’s size, its his-
tory of private and voluntary involvement in public space provision and manage-
ment, and the multiplicity of stakes in those spaces make it a laboratory in which to 
observe how public space governance has responded to pressures on existing gov-
ernance systems and to try to understand the full implications of those responses.
Should we be concerned about the transfer of public space governance from 
elected local governments to organised groups of stakeholders? Does this make 
those spaces more private than public? What are the aggregate consequences of 
transferring public space governance to third parties for the city?
For some, direct stakeholder involvement in governance represents a more 
effective way of ensuring that towns and cities remain viable and competitive, with 
potentially more efficient, demand- sensitive and differentiated ways of delivering 
services and managing public spaces. Added to this is the access to resources of 
various kinds beyond those of declining public sector budgets (Audit Commission 
2002). For others, the transfer of public realm governance functions from the state 
to other social agents, and especially to the private sector, constitutes privatisation. 
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public realm and their prevalence over more communal ones (see Low and Smith 
2006; Kohn 2004).
This chapter discusses the implications of governance transfer processes 
in public spaces with evidence from London. It deploys an analytical framework 
based on the notion of rights over public goods (Blomley 2014; Ostrom 2003) to 
reflect on how those arrangements shape the attributes that make up the public 
essence of those spaces – their publicness. In doing that, the chapter explores the 
point highlighted by Boydell and Searle (2014), of cities made up of constellations 
of spaces with fine- grained differences in publicness making up the public realm.
In its look at emerging forms of public space management in London through 
the lens of allocation and appropriation of rights, the chapter also examines the 
emerging tensions between the active participation of those with a recognised 
stake in a public space and the protection of other legitimate interests, including 
those of the wider society. In its conclusion, the chapter discusses the implications 
of its findings for local democracy, for London and for other global cities.
The context: Declining public space budgets and increasingly 
diverse demands
The offloading of governance and management responsibility over public goods 
in general and public spaces in particular in the UK has a long history, with its fair 
share of controversy and opposition. The background has been the long process 
of redesign of the role of the state under a powerful mix of ideological aspirations 
for a reduced state and the move to adapt the economy and society to a globalised 
economy. It has been at play from the late 1970s, since the early years of Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservative government, and its latest incarnation has taken the shape 
of ‘devolution of power’ from government to regional, local government and civil 
society, and goes hand in hand with a search for alternative ways to fund public 
services (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012). This process has been given a considerable 
push with the recent financial crisis and the austerity measures that have come to 
dominate many western economies (see e.g. Raco 2013; Hastings et al. 2015; Peck 
2012). Local authorities have used this devolution of power framework to transfer 
in part, or as a whole, governance and management responsibilities for local public 
services to interested parties in civil society, under what some have termed con-
tractual governance (Peel et al. 2009; Vincent- Jones 2000). For public spaces, this 
has been substantiated in many forms: in the proliferation of long leases to allow 
the transfer of public land containing, or designated to contain, parks and green 
space to not- for- profit trusts; in the increasing use of the 2002 right-to-manage 
 legislation to transfer the management of local authority housing estates and their 
grounds to resident- led bodies; and in the use of public–private partnerships and 
private finance initiative mechanisms in build–operate–transfer contracts to secure 
private capital investment for redeveloping and managing public facilities. This is 
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in addition to the wide use of simpler contracting- out instruments transferring 
all or some public space governance responsibilities to a contractor and the mul-
tiplication of less formal arrangements incorporating stakeholders in governance 
decision- making. The implications of this process for the nature of public spaces 
can be significant.
There is considerable academic literature on the withdrawal of the state from 
the provision and management of public spaces (see Low and Smith 2006; Law 
2002; Minton 2006, 2009; Németh and Schmidt 2011; Langstraat and van Melik 
2013). It draws on long- standing, predominantly US debates about the changing 
nature of the state and of the relationship between state and markets, the public 
and the private, and the extension of forms of commodification into social life. In 
most of the pre- financial crisis literature, the decreasing presence of the public sec-
tor in the provision and management of public spaces is associated with a more 
assertive role of market forces in urban governance in the 1980s and 1990s (see 
Kohn 2004; Sorkin 1992). This shift would be a corollary of the dominance of ‘neo-
liberal’ or pro- market approaches to politics and to policy- making and the emer-
gence of the ‘entrepreneurial’ city.
Overall, the literature suggests a gradual process of privatisation, with cor-
porate interests taking over public spaces. This would be exemplified either in 
direct provision in the context of privately led urban regeneration projects and the 
multiplication of privately owned public spaces (Hayden 2006), or through the 
business- led management of publicly owned spaces, as in the case of BIDs (Minton 
2009; Ward 2006). Some have even suggested the ‘death of public space’ (Sorkin 
1992)  as the outcome of this commodification and privatisation process, with 
adverse consequences for an inclusive democratic polity.
The post- financial crisis literature has emphasised the impacts of austerity 
policies and the search for resources outside the public sector to provide and man-
age public goods. Privatisation is still the main theme, as a cash- starved public sec-
tor sells off its assets to the highest bidder in order to obtain the necessary resources 
to invest in underfunded public services (see Raco 2013; Whitfield 2012). Some, 
however, have focused on the potential for a new citizen–state relationship that 
process might facilitate (see e.g. Pestoff and Brandsen 2010). Difficulties in pro-
gressing with capital- intense redevelopment operations might create a challenge 
to the ‘neoliberal order’ and offer opportunities for the temporary takeover of pub-
lic spaces by activists and community groups in the name of an alternative, more 
democratic publicness. This would represent a form of resistance urbanism, cre-
ating a new ‘commons’ and suggesting embryonic forms of citizen empowerment 
(Kohn 2013; Lubin 2012; Gursozlu 2015; Eizenberg 2011).
Is that what we see in London? A visit to most of its public spaces would not 
give the impression that they are in immediate danger of becoming corporatised 
spaces, and the ‘end of public space’ still seems far off. On the contrary, there is 
evidence that old and new public spaces in London under different regimes have 
flourished (see e.g. Carmona and Wunderlich 2012). At the same time, the few, 
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occasional and temporary acts of radical takeover – such as those of the Occupy 
London movement  – have so far not succeeded in bringing about new types of 
state–citizen relationship. Not that there are not examples of both, but, more 
numerous than corporatised public private spaces and their opposite, the protest 
takeover spaces – and arguably more significant for the daily life of the majority of 
citizens – are those in which governance and management regimes have become 
hybridised. As they seek ways to cope with austerity, while often under pressure to 
respond to historical demands from pressure groups, local governments and com-
munities have been devising ways to ensure that existing and new public spaces 
somehow meet their aspirations and fulfil the functions expected of them. This has 
taken place in some planned and some ad hoc fashions, through various forms of 
transfer of governance and management responsibility from the public sector to 
a plethora of other actors from the private, voluntary and community sectors, as 
indicated earlier. Whereas those governance transfers might not be as dramatic 
as corporate or activist takeover, they raise fundamental questions about the very 
nature of publicness, of what public spaces are or should be.
Assessing publicness
There is good evidence of an increasing number of public spaces in London gov-
erned through arrangements that diverge from the norm (De Magalhães and Freire 
Trigo 2017a, 2017b). This has led to questions about how public they really are, 
manifest in recent policy concerns with the consequences of the proliferation of 
public spaces outside direct local government control (see e.g. London Assembly 
2011). This is reflected in turn in the popular press and informs the debate around 
a potential loss of ‘publicness’ caused by those governance arrangements.
However, assessing ‘publicness’ is not a straightforward matter. Most of the 
literature on the subject adopts a normative stance, centred on ideal models of 
publicness, against which individual spaces could be measured. The criteria defin-
ing those models vary considerably, from ownership to the nature and range of 
the users, to the type of relationships public spaces should foster between them, 
to the nature of the practices that take place there, to design elements, and to a 
combination of those in varying proportions (see e.g. Ellin 1996; Varna 2014; Low 
and Smith 2006; Mitchell and Staeheli 2006; Benn and Gauss 1983; Németh and 
Schmidt 2011). Implicit in most formulations is the view of publicness as an objec-
tive and absolute concept with a measurable dimension, with spaces being more or 
less public the closer to or further away from the norm they are. Any progressive 
policy agenda should therefore be concerned with making as many public spaces 
as possible come closer to that norm and with changing those that diverge from it.
The problem is that cities are made up of a vast array of public spaces per-
forming different functions for different groups of people, with varying practical 
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and giving rise to a myriad of potential conflicts. There is only a weak rationale for 
the idea that a place such as Trafalgar Square in central London, with its central 
location, easy accessibility, large symbolic appeal and tradition of events and large 
demonstrations, should have its publicness measured with the same gauge as a 
small local park, used primarily by local elderly people, dog walkers and young 
mothers and their children. Moreover, whereas there are spaces that might be eas-
ily classified as fully public or fully private, for many more this is far more nuanced, 
and most will have attributes that might exhibit different degrees of publicness or 
privateness. The case for a spectrum of publicness rather than a more simplistic 
public/ private dichotomy is not new (see e.g. Carmona 2015).
Understanding what different types of public space governance arrange-
ments mean requires a relational, non- normative conceptualisation of publicness. 
This should take into account the context in which a space is located, the manifold 
stakes that people and groups of people might have in it and the ways through 
which these stakes are negotiated and the priorities defined by those arrangements.
Publicness is about the rights people have over the attributes of a space – what 
they can and cannot do with them. The literature on property rights and the com-
mons suggests the basis for a non- normative view of publicness, understanding it 
as the result of the allocation of rights and responsibilities over those attributes 
(Ostrom 2003; Colding et al. 2013; Lee and Webster, 2006; Németh 2012; Boydell 
and Searle 2014). Whereas the list of material and immaterial attributes of a public 
space will be extensive, the chapter focuses on the rights associated with the most 
basic and defining elements of publicness: the degree of openness of access and use 
of the space and its attributes and the power to have a say on them (De Magalhães 
and Freire Trigo 2017a).
Firstly, then, is the right of access: the most basic expectation is that a public 
space should be provided and managed in a way that secures relatively open access 
to most members of society. This formulation accepts Webster’s (2002) point that 
very few urban public goods – public spaces included – are public in the sense of 
absolute openness to access. Rights of access encompass rules and mechanisms 
that regulate whatever restrictions there might be on how individuals access the 
attributes they value in a particular public space, be they physical access to the site 
or the access to a facility or activity.
Secondly, the expectation is that people who have access to that space would be 
able to use it and enjoy its attributes – that is, the right of use – without other restric-
tions than those dictated by broadly accepted social norms of behaviour and rights of 
other users. Rights of use refer to the rules and codes of behaviour, and to enforce-
ment mechanisms that regulate how individuals that have access to a public space 
can enjoy its attributes, be they physical or the confirmation of a symbolic function.
Thirdly, people would expect that users of a public space, the public, would 
have the right to a say on key decisions regarding its management and future, 
including the setting of rules about access and use. This would represent a third 
basic right, the right to accountability. Rights to accountability refer to the rules 
and mechanisms through which the different stakes in a particular public space 
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are heard and recognised in its governance and management, and through which 
conflicts and disputes between them are solved.
Drawing on Ostrom’s (2003) conceptualisation of the governance of common 
pool resources, distribution and exercise of rights to access, use and accountabil-
ity is itself shaped by a negotiation process that involves the allocation of rights 
to manage, regulate, exclude, dispose and so forth, which make up public space 
governance (see also Foster 2011; Garnet 2012). In other words, the negotiation 
process through which these rights are defined, bundled up, unbundled and allo-
cated defines public space governance, which in turn affects how the rights that 
characterise publicness are themselves allocated and exercised.
Using that analytical framework, the chapter turns to four cases in London in 
which local authorities and other public bodies have reallocated the governance 
rights that shape publicness to different stakeholders.
Devolved publicness and stakeholders’ rights
A cursory look at the main public spaces in many areas of London will show a collec-
tion of public space governance regimes, replicated in various degrees elsewhere. 
This chapter focuses on those cases in which the transfer of governance rights away 
from the public sector has been more extensive, and the rights transferred more sig-
nificant in their impacts on publicness. The chapter looks at four cases within walk-
ing distance of each other, in the South Bank area of London, across the Thames 
from the West End (Figure 5.1). This leaves aside the more obvious cases of privately 
Figure 5.1 The four cases (author)
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owned public spaces, where the rights associated with publicness were defined and 
allocated through the mechanism of planning obligations, and focuses attention on 
those that still belong to local governments but whose governance has been fully 
and successfully transferred to other social actors. They are particularly important 
as the former tend to represent new, additional public space (although not always), 
whereas the latter refer to existing and often long- standing public spaces.
The first case is Potters Fields Park, a one hectare park across the river from 
the Tower of London. It was leased to the Potters Fields Management Trust by 
Southwark Council in 2005 for a period of 30 years, renewable for another similar 
period. The Trust is a not- for- profit company constituted to redevelop the park and 
subsequently manage it. It is run by a Board of Directors made up of two represent-
atives from the local authority, one from the Greater London Authority, one repre-
sentative from each of the two neighbouring residents’ associations, one from the 
adjoining More London business estate and one representative from the local BID. 
The lease gives the Trust full autonomy to manage the park, including the right 
to raise income through hiring parts of it for private events. As with other leases 
of this kind, it includes a Service Level Agreement with detailed specifications on 
cleaning, health and safety, maintenance, gardening and hiring the park for events.
Waterloo Millennium Green is a relatively small but centrally located park 
just south of Waterloo railway station. It was leased in 2014 by Lambeth Council 
to Bankside Open Spaces Trust (BOST), in an exceptionally long lease (999 years). 
The Trust, set up in 2000, is a charity specialist in horticulture, gardening and the 
management of urban open spaces in the South Bank area of London. It is governed 
by a board of 12 trustees and has connections with several residents’ groups from 
public and private housing estates. The lease gives the Trust full responsibility for 
management and maintenance, which includes securing funding and empowering 
the local community to take on greater responsibility for the park.
The other cases involve land that belonged to the Greater London Council 
(GLC), the former London- wide government disbanded in 1986, and subsequently 
transferred to other public organisations before being leased out to the manag-
ing bodies described here. Jubilee Gardens is a highly visible park by the Thames, 
across the river from the government buildings in Whitehall and next to the famous 
London Eye. It was originally a patch of grass transferred to the Arts Council 
England and leased out to the Southbank Centre (a complex of theatres, concert 
halls and exhibition space), which gave a 135- year sublease to the Jubilee Garden 
Trust in 2012. The Trust is a charity set up in 2008 to take over the management of 
the park after its redevelopment. Its board has up to 16 trustees representing neigh-
bouring landowners, local businesses, residents and up to four co- opted members 
(the local authority being one of them). It is chaired by the Chief Executive Officer 
of the South Bank Employers Group, a partnership of 17 of the major organisa-
tions in the South Bank area, created to promote it as a destination for leisure and 
business, and which now works as the executive arm of the South Bank Business 
Improvement District. The lease gives the Trust full responsibility for managing 
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the park, including enforcement of rules and regulations, but significantly not the 
power to generate income from the park.
Nearby Bernie Spain Gardens is also located on land that previously belonged 
to the GLC. It is a small central park facing the busy Thames riverside walkway 
and bordering the Coin Street housing cooperative buildings. It was leased to the 
Coin Street Community Builders (CSCB) for 99  years, renewable for a similar 
period. CSCB is a social enterprise that owns the lease on the land and the coop-
erative housing around the park, controlled by a board elected by its members, 
all local  residents. Its main activities are the development of cooperative housing 
and accompanying facilities in sites around the park. The lease gives CSCB full 
autonomy in the management of the park and adjacent Thames riverside walkway, 
including its initial redevelopment, its maintenance and revenue-raising rights.
All four sites are open to the wider public without significant barriers. All 
allow for a great variety of activities to happen in them, akin to a local authority- 
managed public space. There are differences, though. The extent of the governance 
rights residing with the management bodies, notably in the Jubilee and Bernie Spain 
gardens, makes them almost solely responsible for setting out regulations for access 
and use of the spaces, with codes of behaviour and restrictions on some activities 
(Figure 5.2). These restrictions might include activities such as cycling, using skate-
boards, ball games, large and/ or political gatherings and rough sleeping, and they 
have their origin in concerns with legal liability, but they also express the needs and 
aspirations of the stakeholders those bodies represent. In Potters Fields and Waterloo 
Millennium Green, such regulations are the result of complex negotiations between 
Figure 5.2 Jubilee Gardens use regulations (author)
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the local authority freeholder and the trust and, although not dissimilar to the two 
previous cases, they tend to be closer to the by- laws applying to other surrounding 
public spaces. Nevertheless, in all four spaces the ‘local community’ (surrounding 
residents, landlords and businesses) have a greater impact on the way openness and 
accessibility are defined and regulated than any other stakeholder, and in that they 
differ, even if subtly, from local authority- managed public spaces.
Accountability rights refers to the right of stakeholders to have a voice in the 
governance of a public space. The four cases in this category have a trust board as 
their main locus of accountability, providing a direct and transparent forum for all 
those stakeholders represented in the management body, to voice and negotiate 
their aspirations. However, this does not apply to all socially relevant stakes. By 
their own constitution, all these cases privilege the interests of particular groups of 
stakeholders, who have formally received the right to oversee the management of 
‘their’ public space on behalf of themselves and the public interest.
A first group of stakeholders, clearly recognised in almost all the arrange-
ments, is that of local residents – that is, those living in the immediate vicinity of 
the public space, whose interests in it as users or property owners are recognised 
as those of the ‘local community’. They are directly represented on the boards 
of three of the four charitable trusts (Potters Fields, Jubilee Gardens and Bernie 
Spain Gardens), albeit with different strengths. They also have seats on the steer-
ing group overseeing BOST, the managers for Waterloo Millennium Green. Locally 
based businesses and commercial property owners small and large are also part of 
the ‘local community’ where they are relevant: they have seats on the boards of the 
trusts in all cases except Bernie Spain Gardens, where surrounding business are ten-
ants of the housing cooperative CSCB – and therefore indirectly represented by it.
Other legitimate stakeholders and the wider public have no direct access to 
those forums. Any accountability to them is less direct and largely depends on the 
mediating role of the local authority. Local authorities do have a seat on two trust 
boards (by rights in Potters Fields, and as a co- opted member in Jubilee Gardens). 
As freeholders, they have also set the scope and the limits for the trusts’ power 
through the drafting of lease terms, as in Potters Fields and Waterloo Millennium 
Green, or through policy ‘lock- in’ with the involvement of the trusts in partnership 
agreements and policy initiatives, as in Jubilee Gardens and Bernie Spain Gardens. 
However, this indirect form of representation of interests contrasts with the direct 
accountability benefitting key stakeholders. Its effectiveness depends on the local 
authority’s interpretation of the ‘public interest’ at any moment in time, on a match 
between that interpretation and the interests of any particular section of the public, 
on the local authority’s negotiating ability, on the effectiveness of the lease terms 
and accompanying Service Level Agreements, and on the strength of sanctions for 
non- compliance with them.
To the vast majority of their users, those four spaces look and feel  public 
and generally well managed. To a large degree, that is what they are, but the 
key  attributes of publicness are determined and shaped largely by the particular 
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interests and aspirations of those represented in the management trusts rather 
than a more inclusive ‘public interest’, however defined. As freeholders and lessors, 
local authorities or other public agencies still retain the basic rights to determine 
how open access shall be, which results in the general public retaining most access 
and use rights. However, full management rights, together with some exclusion 
and alienation rights (e.g. the right to lease out space for fee- charging events), now 
belong to surrounding residents, businesses, property owners, civic groups and 
other selected parts of the local community. They also own an important element 
of governance rights, namely the right to be heard in decisions about the space and 
have their aspirations and interests counted in a direct manner: it is to them that 
the trusts are directly accountable.
This suggests a public space governance model with a break- up of the bundle 
of governance rights between the local authority and what are effectively ‘clubs’ 
of local stakeholders. This particular form of governance arrangement explicitly 
privileges some stakeholders (i.e. surrounding residents, businesses and property 
owners, and civic groups with local focus) over others, and separates their needs 
and aspirations from other more diffuse, dispersed and less articulated but equally 
legitimate interests on the basis of their geography, strength of stake and mobilisa-
tion capacity. This allows for the empowerment of those with their stakes recog-
nised in the governance arrangement; a better match between the aspirations of 
that ‘club’ of recognised stakeholders and the management of ‘their’ public space; 
and more direct and transparent accountability lines between management bodies 
and that community of stakeholders. However, it does so at the cost of formalising 
differences in rights and at the risk of disempowering other stakeholders who are 
not included in the governance arrangements. Whether or not that risk material-
ises depends on how well the governance arrangement balances the directly voiced 
aspirations of the ‘club’ and those of others, how conflicting they might be and how 
capable local authorities are of detecting and expressing the latter.
So far, those and similar forms of public space governance and management 
have worked well. All four parks are well managed and adequately meet the needs 
of their users while freeing their corresponding local authority from the burden 
of maintaining them. Conflicts between the interests of the trusts, their constitu-
ent members and other sections of the population have so far been minimal, or at 
any rate no more frequent than those occurring in local authority- managed public 
spaces. However, as the governance of more and more public spaces is transferred 
to groups of stakeholders with their own sets of interests, the chances of conflict 
increase, as does the prospect of a fragmentation of the public realm.
Conclusions
This chapter has looked at a few cases of emerging arrangements for the governance 
and management of public spaces in London to explore their potential implications 
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for publicness. The first observation is that most of the debate so far about changes 
in public space governance in London and elsewhere has insisted on linking the off-
loading of governance to third parties to an increase in corporate power and priva-
tisation. This might hold true in some new public spaces resulting from large urban 
regeneration projects, especially in the so- called POPS. However, the exclusive focus 
on potential corporate control has ignored the subtler and finer- grained process of 
negotiation over the rights that make up publicness in existing public spaces and 
therefore fails to incorporate a more nuanced understanding of the relationship 
between different communities of stakeholders, elected government and society. As 
the four cases suggest, the disengagement of local government from public space 
management in London seems to be leading to a complex and varied process of 
reallocation of different rights over publicness attributes, creating a landscape of 
multiple ‘publicnesses’ catering to diverse groups of interests, rather than a narrow 
contraposition between public and private, or between individual and corporate.
The second observation is that the four spaces have remained essentially 
‘public’ in the sense that most rights of access and use are enjoyed as they would be 
in a ‘normal’ public space and are experienced as such by most people. Municipal 
by- laws still regulate access and use in some of those spaces, and when they do not, 
the rules that apply are not very different from them. However, there is a funda-
mental difference, which might not be perceived and felt in the daily use of those 
spaces: this concerns who has the right to have a say in the governance and man-
agement of the space, that is, the right to make public space management bodies 
accountable. In all the cases these rights were transferred to something akin to a 
club of self- selected stakeholders, whose membership was defined by where they 
reside or work or the strength of the stake they or their business might have in the 
public space. This is particularly important as it is through that right that stake-
holders can realise their aspirations for public spaces, including the way they look 
and feel, and ultimately what might or might not happen in them.
What would then be the implications if we consider the aggregate impact of 
these arrangements for London as a whole, or for any other large city following 
the same path? The disengagement of local government with public space govern-
ance and the transfer away of responsibilities to others provides answers to real 
demands upon public spaces, and therefore this trend is likely to continue. Local 
authorities can divert their shrinking budgets to other public services, financial 
and social capital from people with a stake in a particular space can be mobilised 
and invested, and business and residents can ultimately exert more control over 
their operating and living environment. The four cases examined in this paper sug-
gest a city increasingly made up of constellations of public spaces with different 
governance systems, with fine-grained differences in publicness, playing different 
functions and catering for different sets of interests. This is a much more complex 
characterisation of the physical public realm than the dichotomy public/private 
often portrayed in the academic and professional debate. 
The London cases so far have not presented the dilemmas associated with 
restrictions in public access reported in the American literature. However, as public 
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space governance arrangements that secured inclusion in most of the 20th century 
evolve to become something different, new challenges emerge. Foremost among 
these is how to benefit from the resources and commitment of groups and individu-
als prepared to invest in a public space, and at the same time ensure the protection 
of all other legitimate interests in that space, including those of wider society. This 
applies to the arrangements discussed in this chapter, but also to POPS and other 
forms of private management. Key here is the ability and the political will to create 
judiciously designed ways to decide whose aspirations and interests should count 
when devolving the governance of public spaces. In a foreseeable future of con-
tinued economic uncertainty and further public expenditure cuts in which stake-
holder involvement in urban governance is a necessity, local authorities should pay 
close attention to ensure that, in the ensuing reallocation of rights and power, the 
‘public interest’ and various legitimate aspirations for public spaces are protected 
and do not become collateral damage.
Notes
 1. It should be noted that POPS in places such as Toronto, Hong Kong or New York are more clearly defined in 
their location, characteristics, opening hours and so forth through a regulated exchange between develop-
ers and local government of public goods or development rights above normal zoning parameters. Their 
equivalents in London, where there are no zoning mechanisms, are the result of case- by- case negotiations, 
with variable requirements for provision and long- term management, depending on the objectives sought by 
developers and local authorities.
 2. BIDs are legally defined associations of occupiers and/ or owners of commercial property in a locality, with 
powers to decide on a compulsory surtax, ring- fenced to pay for additional services and improvements to that 
locality. In the US, Canada and indeed most countries, BIDs are mostly composed of and run by local commer-
cial property owners, whereas in the UK they are predominantly made up of commercial property occupiers.
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London, its infrastructure and the logics 
of growth
Daniel Durrant
In fast- growing, global cities such as London and Toronto the social and physical 
infrastructural systems they depend upon are often stretched. As a combination of 
global and local drivers increase demand through rising population and inflows of 
capital, it is these systems that need to catch up and, in some cases, will constrain 
the abilities of cities to grow. As discussed by Theresa Enright, some of these sys-
tems, in particular those geared towards mobility, face outwards, connecting cities 
to patterns of global circulation of people and capital. Yet not all systems facili-
tate this sort of global engagement so directly. They also function at a more local 
and regional level, enabling cities, for example, to process the waste they produce, 
to relieve pressure on their housing markets through accessing land beyond their 
boundaries and to connect in other ways to regional and national economies.
In the same way, the politics of infrastructure is both global and local at the 
same time. Both London and Toronto share the experience of populist former mayors 
for whom infrastructure is part of their appeal to voters, be that cycle infrastructure 
(and its removal) for Rob Ford or the Garden Bridge for Boris Johnson. There are 
similarities in the political geographies that pit suburban against urban voters (Walks 
2014). Yet there are also differences, with Johnson’s use of the bicycle as his choice of 
urban transport functioning as a symbol of his approach to the city and Ford’s pref-
erence for the SUV communicating a very different position. While the challenges 
of globalisation and accommodating growth are something infrastructural systems 
share, the geographies they serve and the regimes by which they are planned, deliv-
ered and governed can also be highly context specific. Mega- infrastructure projects 
in particular seem to generate their own politics yet they also spring from local politi-
cal cultures. They are costly and disruptive, and voters have good reason to be scep-
tical of the claims made by the civic boosters that promote them (Flyvbjerg 2014). 
Nevertheless, the politics still often remain local, and the groups that are affected by 
and oppose megaprojects differ, as do the justifications that are made.
This chapter looks at one element of the justification used for two of London’s 
recent megaprojects:  the Thames Tideway Tunnel and High Speed Two (HS2). 
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This is unique to the UK, London and its history as an imperial capital, harking 
back to an era of Victorian prowess. The following sections establish the context 
in which this discourse sits. Firstly there is the city itself, its recent growth and 
the way London has promoted itself as a place where a distinctive ‘megaproject 
ecology’ has apparently resolved the difficulties global cities around the world face 
in meeting their infrastructural needs. In the case of London these needs and the 
infrastructural systems that seek to accommodate them are rarely fully contained 
within the city’s boundaries, constantly spilling over both physically and politically. 
This is reflected in a description of the two projects themselves, their history and 
the opposition to them. While they are different in terms of their scale, form and 
function, the following section discusses their political framing as responses to ‘our 
Victorian forebears’. The concluding discussion reflects upon the extent to which 
such responses can be seen as responding to common global challenges as opposed 
to being the products of very local context- and time- specific discourses.
London: Its infrastructure and ‘megaproject ecology’
London’s position in the first and second decades of the twenty- first century as a 
contender for the role of premier global city comes after a recent history of post- 
war, post- industrial decline. The political response to this, the way it has shaped 
the city with the globally connected Docklands development and the infrastruc-
ture that has enabled one form of global trade to replace another, is reflected in the 
narrative and politics of infrastructure. As a national capital, London, its economy 
and its infrastructure serve a symbolic and economic function which is often hard 
to disentangle from the country as a whole, despite significant regional dispari-
ties. Thus, the perception of a country seen as economically moribund and para-
lysed by political strife (between labour and capital) was reflected in the belief 
that the country struggled to deliver major infrastructure, a story also played out 
in the capital. There was a narrative of interminable public inquiries, such as those 
over the expansion of London’s airports in the 1960s, and a series of ‘planning 
disasters’, which again often centred on London, its motorways and civic infra-
structure (Hall 1980). As with the wider economy, the Thatcher government was 
seen as the turning point in the ability of the country to deliver projects, seen in 
both the infrastructure required to support what became a global hub in London’s 
Docklands and a growing appetite for megaprojects. The anecdote of the then 
Prime Minister’s fury at the unfavourable comparison between French and British 
rail infrastructure and the British inability to complete their high- speed rail con-
nection on time made by French President François Mitterrand is often treated as 
a pivotal moment in which a political commitment to infrastructure delivery was 
forged (Faith 2007).
Following this, a team from the consultancy Arup appeared successful in 
breaking the deadlock of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL, later rebadged as 
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HS1) where the former nationalised rail provider British Rail had failed. In con-
necting London to Paris via high- speed rail, Arup was able to design a route that 
minimised the demolition and threat to property values that had united urban and 
rural opposition to the initial British Rail proposals. The local politics that saw suc-
cessful lobbying for stations in Kent to placate rural opposition and at Stratford in 
east London was fortunate, as it would be the same link to the optimistically named 
‘Stratford International’ that was to become a key component of London’s bid to 
host the 2012 Olympics. This enabled the then Mayor Ken Livingstone to connect 
the mega- event to the ongoing planned regeneration of the east of London, turbo 
charging the development of brownfield land with the Olympic Park at Stratford.
The significance of this for the way infrastructure was planned and delivered 
was that from a perceived inability of UK governance systems and constructors to 
manage large infrastructure, an alternative narrative of success emerged. Buoyed 
by the successes of CTRL and the 2012 Olympics, it was in many ways the zenith 
of what its advocates had begun to describe as ‘London’s megaproject ecology’ 
(Davis 2017). London is a centre for not only global finance but also construction, 
engineering and architecture, with a dense network of consultancies. This network 
was boosted by the quasi- public Olympic delivery and legacy organisations, the 
growing role for Transport for London and recently bodies such as HS2Ltd and 
Bazalgette Engineering that are delivering the projects discussed in this chapter. 
This nexus of skills, knowledge and personnel aligned neatly with a city and wider 
political culture in which both parties were eager for infrastructure development.
In tandem with this turnaround, the system for planning major infrastructure 
has seen an overhaul in the form of the 2008 Planning Act. Driven by the percep-
tion that the previous public inquiry process was prohibitively slow, and by the 
use of key projects such as Terminal 5 at Heathrow (London’s main airport) to 
 create narratives of delay, the new system was heavily skewed towards rapid deliv-
ery of consent (Marshall and Cowell 2016). Furthermore, the wider institutional 
framework around infrastructure has also been reconfigured, most prominently in 
the establishment of a National Infrastructure Commission in 2015 by the former 
Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer under the Coalition and Cameron gov-
ernments, George Osborne. The Non- Departmental Public Body is charged with 
producing a National Infrastructure Assessment once in each parliament, setting 
out the needs of the UK and monitoring the government’s performance. While 
tasked with offering impartial advice to government, the Commission is made up 
of key figures from industry, construction and finance. The Commission promotes 
what it defines as ‘economic infrastructure’, with the recent history of infrastruc-
ture provision described as an ‘endless cycle of delays, prevarication and uncer-
tainty’ that has ‘limited growth’ (Armitt 2018, 3).
HS2 and the Thames Tunnel are not the only significant infrastructure pro-
jects underway. In recent years London’s megaproject ecology has fostered a return 
to several, once rejected, transport projects. Crossrail, a new regional rail link, is 
currently under construction and will connect the West of London and Heathrow 
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Airport to both Canary Wharf in the Docklands and the north-east, beyond London’s 
boundaries into Essex (Hebbert, 2014). The project was due in 2018 but at the 
time of writing (mid- 2019), the final completion date is becoming increasingly 
uncertain. Plans to expand Heathrow Airport, scrapped by the incoming Coalition 
government of 2010, are currently back on the agenda, with a new National Policy 
Statement on airports (DfT 2018) setting out government support for expansion 
under the 2008 Act. There are other major investments in transport infrastructure, 
such as the extension of the Underground’s Northern line opening up the Vauxhall 
Nine Elms Battersea Opportunity Area, home of the iconic Battersea Power Station 
(Ward et al. 2016) – yet another in a series of projects that appear to have come to 
fruition after what had been years of deliberation and false starts.
The politics of London’s infrastructure is played out at different scales, and at 
the local level there are opponents of the specific impacts of projects. These, never-
theless, will often connect to wider national and global issues such as the costs to 
taxpayers or the environmental damage caused. The narrative of projects such as the 
expansion of Heathrow or HS1 in the past often reflected the desire for global con-
nectivity discussed by Enright (see Chapter 4), yet there is always a distinct charac-
ter to this. The former, for example, has been framed as an important signifier that 
via London’s main airport the post- EU referendum UK is still ‘open for business’. Yet 
there is also an important internal dimension to the national politics of London’s 
infrastructure. The way in which the city constantly rubs up against its institutional 
boundaries has recently proved contentious in its transport connections to the wider 
South East of England where a significant proportion of its workforce actually live. 
The national (Conservative) government has been unwilling to allow Transport for 
London (controlled by Labour Mayor Sadiq Kahn) to govern the wider rail networks 
that connect to the city in what is seen as an unpalatable overreaching of mayoral 
authority into areas that are not represented (see O’Brien et al. 2018 for a detailed 
discussion). More generally the advocates of London are keen to stress that invest-
ment in the city’s infrastructure is of benefit to the UK as a whole (London First 2015). 
Yet this view has never been without contestation, Cobbett’s (1821) dismissal of the 
‘metropolis of empire’ (as proclaimed by the civic boosters of the day) as the ‘Great 
Wen’1 being a notable example. More recently and specifically this can be seen in the 
annual,  unfavourable, comparisons between per capita infrastructure spending in 
London and the less affluent regions of the UK (Raikes et al. 2018), a comparison that 
is particularly acute given that infrastructure spending in the capital held up well in 
contrast to the recent austerity inflicted disproportionately upon local governments.
HS2
HS2 is intended to provide a high- speed rail link connecting London, the 
Midlands and ultimately the North of England. It is currently planned to run 
from Euston Station in central London via an interchange on what has become 
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a major brownfield redevelopment at Old Oak Common in the north- west of the 
city. From here the initial phase runs directly to Birmingham, passing through the 
Chiltern Hills Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) in Buckinghamshire 
with a second phase planned to split, forming the ‘Y’, to connect to Leeds and 
Manchester. The overall costs of the project are hard to discern at the time of 
writing, as they have risen from an initial estimate of £32 billion to around £65 
billion (Haylen 2019), with a review of the project ongoing, as discussed below. 
Phase 1 and part of phase 2 have been granted consent via a hybrid Bill, a par-
liamentary process distinct from the 2008 Planning Act, the same consenting 
regime used for Crossrail. It is being delivered by HS2Ltd, a company wholly 
owned by the Department for Transport (DfT), with the costs shouldered directly 
by central government. In contrast to previous UK megaprojects of this scale – 
the Channel Tunnel (Gourvish 2006) and CTRL (Faith 2007) – HS2 has had a rel-
atively short gestation given its origins in the lobbying of a number of influential 
rail industry executives, Jim Steer of Steer Consulting in particular. Steer’s initial 
suggestion that the UK should consider additional high- speed rail lines, indeed a 
whole network, came in the form of a report from the consultancy Atkins, com-
missioned in 2003. The report itself is a technical analysis framing the issue as 
one of increasing rail capacity on the overburdened lines into London and sets 
out a broadly similar network to the one proposed by the government in 2010 
(Atkins 2003).
Initially conceived under the Labour government, the project was adopted 
largely unchanged by the incoming Coalition (2010–15). A  significant figure 
within this transition was Lord (Andrew) Adonis, a vocal advocate of the project 
who as a Labour peer embodies the cross- party consensus on infrastructure, hav-
ing recently served as Chair of the National Infrastructure Commission. Since 2010 
the key political figures championing the project have always been Conservatives, 
with DfT led by a Conservative minister under the Coalition and with Conservative 
administrations from then on. Thus, the framing of the project, and to a certain 
extent its form and approach, have been via the lens of Conservative Party poli-
tics. As discussed, the basic form of the project has, thus far, changed little, and 
some of the approach, such as an aggressive strategy to acquire land and to secure 
rapid parliamentary consent, can be explained in part by the small ‘p’ politics of 
infrastructure. The early stages are crucial as the infrastructure delivery indus-
try is well aware of the political risks of cancellation, which, it could be argued, 
explains the overly optimistic estimates of cost and delivery time. Some of this is 
also fed by the narrative of delay that has shaped the streamlining of infrastructure 
planning, indeed planning more generally, as a project that has spanned the party 
political divide. The specific Conservative dimension to the project can be seen in 
the removal of regional development objectives attached to the project under New 
Labour and its framing as a component in George Osborne’s ‘Northern Powerhouse’ 
agenda. While the mostly Labour leaders of Birmingham and Manchester have 
always been vocal in their support, the extent to which the benefits of the project 
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will flow from London rather than to it is highly contested, clouded in rhetoric and 
based on limited evidence (Tomaney and Marques 2013).
There has been a party political character to the opposition, with civil society 
groups in the Labour- controlled London Borough of Camden mounting a challenge 
to the widespread demolition of housing and businesses required by the expansion 
of Euston Station. Yet, in contrast, the Chilterns AONB is a Conservative heartland. 
Until recently opponents here have felt marginalised within a Conservative Party 
that has seen central figures supportive of the project. Yet the febrile politics of 
Brexit has seen Boris Johnson promise a review of HS2 as part of his appeal to 
the wider party. The Chilterns has also been the centre of some of the key civil 
society opposition, in particular HS2 Action Alliance, led by two former rail econ-
omists who have taken what they describe as an ‘evidence- based approach’ to 
criticisms of the technical and economic arguments for the project. There has also 
been organised opposition from local authorities through the 51M group led by 
Buckinghamshire County Council. National and regional media maintain ongoing 
scrutiny of the project, which saw peaks during the initial consenting phase, but 
as of early 2019 this seemed to be ramping up, with a number of documentaries 
pointing to rising costs and the impact on those households and businesses in the 
path of HS2 from both the BBC and independent broadcasters Channel 4.  This 
could be considered a success for those opposed to the project given that one target 
of the campaigning organisations has been the economic case, a tactic that has 
proved effective in other struggles against transport megaprojects (see Griggs and 
Howarth 2013, 294, for a further discussion of the way opposition groups sought 
to undermine the economic arguments for airport expansion).
Thames Tideway Tunnel
On the face of it the Tideway Tunnel is, in contrast to HS2, located completely 
within London, conceived as an addition to the city’s Victorian waste water system 
designed and built by the engineer Joseph Bazalgette. It is intended to enhance 
London’s capacity to deal with rainwater which, flowing into the sewers from an 
increasingly impermeable urban environment, results in the discharge of raw  sewage 
into the Thames. It is framed explicitly as a ‘necessary extension to the legacy of 
the Victorians’ (Halliday 2013 cited in Loftus and March 2017), as grafting new 
infrastructure onto the still functioning system in order to accommodate London’s 
growing population (Stride 2019). However, where this framing of the project and 
particularly its solution is apparent is in the construction of excess capacity. The 
initial study conducted by the Thames Tideway Strategic Study Group (TTSSG), a 
multi- agency group established by the Department for the Environment, Farming 
and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in 2005, set out the project’s objectives as ensuring 
compliance with the EU Directive on Urban Waste Water, which the discharge of 
sewage into the Thames threatened to breach. Yet a 2017 report on the project by 
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the UK’s National Audit Office identifies an additional objective. Added in 2014 
(considerably later than the initial reports setting out the need for the project), 
it is to ensure ‘that a lack of strategic sewer capacity does not constrain London’s 
growth over at least the next hundred years’ (NAO 2017, 42). This commits the 
project to the construction of a larger system than is necessary with a view to future 
expansion of the city.
Unlike HS2, the Tideway Tunnel is private sector- led, delivered by a consor-
tium of investors that provide construction finance with the ultimate client being a 
privatised utility, Thames Water. Yet on closer inspection, as is the case with many 
large infrastructure projects, many of these boundaries and distinctions become 
decidedly fuzzy. The Tideway itself (the tidal reaches of the Thames that will see a 
reduction in sewage discharge as a result of the tunnel) stretches out through the 
Thames Gateway in Kent and Essex into the North Sea. The £4.2 billion cost of the 
project is borne by Thames Water’s customers, a catchment area that spreads into 
the surrounding counties as far west and north as Gloucestershire and Oxfordshire. 
Indeed, due to the way in which investors have been incentivised (Plimmer 2017) 
households are currently paying on average £13 per year for the project (NAO 2017) 
despite a completion date of 2027. Critical analysis of the project points towards a 
nostalgia for Victorian achievements, combined with a form of financialisation that 
appears to encourage the production of mega- infrastructure. Furthermore, it is 
argued that Thames Water’s ‘Neo Victorian hubris’ cloaks a relative lack of ambition 
(Loftus and March 2017, 7). The solution is outdated and energy intensive, exclud-
ing the ‘socio- ecological’ integration reflected in the smaller- scale combination of 
environmental measures and the maximisation of the existing infrastructure.
In contrast to the often frenzied coverage of HS2, the Tideway Tunnel has 
seen less media scrutiny. However, the UK broadsheet the Financial Times has given 
considerable coverage to critical voices highlighting the role of Thames Water and 
its ‘opaque’ corporate structure (Allen and Pryke 2013), which includes holding 
companies in the Cayman Islands and sees it paying little in the way of corpora-
tion tax (Plimmer 2017). Opposition to the project has been more localised and 
technical, with residents’ groups and London local authorities raising concerns 
about the impact of construction on their residents. The latter group formed the 
Thames Tunnel Commission in 2011, which called for a re- evaluation (Dolowitz 
et al. 2018, 84)  in line with the green infrastructure options and called for fur-
ther critical analysis from water industry experts and engineers. Of particular sig-
nificance among this group is the opposition to the project from Professor Chris 
Binnie. As the original Chair of the 2005 TTSSG, he had originally recommended 
the tunnel solution to DEFRA, the government department with oversight of the 
privatised water companies, at its original estimated cost of £1.7 billion. Binnie 
now argues that in its current form it represents a costly and unnecessary solution 
to which alternative solutions in the form of Sustainable Urban Drainage and the 
greening of London’s built environment (in order to attenuate flows of storm-
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Unlike HS2, the broadcast media has been kinder to the Tideway Tunnel in the 
form of a recent hagiographic documentary from the BBC. This gave minimal cover-
age to any countervailing voices, seemingly beguiled by both the scale and momen-
tum of the construction phase of the project. Recently, though, both HS2 and the 
Tideway Tunnel have seen opposition as part of a new wave of direct action. This 
has always been a feature of UK infrastructure politics, having been successful in 
opposing London’s urban motorways in the 1960s, the large Conservative national 
road building programme in the 1990s and plans for the expansion of Heathrow 
Airport in the first decade of this century. Most recently, both projects have been 
the target of direct action from the environmental campaign Extinction Rebellion, 
with tunnel sites blocked in protest against the impact of lorry movements on local 
air quality and the carbon emissions of the vast amounts of concrete used in their 
construction. For HS2 there has been some localised protest in Camden, particu-
larly around the destruction of a local park and cemetery, St James Gardens, and 
more recently the occupation of trees due to be felled at the Colne Valley nature 
reserve in the west London Borough of Hillingdon.
Matching up to ‘our Victorian forebears’
The allure of megaprojects such as the Tideway Tunnel or HS2 not only captivates 
broadcasters; such projects also work their magic on decision- makers. At times the 
logics by which they are justified are as projections of national virility, with infra-
structure such as Heathrow Airport, the Channel Tunnel and its rail link connect-
ing the national capital to the outside world. Mega- events such as the Olympics 
showcase the city, its infrastructure and in this case its capacity for regeneration. 
Yet decision- makers must also justify projects both to themselves and to the publics 
who are affected and bear the costs. This justification is particularly important in 
those early stages where the political risks are high and the benefits of such massive 
investments are far from being realised. In order to explain the hold such projects 
have over their promoters, both in politics and within London’s megaproject ecol-
ogy, it is useful to look at one feature of the discourse through which such costly 
additions to the capital’s infrastructure and outward connections are justified. This 
is a logic that connects the technocratic boosters from within the city’s megaproject 
ecology to national politicians, fitting neatly with a specific narrative within con-
temporary Conservatism, and may go some way to explaining one framing of the 
current appetite for mega- infrastructure.
First, though, in order to understand the unique hold megaprojects have over 
the political imagination of ‘growth coalitions’ (Molotch 1976), it is necessary to 
explore the discourse, narrative and logics that underpin the mythic quality  of 
these hegemonic projects. In Flyvbjerg’s addition to Frick’s (2008) application 
of the concept of the ‘technological sublime’ to explain the impact that the sense 
of awe generated by megaprojects has on both the physical form of infrastructures 
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and the politics surrounding them, Flyvbjerg adds three – political, economic and 
technical – to the now four ‘megaproject sublimes’ (Flyvbjerg 2014). The language 
used to describe them is in itself revealing of the psychological content. There is 
the enjoyment political leaders derive from the ‘ceremonious ribbon cutting’, the 
delight of business and trade union leaders at profits and jobs and the pleasure gen-
erated by these iconic structures (Flyvbjerg 2014, 9, italics added).
In focusing upon the discourses through which such coalitions operate it is 
important to acknowledge that, as Glynos and Howarth (2007) point out, there is 
never a single logic that justifies political projects such as investment in the capital’s 
infrastructure. Logics are plural and multidimensional. The technical dimension, 
however, cannot be simply ignored. There are perfectly valid reasons to increase 
the capacity of both the capital’s waste water systems and the rail system that 
serves it, yet these have to be appraised against alternative solutions for attenuat-
ing and managing demand. The materiality of both systems means they generate 
their own timescales through the lifespans of the physical elements from which 
they are constructed (Anand 2015) – the 318 million bricks of Bazalgette’s sewer 
system, the mortar that binds them together, the stations and tunnels of the rail 
network were all built in a different era and are ageing (albeit remarkably well). It 
is also true that both these infrastructural systems were either constructed, or saw 
major inflows of investment, at a time when London was the capital not merely of 
the United Kingdom but of a dominant, expansionist global empire, with all the 
resources that entailed. From that early investment these systems have been sub-
ject to the ravages of time, although in the case of the transport system, relatively 
recent analysis concluded that it is still fit for the needs of modern Britain, or at 
least the way its economy was envisaged as of 2006, cautioning against the ‘pursuit 
of icons’ (Eddington 2006).
Cycles of investment in the built environment, the way problems are con-
ceived and options are explored (or rejected) have been shown to be intrinsically 
shaped by discursive constructions (Weber 2016; Griggs and Howarth 2013). Such 
constructions do not only shape or frame the reality of the way the problems of 
London, its growth and infrastructure are defined, they also establish hegemony 
and permitted solutions. Within these discourses, multiple elements (words, 
things, humans and non- humans) are assembled and crucially reconfigured, given 
their contingency. Thus, one key element of the discourse in this case, Victorian 
infrastructure and prowess, and the Victorian era more generally, can be seen to 
be deployed in different ways by different discourse coalitions. The contingency 
of the way a concept such as the Victorian era operates within the structure of the 
discourse that frames each project is revealed in the different ways it appears and 
is used in both cases. With the Tideway Tunnel, though it can be seen to be used 
in a rhetorical sense by Boris Johnson (cited in Loftus and March 2017, 7), gener-
ally it is very much front and centre embodied by one person. Joseph Bazalgette 
was the renowned Victorian who, as Chief Engineer of the Metropolitan Board of 
Works from 1856 to 1889, oversaw the construction of London’s original system of 
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interceptor sewers. The present- day organisation delivering the 25 kilometre sewer 
has named various entities within the structure of holding and financing compa-
nies after Bazalgette. Bazalgette’s original system of sewers was commissioned by 
the government of the day following the ‘Great Stink’ of 1858, when Parliament 
was unable to sit due to the stench of raw sewage discharged into the Thames by 
London’s chaotic waste water system. As an episode in London’s infrastructural his-
tory it is often depicted as a tale of political leaders finally compelled to finance 
new infrastructure after being forced to confront the consequences of their own 
inaction (Stride 2019).
In the case of HS2, the Victorian era is deployed in what are portrayed as 
technical arguments, as in the case of the Tideway Tunnel; however, there is also 
a more overtly political use. The establishment of the Victorian era as both a prob-
lem and a benchmark against which modern Britain ought to be measured has 
been heavily, but not exclusively, associated with politicians of the liberal right and 
the Conservatives. Early policy documents, in which the DfT began to release the 
proposals for the project, problematise the ‘acute connectivity limitations of the 
Victorian rail network’. The same documents apply a strong temporal framing to 
the ‘once in a generation opportunity’ to meet this ‘twenty- first century transport 
challenge’ (DfT 2010). This is a framing of the project that survives the change of 
government, with the language becoming more strident under the Coalition. In 
the first public consultation on the route, then (Conservative) Secretary of State 
for Transport Philip Hammond describes the current network as a ‘tribute to our 
Victorian forebears’ but also states: ‘Our current railway system dates back to the 
Victorian era and will not be sufficient to keep Britain competitive in the twenty- 
first century’ (DfT 2011, 7), here further problematising the Victorian network, not 
only in terms of its capacity but also in terms of national competitiveness. HS2 is 
presented as a national project rather than one centred on London. It is an essen-
tial feature of the UK’s ‘Twenty First Century economy’, with Hammond evoking 
the ‘horrific fantasy’ (Griggs and Howarth 2013, 415)  of the country being ‘left 
behind’. The fantasy in this case serves a similar function to the way competitive-
ness and fear of the consequences of a reluctance to invest in infrastructure have 
been deployed in the discourse around aviation and the expansion of the capi-
tal’s airport capacity, albeit by the 1997–2010 Labour administration (Griggs and 
Howarth 2013).
Where this combination of global competitiveness, infrastructure investment 
and the way the Victorian legacy is deployed in the case of HS2 has a unique char-
acter is in the intersection with the notion of a ‘global race’ that was a broader 
feature of the political milieu during the Coalition administration. While adopted 
by figures such as David Cameron in reference to HS2, its clearest exposition came 
in a polemic authored by a group of young MPs from the wing of the Conservative 
party that under Boris Johnson triumphed in the internecine struggles over Brexit. 
Britannia Unchained sets a narrative of national economic decline in the context of 
a retreat from Britain’s ‘Victorian Liberal principles’ (Kwarteng et al. 2012, 8). The 
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solution is given as an investment in skills development, but crucially this is cou-
pled with a combination of massive deregulation and infrastructure investment. 
This group and the ideas they expound form one of the overlapping and com-
peting views of the direction the country ought to take on leaving the European 
Union. The significance of this vision for London can be seen in the current popular 
description of this option as Singapore on Thames (Wolf 2019), placing the capital 
and its further deregulated financial sector at its centre.
Conclusion: The logics of growth
In the attempts to construct hegemonic narratives in support of both the Tideway 
Tunnel and HS2 it is possible to see the ‘radical contingency’ of the Victorian era, 
Victorian engineering and Victorian engineers. As objects within the discourse, 
they are deployed by different actors and in different ways yet always to buttress 
a narrative in which investment in costly mega- infrastructure is the only possible 
response to the pressures facing London. They cut across the city’s megaproject 
ecology, dovetailing neatly with the narratives political leaders construct for them-
selves. These are narratives that are startlingly devoid of reflection on the iniqui-
ties of an imperial project that had established London as the premier global city 
of a previous era. Were these narratives simply confined to the realm of politics, 
then perhaps they would be little more than background noise to the functioning 
of London and the infrastructure that connects the city to both its immediate sur-
roundings and the wider world. Yet as hegemonic projects the risk is that they do 
more than this. At a time when the claims of the boosters of London’s megaproject 
ecology are looking hollow, with uncertainty over the time taken and the cost of 
Crossrail and the delivery of HS2, coupled with growing concerns about the envi-
ronmental costs, they actively exclude and silence the countervailing voices. These 
are voices advancing solutions to contemporary challenges that are not dependent 
upon damage to the ecology of London, its hinterlands and urban environment, 
and that are not predicated upon global circulation or financialised infrastructures 
directing revenues offshore.
Such tensions between global drivers of growth and the pressure they place 
upon infrastructural systems are not unique to London or Toronto, nor are trends in 
politics, such as the rise of right- wing populism which has touched both cities. Yet 
crucially they have touched both cities in different ways and at different times and 
via different individuals. Thus, while the logics that appear to determine the growth 
of such global cities must have a global dimension, the narratives through which 
they are articulated, that frame urban problems and justify certain (mega) infra-
structural solutions over others, are also highly contextual. They are constructed 
and maintained by key figures within urban growth coalitions and so reflect their 
psychology, their view of themselves, the world and the extent to which they do, or 
do not, match up to their mythic forebears.
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Note
 1. Wen meaning boil or pustule.
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Governing urbanisation in the global 
city: A commentary
Alan Walks and Mike raco
Even before the COVID- 19 pandemic erupted, global cities such as London and 
Toronto – and their extended metropolitan regions – were (as Brail and Vinodrai in 
Chapter 2 highlight) at a crossroads. Dealing simultaneously with changes occur-
ring in the global economy in which they are keenly and uniquely embedded, as 
well as the ever deepening national and regional politics of neoliberalism and aus-
terity, these urban regions find themselves faced with a set of options for identify-
ing and navigating pathways forward, one that the potential for pandemics has 
made even more urgent.
However, not only are these metropolitan areas at the cutting edges of 
changes occurring with the larger global political economy, but because of their 
privileged position and influence the policies and modes of governance they adopt 
to deal with emergent issues become models for how other cities located elsewhere 
respond. It thus becomes imperative to understand how governance in these cities 
has been evolving in response to the local and global pressures tied to their sta-
tus. Their experiences can also be used to challenge broader narratives of ‘urban 
ungovernability’ that are resurfacing internationally on the (neoliberal) political 
right. As Le Gales and Vitale (2013) argue, the 2000s have seen the re- emergence 
of Douglas Yates’s (1977) ideas on the supposed inability of state actors to man-
age cities and populations or to ‘buck’ markets through the regulation of capital. 
Such narratives have been used to legitimate broader pro- market deregulation and 
privatisation programmes. The chapters here, conversely, show that policy- making 
and political decisions still matter enormously and have a direct impact on urban 
built environments and communities.
There are some clear similarities, but also differences, in the challenges 
faced by London and Toronto. Both are the largest and most dynamic metropol-
itan regions in their respective nations, the pre- eminent global cities for the UK 
and Canada. Both London and Toronto concentrate substantial financial sectors 
of global reach and importance, and their embeddedness within global financial 
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networks is one of the key things that makes their economies unique. In many 
ways, the economies of both metropolitan regions live off the hard work done in 
other places. This is not least because so much of their financial profits derive from 
lending to people and firms located elsewhere, but also because the terms of trade 
are stacked in favour of the most developed nations, and because of the ‘wall’ of 
money being invested in financial products since the bursting of the dot- com bub-
ble in the early 1990s (Aalbers 2016).
The timing and evolution of their respective financial industries differs, 
though. Previously the centre of a global (‘British’) empire with some of the world’s 
largest and most global banks, London’s economy has, since the end of the Bretton 
Woods fixed- rate monetary exchange system, become the global centre for foreign 
currency exchange. Upon this, it has built sizeable expertise in over- the- counter 
derivatives, especially foreign exchange swaps. In part, London’s rise is a result of 
its status as a location for global arbitrage – one can make trades in the UK using 
US dollars that one cannot do (because of US federal regulations) in New York or 
other US cities (Gowan 2009). Toronto’s more recent rise, meanwhile, has been 
built on its foundation as a national financial centre with a highly regulated oli-
gopolistic banking structure, with its strong banks increasingly expanding into the 
US economy and selected other nations in the face of their crisis- derived weak-
nesses. Whereas London has been a top- tier global financial centre for much of the 
post- war period, Toronto has been moving up the hierarchy in rapid fashion since 
the 1990s (see also Chapter 2 by Brail and Vinodrai).
London and Toronto are also the largest recipients of immigrants, and because 
of this the most diverse metropolitan areas, in their respective nations. While 
Toronto scores a lot higher than London on this (with roughly half of Toronto’s 
population foreign born, and since 2016 more than half of the metropolitan popu-
lation identifying as a visible minority, making Toronto a ‘minority- majority’ urban 
region), both metropolitan areas rank far above their national urban counterparts 
on these variables. This sets both Toronto and London apart from their respec-
tive nations socially, culturally and politically. The contrast between how voters 
in London and other places in England voted in the Brexit referendum is but one 
 example – and outcome – of this discrepancy. In both cities, local populations are 
far more used to living and working alongside people who are different from them-
selves, and in turn have become far more tolerant and cosmopolitan than residents 
in other cities. Residents of both the London and Toronto regions see themselves 
differently from the rest of the country and are often visibly different. Residents of 
other places often resent those who live in Toronto and London, and their politi-
cians, not least because they tend to be wealthier because of the booming financial 
sector. This creates similar political dynamics, albeit situated within national politi-
cal contexts that differ due to very different national historical trajectories.
And of course, many of the local social and infrastructural dynamics are also 
similar. By concentrating workers in one of the most remunerative economic sec-
tors (finance), and with the largest flows of immigrants and refugees, global cities 
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exhibit greater income inequality and racialised inequality than most other cities. 
It is mainly in the global cities that the wealthiest people are found, often in gen-
trifying neighbourhoods close to downtown, displacing poorer households. Rising 
rents, land values, deconversion of tenanted homes into owner- occupation lead-
ing to a lack of rental housing, and homelessness are, unsurprisingly, outcomes 
of this, especially in the context of deregulation of housing, finance and labour 
markets (let alone the lack of sufficient new rental housing). London and Toronto 
are among the poster- children of urban social polarisation, despite the fact that 
their labour markets remain stronger than those of many other cities and wages 
are generally higher.
These factors present notable challenges for urban governance in both places. 
As the chapters in Part I make plain, national (and sub- national, i.e. Province of 
Ontario in the Canadian context) governments look to both cities as key to their 
sustained global economic competitiveness and advantage. Both London and 
Toronto are expected to disproportionately produce jobs, economic growth and tax 
revenues for their respective national populations and to incubate the technology- 
based firms said to be the key to future prosperity. At the same time, however, gov-
ernance at the national, sub- national and local (urban) scale all have to navigate 
the resentments and jealousies of those living in different places, especially given 
that sustained competitiveness requires significant public spending on urban infra-
structure in these global cities, but from an equity perspective it doesn’t appear 
to many other people fair to spend more money in the wealthier cities. It is in this 
context that a politics of automobility and transit (in whose interests are state 
infrastructure investments?), of immigration (e.g. Brexit in the UK), connectivity 
(transport infrastructure to other nations, airports, etc.) and planning (should for-
eign investors and residents be welcomed or controlled, especially given the vulner-
abilities of globally connected cities to pandemics? How to get more rental housing 
built in the absence of funding from upper levels of the state?) have evolved.
National and sub- national levels of the state, for decades, have been adopting 
various neoliberal reforms and have pushed city municipal governments to do the 
same (for Toronto, see Boudreau et al. 2009). State- owned firms and infrastructure 
(British Rail in 1993, Ontario’s Highway 407 in 1999, etc.) were privatised, and 
public–private partnerships were promoted for building everything from roads and 
rail infrastructure to hospitals. Meanwhile, a host of public services including edu-
cation, public health, libraries and job training were either cut or reformed with an 
eye to using private agencies (see also Joe Penny’s chapter in Part III of this book). 
Yet it is also important to note that both cities also have a long history of public–
private sector interactions that continue to shape current practices and urban pol-
itics. In the London case, even during the perceived high- water mark of strong, 
modernist planning during the 1960s, developers and private actors were notori-
ous for exploiting loopholes in regulations and were able to bypass the city’s core 
planning restrictions and social policy regulations. Indeed, Jenkins (2019) argues 
that the city’s planning system has always played catch- up with the private sector 
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and historically has been unable to meaningfully regulate the city’s development. 
Similar arguments have been made about London’s core transport infrastructure, 
much of which was originally built by private entrepreneurs in the Victorian period 
and sought out routes of greatest profitability, rather than those that might address 
public needs and strategic concerns (Wolmar 2008). The importance of such lega-
cies are exemplified in the chapters on both cities, including those by Durrant and 
Enright, that shed light on the culturally mediated assumptions of what qualifies as 
legitimate and illegitimate forms of state intervention.
Housing systems have been particularly affected by neoliberalism. Not only 
were most social/ public housing plans shelved and responsibilities downloaded 
to local municipalities, but state policies promoted private innovations in mort-
gage finance that encouraged lenders to push new kinds of mortgage loans for 
homeownership (see Walks 2014 for the Canadian story). Social/ public housing 
units were sold to private owners under Thatcher’s right- to- buy scheme through 
the 1980s and 1990s, and in Toronto under the Ford administration’s sales of 
‘scattered- site housing’ (Walks 2012). As a number of chapters in Part II of this 
book note, this has led to a significant loss of rental housing units which has been 
particularly acute in London and Toronto. Both London and Toronto are also politi-
cal capitals and major seats of power (London is the national capital; Toronto is 
the capital of Canada’s largest province, Ontario). Because of this, they are highly 
visible to their respective states, and these cities are often first to bow to the force 
of the state governments who host them – and often make them into an example. 
For instance, the Greater London Council was disbanded by the Thatcher govern-
ment in 1986 to thwart the local power of then Mayor Ken Livingstone; Toronto 
was the first city to be amalgamated by the Conservative Ontario provincial gov-
ernment in 1998, in part to force new market- based taxation systems on the city 
and to thwart the power of local left- leaning councillors (see Boudreau 2000; Keil 
2000; Sancton 2000).
All these challenges are felt keenly in the realm of city building. How the 
processes of urbanisation are governed in each metropolitan region develops in 
response to both imperatives emanating from the global scale, as well as national, 
sub- national and local politics around who will and should benefit. This is most 
obvious in the case of infrastructure. As the chapters by Durrant and Enright dem-
onstrate, transport infrastructure is highly fraught, especially that which connects 
the world to the city via links to key international airports. Global cities require 
global connections, but to negotiate local politics, and to sustain local working- 
class labour, they also involve a highly localised politics around where the lines and 
stops will be. The case studies suggest it is well- heeled elite areas that typically fight 
against proposals to locate this infrastructure nearby on the grounds of negative 
externalities (see Durrant’s chapter for discussion of Camden’s local opposition to 
the HS2 line to Heathrow Airport in London), whereas working- class neighbour-
hoods, where locals need access to jobs, ask to have stops built nearby in the light 
of their positive externalities (see Enright’s chapter for Weston’s local insistence on 
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having a stop on Toronto’s Union Pearson Express airport line). Given that many 
residents, even within the cores of these regions but especially in the various sub-
urbs, do not have access to adequate transit nor could hope to afford to live in the 
transit- rich neighbourhoods of the inner city, it is not surprising that such infra-
structure is contested on equity grounds and highly politicised. To connect to the 
world, some will be granted privileged access to transit, while others will be com-
pelled to drive in a hopelessly congested and frustrating city. Who should get that 
access? For whom is this infrastructure built? These questions lie at the intersec-
tion of the global and local pressures compelling the focus on local infrastructure. 
It also helps explain why transport would be more politicised than, say, sewage 
treatment (see Durrant’s chapter). The latter is expanded to deal with what might 
be called ‘residuals’ of past urbanisation, while the former strongly shapes the way 
future urbanisation will impact local residents.
The tensions between the need to foster global connections and competitive-
ness on the one hand, and to address the very real social and political problems that 
are disproportionately felt in global cities on the other hand, have been significantly 
heightened by the push towards neoliberalism on behalf of national and sub- national 
governments. City planning processes in each metropolitan region have had to 
negotiate these tensions, and in doing so have attempted to walk a fine line between 
a state- led promotion of the public interest and a deregulated pro- market neoliberal 
promotion of private sector investment. As the chapters by Raco and Livingstone, 
Moreira de Souza, Brail and Vinodrai, and De Magalhães demonstrate, there have 
arisen what Raco and Livingstone call ‘radical ambiguities’ affecting how planning 
is practised. Both the London Plan and the London Housing Strategy privileged the 
roles of private sector investors and developers, and explicitly sought to enrol them 
as key agents in meeting urban growth targets, thus fulfilling the demands of the 
neoliberal state to promote markets. However, in doing so, these processes encour-
aged investors to buy up much- needed housing for their own use and to prioritise 
developments that had less benefit for local residents, forcing planning and public 
policy to innovate in new ways to regulate and compel development in the public 
interest when it becomes clear that local populations are not benefitting. A specific 
arena of such regulation involves the licensing of private rental housing providers 
and rent controls which, as Moreira de Souza notes, has evolved into a fragmented 
multi- jurisdictional scheme, which not only limits the application of knowledge and 
universal rights, but facilitates arbitrage on behalf of investors. In Toronto, mean-
while, as Brail and Vinodrai note, the amalgamation of the six central municipalities 
into one large City of Toronto in 1998, undertaken by the neoliberal Mike Harris 
provincial government, left a similarly fragmented ‘ghost’ regime of licensing and 
regulation for specific sectors, including the licensing of rooming houses, which are 
still illegal in several areas of Toronto (see also Campsie 2018).
Such radical ambiguities are also borne out in De Magalhães’ study of quasi- 
privatisation of public parks in London, where private trusts are given extended 
contracts to manage parks (thus freeing municipal budgets from some of the 
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expense), but in the joint interests of both the trust and the public (partly regu-
lated by the municipality). This puts formerly public space in the hands of self- 
interested ‘club realms’, and although the parks still feel public, they create a 
fragmented regulatory and governance structure that creates differential rights 
and limits how much say the actual public might have in how they are maintained 
and used. In the Toronto region, such differential rights are rooted in the different 
approaches among municipal councils, some of whom – like the City of Toronto – 
have tended to prioritise public accountability while others – especially some of 
the 905 suburban municipalities – prefer a form of urban managerialism that puts 
decision- making in the hands of hired managers, trusts or other quasi- public forms 
of governance (Cowen 2005). De Magalhães argues that, extended to the logic of 
urban governance more broadly, such neoliberal forms of public space manage-
ment ‘suggest a city increasingly made up of constellations of public spaces with 
different governance systems, with fine- grained differences in publicness, playing 
different functions and catering for different sets of interests’ (see Chapter 5). Such 
is one of the legacies of neoliberal governance in the global city that has been asked 
to perform multiple functions for multiple publics.
The development of differential forms of rights for different users, citizens, 
residents, firms and other kinds of ‘stakeholders’ in global cities such as London 
and Toronto means that rights are not held in consistent and universal fashion. 
Indeed, the critique of planning inherent in Raco and Livingstone’s chapter ques-
tions whether planning itself can be expected to remain a process by which uni-
versal and consistent rules are applied in the public interest. Instead, there arises 
an incentive for actors to engage in jurisdictional arbitrage and to seek approval 
to skirt existing regulations in the name of local distinctiveness, process efficiency 
and/ or the promotion of entrepreneurialism. Because growth pressures have been 
felt most acutely in global cities such as London and Toronto in the post- industrial 
era – what Allen Scott (2011) calls the process of ‘third wave urbanization’ – it is in 
urban regions such as London and Toronto that both the innovations in governance, 
and the outcomes of the multiple pressures and tensions bearing on policy- making, 
have been first articulated. The fragmented and ambiguous ways that urban 
development has been governed in the recent period, however, call into question 
whether they could be conceived as a model for how other cities might respond to 
the slightly different mix of factors impacting on planning and governance there.
The chapters in Part I also highlight a growing mismatch between the scale 
of challenges being faced by urban agencies and their resources and capabilities 
to introduce effective forms of regulation. The 2010s have witnessed the growth, 
for instance, of new digital technologies and big data forms of private sector- led 
accumulation and organisation (Zuboff 2019). Attempts to regulate firms such as 
Uber and Airbnb have created new challenges for authorities in both cities, with 
policy- makers once again caught in an ambiguous position of seeking to promote 
cutting- edge technologies and private sector dynamism, while also ensuring that 
existing residents and firms are protected from the worst effects of (relatively) 
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unregulated activities. As noted by Hawes and Grisdale in Chapter 11 of this book, 
Fields’s (2019) recent work on the growing power of ‘automated landlords’ in shap-
ing urban rental markets, and Wachsmuth and Weisler’s (2018) powerful critique 
of Airbnb, underscore some of the direct challenges that new forms of data- led 
capitalism are having on the ability to govern urban environments and manage 
tensions among urban social groups, even before the COVID- 19 pandemic layered 
new logics and tensions over this landscape. As authors such as Yeung (2017) have 
argued, the capacity of territorially organised urban administrations to manage 
and shape these new forms of enterprise has thus far been lacking. State capacities 
in cities such as London and Toronto are hollowed out by neoliberal reforms and 
these cities are increasingly governed by complex constellations of public, private 
and civil society actors, creating political vulnerabilities but also opportunities. The 
chapters here highlight some of the emerging tensions that authorities are facing in 
global cities and their responses to new challenges.
References
Aalbers, Manuel. 2016. The Financialization of Housing: A Political Economy Approach. London: Routledge.
Boudreau, Julie- Anne. 2000. The Mega- City Saga: Democracy and Citizenship in this Global Age. Montreal: Black 
Rose Books.
Boudreau, Julie- Anne, Young, Douglas and Keil, Roger. 2009. Changing Toronto: Governing Urban Neoliberalism. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Campsie, Phillippa. 2018. Rooming Houses in Toronto 1997–2018. Toronto: University of Toronto Cities Centre 
Research Paper No. 242. Accessed 22 July 2020. http:// neighbourhoodchange.ca/ documents/ 2018/ 04/ 
campsie- toronto- rooming- houses.pdf.
Cowen, Deb. 2005. ‘Suburban Citizenship? The Rise of Targeting and the Eclipse of Social Rights in Toronto’. 
Social and Cultural Geography 6:335–56. https:// doi.org/ 10.1080/ 14649360500111212.
Fields, Desiree. 2019. ‘Automated Landlord:  Digital Technologies and Post- crisis Financial Accumulation’. 
Environment and Planning A. https:// doi.org/ 10.1177/ 0308518X19846514.
Gowan, Peter. 2009. ‘Crisis in the Heartland’. New Left Review 55(Jan–Feb):5–29.
Jenkins, Simon. 2019. A Short History of London. London: Penguin.
Keil, Roger. 2000. ‘Governance Restructuring in Los Angeles and Toronto:  Amalgamation or Secession?’. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24(4):758–781. https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ 
1468- 2427.00277.
Le Gales, Patrick and Vitale, Tommaso. 2013. Governing the Large Metropolis. Sciences- Po Working Papers. 
Accessed 22 July 2020. https:// hal- sciencespo.archives- ouvertes.fr/ hal- 01070523.
Sancton, Andrew. 2000. ‘Amalgamations, Service Realignment, and Property Taxes: Did the Harris Government 
Have a Plan for Ontario’s Municipalities?’. Canadian Journal of Regional Science 23(1):135–56.
Scott, Allen J. 2011. ‘A World in Emergence: Notes toward a Resynthesis of Urban- economic Geography for the 
21st Century’. Urban Geography 32:845–70. https:// doi.org/ 10.2747/ 0272- 3638.32.6.845.
Wachsmuth, David and Weisler, Alexander. 2018. ‘Airbnb and the Rent Gap: Gentrification through the Sharing 
Economy’. Environment and Planning A 50:1147–70. https:// doi.org/ 10.1177/ 0308518x18778038.
Walks, Alan. 2012. Anything but Scattered:  The Proposed Sale of Toronto Community Housing’s Standalone 
Scattered- Site Housing and Implications for Building an Inclusive Toronto. Toronto: University of Toronto City 
Centre Policy Brief No. 2. Accessed 22 July 2020. http:// neighbourhoodchange.ca/ wp- content/ uploads/ 
2012/ 08/ Walks- TCHC- Anything- But- Scattered- NCPG- Policy- Brief- 2- Aug- 2012.pdf.
Walks, Alan. 2014. ‘Canada’s Housing Bubble Story: Mortgage Securitization, the State, and the Global Financial 
Crisis’. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38(1):256–84. https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ 
j.1468- 2427.2012.01184.x.
Wolmar, Christian. 2008. Fire and Steam. London: Atlantic Books.
Yates, Douglas. 1977. The Ungovernable City. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Yeung, Karen. 2017. ‘Algorithmic Regulation:  A Critical Interrogation’. Regulation & Governance 12:505–23. 
https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ rego.12158.

































Governing urban development 
on industrial land in global cities: 
Lessons from London
Jessica ferm
Deindustrialisation, global cities and the fate of industrial 
land: London and Toronto in context
The impact of deindustrialisation in European and North American cities has been 
hugely varied. Transformations in the global economy since the 1970s saw the 
mass relocation of routine manufacturing jobs from the hitherto industrialised 
world to locations with cheaper land and labour. A  new international division 
of labour emerged, with a spatial separation of production and services across 
global locations. Key cities such as London and Toronto emerged as locations for 
multinational headquarters (Friedmann 1986) and centres of global financial 
control with agglomerations of finance, law, accounting, advertising and consult-
ing (Sassen 2012). According to the Global Financial Centres Index 2019, London 
ranks as the second most important financial centre, after New  York. Toronto 
now occupies seventh place, following the Asian cities of Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Shanghai and Tokyo (Miaschi 2019). London, described in the 1960s by Peter Hall 
(1961, 23) as the ‘single most important seat of manufacturing’ in the UK, started 
this process of deindustrialisation and restructuring in the 1970s (GLA Economics 
2016). The city established itself as a leading financial centre in the late 1980s 
and featured in Sassen’s (1991) book, The Global City, alongside New York and 
Tokyo. Deindustrialisation in Toronto happened a little later. In the early 1980s, 
the City of Toronto’s financial district was relatively small and was still eclipsed by 
Montreal, but within a decade it had emerged as the clear leader, and by the 1990s 
it was home to the majority of Canada’s banks, foreign banks and trust companies 
(Sassen 2012).
Yet, as Massey (2007) argues in the context of London, the global city thesis 
places too much emphasis on the importance of the financial and business services 
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importance of economic and social diversity, and the relationship between global 
cities and their national economies. Moreover, she claims there ‘is a politics … in 
this continual characterisation of London as overwhelmingly global and in the high-
lighting of this particular element (global finance and business services) of its com-
plex, diverse economy’. In doing so, it ‘relegates to comparative invisibility the host 
of activities that keep the economy going’ (41). Many of these economic activities 
have no obvious location in space – courier workers, plumbers, carpenters, mobile 
carers and others. Many economic activities take place on industrial land or in build-
ings that are physically separated in space from the high- income jobs of the financial 
district, the centres of tourism and entertainment, or residential neighbourhoods. It 
is the fate of this industrial land, or what is referred to as employment lands in the 
Toronto context, and the activities therein which is the subject of this chapter.
For despite the shift of production to developing nations, some industry 
remains in global cities  – either because it needs to be close to its market or to 
other related businesses in the production or value chain, or because it directly 
serves and supports other businesses or residents (see Ferm and Jones 2017 for 
further elaboration). As Edwards and Taylor (2017) point out, the significant role 
still played by industry in cities such as London and the city’s dependence on the 
production of goods (no matter where that production takes place) renders the use 
of the term post- industrial rather meaningless. In both cities, demand for industrial 
space is growing, vacancy rates are considered to be low and there has been a stabi-
lisation of employment in manufacturing (CAG 2017; Toronto City Planning 2019). 
Importantly, industrial land also performs a broader function: it accommodates a 
diversity of enterprises and activities, not only industrial ones, who are occupying 
premises there because of their relative affordability and flexibility (Ferm and Jones 
2015). As Lehrer and Wieditz (2009) show in Toronto, employment lands have 
been the site of multiple rounds of industrial gentrification; for example, a declin-
ing manufacturing district became the site for Toronto’s studio district – a cluster 
of film, television and related firms – which in turn was threatened with redevelop-
ment into a big box retail complex. Such industrial displacement as a result of real 
estate speculation for higher- value uses has been documented in a range of other 
North American cities such as New York (Curran 2007, 2010), San Francisco (BSB 
Advisory Board 2007), Chicago (Rast 2001) and Vancouver (Powell 2018), as well 
as in global Asian cities such as Seoul (Michael 2019).
In this context, the question of how to strategically handle remaining par-
cels of industrial land emerges as a critical issue. London is an interesting case 
study because it is at a crucial juncture in its approach to industrial land policy. 
Between 2001 and 2015, the Greater London region lost 16 per cent of its indus-
trial land capacity, the majority to residential development, accelerating in the last 
five years of this period when the annual loss of industrial land was three times 
the target in the London Plan, and almost eight times the target in central parts of 
London (AECOM 2016). This is a loss comparable to Toronto, where land zoned 
for employment shrank by almost 10 per cent between 2006 and 2018 (Dingman 
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2018). In line with actual and projected downward trends of industrial employ-
ment, the Mayor of London had been actively planning for the redevelopment of 
some industrial land since 2004. However, this prompted the mayor and his London 
Plan team to revisit its approach in the new London Plan (GLA 2019), introducing 
policies that simultaneously aim to halt the further loss of industrial capacity and 
to accommodate new housing within mixed-use environments on industrial land 
(see illustration in Figure 8.1). Following a review of the drivers for change, this 
chapter tells the story of how London got to this point and provides some critical 
reflections on emerging policy, whether it will work and what the lessons for other 
global cities might be.
Drivers of change
theoretical perspectives on the separation of industry and housing
Although industry was an inherent and accepted part of the urban mix in nineteenth- 
century industrial cities, in the early twentieth century conflicts between industry 
and housing led to the increasing use of planning tools to manage these tensions – 
through statutory zoning in the North American context and protected indus-
trial areas in local plans in the UK. In addition to the traditional arguments for 
Figure 8.1 Architects’ illustration of a mixed- use industrial and residential 
development, included in the Industrial Intensification and Co- Location Study 
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the separation of industry and housing on the basis of noise and pollution, there 
are also arguments that support planning intervention in order to correct market 
failures. For example, allowing land use allocations to be determined by the price 
signal alone might not result in the most economically efficient land use allocation 
in the long term: it will not support the location of small businesses in central areas 
during the incubation phase or the provision of flexible space suitable for move- on 
businesses, and it will not promote social equity, including the provision of jobs 
near to residents who need those jobs (see Chapple 2014; Heikkila and Hutton 
1986). In removing competition from higher- value uses, particularly housing, 
the separation of land uses has the effect of suppressing land values and allowing 
price- sensitive businesses to locate close to their customers and markets, and other 
complementary businesses, in the city.
On the other hand, arguments against the separation of land uses through 
statutory or policy means are based on both economic factors (see Heikkila and 
Hutton 1986 for a summary) and increasingly adopted norms about what makes 
good urbanism. Mainstream, neoclassical economic theory holds that markets  – 
left to their own devices – will determine the most efficient allocation of scarce land 
resources, and that businesses will choose an optimum location based on a balance 
between their need to co- locate with other businesses and access markets, custom-
ers and employees. On this basis, if it is not economically or practically efficient for 
businesses to be near housing, they will not be; hence, heavy industry still needs to 
be separated from residents.
In addition, separating land uses is increasingly seen as outmoded. Accepted 
good practice in urbanism is to promote mixed-use, compact urban environments, 
which can accommodate a range of uses in dense development, promoting walk-
able urban environments and discouraging sprawl. In Europe, this has been under-
pinned by an environmental sustainability agenda of compact cities, promoted by 
the European Commission in the 1990s and the UK government in the early 2000s 
as part of its drive for an ‘urban renaissance’ to address inner city decline. The trend 
towards mixed-use, compact cities and urban renaissance has its parallels in the 
‘new urbanism’ and ‘smart growth’ movements in the North American context.
housing as a competing driver for change
The move by the middle classes back to the inner city – sites of former industrial 
activity – is well documented in the gentrification literature. In the early 2000s, 
the term ‘super- gentrification’ was used to describe the next wave in parts of inner 
London, where this time middle- class residents were being displaced by super-
wealthy professionals working in the financial services of London (Butler and 
Lees 2006). London’s current housing market and evidence of its extreme unaf-
fordability is described elsewhere in this book (see chapters by Gabrieli, Raco and 
Livingstone). Prior to the recent fall in residential values – assumed to be a Brexit 
effect – in 2015, research for the Greater London Authority (GLA) showed that they 
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were on average more than three times industrial land values across London, and 
almost eight times the value in the centre (AECOM 2016, table 4.1). In this context, 
there are grounds for some grave concerns about a laissez- faire approach when it 
comes to accommodating industry in the city. Scholars in other post- industrial cit-
ies have argued that industrial decline is only a limited part of the story of the loss 
of industry, and that real estate speculation is often supported by political motiva-
tions (Rast 2001) and alliances between the real estate and financial sectors and 
the mass media (Indergaard 2009; Zukin 1988). In her detailed study of the loss 
of industry in Williamsburg (Brooklyn, New  York), Curran (2007, 2010)  argues 
that the loss of industry was not only the result of global competition or increasing 
labour costs, but also of real estate speculation for residential conversion, actively 
promoted and reinforced by developers, city planners, policy- makers, landlords 
and individual gentrifiers, in the absence of public and political support for indus-
trial uses in the city. In London, there is also increasing evidence that deindustri-
alisation is no longer the main cause of the loss of industry. For example, a review 
of employment land studies in inner boroughs consistently showed a shortfall of 
supply relative to demand, and there is evidence even in outer London boroughs of 
speculation for redevelopment of industrial sites and landlords offering short and 
insecure leases to facilitate redevelopment (see Ferm and Jones 2015).
In London, population growth – projected to rise more than 20 per cent to reach 
10.8 million by 2041 (GLA 2017a) – is accompanied by a crisis of housing affordabil-
ity. The primary policy tool to address this currently is to boost housing supply over-
all, and the mayor has set local authorities ambitious housing targets; some outer 
London boroughs have seen their annual targets double since the last London Plan in 
2016, and one inner London borough now has targets more than seven times those 
previously set.1 The pressure this places on planning officers, in making day- to- day 
decisions on planning applications, is evident and has been one of the key drivers 
behind the accelerated loss of industrial sites in London (Ferm and Jones 2016). The 
changing relationship between planners and real estate actors is also key here: as 
the funding for direct provision of public services and infrastructure has decreased, 
planners have been left with little alternative but to support the principle of the 
‘highest and best use’ on any given site in order to secure maximum public benefit 
from the development through planning gain mechanisms (see also Wolf- Powers 
2005; Rydin 2013). Housing becomes the preferred use, not only because of its high 
value and pressure to meet housing targets, but also because it provides accommo-
dation for workers in the higher- value economic sectors that are seen as the drivers 
of the economy (Jonas et al. 2010). Furthermore, real estate actors have become 
more powerful in the production of both knowledge and planning frameworks that 
guide decision- making, which allows ‘their values and objectives to predominate in 
the decision making process’ with decisions being made ‘based on quantitative met-
rics and financial projections’ (Robin 2018, 10). Understanding the complex way in 
which urban environments are transformed and produced, and the role and power 
of different actors, is critical to establishing the likely effectiveness of policy.
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Pressure for change
The changes to London’s policy on industrial land, which will be detailed in the 
next section, were influenced by the work of grassroots activists and industry lob-
byists, as well as mounting evidence that further loss of industrial capacity would 
be detrimental to London. In 2013, Just Space – a London- wide network of com-
munity groups and activists set up to influence the London Plan – formed a sub- 
group, Just Space Economy and Planning (JSEP). Whereas the wider network 
campaigns on planning and development matters more broadly (see e.g. Sendra 
and Fitzpatrick’s chapter on Just Space’s activism work to protect social housing), 
JSEP came together with a shared interest in alternative economic models and a 
desire to influence the direction of the London Plan with respect to the economy. 
The group was initially supported by Myfanwy Taylor, as part of her action- based 
doctoral research on contested urban economies, and includes a range of activists, 
community groups, small business owners, interested academics, architects and 
economists.2 One strong area of interest, established early on, was in response to 
what the group perceived as a crisis of affordable workspace and more particularly 
industrial accommodation. In 2015, it published a handbook for community groups 
fighting a loss of workspace (JSEP 2015), held two themed seminars on affordable 
workspace and industrial land, as well as a bigger ideas workshop, ‘Making the 
City’ – which GLA officers attended – and accompanying pamphlet, ‘London’s Future 
Has Industry’ (Just Space 2016a). In addition, London Metropolitan University’s 
Cass Cities unit, led by Professor Mark Brearley and Jane Clossick, started a cam-
paign, London Is Eating Itself, informed by their students’ ongoing work researching 
industrial businesses in London.3 The campaign attracted media attention, includ-
ing articles in The Observer and Guardian newspapers, ‘London: The City That Ate 
Itself’ (Moore 2015) and ‘Made in London No More: Will Property Speculation Kill 
Industry in the Capital?’ (Wainwright 2017).
In 2016, the election of a new Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, prompted the 
announcement of a new London Plan. At this point, Just Space started work on a 
‘Community- led Plan for London’ (Just Space 2016b). This proactive approach also 
involved setting up meetings with the teams responsible for the London Plan and 
the various mayoral strategies. Members of JSEP met three times with the team 
preparing the Economics Evidence Base for London and facilitated a roundtable 
meeting (held on 15 May 2017)  on the issue of workspace with officers across 
the various teams. When the new London Plan was published for consultation 
(GLA 2017a), the Just Space written response included a detailed critique of the 
‘Economy’ chapter.4 Members of JSEP also gave evidence to a panel of inspectors at 
the Examination in Public (EiP) on the London Plan, at sessions focusing on indus-
trial land policies and affordable workspace.
The other influential group has been the London Industrial and Logistics 
Sounding Board, set up in July 2017 and initiated by officers at the GLA and London 





govErNiNg urBAN DEvELopMENt oN iNDuStriAL LAND 121
and logistics developers (Segro), industrial owners and asset managers (Capital 
and Industrial), occupiers (DHL, Safestore, Ocado), local authorities, Transport 
for London, the Federation of Small Businesses, Society of London Manufacturers, 
Port of London Authority, London Chamber of Commerce, Industrial Business 
Improvement Districts network, Turley (planning consultants), CBRE (planning 
and property consultants), Dentons (planning lawyers) and myself as an aca-
demic. The role of the Sounding Board was ‘to ensure that London’s industrial sec-
tor has a voice in shaping London’s emerging planning policy and contributes to 
good growth’.5 Although convened by the GLA, and limited to invited members, the 
group has played an important role in enabling representatives from the industrial 
and logistics sector to influence the London Plan.
Another source of pressure was mounting evidence that the demand for 
industrial sites was no longer declining. Signs of this were evident in the property 
market, in declining vacancy rates and high rental levels due to a mismatch between 
supply and demand. Evidence given to the London Assembly Planning Committee 
in September 2017 suggested that vacancy rates had fallen from around 16 per cent 
in 2001 to 11 per cent in 2015 across London.6 In many inner London boroughs, 
vacancy rates were less than 5 per cent and on one of the largest industrial estates 
in London (Park Royal), vacancy rates were described as ‘dangerously low’ at 2 per 
cent, with long occupier waiting lists. These figures are supported by evidence of 
a projected positive net demand for industrial land in London (CAG 2017). This 
was confirmed by the industrial developers and asset managers at the panel of the 
planning committee, who reported increased demand for warehousing and logis-
tics facilities due to growth in online retailing, as well as higher demand for sites 
closer to central London from time- sensitive and so- called last-mile businesses. In 
addition to these changes in the distribution economy, Mark Brearley (proprietor 
of a manufacturing business and professor at Cass Cities, London Metropolitan 
University) explained that the growth in the population of London is, in turn, 
linked to a growth in businesses that serve this population:  ‘more people need 
more pints of milk, more buildings, more school dinners, more hospital bedsheets’. 
As prosperity in London increases, this also fuels growth in ‘everything niche and 
differentiated’. As a result, a range of industrial businesses are growing, including 
builders’ merchants, self- storage, public transport and courier depots, catering, 
higher- end and just- in- time food and drink production, art and artisan production, 
garment and accessory making, printing, culture- related production and logistics 
(such as set and prop makers), bespoke furniture and joinery, steel fabrication and 
building fit- out, waste handling and recycling – all at the small and medium scale. 
The more skilled and entrepreneurial people are attracted to London, the more 
people create and grow industrial businesses there. In response, the deputy mayor 
for planning, regeneration and skills claimed in the committee that ‘we are on the 
cusp of a real problem’ and acknowledged that this ‘has come about through the 
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Alongside more optimistic projections on the future industrial economy, 
there was evidence that the structure of London’s economy was changing. In 2013, 
London documented a slowing of growth in its financial and insurance services 
sector, with a projected decline by 2030 (Wickham 2015, Figure 3a), undermin-
ing London’s prior model of economic growth heavily reliant on its success as a 
global financial centre. In response, the GLA’s own economics team placed greater 
emphasis on economic diversity as a resilience strategy, particularly amid concerns 
about the impact of Brexit (GLA Economics 2016). The GLA’s regeneration team 
led on important work auditing businesses on industrial land. The highest pro-
file of these was the Park Royal Atlas (GLA 2014), but smaller internal pieces of 
work were completed in a range of other industrial locations. This work helped to 
build an important evidence base and raise the profile of industrial land within the 
GLA, also providing impetus and a methodology for further auditing work under-
taken by students at London universities (London School of Economics, London 
Metropolitan and UCL).
A critique of the new London Plan’s approach to managing 
industry
When the mayor’s new London Plan was published for consultation in 2018, a seem-
ingly bold approach to industrial land policy was set out. Firstly, in order to halt the 
loss of industrial capacity, Policy E4 states that there will be ‘no net loss’ of industrial 
Figure 8.2 Map of London boroughs showing the management of the transfer 
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floor space across London. Under previous London plans, the 32 London boroughs 
(local or municipal authorities with planning powers) were each given targets 
for the transfer of industrial land to other uses, with some boroughs identified as 
suitable for ‘restricted’ release, some for ‘limited’ release and a few for ‘managed’ 
release (the latter facilitating the highest quantum of transfer). Figure 8.2 illustrates 
this approach of ‘managed decline’ and contrasts it with the new approach in the 
London Plan (Figure 8.3), in which only three east London boroughs – Newham, 
Barking and Dagenham, and Havering – are still identified for some limited release 
of industrial land, with the remaining boroughs required to either retain or provide 
new industrial capacity, such that – overall – there is no net loss.
This has been complemented with a second new policy (E7), which pro-
motes industrial intensification and co- location of industrial and residential uses. 
This is intended to stimulate denser development, both in the form of multi- storey 
Figure 8.3 Map of London boroughs showing the management of industrial 
land capacity under the policies proposed in the Draft London Plan 2017 
(GLA 2017a)
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industrial, and mixed- use industrial and residential development. The policy was 
supported by work undertaken on the viability of intensification and the urban 
design solutions required (GLA 2017b; We Made That 2018).
There is much to commend in the new London Plan’s approach to managing 
industrial land. Importantly, it moves away from the previous policy of managed 
decline and sends a clear signal, through introducing an approach of ‘nil net loss’ of 
industrial land across London, that it is seeking to halt any further loss and support 
London’s industry moving forward. The ambition to integrate industry and housing 
also has many merits in principle, at least for much contemporary industry, working 
towards ‘industrious cities’, where industry is given more prominence in the city, 
allowing it to be celebrated and avoiding the parcelling off of industry in anony-
mous sheds. It has stimulated lively discussions and innovative architectural design 
solutions to the challenge of co- locating industry and housing, some of which we 
are starting to see come forward as (private sector- led) demonstration projects.
However, the change in approach we see in the new London Plan appears to 
be an attempt to develop a win–win solution: deliver more housing and, at the same 
time, accommodate existing industrial businesses and future projected demand for 
industry. The mantra of growth underpinning the London Plan since its beginnings 
(Taylor 2013) shows no sign of waning, despite the current mayor framing it in the 
new London Plan as ‘good growth’. The latest plan has 48 Opportunity Areas – areas 
of growth where thousands of new jobs and homes are planned – which is double 
the number identified in the original 2004 Plan. New and planned major trans-
port infrastructure serves as the basis for this growth, but much of it (the planned 
Bakerloo line extension, Crossrail 1 and Crossrail 2) runs through London’s largest 
reservoirs of industrial land. With little political appetite for building on London’s 
Green Belt, industrial areas became an easy target for accommodating large- scale 
housing development. The ambition to preserve existing industrial capacity and 
accommodate new accommodation in this context is challenging to say the least 
and requires a political ambition at both the London regional and local authority 
scales. Such leadership is currently lacking. In fact, the wider growth ambitions of 
the city, and a commitment to solving the housing crisis, are clear political priorities 
that are eclipsing the few voices that are speaking up for the importance of retain-
ing and providing industrial accommodation. These struggles are already being 
played out in many of the Opportunity Areas, where development is progressing – 
in the Old Kent Road, in Tottenham, in Charlton Riverside – as well as on industrial 
sites close to existing Opportunity Areas that are feeling the impact of development 
pressure beyond the boundary, such as Camley Street north of King’s Cross.
If the London Plan is to succeed in its ambitions to increase capacity for 
both industry and housing, it will depend crucially on the deliverability of the nil 
net loss policy in practice and on the viability of intensification and co- location 
across London. If owners and developers of industrial assets do not bring for-
ward sites for redevelopment in line with policy, or if the nil net loss policy is 
difficult to enforce, then the signal that co- location is acceptable in policy terms 
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is likely to facilitate the further loss of industrial land to residential or mixed 
use with no guarantee of industrial accommodation. The fear is that the London 
Plan is overly optimistic in assuming its policies will be easy to implement at the 
local level, and that the unintended consequence of this suite of policies will 
further fuel real estate speculation and rising hope values. Lessons can already 
be learned from experience at the local borough level, where there has been 
a softening of policy on industrial land for a number of years, with Strategic 
Industrial Sites being variously renamed as Mixed Use Employment Areas, 
Regeneration Areas and so forth, but little employment delivered on these sites 
(see Ferm and Jones 2016).
At the London Plan EiP session on this matter,7 there was a consensus among 
participants that there was an over- reliance on industrial intensification to achieve 
housing targets and deliver additional industrial capacity in the London Plan. 
London boroughs giving evidence at the session insisted that the viability of inten-
sifying industrial and co- locating residential land use had not been adequately 
demonstrated. Developers and asset managers emphasised the lack of commer-
cial incentives to redevelop sites in line with policy, if this would mean losing yard 
space or developing space that was less attractive to occupiers and harder to rent. 
These discussions suggest that the challenges in making this policy succeed lie not 
so much in finding the right design solutions – there are many good examples com-
ing forward already – but in incentivising developers and investors to build and 
invest in schemes for which there is little demonstrable occupier appetite.
One glaring weakness of the nil net loss policy as it stands is that it only 
applies to industrial sites that are considered in policy terms as ‘strategic’ or ‘locally 
significant’. Thirty- six per cent of the total industrial land in London falls outside 
these policy designations (AECOM 2016, 1) and is therefore not considered in the 
targets allocated to the 32 boroughs. Leaving out non- designated sites is possibly 
strategically deliberate. In the ‘Housing’ chapter of the new London Plan, a new 
‘small sites’ policy has been introduced which seeks to encourage smaller residen-
tial developers to deliver more housing. The small sites policy is critical to achiev-
ing the housing targets in the London Plan, and non- designated industrial sites are 
likely to be an important source for bringing forward small sites for housing.
For planning officers in individual boroughs seeking to work with, imple-
ment and enforce a nil net loss policy, there are mixed messages in the Plan and a 
lack of guidance for policy- and decision- making to be effective. For example, in 
parallel to the nil net loss policy, the Plan actively encourages (more than before) 
residential and mixed- use development on all industrial sites, even those labelled 
‘strategic’ (as long as there is a coordinated plan- led approach to consolidation 
and redevelopment). Given this permissive approach on all types of industrial 
land, there now appears to be less distinction between the three categories of 
strategic, locally significant and non- designated sites. Applying this policy at a 
London- wide scale is very broad and it is difficult to see how it would govern local 
decisions, especially given the lack of detailed, up- to- date audits of many of the 
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industrial areas in question against which monitoring can take place. At the EiP, 
Just Space criticised the GLA for leading on, or being involved as strategic part-
ners in, planning frameworks that involve development on industrial land, as this 
undermines their role in defending policies in the Plan. There was concern that 
the new London Plan allows for strategic industrial sites to be lost through rather 
vague master- planning exercises that are not required to follow statutory plan-
ning processes and proper consultation.
Just Space requested stronger wording on the need to involve industrial busi-
nesses in the preparation of plans that change the character of an industrial area 
or involve any relocation of those businesses. Whether or not there is any real com-
mitment to retaining existing industrial businesses is unclear. In many of the dem-
onstration projects that are cited as good practice examples (see We Made That 
2018), the industrial space seems to be targeted more at maker firms of the new 
economy. The research evaluating these emerging schemes has yet to be under-
taken, but based on my previous work evaluating redevelopment of industrial sites 
for residential and ‘affordable workspace’, developers’ preferences for occupiers 
that help to market the more profitable residential component of the schemes is the 
main driver of outcomes, which leads to displacement of the original occupiers – a 
form of industrial gentrification (Ferm 2014).
Conclusion
London’s changing approach to managing the relationship between industry and 
housing has been documented in this chapter. It is an experience that has relevance 
for Toronto and other post- industrial cities that are grappling with problems of the 
displacement of industry by higher- value uses, in a context where deindustriali-
sation is no longer the main driver of the loss of industry, and there are signs of 
growth in the sector. Many of these same cities are also grappling with a housing 
crisis, which is politically a higher priority.
In the past, industrial land was arguably a legitimate source of land for hous-
ing, given the projected ongoing decline of industrial employment. In London at 
least, the trend is reversing and for the first time there are projections of net future 
demand for industrial accommodation. This has required some innovation and 
creative thinking by policy- makers, and the solution has been to promote integra-
tion of housing and industry and intensification of existing low- density sites, in 
the hope that both housing and industrial capacity can be accommodated – a win–
win solution. However, this chapter argues that there is an element of ‘wishful 
thinking’ in this approach, with a reliance on many (as yet) untested assumptions. 
Integration between industry and housing may well be a laudable long- term aspi-
ration. But given the speed of change, departing from a clear protectionist stance 
on industrial land is, in the short term, likely to favour housing and lead to its 
continued loss.
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The lobbying work that has been undertaken in the last decade, described 
in this chapter, has certainly raised awareness of the importance of protecting the 
industry that remains and accommodating any future projected growth – for the 
functioning of London’s broader economy if nothing else – but there is little evi-
dence of any serious challenge to London’s growth model, to its reliance on highly 
specialised financial and business services sectors, or – referring back to Massey 
(2007) – a real appreciation of the economic (and social) diversity that underpins 
London’s global city status. Other issues are seen as having higher priority politi-
cally. Activists questioning the granting of planning permission for residential tow-
ers on strategic industrial land are criticised openly on social media for standing 
in the way of delivering much-needed ‘affordable housing’. This points to a deeper 
problem of the financial development models we have come to rely on to secure the 
delivery of affordable housing and broader social infrastructure. As long as these 
remain unchallenged, there is unlikely ever to be any strong political leadership 
supporting the retention of industry in our cities.
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Notes
 1. Author’s own calculations based on a comparison of table  4.2 of the new London Plan (GLA 2019)  and 
table 3.1 in the 2016 London Plan (GLA 2016). Boroughs with the highest hike were chosen for reflection 
(Barking and Dagenham, Barnet and Tower Hamlets).
 2. See Taylor and Edwards (2016) for an account of JSEP’s work and impact in the first two to three years.
 3. A selection can be viewed at: https:// casscities.co.uk/ research.
 4. Accessed here: https:// justspace.org.uk/ 2018/ 02/ 24/ london- plan- write- now.
 5. Drawn from the group’s Terms of Reference (not available publicly online).
 6. The London Assembly is made up of elected members, whose function is to hold the mayor to account 
by publicly examining policies and programmes. A  transcript of the meeting of 7 September is available 
under ‘Committee Meetings’ at: http:// www.london.gov.uk/ about- us/ london- assembly/ london- assembly- 
committees/ planning- committee.
 7. This was considered as Matter 62 (Land for Industry, Logistics and Services to Support London’s Economic 
Function) held on 19 March 2019 at 9.30 am.
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Global city, global housing bubble? 




The key ‘global’ command- and- control cities are at the cutting edge of many of the 
changes occurring as a result of the extension of a finance- led global capitalism. 
For decades before the emergence of COVID- 19, the spread of a global market for 
financial securities linked to housing has provided credit for the purchase of land 
and housing in a number of cities, which pushes up not only house and land prices 
but also rents, as landlords seek to cover their mortgage costs. Yet many of the fac-
tors that have been driving up urban housing costs are not well understood. Lack 
of understanding of these factors not only has the potential to fuel problematic 
forms of ‘populist’ politics but has also led to policies that arguably have made the 
situation worse. This chapter provides an examination of the Toronto case, with 
an eye to understanding the effects of housing market processes and housing poli-
cies with relevance not only for Toronto but for many key global cities around the 
world, including London. The chapter begins by explaining the cause of Toronto’s 
‘bubble’. It then examines some of its implications, and it concludes by drawing on 
this history to outline basic solutions to the affordable housing situation in the city.
Toronto and its housing bubble
As noted by Vinodrai and Brail in Chapter 2, greater Toronto is Canada’s largest met-
ropolitan area (containing between 5.9 and 8.1 million people, depending on how 
the metropolitan area is defined/ bounded), with Canada’s largest city at its heart 
(the City of Toronto, with 2.73 million people in 2016). It is also Canada’s predomi-
nant immigrant reception urban region, attracting over 36 per cent of all immigrants 
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Toronto is Canada’s most diverse metropolitan area, and people from all 255 types 
of ethnicity tracked in the 2016 census of Canada are present in Toronto, far more 
than in most other Canadian cities. Toronto is Canada’s pre- eminent ‘global city’.
As Canada’s premier financial centre, Toronto has done better than many 
other cities in the transition from a Fordism dominated by manufacturing to a 
globalised post- Fordism characterised by finance- led capitalism, and Toronto has 
remained among the wealthiest regions in the country. Yet economic restructuring 
has had spatial and political implications in Toronto, with most of the dwindling 
industrial sector located in the suburbs and exurbs, while the booming financial 
sector is concentrated in the central business district (CBD) (Walks 2015; see 
also Chapter 2 by Brail and Vinodrai). This has led to rapid gentrification of the 
inner city, de- conversion of many older housing units from rental tenure to owner- 
occupation and a slow shift of the immigrant reception neighbourhoods into the 
suburbs (Walks and Maaranen 2008a, 2000b; Walks 2011).
High housing costs and declining levels of housing affordability are perennial 
issues affecting ‘global’ cities such as Toronto and London. Of course, it is difficult to 
define exactly what ‘affordability’ means. In the Canadian tradition, housing is unaf-
fordable if payments take up more than 25 per cent of before- tax income, but this was 
raised to 30 per cent in the late 1980s. As Chapter 11 by Hawes and Grisdale shows, 
this is also when affordability generally became worse, and by the 2000s roughly half 
of Toronto’s renter households, and a third of owners, had payments that exceeded 
this threshold. Another common definition of affordable housing is housing that rents 
at 80 per cent (or less) of the average market rent – this has been the definition used 
by the Province of Ontario to assess rental affordability (see MMAH Ontario 2011). 
Since the 1980s, Toronto in particular has suffered from an inadequate production 
of rental housing within either of these affordability criteria, driving up average costs 
(Suttor 2016; Walks 2006). With the advent of the 2008–9 Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC), which saw house prices in the United States decline, housing costs in Toronto 
counter- intuitively escalated to record levels. Rents followed suit after a lag. By 
February 2017, one of the largest Canadian banks (Bank of Montreal: BMO) declared 
the Toronto region housing market ‘in a bubble’ even as housing markets in most other 
Canadian cities were ‘well- behaved’ (Gray 2017). In September 2019, the Swiss bank 
UBS declared Toronto’s housing market the second most overvalued of any city on the 
planet, and the worst in North America (McClelland 2019). In a 2019 survey, Toronto 
ranked dead last among Canadian cities in renter satisfaction (Lewis 2019).
That an already expensive housing market had crossed a line into bubble ter-
ritory had already become a common sentiment in Toronto (Febbraro 2019). Of 
course, ‘housing bubble’ is a fraught and contested term meaning different things 
to different audiences. Joe Stiglitz was among the first to solidify a scholarly defini-
tion. In his view, a bubble occurs when real estate valuations significantly deviate 
from the underlying fundamental values supporting those prices, such as the rents 
the units can garner in the open market and the incomes of those who make the 
payments, with the result that bubble prices may be vulnerable to decline (Stiglitz 
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1990). This is typically how a bubble has been defined within the economics dis-
cipline ever since (see Abildgren et al. 2018). However, Stiglitz (1990) also noted 
that one can only determine whether a particular housing market has been in a 
‘bubble’ by looking in the rear- view mirror based on the evolution of underlying 
values. Konings (2018) and Bichler and Nitzan (2009), meanwhile, argue that 
there are no fundamental values upon which to base prices, whether for housing 
or otherwise. Instead, valuations result merely from willingness and ability to pay, 
and thus from the confidence that buyers (including those buying for use value as 
well as investors buying for exchange value) have that values will not fall. Thus, 
housing bubbles – even those seemingly (far) out of line with incomes and rents – 
may not always be prone to decline, but instead could be held aloft as a result of 
ongoing investment demand and institutional factors. It depends on confidence, 
the sources of demand and how the market is structured.
Regardless of how one might define a bubble and identify its presence, it is 
clear that average house prices in the Toronto census metropolitan area (CMA) 
rose much faster following the GFC than house prices in most other metropoli-












































































































Canada 10-City Index (not including the Toronto CMA)
Figure 9.1 House prices in the Toronto census metropolitan area compared 
with house prices in other large metropolitan areas in Canada. Created by the 
author, using data from the Teranet House Price Index dataset (Teranet 2020). 
The Canada 10- City Index was calculated using the Teranet indices and weights 
for the Montreal, Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Ottawa, Winnipeg, Quebec City, 
Hamilton, Victoria and Halifax metropolitan areas (CMAs), that is, 10 of the 11 
metros in the Teranet 11- City Index (i.e. without the Toronto CMA). Teranet only 
collects information on 11 CMAs. January 2008 = 100
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higher than the Canadian average, they have typically moved up or down in a simi-
lar pattern to the rest of urban Canada. Things changed after 2008, with Toronto 
(and Vancouver) witnessing significantly stronger house price inflation than most 
of the rest of urban Canada, leading to unexplainably elevated prices – the situa-
tion I refer to here as the ‘bubble’.
Not only did the affordability gap widen between the Toronto region and 
other CMAs, but the difference in the rate of price increases widened as well. 
Between 2009 and 2016, Toronto prices grew almost twice as fast as the average of 
the other 10 metros in Teranet’s 11- City Index (which includes Vancouver): 63.2 
per cent in Toronto (for an annualised rate of 9 per cent) vs 32.3 per cent in the 
other 10 metros (annualised rate of 4.6 per cent). During the hottest 18 months 
between January 2016 and July 2017, Toronto CMA house prices rose almost three 
times faster (41 per cent in Toronto vs 14.7 per cent in the other 10 metros, for 
an annualised 27.5 per cent vs 9.8 per cent increase). Although concerted efforts 
by the federal and provincial governments from mid- 2017 onward were success-
ful in reducing the pace of inflation, prices after a short mini- correction in early 
2017 continued rising, and even during the more muted rises in 2018 and 2019, 
Toronto’s annualised rate of price increases (7.6 per cent) was over four times faster 
than that for the other 10 metros (1.8 per cent). By summer 2019, the average- 
priced home had become out of range of the entire bottom 90 per cent of the CMA 
population, despite Toronto having some of the wealthiest households in the coun-
try (Febbraro 2019), and then continued rising through most of 2020 despite the 
ongoing pandemic. And as private landlords need to cover their costs (including 
mortgage costs), rents rose along with values all the way up to the pandemic onset.1
Toronto is not the only city facing unaffordable and rapidly rising housing 
costs. Fairly similar patterns, but established even earlier than those in Toronto, 
are found in Vancouver (Canada), London (UK), Sydney (Australia), New York City 
(US) and a host of other ‘global cities’ (Ley and Murphy 2001; Ley 2017; Moos and 
Skaburskis 2010; Skaburskis and Moos 2008; Wetzstein 2017). High and rising 
housing costs that price out regular households appear to be a form of global city 
‘disease’, and this has raised many questions among scholars, policy- makers and 
housing activists. What explains such high costs and the rapid house price inflation 
of the most recent decade? What are the implications of such high housing costs? 
Given these causes and implications, what might be done to make housing more 
affordable? The rest of the chapter deals with these questions, using Toronto as its 
case study.
Explaining Toronto’s housing bubble
While a number of factors have contributed to sky- high housing costs, there have 
also arisen a number of erroneous claims and misconceptions about certain causes 
driving the housing bubble. It is important to critically examine such claims and 
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to ascertain their relative importance. One of these misconceptions relates to the 
impact of rising inequality and the investment patterns of transnational elites in 
driving up local housing costs. It is clear that inequality in income and wealth (as 
revealed by the shares of each belonging to the top 10 per cent and top 1 per cent of 
earners) has been increasing since the 1980s in many developed nations, albeit to 
different degrees depending on national policies (Piketty and Saez 2014; Alvaredo 
et al. 2017). There were, by the mid-2010s, many more high net- worth individuals 
(HNWIs) searching for the best places to invest their wealth, especially from the US 
due to the rapid rise of inequality there since Ronald Reagan’s presidency (Piketty 
et al. 2018) and from Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Novokment 
et al. 2018). Coupled with the development of global information technology net-
works that have made it easier to move money around the world, this understand-
ably has allowed many transnational elites to purchase housing in different cities. 
There is no doubt that global cities such as London, New York City, Vancouver and 
Sydney have come to act ‘as a safe deposit box for the transnational wealth elite’ 
(Fernandez et al. 2016; see also Rogers and Koh 2017).
But are high and rising housing costs in global cities mainly a result of this 
phenomenon? In Canada, many people are convinced that an influx of money from 
foreign buyers, especially from China, has created those bubbles and priced out 
Canadian home buyers (Todd 2017; Kalinowski 2018). Even some Canadian schol-
ars (Ley 2010, 2017) have promoted the idea that rising house prices are largely 
due to demand from foreign buyers. Responding to public anger over the pros-
pects of foreign buyers outbidding for housing in Vancouver, the British Columbia 
(BC) provincial government in 2016 imposed a 15 per cent (raised to 20 per cent 
in 2018) ‘foreign home- buyers tax’ on house purchases in Vancouver and Victoria 
(Todd 2017). With rising prices starting to produce a similar politics of resent-
ment in Ontario, in 2017 the Ontario government imposed a similar 15 per cent 
‘non- resident speculation tax’ on house sales within Greater Golden Horseshoe – 
the larger area that contains not only the Toronto CMA, but Hamilton, Oshawa, 
Barrie, Guelph and St Catharines – as part of their ‘Fair Housing Plan’ (Kalinowski 
2018). Furthermore, reports by the BC government (Maloney et al. 2019) as well 
as non- governmental organisations such as Transparency International Canada 
(see Lee- Shanok 2019) have suggested that the Toronto and Vancouver housing 
markets were being used by international crime syndicates to launder money. The 
BC report suggested that C$6.3 billion had been laundered through Vancouver and 
Victoria housing markets in 2015, representing roughly 5 per cent of real estate 
transactions and causing a roughly 5 per cent (only)2 increase in housing prices 
(Maloney et al. 2019).
But how much blame might foreign buyers actually deserve for rising 
housing costs? The evidence suggests that their impact in Toronto (and even 
Vancouver) is less important than many local residents, and the BC and Ontario 
governments, have thought. First of all, the alarming BC report was not based on 
actual flows of investment into BC, but instead on estimates of total global flows 
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of money laundering activity, with rough projections (without actual evidence) 
of how much of this might flow into Vancouver; thus, it is not a reliable source of 
data. Actual data, however, were estimated by the Canada Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation (CMHC), suggesting that before the BC foreign home- buyer tax was 
implemented in 2016, roughly 13 per cent of buyers in Vancouver were foreign 
nationals (CMHC 2016). This is the exact same percentage (13 per cent) identi-
fied in a 2017 study of transactions in the London (UK) housing market (Fraser 
2017). This is enough to increase house prices at the margin, but it also means 
that 87 per cent of home buyers were Canadian (or in London, from the UK). The 
effect of foreign buyer demand is even smaller in Toronto, where a subsequent 
analysis found that only 4.7 per cent of homes were purchased by foreign buy-
ers in the year before the imposition of Ontario’s non- resident speculation tax 
(Kalinowski 2018); thus, 95.3 per cent of all such purchases in Toronto were made 
by Canadian residents, and this went to almost 100 per cent after the imposition of 
the tax (Kalinowski 2018). Another study found that only 2.5 per cent of Toronto’s 
overall condo stock was owned by foreign nationals (CMHC 2017). Although for-
eign buying is real, it is thus not the main, nor potentially even the secondary, 
cause of rapid house price inflation in global cities. The vast majority of demand is 
local, even in London, and even more in Toronto.
The role of public policy in Toronto’s housing bubble
If house price inflation is mainly the result of local demand, why have prices risen 
more quickly since the GFC, which began with a recession (not a boom) and was 
followed by slow (not fast) economic growth and wage growth, than in the decades 
before the GFC? The riddle of a housing bubble during and after a recession is 
among the many puzzling phenomena that lead to suspicions about foreign buy-
ers. The missing puzzle piece is not foreign buyers but the influx of cheap avail-
able credit to local buyers that has flooded mortgage markets in the aftermath of 
the GFC, coupled with the ways that ‘financialisation’ has evolved to incentivise 
riskier lending. When the GFC erupted, governments all over the world (including 
Canada, the UK and others, following the US lead) forced down central bank inter-
est rates to as close to zero as they could (producing negative real interest rates; 
quantitative easing in the US, UK and EU did this as well), in order to stimulate 
lending and protect borrowers from insolvency. But this spurred many banks to 
lend, and to make riskier loans than they would have, including across national 
borders. Because of the ways that mortgage securitisation has evolved, much of 
the cheap credit that was made available went into mortgages for residential real 
estate, and banks no longer bore much of the risk of default (see Aalbers 2016; 
Walks 2019 for a longer discussion). One could suddenly acquire a larger mort-
gage, at a lower interest rate, on looser terms, than in the past, and this incentivised 
investors to put their money into housing, including second homes that they would 
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rent out for profit (benefitting professional landlords, and turning many house-
holds into amateur landlords).
In effect, governments facing recession purposefully stimulated credit crea-
tion and real estate investment as a way of spurring economic growth and jobs in 
the face of crisis. Scholars have referred to such a policy approach as ‘privatized 
Keynesianism’ (Crouch 2009), in that instead of governments doing the borrow-
ing and spending in order to stimulate the economy and put people to work (as in 
traditional ‘Keynesianism’), it is now private individuals and households that are 
incentivised to borrow and spend in order to stimulate the economy. However, one 
result is rapidly rising debt levels among individuals and households, a negative 
outcome of this policy approach which in the long run makes those households, 
and their local economies, more vulnerable and susceptible to economic crisis 
(Walks 2013).
If transnational elites buying up property in global cities is not a primary fac-
tor driving up their house prices, does this mean that rising inequality cannot be 
blamed for the housing bubble? No, in fact rising inequality has played an impor-
tant role in driving up house prices through wealthy individuals’ investments into 
mortgage markets. Increasing income inequality provided the wealthy with greater 
ability save more of their income than in the past. With declining returns in manu-
facturing and other industries, they have invested much of their savings in finan-
cial securities of various kinds. As Lysandrou (2011) notes, the various funds that 
absorb these savings (including hedge funds, mutual funds, money market funds, 
pension funds, etc.) find it easier to invest in financial markets than to move funds 
around the world directly into hard assets. This has created what Aalbers (2016) 
calls a ‘wall of money’ searching for yield in global financial markets. Because 
national and international public policies (including the various Basel accords; 
see Major 2012) have provided incentives to invest in financial securities that flow 
funds into mortgage markets, and because of innovations in mortgage securitisa-
tion that make lending for mortgages almost riskless for banks, a large propor-
tion of these savings flow into channels that provide credit for mortgage lending. 
Neoliberal policies that reduce taxes for the rich, and that reduce welfare- state 
spending for universal programmes, are thus in part responsible for creating this 
wall of money flooding into mortgage markets and, in turn, more available and 
cheaper mortgage credit available to borrowers. The US and UK have an interest 
in promoting neoliberal policies that create inequality around the world. With the 
world’s largest financial sectors, the US and the UK have a competitive advantage 
in providing financial securities and services to HNWIs, and their economies end 
up absorbing a portion of this investment, making both countries richer than they 
would otherwise have been (see Walks 2019 for more discussion). Financialisation 
allows the US and UK to extract (‘expropriate’ according to Lapavitsas 2009; as a 
form of ‘tribute’ in Gowan’s 2009 analysis) a portion of global profits from housing 
investment, helping to explain why these countries have been so slow to reform 
their financial sectors.
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The Canadian federal government implemented a number of policies that 
took the risk ‘off the books’ of Canadian banks and encouraged them to lend for 
mortgages. These policies included creating new mortgage- backed securities pro-
grammes in which the federal government either directly purchased or insured 
mortgages and related securities (see Walks 2014 for details). This made pri-
vate mortgage lending virtually risk free for banks and other mortgage lenders 
and helped flood mortgage markets in Canada with cheap and abundant credit. 
Canadian buyers, able to access so much credit, competed to outbid each other for 
existing housing, rapidly bidding up prices, especially in those cities where (due to 
a lack of rental housing) investors were incentivised to buy up second properties 
to rent out (the ‘buy- to- let’ market) – creating the ‘bubble’ evident in Figure 9.1.
It must be noted that – as discussed by Hawes and Grisdale in Chapter 11 – the 
housing bubble in cities such as Toronto would not have occurred without policies 
and processes that reduced access to affordable rental housing and encouraged 
investment in owner- occupied housing at the expense of rental housing. If there 
had been sufficient affordable rental housing, average rents would not have risen at 
a rate exceeding income increases, households facing rising house prices would not 
feel compelled to buy (instead of rent) and investors would not have been incen-
tivised to buy up housing units at inflated prices to rent out. Three factors have 
conspired to reduce the amount of affordable rental housing available in Toronto.
First of all, gentrification  – specifically the conversion of formerly rental 
housing into owner- occupation – has eaten away at the stock of formerly afford-
able rental housing. In just 20  years, across the Toronto CMA the total stock of 
rental units with rents below 80 per cent of the average CMA rent (the Province 
of Ontario’s official definition of ‘affordable rental housing’; see MMAH Ontario 
2011) declined from 237,816 units in 1991 (41.3 per cent of the rental stock, and 
17.4 per cent of all Toronto CMA housing units) to 173,783 units in 2011 (27.5 per 
cent of the rental stock, and only 8.7 per cent of all housing units).3 Because social 
rental units have not disappeared, the brunt of these declines have been felt in 
the privately rented affordable stock. In the 1991–2011 period, privately rented 
housing units affordable under the provincial definition (80 per cent of average 
rent or less) declined by over 70 per cent within Toronto’s inner city (Walks et al., 
forthcoming). This was on top of the major waves of gentrification that occurred 
from the late 1960s through the late 1980s which had already resulted in many 
former inner city rental units being de- converted to owner- occupation (Walks 
and Maaranen 2008b). This has implications not only for housing costs, but also 
for the ability to maintain an innovative and authentic arts scene (see Chapter 15 
by March).
Second, as Hawes and Grisdale discuss in Chapter 11, upper levels of gov-
ernment halted funding for new social affordable housing, preferring instead to 
allow private sector actors to produce condo units for the owner- occupier market, 
under sway of an ‘asset- based welfare’ approach to housing, and with the idea 
that some of these would end up as (higher- priced) rentals (Walks 2006; Walks 
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and Clifford 2015; Suttor 2016). However, the Ontario government (the provin-
cial governments are the level that regulates rental housing) chose not to apply 
rent controls to condo units built after 1991, the majority of which were located in 
Toronto, a policy that clearly led to rising average rents (Rosen and Walks 2015; 
Hale 2018). Although a short- lived New Democratic Party (Canada’s party of the 
left) government invested in new social units in the early 1990s (roughly 14,000 
within the City of Toronto), subsequent Ontario provincial governments have built 
very few new units and downloaded responsibility for existing units to municipali-
ties. The roughly 15,000 new social rental units built since 1990 have done little 
to make up for the loss of roughly 123,000 affordable rental units that occurred 
within Toronto’s inner city alone over this period (see Walks et al. forthcoming). 
The result has been a rapid decline of affordable rental units over time and the 
development of a rental housing crisis.
Third, as Hawes and Grisdale discuss, a significant proportion of rental stock 
was shifted out of the long- term market and into the short- term rental market 
geared to tourists and visitors (and marketed through online sites such as Airbnb). 
While the COVID- 19 pandemic disrupted this shift, by 2020 the number of long- 
term rental units in Toronto was already diminished.
With all these factors at play, it is no surprise that international investors 
have eyed Toronto’s rents as likely to continue rising, spurring real estate invest-
ment trusts (REITs) and other large financialised corporations to buy up older 
rental buildings to capitalise on such rent increases (see August and Walks 2018; 
Chapter 11 by Hawes and Grisdale, for more information).
The final piece of the puzzle is the employment effect of policies put in place 
in the face of the GFC. Governments around the world – including Canada and the 
UK – implemented policies that bailed out the financial sector and those sectors 
that depended on it, such as housing and automobile sales. While this prevented a 
global depression, it also meant that apart from housing construction it was mainly 
in the financial sector that jobs and wages continued to grow. Global cities such as 
Toronto and London are ‘global’ largely because they are the main financial centres 
of their respective nations. Policies bailing out the financial sector supported job 
growth in Toronto at the expense of many other places in Canada. Fifty- five per 
cent of the 50,775 jobs created within the FIRE sector (finance, insurance and real 
estate) in urban Canada between 2011 and 2016 were located in the Toronto CMA, 
which captured 25.2 per cent of the total job growth (of all new urban jobs) over 
this five- year period (representing 197,305 new jobs).4 This disproportionately 
attracted young adults aged 20–29 to Toronto (many via migration from other 
places in Canada), and this age cohort increased in Toronto by the most (66,685 
people) of any CMA, representing 34.3 per cent of their total growth across urban 
Canada, helping to spur local demand for rental housing in Toronto at exactly the 
same time it was becoming extremely scarce due to the factors discussed above.
Faced with a lack of rental housing and rising house prices in the owner- 
occupied sector, new households in Toronto were incentivised to buy housing as 
 
toroNto’S houSiNg BuBBLE AND itS DiSCoNtENtS 139
soon as they could, further bringing demand forward from the future and help-
ing bid up the price of remaining properties. One might expect that the construc-
tion industry would have responded by ramping up housing starts and in doing so 
help rebalance demand and supply. In fact, they did this, but mainly in the owner- 
occupied condo sector where demand kept rising from both sides (households 
looking for a place to live, and investors in the buy- to- let market, both of whom 
increasingly relied on mortgage financing) in the face of rising prices (Rosen and 
Walks 2015; Chapter 11 by Hawes and Grisdale). But as is usual during a credit- 
fuelled bubble, production has not been able to keep up with rising demand, so 
even in the condo sector sale prices rose faster than incomes and rents. But even 
with rapidly rising rents, many investors in the buy- to- let sector were not earning 
a very high profit, if any (Kalinowski 2020a), due to the already high land and 
housing costs.
Implications, discontents and policy responses
The housing bubble in Toronto (and other cities such as Vancouver) has had a num-
ber of important repercussions. One of these is high and rising levels of indebted-
ness, as households take on ever greater mortgages in order to purchase housing, 
and as tenants use debt to smooth consumption in the face of rising rents. One stand-
ard measure of indebtedness is the ratio of total debt to annual disposable income, a 
measure that controls for inflation. Across all households in Canada this ratio stood 
at 107.8 per cent in the first quarter of 1999, but then rose by 56.3 per cent to a ratio 
of 167.46 per cent in the first quarter of 2016.5 Tellingly, households in Toronto 
saw their debt levels rise at almost twice this pace, from 105 per cent in 1999 to 
210 per cent in 2016 (Gellatly and Richards 2019, 4). Furthermore, debt is highly 
skewed, with the poorest one- fifth of households experiencing levels of indebted-
ness 2.6 times greater than richer households (420 per cent of disposable income, vs 
162 per cent). This has contributed to widening the distribution of wealth: in 1999 
the average net worth of the richest quintile in the Toronto CMA was 78 times that 
of the poorest quintile, but by 2016 this had increased to 131 times, largely because 
wealthier households now own much of the real estate that is increasing in price, 
while poorer households either remain tenants or take on larger debts in order to get 
owner- occupied housing (Gellatly and Richards 2019, 6–7). High levels of house-
hold debt are not only a key economic vulnerability facing the country but are also 
linked to rapidly widening levels of wealth inequality.
When local prices and availability of housing are clearly out of alignment 
with other local conditions such as incomes and the availability of jobs, and the 
population is feeling the combined stress of rising inequality and indebtedness, 
the inclination is for local residents to suspect something is amiss and to look 
for someone or something to blame. This is at the heart of policies that point the 
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finger at foreign buyers, including the foreign/ non- resident buyers/ speculation 
taxes, which largely aim to address suspicions that wealthy Chinese investors were 
pricing locals out of housing in Toronto and Vancouver (Kalinowski 2018; Todd 
2017). Misunderstandings about the underlying causes of the bubble also fuel 
so- called populist political movements attempting to capitalise on confusion and 
resentment. Although his new political party – the People’s Party – did not win 
many votes in the 2019 election, leader Maxime Bernier campaigned on a promise 
to reduce Canada’s intake of immigrants, which he argued would reduce house 
prices via lower demand (Pinkerton 2019).6
Two other scapegoats in the rush to assign blame are the planning system 
that has been in place to manage and direct urban growth, and rent controls that 
prevent landlords from raising rents faster than the rate of inflation. The Doug 
Ford- led Conservative Ontario government eliminated rent controls on new units 
in late 2018, arguing it would spur developers to build more rental housing, but 
the main immediate outcome was a 6.8 per cent rise in rents  – three times the 
rate of inflation (Kalinowski 2020b), while the COVID- 19 pandemic spurred many 
developers to abandon their plans (including the Google- affiliated Sidewalk Labs 
plan for Toronto’s waterfront). Although the capitalist free market has never built 
affordable housing for poor people (especially purpose- built rental housing) with-
out strong government dirigisme (see Suttor 2016), a so- called YIMBY (Yes In My 
Back Yard) movement has arisen across North America that seeks to attack govern-
ment regulation, relax density and zoning requirements, and speed up or remove 
altogether the development permitting system so that new high- density housing 
can be built quickly by private market actors (McCormick 2017). In Toronto, John 
Lorinc has been leading the fight for cutting development charges and allowing 
developers to build at higher- density zoning, in what he calls the ‘yellow belt’ of 
single-family homes – with the idea that this will solve Toronto’s housing afford-
ability crisis (Lorinc 2019). What such groups miss is the fact that governments at 
all levels have been allowing developers more and more flexibility for years, but 
this has often led to higher land prices due to land speculation, gentrification and 
forms of redevelopment that price out the poor. Furthermore, high housing costs 
have resulted from a lack of affordable rental housing alternatives coupled with a 
credit- driven rush into owner- occupied housing. Loosening regulations on devel-
opers will only mean more (expensive) owner- occupied condos.
Misconceptions about the causes of housing unaffordability have led to 
proposed policy solutions that would only make it worse. The ending of rent 
controls under the Ford government is one example. In another, scholars and 
politicians on the right of the Canadian political spectrum, including the leader 
of the Conservative Party from 2017 through 2020, Andrew Scheer, and Premier 
of Alberta Jason Kenney, have advocated reducing or eliminating regulations that 
limit how much of a mortgage loan prospective homebuyers can borrow from fed-
erally regulated lenders (Scoffield 2019).7 This would only further drive up both 
wealth inequalities and housing prices, as buyers able to borrow larger amounts 
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would seek to outbid each other for the same housing, while higher- income house-
holds would benefit most from the additional credit. It is not the solution to a bub-
ble. Nor is the elimination of rent controls or planning regulations a solution – these 
approaches only lead to higher rents, higher land values, more speculation, more 
gentrification and a housing system that is increasingly rigged against renters, even 
in the face of a pandemic.
Conclusion: Toward a more contented housing system?
The rise of house prices in global cities such as Toronto and London is explainable 
by the fact that, in a post- GFC world where the financial system was bailed out and 
encouraged to increase its lending, it is mostly in the financial centres where jobs, 
wages and demand for housing have grown, while mortgages have become easier 
to acquire. And because the financial sector is one of the most spatially centralised 
within cities (typically located in the downtown core), this has spurred rapid gen-
trification – including the de- conversion of rental units to owner- occupation – in 
such cities. While housing in global cities such as Toronto and London is certainly 
used as a place to park wealth on behalf of a transnational elite, this has not been 
the main cause of the bubble. The vast majority of demand for real estate is from 
local residents: it is because more people were able to access larger mortgages than 
in the past (and at negative real interest rates) that house prices inflated so quickly. 
Coupled with cheap credit, a lack of affordable rental alternatives encouraged new 
(and often amateur) landlords to enter the buy- to- let market, along with large 
financialised corporations (e.g. REITS) that buy up older rental buildings, to take 
advantage of growing demand for rental housing. This added to overall demand 
for units and hence increased prices. Those needing to find housing in global cit-
ies end up as the ‘unwilling subjects’ of housing financialisation (Fields 2017), not 
only due to the lack of affordable choices, but also due to the fact that financialisa-
tion has resulted in a concentration of work (and often the only new jobs, as manu-
facturing and retail jobs disappear) in global cities.
Misunderstanding about the reasons for the bubble has given rise to both 
a populist politics searching for scapegoats and a host of proposed solutions that 
would make the situation worse. Removing regulations on lending will only lead to 
more predatory forms of debt and more indebted households. The COVID- 19 pan-
demic has made this situation potentially more dangerous. The Canadian federal 
government and the Bank of Canada have responded to the pandemic by slashing 
interest rates and implementing a new, larger Insured Mortgage Purchase Program 
meant to encourage banks to lend for mortgages in order to stimulate the economy. 
Not only has this led to a renewed bubble and the resumption of predatory forms 
of credit, but it could saddle more households with unsustainable debts. Instead, 
mortgage finance needs greater regulation specifically to avoid speculation and 
to shape lending in the public interest. Those who would relax rent controls and 
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zoning, reduce development charges and otherwise incentivise capitalist develop-
ment will only end up benefitting developers at the expense of rising rents, higher 
land costs, more speculation and heightened gentrification. Capitalism has never 
found it profitable to build quality affordable housing. It will be necessary for the 
state to require, if not also fund, a greater range of affordable housing choices. 
Inclusionary zoning, in which higher- income owners and renters in condo build-
ings cross- subsidise lower- income households (with the units allocated by housing 
agencies rather than the condo boards or developers), would have helped – and will 
still help – to increase the availability of moderately priced rental units. Community 
land trusts have the ability to keep land costs down and empower local communi-
ties to collectively manage housing units to meet real needs, rather than private 
greed (see Bunce, Chapter 19). State provisions that prevent de- conversion of older 
rental housing would help limit gentrification and maintain affordable housing in 
the older accessible stock. Lastly, new state- funded social housing would help pro-
vide affordable units, keep rents down and dis- incentivise speculators and preda-
tory finance from turning rental buildings into cash cows for global elites. Global 
cities, including Toronto, require a mix of these solutions as well as, eventually, the 
socialisation and democratisation of finance itself.
Notes
 1. All data in this paragraph calculated by the author using the Teranet House Price Index dataset. Note that 
Figure 9.1 anchors the values for both sets of data to 100 in January 2008.
 2. According to the Teranet House Price Index, house prices in Vancouver rose 12.5 per cent in 2015, so even 
the flawed and biased estimate produced by the authors of this BC report effectively suggests that more than 
a majority (60 per cent) of the increase in house prices resulted from local factors.
 3. Calculated by the author using data from the 1991 Census of Canada, the 2011 Census of Canada and the 
2011 National Household Survey (for details, see Walks et al. under review).
 4. This is well in excess of its share of the total CMA population (22.4 per cent) and urban labour force 
(22.7 per cent), meaning that the Toronto CMA brought in labour from the rest of Canada during this time, 
creating a roughly 5 per cent jobs deficit between the rest of Canada and the Toronto CMA. All the data in this 
paragraph calculated by the author using data from the 1991 Census of Canada, the 2011 Census of Canada 
and the 2011 National Household Survey.
 5. Calculated by the author using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM II Table 3780123.
 6. In an interview with the Toronto Star newspaper, Bernier said ‘immigration will be a solution. Fewer immi-
grants, you’ll have less pressure on the housing market so pressure will be lower’ (Pinkerton 2019).
 7. This includes removing the so- called stress test that requires non- insured borrowers to qualify for a mortgage 
at the higher of the official posted rate or the rate that the lender offers them plus two percentage points. This 
is in place to protect the lenders (or the investors buying financial securities backed by mortgages) by mak-
ing sure borrowers will still be able to pay their mortgages if and when interest rates rise. The Conservatives 
advocated eliminating the stress test and relaxing other regulations.
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This chapter aims to describe and analyse some of the fundamental trends and pol-
icy issues in the London housing market. Focusing on the unaffordability problem 
for first- time buyers, the chapter will show how this emerges as a market outcome 
where price dynamics, foreign investments, speed and type of development activ-
ity interrelate and play a major role. The chapter employs a descriptive economic 
analysis to explain detailed empirical evidence on demand, supply and prices 
across the London housing system; the economic analysis will describe the institu-
tional and market links between planning, development and housing demand and 
will exemplify how those links impact on market prices and affordability. Under an 
institutional economic approach, I will describe how the fundamental activities/ 
functions of development, investing and planning are linked by prices and financial 
variables, and how those activities shape market outcomes, henceforth describing 
and making sense of recent market trends. In view of this institutional analysis, 
I will then critically present the most recent policy proposals and discussions.
The problem
The empirical evidence is stark: London is not affordable for the average earner, 
as first- time buyers are in the top 20 per cent of city household income distribu-
tion. Research from Halifax (2019)1 shows that the average first- time buyer pays a 
deposit of £110,656 (26 per cent of the purchase price); this is about three times 
more than in 2008, when it stood at £38,335. Unsurprisingly this implies that first- 
time buyers are now older than they were in 2008 – aged 31 nationwide and aged 
33 in London – up by two years. The primary reason for this dramatic lack of afford-
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According to Office for National Statistics (ONS) data, house prices have 
increased in every region of England since 2004. Prices per square metre in London 
increased far more than in any other region, leading to a widening gulf between it 
and other regions. In 2004, the average price per square metre in London varied 
from £2,310 in Barking and Dagenham to £8,190 in Kensington and Chelsea, but 
by 2016 these figures had risen to £5,970 and £19,440 respectively. The top 19 
most expensive local authorities by price per square metre are all in London, with 
Elmbridge (Surrey) the twentieth most expensive non- London area. Barking and 
Dagenham, the cheapest borough in London, is still more expensive than the prici-
est local authorities in the South West, Midlands or North.
If we associate those figures to data on first- time buyers we unequivocally 
notice that London remains too expensive for many young first- time buyers, with 
research from Hometrack (2018) showing that £84,250 was the average income 
required to buy an average property. Average first- time buyer property prices in 
the capital have increased by 50 per cent in 10 years and now stand at £426,857. 
Within the context of a national affordability crisis, there is a particular disparity 
between the previous figures for London and the rest of the UK, where property 
prices went up by one- fifth (21 per cent) since 2008, with the average price up from 
£172,659 in 2008 to £212,473 today, while the average deposit is now £32,841, up 
by 70 per cent from £19,364 in 2008.2 Moreover, research from Trust for London 
(2017) shows that the high cost of housing in the capital largely explains the higher 
rate of poverty in London (27 per cent of Londoners, compared with 21 per cent 
across England, after housing costs).
There are various measures of affordability.3 The most commonly used indi-
cator in the UK is the ratio of house prices to incomes or earnings – and indeed 
this is also used in many other countries. Based on the 2018 release of ONS data, 
Figure 10.1 illustrates the median affordability ratio, which is the ratio of median 
price paid for residential property to the median workplace- based gross annual 
earnings for full- time workers. We notice that in London the ratio is at 20, twice the 
UK average. There are broad differences; the figure shows the least affordable and 
the most affordable boroughs.
More generally, ONS (2018) shows that over the past five years, more local 
authorities in London and surrounding regions have fallen into the least afford-
able category. In 2018, eight of the 10 least affordable local authorities in England 
and Wales were in London, with two being in the surrounding South East region. 
The most affordable local authorities in 2018 were in the North West, Wales and 
the East Midlands. It is also interesting to look at some international comparisons. 
A survey by Demographia (2019) shows that the median ratio for London is in the 
severely unaffordable category,4 alongside cities such as Hong Kong, Sydney, Los 
Angeles and Vancouver.
Extremely high prices and unaffordability, especially for first- time buyers, 
can also explain why London’s overall homeownership rate has fallen in recent dec-
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from the Greater London Authority (GLA 2018) shows that in 1990, 25 per cent of 
households in London headed by someone aged 16–24 and 57 per cent of house-
holds headed by someone aged 25–34 owned their home. However, by 2017 these 
figures had fallen to 8 per cent and 28 per cent respectively. Homeownership rates 
also fell for households headed by someone aged 35–44 (from 69 per cent to 49 per 
cent) and 45–54 (71 per cent to 52 per cent) over the same period. During this 
period, the ownership rate for households headed by someone aged 55–64 ini-
tially rose, but over the last decade it has fallen back to its original level at 63 per 
cent. Finally, the proportion of households headed by someone older than 65 who 
owned their own home rose relatively steadily from 49 per cent in 1990 to 72 per 
cent in 2017.
An economic analysis
This section presents various descriptive statistics and trends, with data about ten-
ure, ownership, foreign investments, speed and volumes of development activity, 
lending market and price trends. It will then present a narrative of how those vari-
ous activities interact and contribute to unaffordability.
The outcome described in the previous section can be understood in terms 
of dynamics of demand and supply, where demand for housing in London has 
constantly grown in the past two decades. Looking to demand, evidence from the 
GLA (2018) shows that since 1997 both London’s population and its economy 
have grown rapidly, although the job market trends are considerably more cycli-













































































Figure 10.1 Median housing affordability ratio (author, data from ONS 2018)
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or 42 per cent, while the population grew by 1.81 million (26 per cent). However, 
this rapid economic and demographic growth was not matched by an increase in 
the housing stock, which grew by only 500,000 homes (16 per cent) over the same 
period. The last five years have also seen a wide disparity, with the number of jobs 
growing by 14 per cent between 2012 and 2017, the number of people by 6 per 
cent and the number of homes by 4 per cent. This increase in demand has not been 
matched by an equal increase in supply.
Why is demand so strong? London is an international financial centre. Lizieri 
(2009) notes that among world cities, a small subset of cities known as international 
financial centres (IFCs) play a major role in the global system of finance. Those cities 
act as centres for asset management and product innovation. Economies of scale and 
agglomeration, which are the benefits that firms obtain by respectively increasing in 
size and locating near each other, have resulted in an ongoing concentration of high- 
order financial services  – such as equity trading, bond trading, foreign exchange 
activity, derivatives trading and wealth management – in a few key global cities.
In a global economy dominated by the free and fast movement of international 
funds, IFCs compete with each other in order to attract capital, with London usually 
being considered one of the most global cities (Sassen 2001). The attractiveness 
of London as a destination for both commercial and residential real estate capital 
has led to the city being described as a ‘safe deposit box’ (Fernandez et al. 2016). 
Looking at foreign investments, Wallace et al. (2017) found that 13 per cent of new 
build properties sold in London between 2014 and 2016 went to overseas buyers.5 
Research by Sá (2016) shows that with no foreign investment in the housing mar-
ket in England and Wales between the years 2000 and 2014, house prices would be 
19 per cent lower than they are now.
House prices can be theorised as an outcome of the dynamics of demand 
and supply:  when housing demand grows more than supply, prices increase. At 
the same time, demand and supply are not fixed and do respond to prices; the 
standard economic tool to analyse those mutual links between demand, supply 
and prices is the general equilibrium model. However, since demand is constantly 
growing and developers’ incentives to supply housing are often changing because 
of changes in planning policies, a concept of long- run equilibrium is not very useful 
to analyse London house price dynamics. The well- known Four Quadrant Model of 
DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992) is a more immediate and useful general equilib-
rium tool to understand how the complex interaction between development and 
investment inevitably creates market dynamics, volatility and cycles.6 Essentially, 
the model considers the specific and joint dynamics of property, investment and 
development markets, where shocks in one market will have an effect, albeit with 
lags, on other markets through changes in prices and rents. For example, a demand 
shock in the property market affects property valuations, which in turn will have 
an effect on investments for new constructions, which will ultimately feed back as 
new supply to the property market, with the possibility of overshooting demand 




trENDS AND iSSuES iN thE LoNDoN houSiNg MArkEt 149
not happened in London, where supply has not increased rapidly following periods 
of rapid price increase. In order to understand the reasons behind a slow supply 
process, we need to refer to intrinsic features of planning, development and the 
housebuilding industry that jointly determine the supply dynamics.
The UK planning system is local, as planning applications have to be 
decided in line with the relevant local planning authority’s development plan. 
The approval process usually involves a negotiation around planning obliga-
tions, also known as Section 106 agreements (based on that section of the 1990 
Town & Country Planning Act); those are private agreements made between 
local authorities and developers and can be attached to a planning permission to 
make acceptable development that would otherwise be unacceptable in planning 
terms. In particular, planning obligations are used for three purposes: (i) to pre-
scribe the nature of development (e.g. requiring that a given portion of housing is 
affordable); (ii) to compensate for loss or damage created by a development (e.g. 
loss of open space); and (iii) to mitigate a development’s impact (e.g. through 
increased public transport provision). This process is intrinsically discretionary, 
with decisions on permitted development on a particular site made on a case- 
by- case basis, following a negotiation process about developer contributions to 
affordable housing and other community infrastructure through Section 106. 
Extensive research documents that the approval process can take months or even 
years and that delay and lack of certainty are factored into developers’ financial 
models,7 increasing required returns and stopping marginal developments from 
going forward.
Potential lack of competition in the housebuilding industry has been long 
debated in the UK (see e.g. Ball 2010). Given extensive evidence that developers 
purchase large quantities of land without developing it, the existence of barriers to 
entry, increased market shares of the largest builders and weak supply responsive-
ness might suggest that developers do so with the intent of pushing up prices, a 
practice known as land hoarding – a stronger version of land banking.8
Despite those known issues, housing supply in London increased substantially 
in recent years. The GLA (2018) shows that since the turn of the millennium the 
net increase in London’s housing stock has been relatively rapid. The GLA (2018) 
reports that an average of 20,000 homes a year were built in London between 2011 
and 2016 according to the new build statistics, but the net increase in the dwell-
ing stock was greater at around 25,400 a year, due to a combination of relatively 
few demolitions and substantial new housing supply coming from conversions 
and changes of use,9 as well as the undercount in the new build statistics. Increase 
in the planned capacity was key for actual supply to increase: data from the GLA 
(2018, 22)  document that the 2004 London Plan identified capacity for 23,000 
new homes, which then rose to 30,500 in the 2008 Plan, 32,200 in the 2011 Plan, 
42,400 in the 2015 Plan and 60,000 in the 2018 Draft Plan; however, the same 
data show the systematic underachievement of actual supply in terms of planned 
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Mortgage availability is the main financial channel impacting on afford-
ability, with cheap liquidity being one of the factors that accelerated demand 
before the Global Financial Crisis. GLA (2018) data show that the level of new 
homebuyer mortgage lending continues to be subdued, with new home mover 
mortgages close to levels last seen during the crash. In 2017 there were 42,800 
new loans to first- time buyers in London, up 1 per cent from 2016, and 30,500 to 
home movers, down 2 per cent. While lending to first- time buyers has recovered 
partially after 2009, the level of lending to home movers is very subdued. Two 
thousand fewer home mover loans were made in 2017 than in 2009. The number 
of home mover loans has fallen by one- fifth (19 per cent) since the second quar-
ter of 2016. The typical first- time buyer in London borrowed 4.04 times their 
income in 2017, up from just 1.88 in 1980. Home movers, who usually bring 
some equity from the sale of their previous home, have typically borrowed at 
a somewhat lower income ratio than first- time buyers. However, the two have 
now converged. Home movers in London borrowed an average of 4.02 times their 
incomes in 2017, up from 3.93 in 2016 and 1.71 in 1980. The Bank of England 
recommended in June 2014 that mortgage lenders do not extend more than 
15 per cent of new residential mortgages at loan to income ratios at or greater 
than 4.5. This is expected to progressively constrain further increases in median 
loan- to- income ratios for buyers in London.
Most first- time buyers typically need high loan- to- value ratios (LTVs); 
however, the availability of mortgage loans with high LTVs fell dramatically in 
the wake of the 2007/ 8 financial crisis. Loans with LTVs of more than 90 per 
cent comprised one- third of all lending to first- time buyers in London in 2005/ 6, 
but this share fell to just 1 per cent in 2010/ 11 and 2011/ 12. In the last two 
years the proportion of loans at LTVs of between 90 and 95 per cent has risen 
again, reaching 14 per cent in the year to September 2017. Loans at LTVs of 
more than 95 per cent are still virtually non- existent. Loans with LTVs of 50 per 
cent or less have risen significantly in both absolute and percentage terms since 
2014/ 15, and in the last year comprised 23 per cent of total first- time buyer 
mortgage loans. This is primarily driven by the Help to Buy policy, an equity loan 
scheme which provides government- backed equity loans of up to 40 per cent of 
the property value, thereby reducing the amount to be covered by a mortgage. 
In 2016/ 17, there were 2,990 homes bought in London with assistance from this 
scheme, with an average loan value of £152,300. The typical income of house-
holds buying with assistance from Help to Buy London was around £66,500. The 
number of Help to Buy equity loan purchases in 2016/ 17 is equivalent to 13 per 
cent of the number of new build private completions in London in that year (up 
from 9 per cent in 2015/ 16). The Help to Buy London share of the homeowner 
market may actually be larger, as some of these new homes would have been 
bought by investors and rented out. By this measure, Help to Buy London plays 
a particularly significant role in outer London, accounting for over one-quarter 
of sales in several boroughs.
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Policies
This section will describe proposed policies through the lenses of the previous 
analysis. In broad terms, policies in the following categories will be discussed and 
reviewed:  (i) policies to increase supply; (ii) policy towards the affordable sec-
tor: shared equity, shared ownership, social rent; (iii) policies towards the Green 
Belt; and (iv) demand- based policies.
Recent policy documents demonstrate a strong commitment to increasing 
housing supply and in particular the supply of affordable homes. The Draft London 
Plan (2018) reports that the mayor’s Strategic Housing Market Assessment has 
identified a need for 66,000 additional homes per year and a strategic target that 
50 per cent of new homes should be affordable, given the declared key objective of 
Mayor of London Sadiq Khan in the 2016 mayoral election to increase the provi-
sion of homes that are genuinely affordable for Londoners. According to the Plan, 
these homes are to be delivered through a range of sources, including partnerships 
with registered providers, the allocation of affordable housing grants as part of 
the mayor’s Affordable Housing Programme 2016–21 and within private develop-
ments. Given the many challenges around increasing housing supply that we have 
covered in the previous section, and that only around 20,000 homes are built every 
year, the current plan presents a very ambitious target.
When we look specifically at affordable housing, data from the GLA (2018) 
show that the percentage of affordable housing secured through the planning 
process fell each year between 2007/ 8 and 2014/ 15 (from 30 per cent to less 
than 15 per cent). Yet the number of GLA- funded affordable homes started in 
London was 8,940 in 2016/ 17, a figure which increased to 12,530 in 2017/ 18, 
the highest since 2010/ 11. Of the affordable homes started in 2017/ 18, 6,730 
(54 per cent) were intermediate (shared ownership or intermediate rent), while 
2,830 (23 per cent) were at social rents or London affordable rent levels, also the 
highest figure since 2010/ 11. The remainder (24 per cent) were other homes for 
affordable rent.
According to the government definition, affordable housing is social rented, 
affordable rented and intermediate housing, provided to eligible households whose 
needs are not met by the market. Eligibility is determined with regard to local 
incomes and local house prices. In particular, the London Plan states that afforda-
ble rented housing is let by local authorities or private registered providers of social 
housing to households who are eligible for social rented housing. Affordable rent is 
subject to rent controls that require a rent of no more than 80 per cent of the local 
market rent, including service expenses. Intermediate housing includes homes 
available for sale or rent at a cost above social rent but below market levels. These 
can include shared equity (shared ownership and equity loans), other low- cost 
homes for sale and intermediate rent, but not affordable rent. Households whose 
annual income is in the range £18,100–£66,000 should be eligible for new inter-
mediate homes. For homes with more than two bedrooms, which are particularly 
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suitable for families, the upper end of this eligibility range will be extended to 
£80,000; these figures are updated annually.
Intermediate housing in the form of shared ownership (SO) and shared 
equity (SE) products constitutes the only types of affordable ownership schemes 
backed by government policies. Whitehead (2010) notes that those schemes have 
been part of UK housing policy since the 1970s, as they were originally developed 
to address affordability issues at times of high inflation, when people who could 
easily afford to buy over their working lifetime were excluded by high payments 
in the early years. Later they became one of a range of low- cost homeownership 
initiatives aimed at extending homeownership, based on expectations that house-
holds’ incomes would increase so that they could move to 100 per cent purchase 
within a reasonable time (see e.g. Booth and Crook 1986). More recently, SO/ SE 
products have been used to provide subsidies to increase homeownership rates by 
enabling marginal purchasers to buy as house prices rose faster than incomes and 
more households were excluded. While there have been many different versions 
over the years, government policy has concentrated on two core models: shared 
ownership, where the purchaser buys a proportion of the property with a tradi-
tional mortgage while the other portion is owned by a social landlord who receives 
rent on this element; and shared equity, where the purchaser buys 100 per cent 
of the property but obtains an equity loan to cover part of the value.10 Research 
by Whitehead (2010) shows that those instruments may be too expensive and too 
risky in the case of depreciations; research by Meen (2018b) shows that those poli-
cies are primarily of benefit to those already on the fringes of homeownership.
Together with the recommendation of resourcing authorities’ planning 
capacity, delivering a variety of sites for development, speeding up and monitoring 
build- out rates, supporting small and medium developers, research from Scanlon 
et al. (2018) recommends that one way of expanding construction output – includ-
ing the affordable type – for boroughs and other public landowners would be to 
commission housing in partnership with developers. This so- called direct commis-
sioning could be seen as a descendant of the council housebuilding programmes 
of the 1960s and 1970s, which provided hundreds of thousands of homes per year 
at the height of production. According to this view, the benefits of this approach 
are that it would effectively introduce a source of cheap land but also a long- term 
source of revenue. Most importantly, by having a guaranteed customer, build- out 
rates could be faster than those achieved by speculative for- sale developers. There 
are few examples of existing partnerships between local authorities and developers 
with different legal structures; research on the pros, cons and controversies around 
those schemes is limited.11
A number of high- profile reports mentioned by Wacher (2018) discuss the 
negative impact that viability assessments have played in reducing the level of 
affordable housing negotiated by local planning authorities through Section 106. 
While the statutory planning framework has remained one that is plan- led, the 
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planning outcomes has resulted in what could be termed a viability- led planning 
system. A range of factors have led to this scenario. As a proposed remedy, policy 
H6 of the Draft London Plan sets out details of the threshold approach to afford-
able housing. This enables schemes delivering 35 per cent affordable housing, and 
50 per cent on public and industrial land, to be assessed under a fast- track route 
without needing to provide detailed viability information. A  key benefit of the 
threshold approach is that it provides greater certainty to the market, particularly 
when developers purchase land. Similarly, at the national scale, the government 
issued a set of proposals for consultation (DCLG 2017) including an approach to 
viability based on area- wide assessment at local plan stage; according to this policy 
proposal, where a proposed development is in line with all the relevant policies in 
an up- to- date development plan, the development should be assumed to be viable 
and no further assessment of viability is needed. Scanlon et  al. (2018) mention 
that many commentators have argued that site- specific issues are so important that 
this is not feasible, especially on larger sites and indeed in London, and that, con-
trary to what is intended, uncertainty would be exacerbated.
London’s metropolitan Green Belt has been singled out as a brake on land 
supply and therefore a driver of rising house prices by various economic analyses.12 
According to this view, constraints on land supply, often justified for reasons of 
‘urban containment’ and densification, are credited with turning housing into an 
especially attractive asset class. The issue is controversial, and it has been heavily 
debated both in academia and in evidence sessions at the UK Parliament.13 Given 
an economic rationale that there should be a cost–benefit analysis between land 
in any use and its alternative proposed use, and a recognition that the Green Belt 
land serves an important purpose, building on it is a complex issue. However, an 
opinion that is gaining momentum is that wherever major infrastructure changes 
accessibility and provides benefits to communities, there should be a review of 
the costs and benefits of modifying the designation of affected land – with the full 
understanding that any Green Belt acreage lost should be replaced by more envi-
ronmentally valuable land (see Mace et al. 2016). Edwards (2016), however, com-
ments that in the more general context of people’s interest in maintaining house 
values and the strong tradition of amenity protection that generate ‘not in my back 
yard’ (NIMBY) resistance to new development in many rural and urban areas, the 
strong commitment of central government and the mayor to protecting the Green 
Belt from residential development may be politically inevitable.
A recent and growing body of research is expanding the policy discussion 
towards demand- side policies. The introduction of a stamp duty supplement on 
most buy- to- let investments and changes in the rate of tax relief on privately let 
properties and second homes are the only examples, albeit with small potential 
impact on prices, of this type of policies. Meen (2018b) comments that although 
increases in housing supply continue to play an important part in improving afford-
ability, it has been known since the review of housing supply by Barker (2004) 
that increases in supply have to be large and long- lasting to have a major effect on 
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affordability, and therefore suggests that the benefits to those on low incomes from 
market provision alone are unlikely to be adequate, and that an important role for 
expansion of social rented housing remains. An alternative view is that housing 
shortages could be reduced if owner- occupiers could be persuaded with a tax to 
reduce ‘over consumption’ of housing and downsize. Meen (2018b) demonstrates 
the consequences of changing the tax system so that property taxes are propor-
tional to income and the housing costs of older households would rise consider-
ably; he suggests that were this to be considered, any changes would need to be 
introduced over a long period of time and/ or offset in other ways. Referring to a 
broader perspective on financialisation of housing, Gallent et al. (2017) also sug-
gest that the solution to the unaffordability crisis could lie in demand management 
policies, despite this often being considered unworkable.
Conclusions
It is difficult and complex to anticipate what the future holds for London house 
prices as the general political and economic uncertainty related to the Brexit pro-
cess continues; the future outlook might be characterised by a general depreciation 
trend, which would imply a different market context from the one described in 
this chapter. ONS data from June 2019 show that average house prices in London 
fell modestly over the year each month from March 2018; from their recent peak 
and trough of £489,000 in July 2017 and £467,000 in June 2019, average London 
house prices have fallen 5.1 per cent. In principle, a decrease in average house 
prices may enable some wealthier potential first- time buyers to buy; however, it is 
fair to say that a strong depreciation could only happen in a scenario of financial 
turmoil and economic recession and therefore with many negative implications for 
the affordability of both first- time buyers and renters, especially the less wealthy. 
Moreover, depreciations would be particularly harmful for current holders and 
providers of SE and SO products.
Questions over future price trends are only one part of the methodological 
challenges in monitoring future trends; another fundamental issue for effective 
policy- making is that while there is no strict definition of housing need, this is usu-
ally understood as the amount of housing required for all households to live in 
accommodation that meets a certain normative standard. The number of house-
holds is often used as a proxy for housing need, but this measure cannot give the 
whole picture. For this reason policy- makers need information to track the changes 
in key indicators in a timely way, as well as to set specific goals or targets while 
making clear what a given measure is meant to achieve and by when; lessons and 
good practices over such issues may be learned across countries.
Research and policy publications cited in this chapter tend to agree that while 
increasing supply is of critical importance – and there is no ‘silver bullet’ that can 
remove all obstacles that still limit housing supply – the issue of affordability in 
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both the private and social housing sectors needs to be tackled directly with more 
financing of affordable housing. Filling the huge existing funding gap for afford-
able housing is challenging, and many experts are debating a more direct role for 
the public sector in the delivery of what is missing, as well as suggesting looking to 
land value capture and tax increment finance mechanisms used by other countries. 
The chapter by Biggar and Siemiatycki (in this volume) analyses land value capture 
mechanisms such as the density bonus used in Toronto in a similar context of low 
affordability; notwithstanding some of the fundamental challenges that relate to 
the negotiation process between planning authorities and private developers that 
have been highlighted for both London and Toronto, such mechanisms might in 
principle be used to divert more resources from private development directly into 
affordable housing.
If policy- makers really want to ensure that more affordable homes are built 
where people want to live, as is often declared across the political spectrum, radi-
cal changes may be inevitable. The debate around the Green Belt described in this 
chapter shows the benefits of providing a careful economic analysis on the impact 
of a policy proposal on house prices; if pros and cons are clearer, more informed 
decisions ultimately can be left to the political realm. Likewise, a clear understand-
ing of the complex interaction between demand and supply – and in particular of 
the effects of possible depreciation cycles, new transport connections and increas-
ing density  – is of paramount importance when evaluating innovative ideas on 
demand- side policies, land value capture mechanisms or a greater role for the pub-
lic sector in the delivery of affordable housing.
Notes
 1. Based on data from Council for Mortgage and Lenders, Halifax house price database and Office for National 
Statistics data.
 2. Those figures imply a widening of the disparity between London and the rest of the UK after the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008–9. Moreover, data from Costar show a relatively slower growing divide for commer-
cial properties: between 2008 and 2018 sold commercial property prices per square foot grew 139 per cent 
in London and 92 per cent in the rest of the UK.
 3. See Meen (2018a) for a comprehensive review.
 4. See Figure 10.1; the denominator of the ratio is median household income.
 5. There are some measurement issues based on the Land Registry’s data. A British expat buying property in 
the UK is an ‘overseas buyer’ by their correspondence address, as is a UK resident buying via an overseas 
company; some overseas residents might buy property via a UK- based address if they have one. It is argued 
that a rough measure of the scale of overseas investment in London’s residential market is perhaps a third of 
upmarket properties, but significantly less across London as a whole.
 6. See Miller (2015) for a simple video lecture on the model.
 7. See for example Whitehead (2017).
 8. Research by OFT (2008) found no evidence that homebuilders have the ability to individually affect market 
prices by buying land, but Hall and Ward (2014, 228) found this conclusion at odds with the experience of 
many experts; recent research by Gabrieli (2018) offers an explanation for this puzzle by arguing that even if 
developers cannot affect land prices, weak pre- emptive competition implies that the best strategy for devel-
opers is to be slow at starting developments.
 9. Clifford et al. (2018) show that between 2009 and 2012 a total of 39,000 residential units were delivered 
in London through conversions of B1 floor space through full planning permission, which represents an 











Crit iCAL DiALoguES of urBAN govErNANCE ,  DEvELopMENt AND ACtiv iSM156
residential units were delivered through office- to- residential conversions between 2013 and 2015, repre-
senting an average of 2,378 units per year −18 per cent of the average prior to 2013.
 10. As explained in the previous section, the current SE scheme is the Help to Buy, where the government lends 
a first- time buyer (or other buyer for a first home) up to 40 per cent of the cost of a newly built home (20 per 
cent outside London), which implies that a 5 per cent cash deposit and a 55 per cent mortgage are needed 
for a house purchase up to £600,000.
 11. Without mentioning the many historical controversies and research about the direct involvement of the 
public sector in housebuilding, we can refer to Edwards (2017) for a commentary where various recent 
cases are mentioned, including Olympic Park, Old Oak Common, Croydon, Hounslow and Haringey.
 12. This is in the context of a more general critique of the role of planning in constraining housing supply and 
reducing affordability; see Cheshire (2014) for a commentary and Hilber and Vermeulen (2010) for a com-
prehensive analysis.
 13. Select Committee on Economic Affairs, 1st Report of Session 2016–17, Building More Homes, HL Paper 20, 
15 July 2016.
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Housing crisis in a Canadian global 
city: Financialisation, buy- to- let investors 
and short- term rentals in Toronto’s 
rental market
Emily hawes and Sean grisdale
Introduction and theoretical framework
The City of Toronto is, in 2020, arguably in the midst of a residential construction 
boom beyond the scope of any other city in North America. With city staff reporting 
almost 400,000 residential units in Toronto’s development pipeline between 2014 
and 2018 (City of Toronto 2019a), the unprecedented number of cranes that now 
dot the skyline have become emblematic of a city undergoing rapid and monumen-
tal transformation. According to a recent report from Ryerson University’s Centre 
for Urban Research and Land Development (Clayton and Shi 2019), the City of 
Toronto was the fastest-growing central city in either the US or Canada for the year 
ending July 2018, with its 77,435 newcomers representing more than those of the 
next three cities combined. Even at a regional level, the 125,298 newcomers to the 
Toronto metropolitan region were only surpassed by migrants to metro Dallas, Texas. 
However, despite this scale of development, it is increasingly clear that not enough 
is being done to house the city’s rapidly growing population, not to mention those 
existing populations being displaced by accelerating housing costs. In a city where 
almost half (47 per cent) of all households are renters (City of Toronto 2019c), the 
Canadian Rental Housing Index (2019) estimates that 23 per cent of those house-
holds spend more than 50 per cent of their income on rent, while high demand for 
rentals has kept vacancy rates persistently down, around the 1 per cent mark, and 
no- fault evictions have almost doubled since 2015 (CMHC 2018; ACTO 2019).
Of course, Toronto is not alone in grappling with such a housing crisis. While 
critical housing scholars are right to point out that housing crises have been a 
persistent companion to capitalist urbanisation since Engels’s early studies of the 
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Financial Crisis (GFC) has reignited both public and scholarly attention around 
what has long been an unstable contradiction between housing as a place for 
 people to live and housing as a financial asset.
However, while the increasing entanglement between housing markets and 
international finance  – a process scholars are calling ‘financialisation’  – has come 
to the fore in critical scholarship since the GFC, this process has unfolded over dec-
ades, as neoliberal governments have worked to roll back social infrastructures such 
as public housing and social housing subsidies that were implemented in varying 
degrees by the welfare states of the post- war era. A key factor in this process was the 
gradual loosening of cross- border capital flows, which enabled surplus capital – what 
Aalbers (2016) calls the ‘wall of money’ – to capitalise on the highest returns avail-
able across a globalised field of potential investments. Especially in a post- GFC envi-
ronment characterised by quantitative easing and low interest rates, scholars observe 
a preference among investors handling this ‘wall of money’ for the acquisition of 
housing assets, one of the few remaining forms of ‘high- quality’ collateral in a stag-
nating global economy (see also Walks’s chapter in this volume). Meanwhile, inves-
tors have themselves become more international- facing and institutionalised into 
often monolithic private equity and pension funds and other institutional investment 
entities (Clark 2000; Aalbers 2016; Fields 2018). Finally, securitisation has been a 
central technology of financialisation as it has enabled otherwise ‘opaque, illiquid, 
and unique assets – like housing and real estate’ (August and Walks 2018, 125) to 
be turned into standardised, interest- bearing financial securities readily available for 
(rapid, value- seeking) exchange on financial markets (Gotham 2009; Walks 2014).
Critical scholarship has done much to document the processes through which 
owner- occupied residential housing markets in North America and Europe have 
become financialised through mechanisms such as asset- backed mortgage secu-
ritisation, in both the lead- up to and the aftermath of the GFC (see Walks’s chapter 
in this volume). A similar literature on the financialisation of rental housing is still 
emerging (Beswick et  al. 2016; Fields and Uffer 2016; August and Walks 2018; 
Fields 2018; Revington and August 2019). While disinvestment and ‘roll- back’ 
neoliberalisation tended to characterise dynamics in the social and private rental 
sectors of most wealthy economies in and through the post- Fordist era, scholars 
note how the post- GFC era has seen a striking increase in interest among private 
equity, pension funds and institutional investors seeking reliable yield in ‘alterna-
tive assets’ such as rental housing (Beswick et al. 2016).
Critical scholars have also documented the ways in which financial logics 
have penetrated the spaces and occupations of everyday life in a variety of contexts, 
 noting an increasing normalisation of individualised notions of responsibility and 
security as manifest in concerns with balancing household budgets, the cultivation 
of investment portfolios to ensure retirement savings, and a heightened cultural and 
societal importance attached to credit scoring (Martin 2002; Langley 2008). This 
element of financialisation and the processes that have encouraged it have in recent 
decades contributed to the near- ubiquity of the notion that everyone should be an 
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investor; investment in rental properties by small- scale, individual investors is a key 
example of such activity. Similarly, in what scholars have also tied to financialising 
processes, the rapid popularisation of short- term vacation renting, made efficient 
by digital platforms such as Airbnb, has also opened up significant possibilities for 
the commodification of housing by making myriad local rental markets accessible to 
international tourist demand (Wachsmuth and Weisler 2018; Grisdale 2019).
Financialising processes, then, have multiple inflections in the housing sector. 
Responding to Fernandez and Aalbers’s (2016) call for the development of case stud-
ies that can inform an analysis of housing financialisation as a locally variegated but 
global totality, this chapter offers a preliminary analysis and overview of some of these 
processes underway in Toronto’s uniquely structured rental market. Following a brief 
history of Toronto’s private rental sector, set in the broader Canadian context, we ana-
lyse the profiles and assess the prevalence of different types of private landlords and 
the extent to which their roles in the sector have been changing as a consequence 
of broader political economic and policy decisions. We consider the present state of 
small- scale private letting and draw attention to emerging forms of ‘buy- to- let’ rental 
providers, including both the incursion of corporate landlords into the multi- family 
rental sector and the recent expansion of short- term rental letting on platforms such 
as Airbnb, especially among the city’s rapidly increasing stock of condominiums.
A brief history of rental housing in Toronto
The prime period of Canadian private rental housing construction, which remains 
the source of most purpose- built rental supply today, took place from the mid- 
1950s to 1974 (Hulchanski 2004a; Suttor 2016). By the mid- 1960s over half of new 
housing units built in Canada were intended for rental (Suttor 2009). In Toronto 
much of the apartment stock built from the late 1950s to the mid- 1970s was devel-
oped in the suburbs by a handful of large firms as towers of 200+ units (August 
and Walks 2018). However, from the 1970s onwards renter households became 
increasingly low- income, as policies encouraging and subsidising homeownership 
that increased access to mortgage financing, as well as the increased presence of 
condominiums after the 1980s, led middle- income households to move from the 
rental sector and into homeownership (Hulchanski 2004a; Suttor 2009; Rosen and 
Walks 2013; Suttor 2016).
As elsewhere, the late 1970s and 1980s saw a dramatic decline in rental 
housing production (Hulchanski 2004a; Suttor 2009). Renters’ incomes were no 
longer high enough for private rental production to remain profitable in light of 
the increased costs to production that also appeared at that time, including large 
increases to the costs of construction labour and land, and rising (and volatile) 
interest rates (Hulchanski 2004a; Suttor 2009). State support and subsidies helped 
to maintain private rental construction into the mid- to late 1980s, but subse-
quently social housing and secondary (often basement) suites became the primary 
 
houSiNg CriS iS iN A CANADiAN gLoBAL C ity 161
sources of new rental units (Suttor 2016). In the 1980s high interest rates contin-
ued to diminish the profit motive for private rental construction and made subsidis-
ing social housing much more costly (Suttor 2009). By 1978 Canada had eschewed 
any responsibilities with respect to financing housing, opting instead for market 
approaches more susceptible to rising interest rates. Suttor (2009) estimates that 
private rental sector completions dropped from a national level of 88,200 comple-
tions between 1970 and 1974, to 43,000 between 1980 and 1984, to 6,200 between 
1995 and 1999. While in the 1980s social rental housing accounted for 39 per cent 
of rental production, the period between 1984 and 1993 was characterised by roll-
backs in social housing for lower- income Canadians. By 1993 the federal govern-
ment had fully withdrawn all funding for new social housing (Hulchanski 2004a).
The rise of the condominium as a pillar of post- industrial re- urbanisation in 
Toronto has had dramatic impacts on the city’s built form and has been a key factor 
reshaping social relations and demographics in the inner city (Kern 2007; Rosen and 
Walks 2015). This stock has grown especially rapidly since the early 2000s. From 
2007 to 2017, condos represented 81.5 per cent of all newly completed housing, 99.1 
per cent of which were in apartment- style buildings, and much of the newest con-
struction has taken place in the downtown and waterfront area of the City of Toronto 
(Rosen and Walks 2015; City of Toronto 2019b). The scale of new buildings has 
also increased, with a dramatic rise to dominance of buildings with more than 250 
units (Rosen and Walks 2015, 293). As of 2016, 26 per cent of the City of Toronto’s 
approximately 1,113,000 housing units were condos (City of Toronto 2019c).
Meanwhile, between the turn of the millennium and 2020, very little 
purpose- built rental housing was constructed. Therefore, condo units  – now an 
attractive form of speculative and cash- flow (rental) investment in a heated mar-
ket – rented in the secondary market have become a crucial source of housing stock 
expected to meet new rental demand (along with rooming houses and non- condo 
secondary suites, such as basement apartments) (CMHC 2018). Between 2006 and 
2016, approximately 75 per cent of all new rental housing stock was added in the 
form of condominiums, 23 per cent in non- condo private units and only 2 per cent 
in purpose- built rental housing (Grisdale 2019, 10). While purpose- built rental 
housing and social housing built in the 1970s and 1980s was generally intended 
to serve moderately low- and very low- income renters, the new secondary market 
stock tends to be high- end, commanding rental prices that often exclude lower- 
income tenants or serve as attractive spaces for the short- term rental market (see 
Figure 11.1) (Rosen and Walks 2015; City of Toronto 2019b).
Changing dynamics of ownership and tenure in  
the City of Toronto
Who owns Toronto’s private sector rental stock and benefits from the enormous 
increases to land, property and rent prices that appeared in the 2010s? In the 1960s 
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and 1970s Toronto’s private rental sector was dominated by large- or medium- scale 
corporate/ commercial landlords/ owners (and typically also developers), primar-
ily of professionally managed apartment towers (August and Walks 2018; Chisolm 
and Hulchanski 2018). Following the decline in purpose- built rental construction 
things shifted and approximately half of these older multi- unit rental properties 
are now owned by individuals (Gibb et al. 2018; August and Walks 2018). Data 
from the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) indicate that at the 
national level in 2017, 49.3 per cent of purpose- built rental housing units were 
owned by individual investors, 39.7 per cent by private corporations, and the 
remainder were held by a combination of real estate investment trusts (REITs) 
(7.9  per cent), public corporations (2.5 per cent), pension funds (0.3 per cent) 
and real estate investment funds (CMHC 2017). However, these numbers neither 
reveal the scale of investors’ operations within these categories nor provide any 
insight on the secondary rental market. Nor do they disaggregate private corpora-
tions in terms of size and corporate structure (e.g. between smaller family- owned 
corporations and monolithic private equity firms). Is the private rental market 
dominated by a small number of individual investors that own large quantities of 
rental units, or many small- scale investors owning only one to three rental units, 
as is the case in Australia and the UK (Arundel 2017; MacLennan et al. 2018)? Is 
it dominated instead by non- individual (corporate) landlords that have very large 
portfolios of rental properties? Indeed, such information is difficult to find.
In England, approximately 89 per cent of landlords (2015) are private indi-
viduals, and the vast majority hold only one rental property (Ronald et al. 2015). 
This situation was intensified by a period of accessible mortgage credit and property 
price crashes around the time of the financial crisis (Ronald et al. 2015; Arundel 
Figure 11.1 Average rents (CAD) in Toronto, 2008–16 (Canada Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation 2018)
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2017; Chisolm and Hulchanski 2018; MacLennan et  al. 2018). While in similar 
nations, such as Australia, the rental sector has also long been dominated by indi-
vidual investors, with relatively few corporate or institutional landlords (Pawson 
2018; Adkins et al. 2019), the Canadian housing landscape has long differed from 
these countries in important ways (Suttor 2009), and with no major housing cor-
rection (despite the financial crisis) it has experienced sustained house price infla-
tion. New units in cities such as Toronto have been particularly concentrated in 
high- rise condos (Walks 2014; Chisolm and Hulchanski 2018; Gibb et  al. 2018; 
Rosen and Walks 2015).
The rise of asset- based welfare and its implications 
for inequality
Understanding the proportions and profiles of individual private landlords, par-
ticularly in the secondary market, is important both because of the effects of 
property- based wealth on wealth (and income) inequality and because of the 
rental market dynamics (and dynamics of control) particular to this form of stock. 
Since the 1990s, Canada’s federal government has absolved itself of any direct role 
in the rental housing sector in favour of policies promoting the premise of an ‘asset- 
based’ form of welfare (Sherraden 1991; Walks 2014). Emblematic of what critical 
scholars call the ‘financialization of daily life’ (Martin 2002), ‘asset- based welfare’ 
describes a policy orientation that aims to replace the traditional welfare state with 
incentives for people to accrue assets that will increase in value over time and thus 
be drawn on as a form of social security in old age. While the federal government 
devolved responsibility for social housing to the provinces in the 1990s, it contin-
ued to maintain involvement in the mortgage insurance market through the CMHC, 
promoting policies amenable to the interests of Canadian (and subsequently for-
eign) financial institutions that, in need of new revenue streams, were increasing 
their operations in household mortgages (Walks 2014; Kalman- Lamb 2017). In the 
early years of the new millennium, and intensifying with the 2008 crisis, the CMHC 
introduced financial products such as government- insured mortgage- backed secu-
rities. These effectively allow mortgage originators to sell mortgages to investors 
in secondary markets (see Walks 2014, and Walks’s chapter in this volume, for 
details). In combination with reductions in government mortgage insurance eligi-
bility requirements for homebuyers, these programmes enabled banks to lend en 
masse to aspiring and upsizing homeowners and individual investors.
Among the results were an increase in levels of household indebtedness 
and a shift of middle- income renters into the ownership sector, variously through 
(a) relatively more affordable condo purchases, (b) expanded condo development 
and (c)  sustained, rapid house price escalation, particularly in Vancouver and 
Toronto (Walks 2014; Rosen and Walks 2015). However, after 2006 the national 
homeownership rate increased only slightly despite sustained house price inflation 
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(Kalman- Lamb 2017). Wage stagnation has had much to do with this, but more 
recent increases in government- imposed mortgage market regulations to impede 
households’ access to homeownership have also played a role. As a result, the sup-
posed wealth- building aims of asset- based welfare have been undermined, while 
financial institutions have benefitted enormously (Walks 2014).
A housing and social security system that promotes the individual (or house-
hold) ownership of assets (such as housing) as the key mode of wealth building and 
retirement savings has contributed to a skewed distribution of wealth; not only are 
those retirees that rely on their housing equity for retirement security vulnerable to 
market downturns, but lower- income and younger households have in many cases 
been locked out of the owner- occupied housing market due to a combination of 
high student debt levels, low wage growth, lack of supply and highly inflated urban 
house prices. As such, early entrants have been the main beneficiaries of these con-
siderable wealth gains. These policies also enhance wealth inequalities between 
renters and owners if owners use the equity in their principal residence and – more 
importantly – the access to additional credit (at the lowest rates) that these assets 
open up to purchase rental properties as further investments for their portfolios. 
This has become a key reason to evaluate the extent of small- scale, individual pri-
vate investor- landlords’ ownership of Toronto’s (and Canada’s) private sector rental 
housing stock within both the purpose- built and secondary markets.
As Arundel (2017) has shown in the UK context, where the dominance of 
individual landlords in the private rental market has had important consequences 
for the distribution of wealth in British society, over 50 per cent of landlords in 
the UK are among the wealthiest 10 per cent of households in terms of housing 
wealth. They are also heavily concentrated among the highest-income-earning 
households, and the highest- income earners see the greatest returns on their rental 
property investments (Arundel 2017). Beyond merely providing pensioners with a 
retirement income boost, rental property investment has served to entrench exist-
ing wealth and income imbalances in the UK. The increased demand from investors 
can also serve to increase house prices and further erode the ability of aspiring 
owner- occupiers to access the homeownership ladder (Ronald et al. 2015).
Data constraints make replication of this analysis difficult in the Canadian 
context. However, young adults are living with parents longer, are facing high and 
escalating rental costs in major cities and are having difficulty in accessing the 
homeownership market; it is thus possible that a similar compounding of wealth 
inequalities, both within and between age groups, is already underway. In this case 
the housing system, rather than providing affordable shelter to all, would not even 
be fulfilling the promises of asset- based welfare, as the wealth gains of the already 
wealthiest and highest- income households occur at the expense of those who may 
never even hope to leave the rental sector.
It is still more difficult to find detailed ownership data for the secondary rental 
market in Canada. Despite it being widely understood that when condominium units 
are developed a significant proportion are expected to be rented out by purchasers, 
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direct data on rental condos and their owners are somewhat scarce. Gibb et  al. 
(2018) claim that the Canadian private rental stock is split roughly evenly between 
small investors on the one hand and medium and large investors on the other. 
A recent analysis by Statistics Canada suggests that nationally, 76 per cent of indi-
vidual, resident owners of multiple residential properties (concentrated in Toronto 
and Vancouver) own only two properties (Bekkering et  al. 2019). It is unclear 
whether additional properties are used as rentals. However, in Toronto 21 per cent 
of two- property owners owned a condo apartment and almost half (46.6 per cent) of 
multiple- property owners held all their properties in the vicinity of their residence, 
suggesting that these are primarily rentals. A 2018 consultancy report (Hildebrand 
and Tal 2018, 4) suggests that a significant group of Toronto’s condo rental inves-
tors tend to be ‘local immigrants’ who are investing for their retirement portfolio 
or as a means to help their children access the housing market. These observations 
could point to a significant group of relatively wealthy, middle- aged, individual pri-
vate landlords in Toronto renting condos, many of whom are new residents. What is 
clear in the Canadian context is that there has been a persistent income gap between 
owners and renters in Canada since at least the 1970s (Hulchanski 2004b). Today, 
nationally, owners’ median income is approximately twice that of renters (Chisolm 
and Hulchanski 2018). In Toronto this can be seen in disproportionate housing 
affordability stress among renters relative to homeowners (Figure 11.2).
In 2016, only 29.6 per cent of Canadian households did not hold any debt 
(Statistics Canada 2017). The average price for a detached home in the Greater 
Toronto Area (GTA) reached $1.05  million in December 2019 (Canadian Press 
2020). Facing high prices, Canadian borrowers, particularly in Toronto and 












Notes: The 1981 Census calculated this figure as the proportion of owners/renters spending more than 25% of 
income rather than 30%. Data not available for 2011 so extrapolated between 2006 and 2016.
Figure 11.2 Proportion of owners and renters spending more than 30 per cent 
of income on shelter costs in Canada and the City of Toronto, 1981–2016 (custom 
tabulated by Sean Grisdale based on data from Canada Statistics n.d.)
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mortgage delinquency rates tend to be considerably higher than average (Better 
Dwelling 2018; Tal 2019). In September 2019 personal insolvencies (driven by 
defaults in unsecured and home equity lines of credit) saw their biggest annual 
increase (19 per cent) nationally since 2009 (Tal and Shenfeld 2019; Heaven 2019).
If small- scale individual landlords tend to hold rental condos as their invest-
ment properties, this also has implications for rental sector stability. Condo rentals 
are believed to be a more volatile form of stock; their investor- landlords may not 
have much interest, experience or knowledge in being a landlord, and may choose 
to sell at any time to realise capital gains. When sold to new buyers, condo units 
may be returned to owner- occupied tenure, and tenants may be asked to vacate on 
relatively short notice if existing owners decide to use the unit for personal pur-
poses (TOLTB 2018). A 2019 report suggests that annual increases to rental condo 
supply have been declining in Ontario, as fewer investors keep their units on the 
long- term rental market (FRPO 2019). The property industry has also recently sug-
gested that new condo- rental investors may be unable to carry costs in the coming 
years if the rents needed to cover monthly costs begin to outpace renters’ ability 
or desire to pay (Kalinowski 2020). Further, secondary condo rentals lack over-
sight and control by local planning authorities, in that they are market- produced 
stock rather than intentional components of land use planning, and the quality of 
rental and experience of renting may be more precarious in this housing (Rosen 
and Walks 2015; Gibb et al. 2018; City of Toronto 2019b).
Institutional investors: Pension funds, private equity and REITs
Recent work on the financialisation of rental housing has demonstrated the scale at 
which large private equity firms such as Blackstone have made inroads into those 
markets most heavily affected by the GFC, with Beswick et  al. (2016) suggest-
ing we may be witnessing the rise of what they call ‘global corporate landlords’. 
Indeed, in the wake of the GFC, it was reported that Blackstone had acquired $10 
billion of repossessed residential properties at foreclosure auctions – many of them 
single- family homes – making it the largest private landlord in the United States, 
and probably the world (UNHRC 2017). Beswick et  al. (2016) also show how 
Blackstone has acquired a formidable portfolio of distressed housing, office, retail 
and commercial property in Ireland, Spain and Greece. However, while research 
does indicate an increasing interest among private equity, REITs and pension funds 
in acquiring ageing multi- family residential apartments in Toronto (August and 
Walks 2018), it is clear that the Canadian context, much like the UK rental mar-
ket (Beswick et al. 2016), is experiencing dynamics divergent from economies that 
experienced a significant foreclosure crisis.
For the most part, Canada managed to avoid what could have been a mass 
foreclosure event by socialising many of the country’s insolvent mortgages onto the 
balance sheet of the CMHC (see Walks’s chapter in this volume). As a consequence, 
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it prevented the formation of those rent gaps now exploited by firms such as 
Blackstone in the US, Ireland, Spain and Greece. Conversely, inflated housing prices 
in major Canadian cities such as Toronto and Vancouver now precipitate different 
problems for local communities, with processes of gentrification primarily benefit-
ting domestic property owners, who are holding existing assets either for the pur-
poses of long- term speculation, to milk existing rents or on the bet that they can 
reposition their assets to entice higher- income tenants. Indeed, according to Raj 
Mehta, Global Head of Private Capital and Partnerships with the property asset 
management company Starlight Investments, 90 per cent of this sector remains 
in the hands of domestic family companies and small individual investors, citing 
good returns amid the confluence of (a) rising rental demand as the middle class is 
increasingly unable or unwilling to access homeownership, (b) limited rental supply 
that is unlikely to be significantly offset by near- term rental completions and (c) an 
unwillingness to pay the capital gains taxes that come with selling (Wilcox 2018).
However, while Mehta notes the Canadian rental market continues to con-
stitute a ‘noticeable gap’ in the overall portfolios of companies such as Blackstone, 
there are signs that this might be changing. For instance, in partnership with 
Starlight Investments, Blackstone recently marked their first incursion into the 
Canadian rental sector in 2018 with their joint acquisition of five apartment build-
ings between Toronto and Montreal (Wilcox 2018), while more recently the same 
partnership announced a second round of acquisitions, buying 1,067 units across 
eight mid- rise buildings in the GTA (Starlight Investments 2019). However, while 
the corporatisation of rental housing across the world has emerged from the ashes 
of many countries’ distressed housing markets, it is important to note that disinvest-
ment in Canada’s multi- family apartment sector was also an important precursor to 
the emergence of Canadian REITs in the mid- to late 1990s. As August and Walks 
(2018) note, a number of overlapping historical events (see above) precipitated 
the legislation that would enable REITs to become the rising stars they are today.
Coincidentally, legislation enabling the first REITs was passed in 1993, the 
same year the federal government took its protracted leave from the rental hous-
ing market. However, as August and Walks (2018) note, the first REITs to invest 
in apartments would not come into existence until 1997–8 with the formation of 
Canadian Apartment Properties REIT (CAPREIT) in 1997 and Residential Equities 
REIT (ResREIT)in 1998. Today, CAPREIT is likely Canada’s largest landlord, 
controlling approximately 64,000 rental apartment and townhouse units across 
Canada, the Netherlands and Ireland in 2019 (CAPREIT 2019). Canada’s Real 
Estate News Exchange notes (euphemistically) how its strategy of shifting ‘toward 
quality in its asset mix, tenant base and market selection’ has paid off, with its net 
rental income increasing by 11 per cent between 2017 and 2018 alone (Duggan 
2019b). Significantly, these REITs were formed at the exact moment that the 
Province of Ontario decontrolled rents, stripped back tenant protections and 
downloaded social housing responsibilities to municipalities, setting the stage 
for investors to capitalise on the deep rent gaps suddenly appearing in Toronto’s 
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ageing and disinvested apartments. There are many REITs operating in Canada’s 
property markets, allowing both small retail investors and institutional investors 
such as pension funds to receive steady returns on property, without succumbing 
to the particular commitments and responsibilities associated with owning actual 
property. And as with private equity firms such as Blackstone, they have pooled 
their investments in the gamut of alternative property asset classes, including stu-
dent housing (Revington and August 2019), office space, industrial space and even 
mobile homes (Duggan 2019a).
However, a number of factors make the emergence of financialised landlords 
a cause for concern with respect to gentrification. As globalised monoliths, they are 
harder to hold accountable legally or politically, while also harder to  negotiate with 
or persuade at an affective level  – opportune conditions for them to coordinate 
their specialised technical expertise, patient capital and market power towards 
maximising revenue streams and exploiting legal loopholes (Fields and Uffer 2016; 
August and Walks 2018). Furthermore, as ownership is shared among any varia-
tion of diverse investors in whatever vehicle ultimately owns a given pool of units, 
the impetus to maximise shareholder value in combination with the unique scale at 
which they enjoy access to credit and technical expertise entails a drive to close rent 
gaps that might not be as strong, or in many cases possible, for smaller landlords 
or firms (August and Walks 2018). Thus residents and housing activists organis-
ing in multi- family housing are stuck between a rock and a hard place: both fight-
ing for repairs to the severely disinvested infrastructure of buildings where smaller 
owners are content to milk their properties into the ground, while also struggling 
against aggressive evictions in buildings acquired by ambitious new corporate 
owners interested in maximising shareholder value by attracting wealthier ten-
ants (August and Walks 2018). While local tenant organising has produced some 
important successes in the form of concessions, they are up against an increasingly 
sophisticated, resourced and patient form of landlord.
Digital short- term rental platforms: An emergent form of 
financialised housing?
While dynamics underway in Toronto’s multi- family apartment buildings are 
characterised by long- standing (though evolving) processes of disinvestment and 
gentrification, one unforeseen consequence of policy- makers’ turn to asset- based 
welfare and buy- to- let rental housing provision has been the rapid expansion of 
digital short- term rental platforms such as Airbnb; these now serve to distort the 
rental market by providing a more flexible and profitable alternative to the tra-
ditional rental market (Wachsmuth and Weisler 2018; Cocola- Gant and Gago 
2019; Grisdale 2019). While companies such as Airbnb represent themselves as 
platforms for everyday people to make extra money renting out an extra room 
(Airbnb 2016; 2017), scholars studying their expansion in cities around the world 
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are increasingly demonstrating how short- term rental platforms are dominated by 
commercial operators capitalising on the willingness of tourists and business trav-
ellers to pay higher rates of rent than locals (Wachsmuth et al. 2017; Crommelin 
et al. 2018; Ferreri and Sanyal, 2018; Wachsmuth and Weisler 2018; Cocola- Gant 
and Gago 2019). Thus, as Wachsmuth and Weisler (2018) have theorised, the plat-
form can be understood as enabling the exploitation of new rent gaps that have 
less to do with the capacity of property owners to invest in their property. These 
platforms are now playing an important role in the commodification and financiali-
sation of housing; the international surplus capital invested in disruptive platforms 
such as Airbnb represents hedges on the platform’s ability to capitalise on rent gaps 
emerging in parts of the city that are attractive to tourists (Wachsmuth et al. 2017, 
2019; Wachsmuth and Weisler 2018; Grisdale 2019).
Drawing on a methodology and dataset developed by Wachsmuth and Weisler 
(2018) to assess the impact of short- term rentals on the local rental market, Grisdale 
(2019) finds that between June 2016 and May 2017 there were 4,479 full- time, 
entire- home Airbnb rentals operating in the city. Thus, at the same time that the 
rental vacancy rate hovered around 1 per cent, full- time short- term rental opera-
tions were shown to be removing approximately 0.85 per cent of the city’s potential 
rental stock from the traditional long- term market. The implication is that insofar 
as these units could be incentivised to return to the traditional rental market, the 
vacancy rate could be almost doubled. Furthermore, Grisdale (2019) observes that 
these 4,479 full- time rentals also took home approximately 58.5 per cent of total 
Airbnb revenue in the city, while the average full- time Airbnb host in many down-
town neighbourhoods was found to be making significantly larger profits than the 
average landlord. A recent report by Wachsmuth et al. (2019) suggests the industry 
did indeed continue to expand between 2017 and 2019. While commercial short- 
term rentals were supposed to be officially banned in Toronto as of summer 2020, 
the sector has continued to operate without oversight. And as a global city that con-
tinues to attract tourists for various reasons, the platform could only be expected to 
continue enticing buy- to- let property owners to take up short- term rentals insofar as 
it continued to offer a more profitable model for investor owners.
As Wachsmuth et  al. (2019) demonstrate, short- term rental hosts running 
multiple listings have assumed an increasing share of both total listings and total 
revenue, suggesting a continuing intensification of short- term rental commer-
cialisation in the city. In 2015, hosts running multiple listings constituted approxi-
mately 23 per cent of total listings, taking home almost 37 per cent of total revenue. 
By 2019 they controlled almost 38 per cent of listings while taking home just over 
53 per cent of total revenue. Both the absolute number of listings and the absolute 
amount of revenue flowing through the sector have also increased significantly. 
Between 2015 and 2019, active daily short- term rental listings in Toronto increased 
more than five- fold, from less than 5,000 in 2015 to more than 21,000 as of 30 April 
2019 (Wachsmuth et al. 2019). In terms of revenue, while between June 2016 and 
May 2017 hosts in the City of Toronto generated approximately $151.3 million in 
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revenue (Grisdale 2019), they more recently took in approximately $218.9 million 
in the period between May 2018 and April 2019 (Wachsmuth et al. 2019), consti-
tuting a 45 per cent increase in yearly revenue in only two years.
While digital short- term rentals have come under scrutiny for a number of rea-
sons, from over- tourism and neighbourhood disruption, to issues of safety and tax 
evasion, Toronto activists emphasise their impact on an already stressed local rental 
market, where vacancy rates are at their limit and evictions are on the rise in popu-
lar Airbnb neighbourhoods such as Kensington Market (Dingman 2019; Mathieu 
2017). Just as scholars are demonstrating in the London housing market (Ferreri 
and Sanyal 2018; Shabrina et al. 2019), this can be understood as an unforeseen 
consequence of decades of neoliberal approaches to housing policy precipitating 
housing systems wherein the total given supply of rental stock is primarily a func-
tion of the willingness of many self- interested investors to supply their property to 
the traditional, regulated rental market as opposed to leaving it vacant, living in it 
part time or hosting tourists. Thus, the expansion of Airbnb in Toronto is particularly 
bound up in the city’s condominium- oriented approach to urban development. As 
Grisdale (2019) shows, the most central neighbourhoods of Toronto, where con-
dominium units are the dominant (in some parts only) form of residential hous-
ing (specifically the Waterfront Communities, South Parkdale–King West and the 
Church–Yonge and Bay Street corridors), together accounted for almost half of the 
city’s full- time, entire-home listings (2,112 listings or 47 per cent). Together, these 
2,112 listings accounted for approximately 32 per cent of the total Airbnb revenue 
generated in the city that year.
This appears to be in line with trends observed in London, where Shabrina 
et al. (2019) show that Airbnbs are most prevalent in the city’s core where there is 
a high predominance of dense, privately rented flats (whether purpose built, con-
verted or in commercial buildings). However, while London and Toronto are seeing 
buy- to- let rental stock assuming a greater proportion of the total, a trend which 
also contributes to potential short- term rental stock, the factors driving these pro-
cesses are not entirely the same. In Toronto, new buy- to- let construction of condos 
has been significant and sustained in neighbourhoods popular for tourists, mean-
ing new condo construction likely accounts for a significant proportion of the total 
potential short- term rental stock (City of Toronto 2019a). In comparison, the rate 
of new construction has been declining in London since the 1970s, suggesting that 
relative to Toronto, flat conversions are likely to be a more significant source of any 
new potential short- term rental stock (Shabrina et al. 2019). Of course, short- term 
rentals cannot simply be explained by the city’s mix of housing tenure. Policy is also 
key, and though regulations banning short- term rentals in non- primary residences 
were set to come into enforcement in summer 2020, the platform has already done 
much to reshape the city. Evictions cannot be taken back, the city has lost much-
needed rental stock, while many properties are likely to have undergone conver-
sion into luxury suites that will only continue to attract higher- income tenants for 
the foreseeable future, whether they live there temporarily or long- term.
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Conclusion
Toronto is facing a crisis of affordable housing for its lowest- income residents and 
for renters and prospective owners across an increasingly wider income spectrum 
(Chisolm and Hulchanski 2018). As the rental vacancy rate hovers at 1 per cent and 
rents continue to rise, ‘no- fault’ evictions, including those requested for renova-
tions and the landlord’s own use, almost doubled between 2015 and 2019 (ACTO 
2019). In this chapter we have responded to Fernandez and Aalbers’s (2016) call 
for analyses of the financialisation of housing in its variegated, locally inflected 
forms. We argue that the financialisation of rental housing in Toronto is mediated 
by the city’s unique mix of tenure and infrastructure: the city’s large stock of ageing 
multi- family rental housing is targeted by large institutional investors exploiting 
rent gaps that emerged suddenly in the wake of rent decontrol legislation (August 
and Walks 2018), while the more recent strategy of relying on condominiums to 
fulfil rental demand in the private market driven by job growth is now compli-
cated by the rise of short- term rental platforms that can offer increasingly lever-
aged homebuyers higher returns in the tourism market, which particularly affects 
global cities such as Toronto and London. At the same time, rapid in- migration to 
the Toronto region and an expansion of mortgage debt driving a housing boom 
uninterrupted by the 2008 financial crisis are factors driving households into a 
rental market that is experiencing severe supply shortages. While purpose- built 
rental development is seeing something of a resurgence after decades of stagna-
tion, the increase is not enough to meet rapidly growing demand in the short term, 
and developers are primarily positioning units to cater to the luxury and high end 
of the market (Lawrence 2019). Meanwhile, the prospect of returning rental units 
from the commercialised short- term rental market remains uncertain. While strin-
gent regulations involving taxation, licensing of all listings and bans on listings in 
all secondary suites and properties that are not a host’s primary residence have 
been legislated, the question of enforcement capacity will continue to haunt cities’ 
attempts to govern this phenomenon.
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Planning for densification and housing 
in London: Urban design and real estate 
agendas in practice
Michael Short and Nicola Livingstone
Introducing ideas on urban densification
Urban densification has long been seen as an approach to counteracting urban 
sprawl (European Environment Agency and European Commission 2006)  and 
delivering sustainability, via more compact cities and efficient use of resources 
such as land, urban transport, materials and energy, for example (Breheny 1996). 
However, an emerging body of literature points to the shortcomings of urban den-
sification, including challenges relating to culturally significant heritage spaces 
(Skrede and Krokann Berg 2019), negative outcomes for social sustainability 
(Dempsey et  al. 2012)  and decreasing social equity in compact cities (Burton 
2000). An important strand within this literature sees urban transformation as 
an opportunity for property- led development, which is often connected to nega-
tive social impacts, for example increasing housing unaffordability, gentrification 
and urban inequality (Immergluck and Balan 2018). Additionally, positive trickle- 
down effects from regenerative property- led development to more deprived com-
munities are not always apparent in reality (Tallon 2013).
To rebut these perspectives, it has also been argued that urban design, com-
bined with real estate development, governance and planning strategies, can 
effectively create more attractive places and place- making processes, recognising 
that although real estate actors may enforce constraints, they can also ‘facilitate 
the creation of successful places’ (Tiesdell and Adams 2012, 60). Of course, the 
idea of what a ‘successful place’ may be is subjective, and there are tensions at play 
between the diverse and variegated perspectives of those operating in markets to 
create ‘successful’ housing developments, which are sustainably designed, cultur-
ally sensitive and appropriate to the context of local communities.
This chapter investigates the inherent complexities of residential densifica-
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address the housing crisis post-2010. Challenges in providing housing, ensuring 
sustainable development and managing densification processes are not unique to 
London but are prevalent in myriad global cities (see Chapter  13 by Biggar and 
Siemiatycki for a discussion on densification in Toronto). The chapter also provides 
a summary and reflection of the proposed changes to urban density policy in the 
incumbent London Plan, which will be finalised in late 2020, and specific guidance 
issued by particular London boroughs in response to this.
This chapter examines current influences on densifying the city form 
grounded in urban design and real estate perspectives using three case studies of 
residential- led development in inner London:  the Heygate Estate (Elephant and 
Castle, London Borough of Southwark), the Victoria Opportunity Area (City of 
Westminster) and Woodberry Downs (London Borough of Hackney). Furthermore, 
it questions whether these influences can cohesively facilitate the creation of ‘suc-
cessful’ residential and mixed- used developments, and how these might be under-
stood as successful. Based upon empirical work undertaken in London, we seek 
to explore the role that urban design plays in mediating between the sometimes 
conflicting requirements of sustainable, progressive property- led development. 
In London a range of densification options have been implemented, from build-
ing tall to the purchase of social housing estates by private developers for new 
private, denser residential development. The chapter will first provide a brief dis-
cussion about the ways in which density has been determined, looking at quantifi-
able approaches versus attempts at understanding perceived densities. This will 
be followed by an overview of urban design and real estate agendas in relation to 
density. The final main section will summarise the policy position towards density 
in London with a discussion of how this works ‘on the ground’ in relation to the 
three case studies (as previously introduced). The conclusions will firstly seek to 
summarise the ways in which density is being promoted and implemented in inner 
London before offering some reflections upon the emerging debate about policies 
for densification in the new London Plan. Finally they will suggest a way forward 
in terms of how London boroughs might manage the issue of density on a site- by- 
site basis, how they may use urban design and planning strategies to achieve that, 
and what the prospects for a more nuanced understanding of social sustainability 
might mean in practice. How the ongoing debate surrounding processes of urban 
densification has unfolded in London is the research focus of the chapter, and the 
conclusions reflect on key lessons from London which may be pertinent to other 
global cities.
Measuring density: Numbers versus local context?
Traditionally, density is something that has been measured in terms of the num-
ber of units in a given area (e.g. Boyko and Cooper 2011; Churchman 1999). 
The unit may refer to the number of dwellings, buildings, rooms or individuals in 
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a given measurable area. Thus this attempt at quantifying density characterises 
places by numbers of units that may, or may not, give an accurate understanding 
of that place. The main issue with the quantifiable approach is that it does not 
respond to the particularities of context and therefore, in essence, it ignores what 
place really means. The numerical measurements are indicative of the density 
more broadly, but they offer a limited and generalised perspective which only 
reflects one aspect of the urban housing story. A ‘more context- sensitive approach 
that simultaneously provides planners with new tools to develop both socially 
and ecologically sustainable urban environments’ (Kyttä et al. 2016, 34) would 
provide dimensionality to ideas surrounding what densification means in our 
urban centres.
Our understanding of density is in line with Churchman’s, in that it ‘can be 
perceived and evaluated in very different ways, by different people, under dif-
ferent circumstances, in different cultures and countries’ (1999, 390). Similar 
approaches to densification have emerged in urban planning in more recent times, 
and in a market- led system, where planning processes are discretionary, such as 
those applied in London, the contextual understandings of density, coupled with 
myriad understandings of how the concept is understood, can be variegated across 
interpretations of density in the city’s 32 boroughs (local authorities created by the 
London Government Act, 1963). Perceived density is ‘defined as an individual’s 
perception and estimate of the number of people present in a given area, the space 
available, and the organization of that space’ (Churchman 1999, 390, our italics). 
Therefore the ‘measure’ of density is subjective and relational rather than objec-
tive and fixed, even though quantifiable approaches have traditionally sought to 
enforce numerically predefined boundaries to the idea of density. In summary, ‘the 
lack of consensus between theory, policy and practice arguably points to a require-
ment for residential densities to be examined on a case- by- case basis according to 
the policy in place at the time as well as the particulars of the place itself’ (Dempsey 
et al. 2012, 96).
Due to subjective experiences and perceptions, each individual understands 
and responds to density in a different way. This can be understood through two 
main lines of thinking:  perceived physical density and perceived social density 
(Bergdoll and Williams 1990). Perceived physical density refers to the relationship 
between physical attributes in the built environment, while perceived social den-
sity refers to a relationship between individuals and communities and the physical 
setting. Furthermore, perceived social density addresses the relative relationships 
not only between individuals and space, but also between individuals in the space 
(Cheng 2009, 12), which again reinforces the importance of accounting for diverse 
local contexts and characteristics. Therefore, the challenge for planners and other 
built environment professionals is to try to understand not only the complexities of 
quantifiable and perceived densities, but the ways in which these interact in par-
ticular places across London’s boroughs to form the built environment and respond 
to housing, property and urban design ambitions.
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London’s urban design and real estate agendas
Questions surrounding city development, including how and where people should 
live, have evolved across the UK since the rapid urbanisation experienced during 
the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century. Potential opportunities for 
providing effective residential housing solutions were pursued through Ebenezer 
Howard’s garden city new towns initiative, polycentric developments and con-
tinuing urban sprawl. However, the late 1950s brought the introduction of the 
metropolitan Green Belt around London, while demographic shifts saw the city’s 
population decentralise and therefore decrease. It wasn’t until the 1990s, when 
London was once more experiencing substantial growth and a shift in housing 
demand, that debates on brownfield redevelopment, the so- called urban renais-
sance agenda, and the advocacy of the ‘compact city’ were considered. Indeed, 
processes of densification and development reflect the temporal dynamics of how 
cities form and evolve. Such processes are conceived by McFarlane as an intercon-
nected triptych of densification, re- densification and de- densification, influenced 
by history and place, as well as actively creating new history and places, which 
‘bring together different temporal trajectories and places across the city, region 
and world’ (2020, n.p.). Presently, London still has an active Green Belt policy, 
coupled with a rising population and ever increasing pressures on land use, and 
therefore since the start of the twenty- first century it has experienced rising house 
prices, increasing social inequity and an inability to meet housing demand. The 
ongoing housing crisis in the city reflects scenarios where social (public) housing 
 developments have stalled (or are pursued in partnership with private entities – 
see Chapter 16 for more on housing struggle), the private rented sector (PRS) con-
tinues to grow apace (see Chapter 3 for a discussion on issues within London’s PRS 
market) and the viability of housing developments is often impacted by land value 
price escalation. Densifying the space available to developers could be perceived 
as a potential solution to the burgeoning affordability crisis being experienced 
in London (see Chapter 10 for a broader discussion of housing affordability), but 
wider policy debates continue over how densification can and should be under-
stood from both spatial and temporal perspectives, and whether a densification 
agenda should be pursued as a response to the complexities of the housing crisis.
It has been argued that ‘density is a simple yet effective measure that brings 
together economic, environmental and social benefits, solving the problems of a 
sprawling society that has become disconnected, disengaged and distant from an 
earlier ideal of urban propinquity’ (Holman et  al. 2015, 2). Indeed, Churchman 
(1999, 389) argues that its appeal to planners and policy- makers is that it is ‘objec-
tive, quantitative, and neutral’, although we actively query the idea of objectivity as 
well as neutrality, in how density can be interpreted and operationalised in the dis-
cretionary planning system; an objective measure may be understood in a subjec-
tive, fluid and non- neutral way, depending on the particulars of a development and 
the London borough’s approach to densification. Density is both a relational and 
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relative concept. However, these ‘multiple win–win claims for density’ (Holman 
et al. 2015, 2) reflect a view that density is an independent variable (Boyko and 
Cooper 2011) that somehow potentially delivers a set of un- or ill- defined benefits. 
Density can, however, be perceived and therefore be experiential. This, unlike the 
‘measurable’ indicators of density, is a relative and subjective indicator. Perceived 
density is not solely about the relation between individuals and their surround-
ing environment, but also about the relations among the individuals in the space 
(Ng 2010).
Academic literature that considers the spatial and temporal impacts of densi-
fication policies in line with the real estate market in contemporary cities is limited 
(Adams and Tiesdell 2012; Udy 2004). The real estate market’s response to den-
sification in the UK is inherently connected to the policies addressing the contin-
ued direction of city development, but there is little reflection on the ‘end value’ 
of densifying residential real estate, in line with relevant policies, development 
or investment processes. The impact of densification through zoning, for example 
(Chakraborty et al. 2010), as well as its social consequences (Glaeser and Gottlieb 
2006), is explored in a more diverse way from a North American perspective (see 
Chapter 13 by Biggar and Siemiatycki for a Toronto perspective on land value cap-
ture and density bonusing).
From a development perspective, densification can either be ‘hard’ or 
‘soft’:  both types of densification can contribute to the creation of new housing 
and can bring different challenges for planning authorities. ‘Soft’ densification pro-
cesses are smaller- scale, infill developments which contribute to the creation of 
new housing in a more discrete manner. Dunning et al. (2020) discuss how softer 
densification should not be overlooked by local authorities and that ‘proactive pol-
icy frameworks’ are necessary, as incremental changes through smaller develop-
ments can result in significant cumulative impacts in local areas. Across the UK, 
London has experienced the highest levels of ‘soft’ housing densification processes. 
As discussed by Bibby et al., in ‘London Boroughs, various combinations of large, 
formal development schemes, that substantially increase site density, and those 
that reduce it, less intrusive infill developments and the deconversion of larger 
existing houses may all be proceeding simultaneously’ (2020, 114); therefore, 
there are potential challenges in managing data relating to hard and soft densifica-
tion, and a need to balance out possibilities of oversupply with development scale.
For larger- scale ‘hard’ densification developments, as well as potentially 
increasing the financial value of denser residential provision for the developer, 
investor and local government, value can also be reflected on in a more socially 
holistic way, considering local amenities, accessibility and transport links, com-
bined with the user market’s willingness to pay for properties (renting or pur-
chasing) in line with cyclical supply and demand issues in the real estate market. 
Indeed, market reports relating to London (London First and Savills 2015) clearly 
conclude that increasing the city’s residential density can result in varied types of 
value creation and opportunities, while contributing strategically to addressing 
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the burgeoning housing crisis. There is no concrete guarantee that the housing 
produced through such strategic developments will offer accessible or affordable 
housing across the income spectrum within local communities. However, analys-
ing and assessing the potential for value creation in London is subject to viability 
appraisals carried out by developers, and the ensuing negotiation and decision- 
making processes between developers, planners and local authorities can result in 
diverse outcomes as they are considered on a site- by- site basis.
Through viability assessments the developer will be able to reflect on costs, 
land values and the perceived profits relating to the proposed development in 
order to ascertain how much of a contribution they will make through ‘planning 
gain’ mechanisms. Local authorities seek to benefit from developments through 
planning obligations such as Section 106 and the Community Infrastructure Levy 
(CIL), agreeing a financial or tangible contribution from the developer in relation 
to affordable housing, contributions towards local amenities or infrastructure. The 
economic factors influencing developments have become increasingly important in 
the 2010s and are seen by many as prioritising profit and finance over other influen-
tial and important urban development influences, such as sustainability. Methods 
of economic modelling applied by developers in the production of affordable hous-
ing (or the lack thereof) have also been criticised as problematic, along with the 
planning system, suggesting that the limited level of affordable housing output is 
‘predictable’ due to the use of viability appraisals (Sayce et al. 2017). Colenutt et al. 
suggest that the dominance of financial viability assessments has led the UK to a 
point where the ‘asymmetry in the relationship between the property industry, and 
local authorities and the communities they serve’ (2015, 453) has been reinforced, 
to the benefit of the developer. Crosby and Wyatt (2016) also demonstrate that via-
bility appraisals enable developers to maximise profits at the expense of the com-
munity. However, other emerging research by Lee (2019) suggests that although 
viability assessments have been utilised advantageously by the developers, such 
scenarios weren’t meant to result in asymmetry of power relations, but that these 
have emerged as a result of limited governmental guidance and regulation. Such 
are the complexities of understanding the varied scales of development processes 
and densities on a site- by- site, borough- by- borough basis, across discretionary plan-
ning authorities with particular institutional approaches and local characteristics.
Urban densification debates are also intimately related to sustainability dis-
courses. Urban densification is seen as both a response to climate change and a tool 
for sustainable urbanisation (Burton 2000). The most influential conceptualisation 
for this is perhaps the ‘compact city’ framing, which purports that the denser a city 
is (in terms of buildings, infrastructure, people, uses, etc.), the better its sustaina-
bility outlook and ecological footprint. However, this is not always agreed upon by 
scholars. In fact, Breheny (1996) acknowledges two schools of thought: centrists are 
those who argue for compact cities, densification and intensification, mainly high-
lighting environmental sustainability benefits of the compact city; and decentrists are 
those who are against compact cities and advocate the benefits of decentralisation, 
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dispersed cities and suburban living by bringing to the forefront economic and social 
sustainability advantages. On the one hand, densification of cities has a positive envi-
ronmental impact by lowering transport needs, making more efficient use of energy 
and reducing the need for greenfield land for housing; it also promotes healthier and 
more sustainable lifestyles via walking and cycling (Burton et al. 1996). On the other 
hand, densifying a city can lead to congestion, lack of affordable housing, no sense of 
freedom and urban alienation; it also can lead to unwanted health costs by exposing 
a larger proportion of the population to air pollution, and by reducing urban green 
space. Hence, there are sustainability claims for and against urban densification. 
Westerink et al. (2013) classify these claims under four categories: environmental 
(i.e. CO2 emissions, energy, water and noise), social (health, wellbeing, social equity, 
segregation/ gentrification and sense of community), economic (land prices, hous-
ing affordability, real estate development and competitiveness) and institutional 
(politics, policy and performance monitoring). In rapidly growing cities such as 
London we see a shift in academic debate away from the synergy between economic 
sustainability and densification and towards tensions between densification and the 
social aspects of sustainability such as social justice and social equity.
Furthermore, in addition to the potential for increased density to affect place 
identity (either positively or negatively), it might be said to also represent a chal-
lenge to the conservation of cultural built heritage, given that densification projects 
often take place in historic urban environments (Skrede and Krokann Berg 2019). As 
the protection and conservation of the historic environment in ‘hybrid’ cities such as 
London is a central concern of planning, promoting higher densities should address 
the core question of ‘how much originality, how much change?’ (Larkham 1996, 
38) in that urban environment. In evolving planning and conservation practice, it is 
recognised that ‘the retention of an appropriate … visual and sensory setting, as well 
as the retention of spiritual and other cultural relationships that contribute to the 
cultural significance of the place’ (ICOMOS 2013, 5), is key. Thus we see an intrin-
sic dilemma for complex cities such as London, where the demands of growth and 
higher densities are potentially at odds with the need to protect and conserve historic 
environments. This relates primarily to the idea of approaches to the management of 
urban change, namely, for cities with an historic environment to evolve in a managed 
way and to not only retain their distinctiveness, but to improve on it through proper 
planning and contributing to a twenty- first- century city (Hobson 2004).
Urban densification in London: Querying policies and practice
Led by the London Plan (GLA 2016), we are witnessing a ‘major programme 
of densification of areas prompted by a lack of land for new homes’ (Allies and 
Morrison 2016, 3). London has traditionally grown outwards, yet ‘this decade is 
the first time we are identifying growth areas in order to recycle existing neighbour-
hoods and land’ (Allies and Morrison 2016, 1). However, density is a concept that 
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has been embedded into London policy since the creation of the Greater London 
Authority and a more proactive mayoral system in 2000, with the creation of the 
London Plan density matrix (LPDM). The first iteration of the LPDM was based on 
the sustainable residential quality (SRQ) density matrix, created by consultants 
Llewelyn- Davies in 1998. The matrix proposed that developing at appropriate den-
sities across different sites citywide should adopt a ‘design- led’ approach to den-
sity, determined by site- specific characteristics and qualities relating to sustainable 
development, as well as accessibility and transport links. The current LPDM has set 
quantifiable lower and upper density targets for sites depending on a broad char-
acterisation (central, urban or suburban) based upon public transport accessibility 
level (PTAL) rating (see Table 12.1). The most recent iteration of the London Plan, 
which will be finalised in late 2020, consulted on whether the LPDM should con-
tinue to be applied in its current format for a number of reasons, as outlined below. 
Such consultative discussions have resulted in diverse and opposing perspectives 
as to whether densification can be used to address the need for 66,000 new homes 
in London annually, and if the matrix is fit for purpose.
As a strategic policy aim of the London Plan, the LPDM assumes that prox-
imity to public transport should encourage higher density, although the matrix 
has been criticised as ignoring the local context and character of neighbourhoods 
and places (Allies and Morrison 2016). As argued by Edwards (2019), the LPDM 
has led to an over- reliance on PTAL which consequently ignores impacts on social 
infrastructure capacity, especially in inner areas. As can be seen from Table 12.1, 
Table 12.1 Sustainable residential quality (SRQ) density matrix (habitable 
rooms and dwellings per hectare) in the adopted London Plan 2016
Setting Public Transport Accessibility Level (PTAL)
0 to 1 2 to 3 4 to 6
Surburban 150–200 hr/ ha 150–250 hr/ ha 200–350 hr/ ha
3.8–4.6 hr/ unit 35–55 u/ ha 35–65 u/ ha 45–90 u/ ha
3.1–3.7 hr/ unit 40–65 u/ ha 40–80 u/ ha 55–115 u/ ha
2.7–3.0 hr/ unit 50–75 u/ ha 50–95 u/ ha 70–130 u/ ha
Urban 150–250 hr/ ha 200–450 hr/ ha 200–700 hr/ ha
3.8–4.6 hr/ unit 35–65 u/ ha 45–120 u/ ha 45–185 u/ ha
3.1–3.7 hr/ unit 40–80 u/ ha 55–145 u/ ha 55–225 u/ ha
2.7–3.0 hr/ unit 50–95 u/ ha 70–170 u/ ha 70–260 u/ ha
Central 150–300 hr/ ha 300–650 hr/ ha 650–1100 hr/ ha
3.8–4.6 hr/ unit 35–80 u/ ha 65–170 u/ ha 140–290 u/ ha
3.1–3.7 hr/ unit 40–100 u/ ha 80–210 u/ ha 175–355 u/ ha
2.7–3.0 hr/ unit 50–100 u/ ha 100–240 u/ ha 215–405 u/ ha
Source: GLA (2016)
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the matrix sets numerical ranges for density in relation to PTAL. For example, in 
suburban areas (typically with low- density detached and semi- detached housing, 
or residential units of two to three storeys) and a PTAL of four to six (with six being 
the highest/ best level of accessibility), you would expect 45–90 units per hectare 
of development when there are 3.8–4.6 habitable rooms per unit. In central areas 
(dense development, city centres, six to eight storeys), at a similar PTAL level of 
four to six, but with fewer habitable rooms per unit at 2.7–3.0, you would expect 
215–405 units per hectare of residential development.
The new Draft London Plan (GLA 2018) sets out a revised density policy which 
would rid the plan of upper limits for densification (Policy D6, Optimising Housing 
Density). This proposed design- led approach would see site context, connectivity 
and infrastructure determinants of site capacity considered; this has broadly been 
welcomed, yet a number of witnesses at the Examination in Public (EiP) outlined 
their concern about the removal of upper density limits on sites. A major concern is 
that the ‘enforcement of clear, upper limits on density would help discourage over- 
bidding by developers when they are buying sites and thus help damp land price 
escalation – to the benefit of social housing providers as well as private develop-
ers and ultimately households’ (Edwards 2019, n.p.). Additionally, the new policy 
regime would place the onus of deciding and implementing densities upon London 
boroughs through site- by- site limits, design codes and the like. Again, there is con-
cern about the implications for this for London boroughs in terms of their capacity, 
ability and need to deliver housing targets (Just Space 2019).
Furthermore, there is additional evidence that the upper limits in particular 
have been ignored and that there is a ‘lack of any hard evidence that the exist-
ence of the matrix has significantly affected either the general level or spatial pat-
tern of new development densities across London, as compared with that expected 
from market forces interacting with borough level signals of planning acceptabil-
ity’ (Gordon et al. 2016, 3). Indeed, Gordon et al. indicate that the upper limits 
have been ‘breached in the majority of the approvals actually granted’ (2016, 3). 
Numbers indicate that the matrix ‘is not being followed, 50 per cent of develop-
ment is above the matrix maximum for its location, 25 per cent is double the maxi-
mum and 15 per cent is below the minimum, i.e. only 35 per cent of development 
is within the appropriate density matrix range’ (GLA 2017, 3). Other alternative 
perspectives suggest that although a lower/ minimum level of density should be 
maintained, the higher/ maximum level should be discontinued (Gordon et  al. 
2016), especially if the new Plan is considering ‘optimum’ rather than ‘maximum’ 
density: this perspective feeds back into the literature on the complexities inherent 
in decision- making across boroughs at local level, and how sites are unique. It also 
demonstrates how, considering the apparent lack of influence the current matrix 
has, decisions are subjective, market- led and multidimensional, with the LPDM 
being seen as advisory rather than rigidly enforced – decisions in relation to den-
sity should not only be determined by PTAL and broad locational characteristics. 
Respondents from Highbury, however, consider that the LPDM should be retained 
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in its entirety, as it provides a starting point from which the developers and local 
planning authorities can begin negotiation processes. Just Space also commented 
that the upper limits of the LPDM should be strictly enforced moving forward until 
each borough has a design code in place, thereby reducing speculation and curtail-
ing land value escalation.
The concerns about viability have been a theme in the discussion of poli-
cies for densification at the London level; the existing policy of having lower and 
upper density limits on sites has resulted, in practice, in developers speculatively 
over- bidding for sites, therefore needing to claw back value from their consequent 
development proposals. The result has been ever higher densities, building heights 
and developers arguing ‘that the price they have paid for land should be taken into 
account in “viability” calculations and used to justify social housing reductions’ 
(Edwards 2019, n.p.). Viability, then, has a negative impact on how much local 
planning authorities can capture through planning gain obligations and Section 
106/ CIL and diminishes contributions towards affordable housing.
Case studies of densification in London: ‘Successful’ 
densification?
Three case studies were chosen to exemplify the nature of the density debate in 
London. In each of the three cases density is being addressed at different spatial 
scales and in different ways:  in Heygate (London Borough of Southwark) the 
municipality has sought to relocate the social housing residents, demolish the 
existing housing and sell the land to developers for higher- density, mainly private 
residential uses. The Victoria Opportunity Area (City of Westminster) adopted 
supplementary planning guidance calls for an additional 1,000 dwellings in a con-
text of nationally important infrastructure, established residential communities 
and a high proportion of protected built heritage (both buildings and areas). In 
Woodberry Down (London Borough of Hackney) around 2,000 council (or former 
council) homes will have been demolished and replaced with more than 5,500 
units on the estate with a very limited number of social housing units, some for 
‘key workers’, and the majority to be sold on the open market.
In each case, urban design processes seek not only to mediate between sus-
tainability concerns and the real estate investment cycle, but additionally to medi-
ate between the existing character of places and the aspirations of densification 
strategies. We use a range of methods including policy analysis, interviews and 
observations on site to assess the processes of densification at play in each location.
Table  12.2 summarises the particular site and proposal characteristics for 
each of the three case studies. For each of the cases, documents produced as part 
of each densification process were collected for review purposes. These include the 
relevant adopted and draft plans (at London and municipal level) and any plan-
ning application documents including supporting information, reports, newspaper 
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articles, letters and consultation responses. The review of the documentation estab-
lished the facts of each of the cases. Site observation was also undertaken for each 
of the case studies as it allowed for the contextualisation of the facts  uncovered 
in the document review stage. Site observation was crucial to understanding the 
context of densification proposals, as well as the impact of those proposals (where 
redevelopment has taken/ is taking place).
The three case studies reflect processes of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ densi-
fication:  the Victoria Opportunity Area reflects the former, and Heygate and 
Woodberry Down reflect the latter. Interestingly, with softer processes of intensi-
fication through infill and discrete developments, as the land has multiple owners 
and the sites are variegated across the opportunity area, issues to do with moni-
toring development processes and outcomes may arise in line with the relevant 
literature (Bibby et  al. 2020; Dunning et  al. 2020). With multiple, concomitant 
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curious to see what the outcomes of these developments are in the longer term in 
line with the LPDM, considering the lack of density- related perspectives in the City 
Plan or supplementary planning documents (SPD). In this respect, in the Victoria 
Opportunity Area, due to the ‘soft’ nature of active densification processes spread 
across a substantial geographical area (40 hectares) with myriad ‘unknown’ loca-
tions, it is unlikely that there will be pertinent questions emerging regarding via-
bility, affordable housing provision and sustainable ‘good growth’. Therefore, the 
success of the densification process will be contingent upon the capacity for the 
smaller- scale developments to contribute positively to and enhance the character 
and context of the locality and its residential community. One measurable outcome 
of success is likely to be whether, through effective densification, the Opportunity 
Area meets the target of creating an anticipated 4,000 new jobs. The spatial and 
temporal evolution of densification processes in Victoria is likely to have a more 
disjointed and less concentrated impact over a longer period when compared with 
the more controversial, ‘harder’ densification projects considered.
The other two case studies both reflect ‘hard’ densification processes, with 
residential development concentrated within defined boundaries and reflecting 
redevelopment of post- Second World War social housing estates, with Heygate 
south of the River Thames in the London Borough of Southwark, and Woodberry 
Down to the north of the city in the London Borough of Hackney. Woodberry Down 
covers a substantially larger area than the Heygate redevelopment (64 hectares 
compared with nine hectares) and will provide a larger number of residential units 
upon completion. However, although a variety of different plans and guidelines 
have been produced in relation to the Hackney development, they offer no specific 
guidance on density. This may be due to the temporal and spatial pattern of the 
development in Hackney, as financial viability and development plans may alter 
over the anticipated 20- year period, rolling out across eight phases. However, with 
this lack of definition over a longer period comes opportunity: moving forward, the 
development could adjust in line with more design- led perspectives if the LPDM 
were to be adjusted, incorporating additional sustainability features, and revisiting 
the developer’s proposals for integrative urban realm. Although the development 
will have been fundamentally based on financial viability assessments, with nego-
tiated planning obligations agreed with the local authority, another opportunity 
would be for developers to actually extract more value from the development in 
the longer term, depending on the responses to London’s housing crisis and move-
ments in land value costs over the lifetime of the development processes, combined 
with the dynamics of the real estate cycle. There may be further opportunity to 
actively develop additional housing units if such a shift is valuable for the devel-
oper, there is consistent demand in the local community, it is approached in a sus-
tainable way and the adjusted proposals can be seen as representative of ‘optimum’ 
density for the area.
The redevelopment of the Heygate Estate, in comparison with the Woodberry 
Down case study, attracted a significant amount of controversy and media attention 
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because the new development is seen to actively contradict Southwark Council’s 
approach to affordable housing provision. The SPD provides details on how hous-
ing can be provided across a range of incomes to maintain the mixed communities 
within the borough. However, the language adopted is imprecise and open to inter-
pretation, and indeed the new redevelopment fails to deliver on affordable housing 
targets (which is something that Woodberry Down does succeed at doing, provid-
ing 41 per cent of the development as social rented housing or for shared owner-
ship). From its completion in 1972 the original Heygate Estate was home to over 
3,000 residents, with over 1,200 social housing units, some of which were sold off 
through the right- to- buy campaign which emerged in the 1980s. The redevelop-
ment has been criticised in the wider media, as although the number of dwellings 
will increase through the redevelopment from 1,214 to 2,704, only 82 of these – 
3 per cent of the whole development – will be provided for social housing. In this 
respect, the processes of densification at play in the Heygate Estate have resulted 
in an area being regenerated but in a community being displaced and alienated, 
as tenants were relocated elsewhere within London. The Southwark case study is 
almost complete and is an example of ‘hard’ densification that, although it clearly 
sits within the recommended guidelines of the LPDM and provides a contempo-
rary, design- led redevelopment, also embodies many of the negative characteristics 
associated with densification: profit maximisation through viability assessments by 
the developer, negative implications for social equity and lack of consideration for 
the local context or community.
Conclusions
The conclusions will firstly seek to summarise the ways in which density is being 
promoted and implemented in inner London before offering some reflections upon 
the emerging debate about policies for densification in the Draft London Plan. 
They will finally suggest a way forward in terms of how London boroughs might 
manage the issue of density on a site- by- site basis, how they may use urban design 
and planning strategies to achieve that and what the prospects for a more nuanced 
understanding of social sustainability might mean in practice.
It is clear that density is an issue that is challenging planners and planning 
in inner London  – the density matrix, in essence, might appear to be conceived 
of in a way that maximises the potential of particular sites in delivering ‘sustain-
able development’, but in reality the negotiation of specific density in inner London 
boroughs is fraught with complexity. The three case studies presented show a 
range of densification challenges from ‘soft’ to ‘hard’ approaches. Each suggests a 
different set of issues that planners face at both the Greater London and individ-
ual London borough levels. What ties them together, however, is a vision of what 
increasing density might achieve, and the skills required in outlining and negotiat-
ing that vision in relation to each site. The ‘hard’ densification promoted in both 
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Heygate and Woodberry Down has seen the removal of significant numbers of 
social housing units and their replacement with private accommodation of various 
types. Should this be the aim of densification? Could a more ‘soft’ approach, as in 
Victoria, deliver more units while maintaining the social housing on which so many 
Londoners depend?
While there is concern about the replacement of the LPDM with targets and 
approaches that are designed and implemented only at the London borough level, 
surely a system that appears to prescribe the optimum development on a site to 
encourage sustainability but which, in reality, allows developers to have the maxi-
mum amount of development for the minimum amount of infrastructure provision 
is flawed. The LPDM promotes a quantifiable approach which does not recognise 
the qualitative ways in which people live and work  – people’s perception of the 
density that is being delivered is entirely absent from discussions in planning in 
London, and this needs to be remedied. Perceived density should be at the heart of 
discussions about the overhaul of planning policy to deliver density targets for the 
benefit of Londoners rather than developers.
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Addressing equity concerns in land 
value capture: The spatial distribution 
of community benefits in Toronto’s urban 
redevelopment
Jeff Biggar and Matti Siemiatycki
Introduction
In high- growth cities such as Toronto and London, creating public good from pri-
vate land development to provide social and physical infrastructure is a key driving 
force of city planning. Booming economies and soaring land values in local prop-
erty markets raise the stakes for cities to capture gains arising from the approval of 
new development and for planners to ensure this development contributes posi-
tively to communities. In this context, land value capture (LVC) mechanisms such 
as density bonusing (used in Toronto) and planning obligations (used in London) 
apply the idea that some of the profits gained from private development should 
be reinvested in public amenities and infrastructure. Toronto and London share 
a similar legislative foundation for planning based on a discretionary process. 
Each planning case is decided on its own merits, accounting for local plans but not 
legally bound to them (Booth 1996; Tewdwr- Jones 1999; Smit and Valiante 2015). 
Discretion enables flexibility in the planning system to adapt to rapid change in an 
urban environment, which may move at a faster speed than planners can respond 
to and predict. Out of these systems emerge development- led planning practices 
that, on the one hand, allow for creativity to adapt to changing trends such as infill 
and brownfield development, but, on the other, reduce the role of plan- led, com-
prehensive planning to provide the stability and guidance cities and their planners 
benefit from to achieve specific goals for the built environment.
This chapter investigates the LVC practice of density bonusing in Toronto’s 
planning system. The chapter begins with an overview of the principles of land value 
capture and related planning instruments. The details of the research project are 
then presented, followed by a discussion of the research findings and their relevance 
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LVC: Political- economic context and conceptual framework
Land value capture refers to any policy or legal instrument whose purpose is to cap-
ture value arising from an increase in the price of property and to use that increase 
for specific purposes (Alterman 2012; Walters 2013). LVC is conceptually rooted 
in the notion of unearned increment, which emerged among nineteenth- century 
political economists such as John Stuart Mill and Henry George, who saw the rise 
in land values derived from public decisions and market conditions, not individual 
landowners (Hendricks et al. 2017). Smolka and Amborski (2000) define LVC as 
the process of securing all or part of the value increase caused by public interven-
tion through regulatory or policy means. Other scholars, such as Alterman (2012), 
suggest LVC may contribute to the public good in the form of windfall capture, an 
understanding shared by Ingram and Hong (2012), who state that the unearned 
increment of individually owned private property is created from public action and 
should therefore be reallocated to society. Examining urban development from 
a social equity perspective means that gains in value resulting from government 
action (subsidies to developers, the building of a park, improvement of schools, 
provision of transit, rezoning of land, etc.) are derived collectively and therefore 
the benefits likewise should be enjoyed by many, not few (Kohn 2016; Fainstein 
2012, 25). The idea of density bonusing resonates with debates on LVC and equity 
as a process of public action (e.g. rezoning sites for more density) and value crea-
tion (e.g. securing community infrastructure).
The rise of LVC comes amid important changes to the political economy of 
cities. The financialisation of urban development in market- intensive, neoliberal 
environments sees governments rely more on user fees and voluntary taxes to fund 
local public facilities, amenities and services rather than general taxation (Fainstein 
2016; Gielen and Tasan- Kok 2010; Sagalyn 1997). Incentivising development to 
receive public benefits is considered politically favourable for local governments 
looking to keep taxes low and residents satisfied. Canadian cities such as Toronto 
are no exception to this trend. A  political climate promoting fiscal austerity in 
municipal budgets has kept taxes low and successive provincial governments have 
downloaded responsibility for affordable housing, transit and social services, result-
ing in chronic underfunding and no choice but to look beyond property taxes to 
make up revenue shortfalls to fund major infrastructure and services (Fanelli 2009; 
Joy and Vogel 2015). Since 2012, property tax increases have been kept at or below 
inflation and population growth, with the city relying on reserve funds, fluctuating 
land- transfer taxes and user fees towards already underfunded services and infra-
structures (Block and Macdonald 2019).
In these conditions, LVC is one avenue to capture some of the gains of market 
speculation from private development. Beginning in the mid- 1980s, many North 
American cities extended these provisions to include institutional infrastructure 
requirements to address affordable housing shortages and other social needs, such 
as schools, libraries, day care centres, and low- income and affordable housing 
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(Altshuler and Gomez- Ibanez 2000). Government intervention in land markets 
informs the LVC paradigm, whereby governments attempt to recoup part of the 
value derived from offloading infrastructure requirements to the private sector. 
While gains made through LVC pale in comparison with broad- based taxation (e.g. 
a tax on the value of land, progressive income taxes), if governments lack resources 
to fund local infrastructure, LVC tools bring capacity to fill in infrastructure gaps 
and thus must not be overlooked (Alterman 2012; Muñoz Gielen and Lenferink 
2018). Alterman and Kayden (1988) use an umbrella term, ‘developer provisions’, 
to describe how value capture techniques work in practice (see Table 13.1).
Incentive- based (negotiated) developer provisions providing public benefits 
are common in cities such as Toronto and London through density bonusing and 
planning obligation instruments (Campbell et al. 2000; Moore 2013). In England 
and Wales, Section 106 planning obligations and the Community Infrastructure 
Levy (CIL) make up the system of developer provisions to mitigate the social and 
environmental effects of development. Affordable housing is the primary contribu-
tion funded through planning obligations; however, similar to Toronto, there are 
local variations in the value of these obligations (Lord et al. 2018). The CIL is a 
standard planning charge with a set formula that is voluntary and applies on most 
new buildings. In combination they provide for the provision of affordable housing 
and community infrastructure (Burgess et al. 2013).
Density bonusing in Toronto
Toronto’s rapid growth trajectory is a key driving force of the use of LVC practices. 
Toronto is experiencing a high- rise development boom with an unprecedented vol-
ume of construction globally and leads North American cities in total active con-
struction cranes at 120 in 2019 (O’Neil 2019). Strong market forces (consistently 
Table 13.1 Conceptual typology of developer provisions, showing differences 
between LVC instruments
How are they 
obtained




Infrastructure (roads, sewers, 
schools, libraries) that directly 
serves the physical and social needs 
of a development
Conditional obligations 




Benefits such as cultural facilities, 
parks and recreation centres serving 
a larger community area beyond the 
needs of a given development
Negotiations between 
government actors 
providing cash in lieu/ 
in- kind contribution
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low interest rates, foreign direct investment and speculation on small land supply) 
are a prevailing narrative for the residential condo boom in Toronto (Filion et al. 
2015; Rosen and Walks 2015). The application of density bonusing depends on a 
booming economy and a perceived value for density by builders and developers, 
making Toronto a rich urban context to study LVC practices.
Most Canadian cities, including Toronto, use development fees or charges to 
finance the costs of infrastructure to ensure growth pays for growth (Skaburskis 
and Tomalty 2000). The provision of public infrastructure and facilities are secured 
through more fixed public revenue streams, such as development charges, prop-
erty taxes, commercial business levies, provincial tax transfer payments and fed-
eral excise taxes such as the gas tax (Côté 2009). Additional infrastructure money 
is secured through indirect sources such as density bonusing. It has been the City 
of Toronto’s view that density bonusing was not intended to be a direct revenue 
tool nor a substitute for other revenue streams such as development charges, but 
used ‘above and beyond’ these mechanisms following policy objectives (City of 
Toronto 2007).
In Toronto, density bonusing is referred to as Section 37 of the Planning Act. 
When a development is proposed beyond what is otherwise permitted in the zoning 
by- law, the developer must provide capital ‘facilities, services or matters’ (affordable 
housing, parks, public art, libraries) in return for the incentive of additional height or 
density. These facilities must ‘bear a reasonable planning relationship’ to a  proposed 
development and have ‘an appropriate geographical relationship to the develop-
ment’ that addresses associated planning issues (City of Toronto 2007, 5). Once a 
development application is approved, the process is facilitated through a community 
benefit agreement: a voluntary, discretionary agreement between a developer and 
a municipality outlining the density incentive provided and the agreed upon public 
benefit,1 which may be in the form of cash or cash in lieu, and put towards a specific 
capital project. In practice, the ward councillor – not city planners – negotiates den-
sity bonus agreements with developers, and the city council (an elected body) has 
the final say on all zoning by- law amendments (City of Toronto 2007, 7). The devel-
oper, city planner and councillor then agree on what they consider an appropriate 
value. Density bonusing is triggered by two key public and private actions: (1) the 
rezoning of land for more height and/ or density and change in use, and (2) a transac-
tion where the city extracts public value (cash or cash in lieu) in return for permitting 
a developer to build a larger or denser building(s).
Section 37 agreements are intended to promote city building objectives of 
the official plan, a means by which the city can achieve ‘responsible, balanced 
growth’ (City of Toronto 2007), and provincial means to provide ‘desirable 
visual amenities to enhance the development site or surrounding neighbour-
hoods’ (MMAH 2009). Like all local planning decisions, Section 37 decisions 
must consider higher- level provincial legislation and policies to which they are 
subordinate (Sorensen and Hess 2015). The province of Ontario specifies that 
municipalities must demonstrate a ‘reasonable planning relationship’ between 
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the proposed public benefit and the development site (MMAH 2009). If it can 
be proven that the relationship is untenable, then planning decisions may be 
appealed by the developer to the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) and more 
recently the OMB’s successor, the Local Planning Appeals Tribunal  – a third- 
party appeal board appointed by the province to settle land use disputes, as well 
as interpret and enforce municipal planning decisions.2 OMB rulings regarding 
what constitutes a reasonable planning relationship or nexus have produced 
conflicting rulings over the past decade. Accordingly, the OMB’s approach sends 
mixed signals to planners as to what is considered an appropriate geographical 
relationship and, more broadly, whether a level of equitable distribution is per-
mitted by legislative frameworks.
Methodology
A mixed- method approach was employed to explore circumstances holistically 
through various data collection and analysis techniques (Creswell and Creswell 
2017). We first collected and assembled density bonusing data (Section 37 com-
munity benefit agreements) provided by the City of Toronto planning department 
to create a unique dataset that includes council approval date, ward location, loca-
tion of development project, type or value of bonus secured (i.e. cash or non- cash), 
community benefit description and project notes. The data enabled an assess-
ment of the types of projects that received funding through the density bonus 
programme, as well as their spatial distribution. Additionally, 20 semi- structured 
interviews were conducted between June 2015 and April 2016 with key stakehold-
ers (planners, politicians, councillors and developers) involved in negotiating or 
determining community benefit agreements. Lastly, the analysis included a con-
tent analysis of relevant provincial and local level policies, plans, acts, guidelines 
and protocol and related materials, as well as a review of media articles, industry 
reports and development industry blog entries. Taken together the data provide 
insights on the application and outcomes of LVC arrangements in Toronto.
Analysis of community benefit agreements
Between the years 1998 and 2014, the City of Toronto generated 630 community 
benefit agreements. Each agreement contains one or multiple benefits. Across 
all agreements, there were approximately 2,000 individual community benefits. 
Seventy- nine per cent of benefits were paid in cash and 21 per cent were described 
as non- cash benefits. Each community benefit agreement is tied to a specific 
 development project and secured in a zoning by- law.
The aim of density bonusing policy in Toronto is to provide a range of 
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affordable housing and day care centres. Moore (2013) found that the city primar-
ily secures benefits that provide a cosmetic treatment to the built form. As shown in 
Figure 13.1, the findings both confirm and extend this observation as the majority 
of benefits are still secured under roads and streetscapes. However, social benefits 
referred to as ‘community, culture and recreation’ are the second- most secured cat-
egory of benefits, with investment going towards community and recreation facili-
ties:  day care centres, early learning centres, theatre space and artist live/ work 
units. The benefits realised under roads and streetscapes tend to be for beautifica-
tion over measures such as traffic calming, as density bonusing is not intended to 
address hard infrastructure requirements such as sewer upgrades, road widening 
and traffic signalling – capital costs supported through development charges (City 
of Toronto 2015b; Tomalty and Skaburskis 2003).
Lehrer and Wieditz (2009) argue that Section 37 mostly provides public art 
and park space over affordable housing and community facilities because the for-
mer favours the developer by driving up property values. Politicians also aim to 
use Section 37 agreements to fund highly visible ‘wish list’ projects such as park 
improvements and community arts and culture amenities that appeal to constitu-
ents and enhance their chance of re- election. The findings confirm this proposi-
tion: after roads, community and cultural facilities, parks and public art make up 
the largest recipients of Section 37 funds; by contrast, affordable housing makes up 
20 per cent of the funds collected.
Overall the analysis demonstrates that Section 37 LVC agreements favour the 
physical environment through investments in roads and streetscapes over social 
infrastructure through investments in affordable housing. This imbalance shows 
that the city struggles to use density bonusing as the strategic implementation 



















Figure 13.1 Percentage of total Section 37 benefits, 1997–2014. This figure 
shows the total breakdown of Section 37 benefits by type and percentage of total 
benefits secured (Biggar 2015; City of Toronto 2015)
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in supporting the bigger challenge of new development outpacing existing and 
planned social infrastructure.
Public perception of density bonusing has prompted many commentators to 
refer to the process as ‘let’s make a deal planning’, which some claim reduces the 
legitimacy of the planning process in the public eye. The optics of councillors negoti-
ating directly with developers to determine the amount of funds captured through a 
Section 37 agreement does not abate suspicions of corruption and cronyism (Jeffords 
and Warmington 2012; Devine 2008). Moreover, the high volume of cash transac-
tions put aside and pooled for future community benefits makes it unclear whether a 
rational ‘nexus’ between a proposed development and the location of public benefit 
will transpire (Healey et al. 1993). Toronto’s ability to secure cash permits council-
lors to invest community benefits anywhere within ward boundaries and pushes the 
majority of benefits off the site where the development is taking place. Toronto has 
seen a general increase in total cash contributions from projects in the last decade. 
Figure 13.2 shows total cash payments for community benefits scale upward over a 
17- year period, the exception being a brief dip in the median cash payment in 2011. 
The median cash payment was $450,000 across the data sample, with the highest 
median cash payment of $987,000 in 2014. Based on historical projections, it is not 
surprising that many councillors and practitioners consider density bonusing an 
important and reliable source for funding municipal projects.
Spatial analysis of community benefit agreements
Public benefits secured through density bonusing occur at the ward scale – there 
were 44 wards in Toronto at the time the study was completed. The amount of 
funds is closely tied to development and thus unequally generated between the 
city centre and key nodes in the city that are growing most rapidly, and those areas 




























































Non-cash payment Cash payment Mean cash payment Median cash payment
Figure 13.2 Frequency of community benefits by form of payment and year 
(Biggar 2015; City of Toronto 2015)
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amount of public benefit investment provided through this policy tool is spatially 
concentrated within the downtown and midtown areas, key growth centres in the 
city. The four wards that comprise the downtown core, in particular, have received 
the lion’s share of bonusing funds – approximately 53 per cent of total public ben-
efits across the city to a combined total of $200 million in cash value. The second- 
highest concentration of benefit agreement funding is along major avenues in the 
inner suburbs, where city plans aim to concentrate growth and there has been an 
uptick in development. By contrast, the inner suburbs in Toronto have received the 
least amount of development and therefore smaller amounts of funds generated 
through LVC.
The links between benefits through LVC and wealth show that most benefits 
are located in affluent yet uneven and gentrifying downtown neighbourhoods. 
Across Toronto, 64 per cent of benefits are in wards with a median household 
income below $63,000. In the downtown, this number is lower at $55,000. For 
example, one ward that received a large share of public benefits is also the most 
socially and economically divided, with higher- income households in single- family 
dwellings existing alongside lower- income public housing complexes (Delacourt 
2016). Yet the majority of the density bonus funding came from developing 
new high- rise housing in the lower- income part of the ward, as compared with 
the single- family neighbourhood where little intensification has occurred (see 
Figure  13.3 for  distribution of density bonusing funds). Thus, it is important to 
take into account socio- spatial inequities within wards. Even if social benefits such 
Figure 13.3 Total cash value (millions) of community benefit agreement by 
ward (Biggar 2015; City of Toronto 2015)
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as affordable housing units (the city’s minimum target is 10 per cent of total units) 
are included in new owner- occupied units in lower- income sections of the ward, 
they are likely not substantial enough to stabilise the rising market value of the 
rezoned land on which they were built.
Discussion
Toronto has secured a wide variety of community benefits from density bonusing, 
which are spatially concentrated in areas experiencing rapid growth rather than 
dispersed geographically and more equally across all parts of the city. The policy 
formulation of density bonusing can be considered a combination of indirect and 
direct value capture; however, the practice of density bonusing does not conform 
to existing conceptualisations of value capture as described by Alterman (2012). 
In general terms, the rationale for density bonusing is partly about anticipating the 
negative impacts of a proposed development (indirect value capture) and offset-
ting them, and partly about the uplift in economic value gained from a planning 
permission for rezoning (direct betterment capture). After viewing the material 
distribution of community benefits, little evidence of the ‘betterment capture’ or 
‘sharing the wealth’ idea of value capture applies to the findings (Alterman 2012; 
Booth and Albrechts 2012). This is not surprising considering that public benefits 
are concentrated in high-density areas where regional policy directs growth. In 
addition, legal requirements and related case precedents at the OMB direct plan-
ners and councillors to provide off- site community benefit contributions close to 
the development site, limiting the distribution of funds to low- income neighbour-
hoods. But interpreting proximity is not straightforward as views of what counts as 
a reasonable distance from a given site vary. In Ontario, the OMB does not always 
provide a rationale when ruling on the lack of nexus between development and 
benefit, sending mixed signals to planners and politicians.
Interviews with government and private sector actors provide insight into the 
process behind community benefits. Table  13.2 summarises interview results. A 
further explanation as to why political influence over local planning matters occurs 
is the discretionary nature of Toronto’s planning system. Local councillors may 
weigh in and direct decisions about where community benefits go and how much 
value should be captured. Interviews with councillor staff suggest that in some 
instances a small yet vocal contingent of residents are successful in lobbying their 
councillor to direct community benefits according to their wishes over the higher- 
order needs of a neighbourhood. This is not surprising, because the ward electoral 
system in Toronto influences who benefits from density bonusing since outcomes 
are tied equally to political boundaries and to geographical ones. Individual coun-
cillors are primarily beholden to constituents within a certain catchment area, so 
there is little incentive for one councillor to share the wealth of his or her negoti-
ated community benefit with another (Moore 2013).
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The open- ended nature of LVC practices, such as density bonusing, that have 
few standards presents an arena for councillors to exercise discretionary power 
to great effect, which in Toronto’s environment leads to variation in process and 
outcomes. The findings show the effects of a municipal structure that grants 
broad- based political discretion to councillors. Factors such as knowledge shar-
ing, understanding of the development process and policy competence among 
local councillors and planners play into how much value will be captured, if any. 
The skill and negotiating acumen of councillors varies by geography, as does their 
ideological conviction over what benefits should be selected. Some councillors 
may be more talented negotiators than others based on their experience and 
knowledge of planning. In the right circumstances, councillors may leverage their 
position to negotiate a higher or lower amount of the uplift from new develop-
ment projects.
Table 13.2 Interview themes. This table shows the three main themes derived 







The scale of public benefit is uneven. Site- specific planning 
addresses local needs at the expense of citywide needs. Density 
bonusing is indicative of development- rich areas in the downtown 
and development- poor areas on the periphery and parts of the 
suburbs. Rationale for benefits to stay on- site, or close to site, 




The development industry was a proponent of formulas to 
base valuation on actual numbers, not artificial ones lacking 
methodological rigour and reliability. Respondents felt current 
approach creates unfairness towards development industry and 
overall lower contribution amounts from additional density for 
the city. Some planners opposed to discussing financial details of 
community benefits transaction because they don’t want them 





Legislative discretion granted to city councillors has politicised 
the negotiation process where councillors ultimately are the 
strongest voice in determining community benefits. Going by 
general guidelines and no set standards, councillors have wide 
latitude in choosing what type of benefit will be selected and 
how much value it will be worth. This dynamic has created an 
uneven playing field across the city’s political boundaries.
Source: author
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For example, one downtown councillor had a previous career in the real 
estate industry and used this experience when negotiating with developers (per-
sonal communication, councillor’s assistant). The councillor negotiated a deal 
($5.5 million) with a developer for the same amount as a deal by her predecessor 
in the same ward, except the councillor’s project was half the density. Similarly, a 
former councillor possessed the ‘architectural and economic language’ to reason 
with developers and acknowledged the value they place on speed and efficiency 
(personal communication, member, downtown community association). Some 
councillors have overlooked opportunities to achieve any public benefits because 
they were unfamiliar with how the process works, whereas others have taken crea-
tive steps to ‘bend the rules in the name of social equity … by doling out money to 
neighbourhoods who were not getting the attention they deserved for affordable 
housing’ (former city councillor, City of Toronto, personal communication).
The data reveal that some individual community benefit project agreements 
deviate from legal requirements to use density bonuses for permanent capital 
projects and use them on operational projects of a social nature. For example, a 
community activist advocated for a developer’s community benefit contribu-
tion of $200,000 to fund a breakfast programme for neighbourhood children. 
Another example saw the organisers of AIDS2006  – an international AIDS con-
ference – receive $150,000 for conference expenses, and a business improvement 
area receive $20,000 for ‘economic development programs’ (Jeffords 2012). Other 
community benefits demonstrate the use of land leases to provide eight below- 
market- rate rental units for artists and visiting professors for a downtown uni-
versity, OCAD, and a non- profit arts and cultural organisation (Biggar and City of 
Toronto 2015; City of Toronto 2015b).
In the context of considerable discretion residing with the individual city 
councillors, the amount negotiated or value of benefit is also influenced by the 
openness and transparency of financial considerations. Some developer respond-
ents bemoaned the lack of rigour and consistency surrounding the valuation of 
Section 37, because they believe planners have a general lack of interest in the 
economic components of a development application. When it comes to economics 
in the development process, planners and developers are at different ends of the 
spectrum and appear to talk past each other. Planners withdraw from discussions 
about financial details despite their integral role in building construction and city 
building more broadly. Developers are often willing to engage in discussions of 
economics because they consider Section 37 a cost, not a benefit or gain to the pub-
lic. When planners do consider the economic dimension of bonusing, the extent to 
which development controls accurately reflect the true costs of benefits and nega-
tive externalities inflicted on the built environment is unknown. One aim of LVC is 
to capture full or partial amounts of ‘unearned increment’ (Smolka and Amborski 
2000). Most planning jurisdictions in Toronto do not explicitly define the value of 
the ‘uplift’ (gains from added density) they hope to capture from intensification in 
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a set formula, instead following a negotiated approach that determines the value of 
density on a case- by- case basis. Citing confidentiality reasons, the City of Toronto 
and developers do not disclose the details of negotiations that outline the total 
costs of the bonus contained within the developer’s pro forma.
Interviews with planners revealed that value capture increment was as low 
as 4 per cent in some instances, and some councillors establish their own measures 
based on unofficial standards, such as the value secured in other development pro-
jects in their ward. Interviews with city councillors revealed inconsistency in the 
understanding of how uplift works. For example, one downtown councillor stated 
in an interview that they secured 15 per cent of the uplift on each project, regardless 
of the scope and specific financial details (personal communication, city councillor, 
City of Toronto). The arbitrary assigning of value also occurs among some devel-
opers. The respondent’s perspective below shows that the value of density is not 
necessarily proportional to a specific project and may be arbitrarily applied: ‘Most 
Section S.37s are in that swing of 10 per cent. That just evolved, I don’t know who 
invented it. People like round numbers, but you rarely find exact amounts’ (per-
sonal communication, Developer 3). These perspectives suggest that planners and 
councillors have no definitive way of knowing whether the gains extracted from 
development meet or exceed the development’s proportionate share of the costs 
associated with community infrastructure needs. Moreover, land values may be 
derived artificially as all numbers are not fully disclosed.
Achieving equity from LVCs
A social equity lens to value capture conceptualises the object of development as 
not just efficiency (highest and best use), but also how development addresses 
(or does not address) social disadvantage and contributes to the quality of life 
for the broader public (Fainstein 2012). An assessment of the scale and scope of 
public benefits in Toronto, and the accompanying factors that help explain vari-
ation in both type and value, reflect broader interpretations of value capture as 
being ‘messy’ and associated policies as confusing (Alterman 2012; Campbell et al. 
2000; Fox- Rogers and Murphy 2015). The inequitable geographic and material 
outcomes of density bonusing point to larger consequences of relying on private 
development to fund public infrastructure. While the intention of policy tools such 
as density bonusing is not to redistribute wealth beyond the vicinity where it is 
derived, the lack of distributive policy function raises more complicated questions 
about a growing equity gap in Toronto: areas that have development get additional 
 public investment and areas that don’t remain stagnant. The findings call into ques-
tion the related problem of neighbourhoods outside up- zoned areas that do not 
directly benefit from increased density but may still be negatively impacted by new 
 development. A  growth model that hinges on developing with density does not 
work towards an equitable spatial order of the city. In this regard, density bonusing 
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can be considered a potential but not fully developed approach to capturing the 
value of development to allocate to social purposes. In the absence of an explicit 
redistributive policy objective, areas in need of community infrastructure improve-
ments will not receive bonusing finds. These issues matter, especially given the 
budget pressures being faced by Toronto, which relies more and more on one- off 
funds through Section 37 instead of predictable general taxation revenue streams 
for community infrastructure. Nevertheless, if local governments such as Toronto 
lack predictable resources to supply the ever changing infrastructure needs for 
localities, discretionary and indirect mechanisms such as density bonusing will 
continue to be applied. These results leave questions of how to maintain the flex-
ibility inherent in density bonusing to accommodate shifting public needs while 
bringing coherence in the form of structure or standards that predetermine the 
actual costs of public facilities and amenities based on need.
These perspectives call for a bigger conversation about basic principles that 
have gone unaddressed: who should stand to benefit, and how can community 
needs match the benefits that are prioritised? A  ‘sharing the wealth’ rationale 
for value capture means that land value captured from development may extend 
beyond the vicinity of the development where value is derived. The site- specific 
nature of density bonusing in Toronto demonstrates that benefits derived from a 
single development tend to stay close to a given site and produce one- off invest-
ments, as is the policy intent. In its current form, this policy area occurs in a 
vacuum, but the notion of community benefit extends beyond the regulatory 
apparatus of land use planning and zoning to other public sector policies, such as 
workforce development and local economic development as seen in the US and 
UK through community benefit agreements (Wolf- Powers 2010).3 On its own, 
Section 37, like other forms of incentive- based indirect forms of value capture, 
generates a small amount of revenue and was intended by planners to supple-
ment, not replace, funding to address the infrastructure gaps faced by the city 
(City of Toronto 2007). However, current conditions of budgetary austerity leave 
councillors with few options but to rely entirely on Section 37 to fund local pro-
jects. Between 2016 and 2019, the city has secured upwards of $90  million to 
fund 150 community facility projects (e.g. childcare, libraries, recreation cen-
tres), making contributions toward the City of Toronto’s ten- year capital plan 
(City of Toronto 2019). But the site- specific composition of this planning activity 
in Toronto is indicative of what Margalit and Alfasi (2016) refer to as ‘splintered 
planning’, where the primacy of deal making is strongly connected to growing 
flexibility and fragmentation in entrepreneurial planning, resulting in one- off 
deals that create a fractured and disconnected vision for a city. Planning becomes 
oriented toward the site, not an area or the city as a whole. Cast in this light, 
LVC tools such as density bonusing and planning  obligations are indicative of 
larger trends in planning; they facilitate uneven  development and create spatial 
and financial inequities in cities, on the one hand, and provide creative ‘win–win’ 
solutions from density for narrow public interests, on the other hand. Toronto’s 
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municipal structure reinforces case- by- case planning due to the ‘ward boss’ sys-
tem that responds to individual constituents in a ‘one property at a time scale of 
development process’ (Valverde 2012, 133). Political boundaries within the ward 
system of electing local representatives focus councillors’ attention on parochial 
issues, which shapes the expectations of citizens to make one- off demands to 
benefit their block or neighbourhood, not the city.
Conclusion
This chapter investigated the LVC mechanism of density bonusing in Toronto. It 
assessed the allocation and distribution of community benefits derived from this 
policy area and considered the extent to which benefits create equity from develop-
ment projects. The chapter found that benefits are spatially concentrated, not evenly 
distributed, and that public benefits are localised and pertain to the physical form of 
the city. The results showed that government actors’  discretionary control of negotia-
tions surrounding density bonusing was a key factor in explaining variation in the 
amount of value captured, which reportedly varies significantly, ranging from 4 per 
cent to 15 per cent of the value from additional height and/or density permitted to 
developers through site- specific rezoning outcomes. For areas that received a high 
amount of public benefits, the negotiating acumen of individual councillors and the 
type of developer were key factors in influencing the range of value and types of 
benefits secured. Political influence in planning matters also distorts how planning 
frameworks in Toronto fit into broader understandings of the purpose of public ben-
efits, including whether equity is considered.
The findings were consistent with the view in the literature that LVC is messy 
and lacks clear rationales in its application (Alterman 2012; Walters 2013). Some 
outcomes suggest the purpose of density bonusing is to create localised effects for 
those immediately affected by development, whereas others suggest the notion 
of a public benefit may be shared with the wider community  – also known as 
‘sharing the wealth’ of extracted public value. Importantly, fees derived from land 
use tools such as density bonusing depend entirely on a strong real estate mar-
ket boom and developer confidence to ask for additional planning permissions 
beyond ‘as- of- right’ zoning. And density bonusing has limited value in many land 
markets across the city, particularly in large parts of the inner suburbs where lit-
tle development is taking place. In other words, the cost–benefit ratio must offer 
a favourable return to a developer making an investment – if developers do not 
perceive a financial benefit in the trade- off between additional density and amen-
ity, an agreement will not be made. Even with these constraints, for cities plan-
ning in a capitalist, market- intensive economy, planners and other city officials 
must find creative ways to apply shared resources to reach common goals and to 
move further towards equitable distribution of public benefits derived from high- 
density development.
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Notes
 1. Suggested benefits include non- profit child care facilities, affordable housing, public art, parks improve-
ment, streetscape improvements, heritage conservation and improvement to transit facilities.
 2. The OMB has since been replaced by the Local Panning Appeals Tribunal (LPAT). The key difference from 
the OMB is that LPAT follows a standard appeals process, reviewing municipal decisions but not making a 
decision or overruling/ substituting that of a municipal council.
 3. Community benefit agreements (CBAs), most common in the US and UK, are led by community–developer 
legal agreements that outline the benefits a community will receive from the development in return for sup-
porting the proposed project (e.g. construction jobs for low- income residents, apprenticeship and training, 
social enterprises and community amenities ranging from day cares to public art). CBAs are a relatively new 
practice in Toronto (Nugent 2017).
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Real estate and housing: A commentary 
Dynamics of a housing crisis – the politics 
and planning of housing in London 
and Toronto
Susannah Bunce and Nicola Livingstone
London and Toronto are cities in the grip of housing crises. Buoyed by real estate 
markets directed by multi- scalar financialisation practices, supportive governmen-
tal policies and regulations, and large corporate and individual investment in resi-
dential property for financial gain, the resultant impacts on the commodification 
of housing and, conversely, the availability of affordable housing have been grave 
in both cities. The production of uneven real estate and housing landscapes has 
formed stark cleavages in social relations in London and Toronto, where the divi-
sions between investors and/ or residents who own property and those who rent, 
are underhoused or without housing have increasingly become visible markers of 
either financial ‘success’ or struggle.
These indicators are etched into the aesthetic and visceral experiences of 
 everyday life in both cities: through the presence of tall construction cranes build-
ing luxury residential towers, via the real estate marketing of gentrifying neighbour-
hoods, in the form of costly ‘bidding wars’ for houses, in the prevalence of Airbnb and 
other short- term lets, in queues for an ever decreasing supply of affordable rental 
units, and in the growing number of rough sleepers and an amplified reliance on 
temporary shelters. In Toronto and London, the housing crisis is intimately tied with 
situations of income disparity and racialisation across both cities, with persons with 
lower incomes, racialised communities, longer-settled and more recent immigrants 
and refugees, and other individuals experiencing discrimination and marginalisa-
tion significantly bearing the consequences of inadequate and unaffordable housing 
(Hulchanski 2010; Mensah and Williams 2013; Millington 2012).
In this commentary, we identify and outline two common themes that emerge 
from chapters in Part II that seek to explain the housing crisis and connected issues 
in London and Toronto: firstly, the rise of financialisation and assetisation practices 
 
 
rEAL EStAtE AND houSiNg: A CoMMENtAry 209
that have worked to further commodify housing and housing tenures, and sec-
ondly, the role of local governments in formulating housing policy and planning 
approaches that connect with the aims of private, market- led residential develop-
ment. The practices that coalesce to form the contemporary real estate and hous-
ing landscape in London and Toronto are numerous and complex. Writ large, we 
observe complicated relational associations between private market actors and 
government interests in real estate and housing in both cities.
The real estate and housing sectors in both cities are continually being reconsti-
tuted and reformed through networked connections and interactions between mar-
kets, governments and individual actors, from a local to a global scale, that mediate 
and incentivise urban investment. These networks and associations are understood 
as both active responses to and products of late- stage capitalism, where financial 
gains are prioritised over community benefits and social justice. The financialised 
terrain of real estate and housing, as noted in examples of multinational corporate 
investment in new large- scale residential developments and existing housing, real 
estate investment trusts and direct foreign ownership, is increasingly connected to 
practices of state policy formation, deregulation and re- regulation that connect with 
and generally augment this investment logic. The chapters in Part II reflect on the 
impact of market- led real estate and housing dynamics and ever changing state sys-
tems of governance and planning (for more on London and Toronto’s governance, 
see Part I). Through the discussions in the six chapters within Part II, we note simi-
larities framed by these relational, and at times contradictory, practices that have 
emerged in both cities, where private sector and government actors seek multiple 
ways to address supply- side opportunities and limitations to produce amenable 
investment spheres. The chapters examine diverse real estate and housing issues 
such as the policies and implementation of residential densification (Chapter  13 
in Toronto, Chapter 12 in London); the forms and functions of deregulated and re- 
regulated planning systems such as the role of planning gain and development levies 
(Chapter 13 in Toronto, Chapters 8 and 12 in London), the impacts of financialisa-
tion, the creation of housing bubbles and market precarities, and the challenges of 
housing affordability (Chapters 9 and 11 in Toronto, Chapter 10 in London) and the 
intricacies of local politics (interwoven through all the chapters).
Across all the chapters we see how policy framings and directives become 
concrete in the geographies of real estate and housing markets, drawing out antag-
onisms relating to variegated spatial and temporal experiences and embodying 
how the local processes at play are inherently influenced by relational processes 
at a regional, national and international scale. Changes in the global economy are 
embedded locally in both Toronto and London, as we witness tensions emerging 
in relation to socio- economic inequalities, the loss of key commercial real estate 
land use, viability assessments and inflated perceptions of land value, resulting in 
both cities experiencing and responding to their respective housing crises in dif-
ferentiated yet similar ways. The housing crisis in both cities  – bluntly encapsu-
lated by disequilibrium in demand and supply, deep unaffordability, reductions in 
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social housing provision and a seemingly ever increasing wealth gap – is explored 
throughout the chapters in Part II. In this commentary, we consider how historic 
and global processes have impacted the housing markets and examine local per-
spectives, policies and responses in both cities.
Perspectives on housing: Financialisation, assetisation 
and affordability
As noted in the previous section, London and Toronto are key financial centres and 
important seats of governance and regulation, with shifting population trends and 
demographics. Since the beginning of the twenty- first century both cities have con-
tinued to grow in population size (as discussed in Chapters 9 and 10). Similar his-
toric trends have shaped both London’s and Toronto’s housing markets, leading to 
the current experience of housing crises formed by both global and local processes 
and transforming housing into a multidimensional investment opportunity through 
financialisation and assetisation processes. The introduction of contemporary 
financing strategies in a neoliberal and deregulated world brings the opportunity 
for change in the market processes of late capitalism, which sees investment and sur-
plus capital as a ‘wall of money’ (Aalbers 2016) consistently branching out into new 
arenas in search of profit maximisation. Securitised interests in real estate, housing 
and mortgages become interests to be traded (with varied levels of risk and potential 
return) as they are repackaged into vehicles for global exchange. As a tangible asset, 
housing transforms into an investment vehicle with increased liquidity characteris-
tics. Thus housing undergoes a process of assetisation, where it has local, national 
and international exchange value through the operationalisation of investment vehi-
cles, in addition to maintaining exchange and utility values in the local market.
Growth in such investment vehicles has been facilitated by the expansion and 
movement of capital globally since the 1980s, as markets have become increas-
ingly interconnected and open to investors anywhere in the world. In a norma-
tive sense, the integration of housing- related vehicles (e.g. asset- backed mortgage 
securities) into wider investment strategies offers the potential for increasingly 
diversified portfolios for investors and brings a multidimensionality to the function 
of housing. However, we argue that ‘financialisation’ processes are often broadly 
defined and are problematic due to subjective and varied interpretations of what 
the term means. Definitions of financialisation reflect ‘a new form of competition 
which involves a change in orientation towards financial results’ (Froud et al. 2000, 
104), and one where ‘the increasing dominance of financial actors, markets, prac-
tices, measurements and narratives, at various scales, [is] resulting in a structural 
transformation of economics, firms, states and households’ (Aalbers 2017, 544).
As an umbrella term, however, financialisation successfully illustrates the 
dynamics across the global investment market and can help us ascertain how 
market- led processes are forming the real estate and housing markets in Toronto 
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and London  – with uneven spatial and temporal impacts (Bond 2013; McNally 
2009). As per Fernandez et al. (2016), Hawes and Grisdale (Chapter 11) observe 
that the financialisation of housing can be seen as locally variegated but also as 
a global totality. Both Walks (Chapter  9) and Hawes and Grisdale (Chapter  11) 
draw our attention to the importance of the ‘wall of money’ and how this global 
totality is expressed through finance strategies developed to accommodate capital 
through housing markets via innovative structures such as private equity vehicles, 
institutional investments such as pension funds and real estate investment trusts 
(in Canada these are much more advanced in structure than their UK counterparts, 
especially in relation to housing). Impacts of financialisation are culturally, tem-
porally and spatially specific in both urban markets, where the wider economic 
contexts are conducive to the development of both direct and indirect investment 
vehicles, which derive value from housing as an underlying asset.
In Toronto, the local real estate market responded very differently to the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis, with a significant construction boom and rapid house price 
inflation that has formed an over- inflated housing market (‘housing bubble’) due to 
disconnects between household income and property values, and increased levels 
of household financial indebtedness. As detailed by Walks (Chapter 9), between 
2009 and 2016 Toronto’s housing prices grew nearly twice as fast as the average 
of the ten other major cities in Canada (with the lowest- income quintile of Toronto 
census metropolitan area households having a debt- to- income ratio of 420 per 
cent). This has been stimulated by the availability of cheap mortgage credit and 
riskier lending as a form of ‘privatised Keynesianism’ (Crouch 2009), which has led 
to an increase in social inequalities (Chapter 9). In London, house prices dropped 
off after 2008 and recovered slowly due to a longer- term market recession and a 
period defined by government- led austerity measures – with the housing market 
still being out of reach, however, for many residents. The impact and uncertain-
ties of Brexit discussions since 2016, combined with fluctuating housing prices 
in London, have incited caution in many investors in the residential market, both 
domestic and international. While Toronto has experienced a recent, albeit small, 
uptick in foreign investment in the real estate market that has had an effect on 
housing prices, the London market has noticeably more entrenched networks and 
forms of investment from foreign capital, which has resulted in housing becoming a 
‘safe deposit box for the transnational wealth elite’ (Fernandez et al. 2016). Certain 
boroughs, such as Kensington and Chelsea, have a substantial number of luxury 
homes targeted towards foreign investors and the very wealthy, and Kensington 
and Chelsea is one of the most unequal local authorities across the city in terms 
of housing. In Toronto, as Walks (Chapter 9) notes, the actual quantity of foreign- 
owned housing has less of an impact on real estate prices than domestic ownership 
(in 2017, only 4.7 per cent of Toronto’s housing was owned by non- residents, com-
pared with 13 per cent in London).
Affordability questions are at the centre of discussions across all the chap-
ters in Part II, and like the concepts of financialisation and assetisation, ideas 
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and definitions of affordability are dynamic, policy dependent, market- led and 
complex. In Toronto, the commodification and assetisation of housing has been 
encouraged by policy shifts, as more traditional welfare policies have evolved into 
approaches related to ‘asset- based welfare’ (see Chapter 11) that encourage people 
to purchase housing as an asset in order to enhance their financial security in later 
life. In the UK market we have also seen a consistent drive towards investment in 
housing as a way to build and secure assets through owner- occupied housing and 
as a way to derive investment returns from the purchase of rental properties. On 
the other side of this residential investment landscape, we see an increased strug-
gle for renters who lease housing through growing private rental markets rather 
than through the social housing sector. Walks (Chapter 9), in reference to Toronto, 
and Gabrieli (Chapter 10), in relation to London, reflect on how the housing crises 
in both cities have shifted relations of owner occupation and widened the income 
and social gap between renters and owners. In Toronto, the financialisation and 
investment focus of the private rental market, coupled with regulatory changes 
such as the eradication of vacancy control, has led to skyrocketing rental prices 
over the past few years, a very low vacancy rate for low and moderately priced 
rental units (around 1 per cent) and a market that is increasingly geared towards 
luxury rentals (ACTO 2019). In Toronto, nearly half (47 per cent) of the population 
are renters, and 47 per cent of these renters spend more than 30 per cent of their 
income on rent (see Figure 11.2 in Chapter 11). In London, anecdotally, spending 
more than one- third of your income on rent and housing costs is generally consid-
ered to be unsustainable.
In both cities there are strong correlations between instances of poverty and 
lack of housing affordability that impacts renters. Gabrieli (Chapter 10), for exam-
ple, notes that the high cost of housing in London largely contributes to the higher 
rates of poverty in the city by comparison with the poverty rate for the UK. In terms of 
affordability in London, Gabrieli discusses how the cost of housing in London remains 
substantially higher than the rest of the UK and too expensive for the majority of first- 
time and local-income earners: the mean affordability ratio, representing the cost of 
property as a ratio to earnings, sits at 20 in London, double the UK average. If you are 
 unable to purchase a house in London and become entangled in the private rental 
sector, the concept of ‘affordable rent’ sits at 80 per cent of the local market rent. 
Considering the discrepancies between local boroughs, this 80 per cent can demon-
strate significant differences in affordability across the capital (as per Gabrieli).
As well as affordability issues, changes in tenure, accessibility, use class and 
other pressures on markets, including densification practices (Chapters  12 and 
13) and loss of industrial land (Chapter 8), contribute to the imbalance of both res-
idential and commercial stock in both city markets. Additionally, the rental land-
scape is further complicated by the rise of short- term rentals such as Airbnb and 
other short- term lets (see Chapter 11). As Hawes and Grisdale (Chapter 11) note, 
in Toronto, nearly 5,000 homes were rented on the Airbnb platform between 2016 
and 2017, taking much-needed long- term private rental units out of the market 
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and further accentuating a low vacancy rate. In London, the short- term rental mar-
ket is similarly impactful, with Airbnb especially prevalent in areas where there are 
high levels of private rental sector housing, with some areas currently seeing up to 
20 per cent of the local market lost to platform rentals (Shabrina et al. 2019), con-
tributing to an already overheated residential market and exacerbating underlying 
housing inequalities.
New configurations of local government involvement in  
housing policy and planning
The housing policy terrain in London and Toronto is tied together with the afore-
mentioned processes of real estate financialisation and housing commodification. 
The formation of housing policies and the planning regimes in both cities have 
rapidly adapted to neoliberal market dynamics, in keeping with the notion of 
neoliberalism as being a series of ‘roll- back and roll- out’ processes of government 
deregulation in order to reduce public investment and re- regulation to ameliorate 
other investment conditions (Peck and Tickell 2002). State- led housing policy and 
legislation approaches, apart from market regulation tweaks to modulate some of 
the tensions between household debt and property over- inflation – such as ‘mort-
gage stress tests’ and the implementation of provincial non- resident buyer taxes 
in Canada, as noted by Walks (Chapter 9) – have largely emphasised ‘innovative’ 
methods by which to decrease public responsibility for housing provision and 
encourage more flexible forms of private–public activity. In both Canada and the 
UK these methods have been constituted by changing ideological strategies of gov-
ernmental austerity, an agenda which has been more intensely felt in the UK con-
text, particularly in the last decade.
New arrangements for the public–private governance and planning of hous-
ing that emphasise the private delivery of housing alongside mitigated forms 
of government involvement are noted in the Toronto context by Biggar and 
Siemiatycki (Chapter 13). They discuss the rise of private sector- developed con-
dos in the city and the role of local government in utilising planning regulations 
to ensure community benefits. They describe the role of ‘uplift’ planning mecha-
nisms such as Section 37  ‘density bonusing’, which allows for increased height 
and density in a private development in return for the construction of public infra-
structure, such as libraries, parks and day care centres in the development area, 
as well as the ad hoc and inconsistent local government use of Section 37. Similar 
issues are present in the London market, where planning gain is captured through 
larger ‘hard’ densification projects, with a payment from the developer to the local 
authority, typically towards amenities, infrastructure or affordable housing via 
Section 106 and Community Infrastructure Levy contributions. However, as dis-
cussed by Short and Livingstone (Chapter 12), recent consultations around the 
density matrix and the new London Plan (due for completion in 2020) have seen 
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those consulted question whether the matrix remains fit for purpose as well as 
whether density should be ‘optimised’ rather than ‘maximised’. If the former, then 
how can a notion of optimal be consistently defined? As with Toronto, the impact 
of density and the concomitant contributions extracted through the planning gain 
system are on a site- by- site basis and can be subjectively interpreted across local 
authorities and between public and private actors.
In Chapter  8, on industrial/ employment land in London and Toronto, we 
can further observe tensions embedded at local levels of governance through the 
planning mechanisms in place as industrial land is lost, frequently to accommo-
date residential development:  the Greater London region lost 16 per cent of its 
industrial capacity (2001–15), and land zoned for employment in Toronto has 
shrunk by almost 10 per cent (2006–18). As the new London Plan is reconsidering 
its approach to dealing with density, it is also reconsidering how best to address 
the issues surrounding loss of industrial land through policies E4 and E7, which 
aim to ensure there will be ‘no net loss’ of industrial space and promote the idea 
that housing can be accommodated through intensification, by creating mixed- use 
environments on industrial land. As Ferm (Chapter 8) reflects, the journey to this 
point was informed by local consultants and lobbying groups such as Just Space, 
who are acting to preserve and protect industrial land. However, concerns remain 
over how the policies can be implemented, especially considering the viability 
mechanisms used to measure and assess the potential of a scheme by developers. 
Ferm expresses concern for the effectiveness of these new policies and how they 
will be enforced, considering their application at the local level and on a site- by- site 
basis; benefits captured through a discretionary planning system are not necessar-
ily always as effective as they could be, as they are negotiated between public and 
private actors, and could result in actual loss of industrial land and increasing real 
estate speculation. In Chapters 8, 12 and 13 we note increasingly complex arrange-
ments between local governments, local consultants and private developers in both 
cities, where private investors and developers lead new housing and mixed- use 
developments and local governments pursue these interests while at the same time 
attempting to generate some public benefits from this housing.
Other housing policy and planning approaches of local government that are 
evident in Toronto and London include an emphasis on ‘intensification’ or ‘densi-
fication’ as a way to encourage more compact urban form through taller and more 
dense housing developments. However, in line with the points outlined in the pre-
vious paragraph, enforcing densification strategies at local level can be complex 
and problematic. Toronto’s government has employed intensification as an official 
comprehensive planning strategy since 2002. Intensification has been packaged 
by politicians and planners as an environmentally sustainable planning strategy 
that encourages more compact use of land within city boundaries and decreases 
sprawled development on the suburban fringes of Toronto (Bunce 2004, 2018). At 
the same time, policies for intensification have dovetailed with the logic of new pri-
vate sector- delivered, market- led housing in Toronto and, indeed, have coalesced 
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to rationalise the planning and development landscape of Toronto’s ‘condo boom’ 
over the past two decades (as described in Chapters 11 and 13), a form of densi-
fication that has been particularly visible in brownfield areas such as the central 
waterfront and along major arterial streets of the city.
Short and Livingstone (Chapter 12) detail the continued interest in densifica-
tion planning in London, directed by the London Plan that is due for publication 
in late 2020. They note that densification is employed as a way to address the lack 
of available land in London for new residential development and that this strategy 
encourages the identification of ‘growth areas’ within borough and neighbourhood 
boundaries for new housing, the primary delivery of which is market- led. Their 
three case studies reflect on the differentiated impacts of densification and how 
it can be interpreted, with diverse implications. Although each case study dem-
onstrates how densification can definitively increase housing provision in London, 
in the Victoria Opportunity Area, Woodberry Down, and Elephant and Castle, 
there are differences in relation to social housing production and contribution 
(or the lack thereof), as well as varied levels of density. There are also issues and 
differences between hard and soft processes of development across a variegated 
spectrum of size and scale, in planning guidance at local level, and in developer 
contributions and discretionary negotiations. In the chapters in Part II that address 
housing policy, it is clear that the complexities in the form, function and produc-
tion of policy mechanisms in London and Toronto are dynamic and flexible; how-
ever, these processes also create tensions and difficulties in the interpretations of 
their purpose, with subjective impacts.
Conclusions
The chapters in Part II carefully point to the nuanced dynamics that constitute 
and shape the housing crisis in London and Toronto. In particular, two important 
themes that emerge from the chapters are the impacts of an increasingly complex 
financialised housing market and the directives of new housing policies that join 
together well with, and in some instances help to guide, housing market dynamics 
in both cities. As the chapters in Part II illustrate, the complex processes and out-
comes of the housing crisis require the need for multifaceted solutions that work 
to address issues of social disparity and injustice. It is simply not enough to explain 
the financial processes and impacts of the housing crisis in London and Toronto. 
An articulation of its social fallout is increasingly necessary as the landscapes of 
both cities become more uneven and the experiences of people facing daily cost of 
living struggles become more visible. We end here by suggesting that a compari-
son of housing contexts in London and Toronto, as shaped through the chapters 
of Part II, offers valuable insights for other global cities facing similar issues and 
outcomes of financialisation, affordable housing constraints, and housing policy 
transformation.
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Since the early 2000s, cities around the world have been enthusiastically restruc-
turing their policy agendas in hopes of becoming globally competitive, and cultural 
policy has become an increasingly important aspect of urban planning as cities 
strive to become ‘creative’. Culture is now strategically deployed in the interests 
of urban regeneration and increasingly understood to play a complex role in pro-
cesses of gentrification and displacement. In cities such as Toronto and London, the 
perceived authenticity of arts communities has been capitalised upon in the pro-
duction of landscapes of desire in post- industrial downtown spaces and disinvested 
neighbourhoods. Yet as grassroots arts ecologies are instrumentalised in urban 
redevelopment, they are also disrupted and displaced. In the case of downtown 
Toronto this has long been the case, as rising property values and rapid upscaling 
continue to pose serious challenges to the establishment of sustainable place- based 
scenes and sites of cultural production, necessitating a variety of survival tactics 
and forms of ‘making do’.
This chapter discusses a specific form of bottom- up ‘place- making’ which has 
long been an important aspect of Toronto’s arts scenes and now appears as a col-
lective and individual response to intensifying gentrification, urban redevelopment 
and top- down arts- led regeneration in the city: ‘do- it- yourself’ (DIY). DIY emerges 
not only as a popular scene in the city, but also as an important political and spa-
tial practice and survival tactic in the face of urban change. I discuss the history 
of DIY’s employment in creative scenes and contexts in Toronto’s downtown, and 
its emergence in the context of Creative City planning. This chapter is part of a 
larger research project I conducted on spatial production in DIY spaces in down-
town Toronto in 2018. I draw upon observations from site visits, semi- structured 
interviews conducted with 16 DIY practitioners working in downtown Toronto, 
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media analysis. I argue that DIY can be politically generative when taken up collec-
tively and is an increasingly important form of self- provisioning as space in Toronto 
becomes less accessible, but that it is also potentially isolating for individual prac-
titioners and can be more generally interpreted as an expression of precariousness.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section details Toronto’s 
particular evolution of strategic cultural policy and the deployment of Creative 
City discourse. The second explores DIY practices, touching upon cases in the 
Toronto and London arts scenes. Here I also trace the ongoing ‘crisis’ of creative 
space in Toronto, highlighting the emergence of unique models of organisational 
spatial provision in each city. The third section discusses Toronto’s largely invisible 
geography of DIY spaces, as well as the often elaborate spatial practices of artists 
working under persistent threat from processes of gentrification that they them-
selves often contribute to. I conclude with a discussion of the Toronto case and the 
broader implications of DIY practices.
Becoming ‘creative’
In the 1990s, when hype around creativity emerged, Toronto’s planning and govern-
ance paradigms were strengthening neoliberal urban trajectories that were already 
being fostered in the 1980s (Desfor et al. 2006; Kipfer and Keil 2000). Intensified 
doctrines of competition and a distinctly entrepreneurial approach to planning and 
governance were levelled against a long- standing angst about the city’s perceived 
‘lag’ in urban investment and development (Kipfer and Keil 2002). Large- scale 
redevelopment and revitalisation, ambitious place- making initiatives and visionary 
megaprojects were pursued with gumption in hopes that they would increase the 
city’s competitiveness. There was a concerted push for deregulation and intensifica-
tion of development in Toronto’s downtown. The removal of provincial rent con-
trols in the 1990s allowed for a rapid turnover of tenants across many downtown 
residential areas, while the deregulation of zoning in formerly industrial or manu-
facturing areas permitted unbridled development to quickly move in, allowing a 
kind of ‘instant gentrification’ to take place (Teelucksingh 2009). These changes 
allowed for widescale demolitions, conversions into high- end studios and commer-
cial galleries, and for rapid upscaling through the development of luxury lofts and 
condominiums, the marketing of which centred around lifestyle and drew upon the 
perceived authenticity of displaced cultural scenes (Crawford 1993; Palmer 2000).
The Creative City rhetoric, as it emerged in Toronto, fit nicely into the city’s 
push to achieve a more globally competitive image. The doctrine put forward in 
the work of Richard Florida (2002; see also Landry 2000; Landry and Bianchini 
1995) was enthusiastically taken up in urban policy, in the style of ‘fast’ (Peck and 
Theodore 2015) policies that are easily transportable between cities. ‘Creative’ pol-
icies have been differently taken up by coalitions in cities around the world, gener-
ally attempting to position culture and creativity as development opportunities and 
 
Diy:  MAkiNg SpACE iN toroNto’S ‘CrEAtivE C ity ’ 221
consumer amenities, but following place- specific trajectories with unique social 
outcomes and implications (Grodach and Silver 2012). In London, for instance, 
‘creative’ policies emerged in the mid- 1990s, promoting the development of cul-
tural hubs and clusters and focusing on the targeted funding and provision of arts 
spaces in ways that are different than what we have seen in Toronto, with differ-
ent results. There are, however, similarities. Take, for example, the lack of clarity 
around the meaning or definition of culture and creativity (Neelands and Choe 
2010; Pratt 2005); the explicit instrumentalisation of creativity in urban regen-
eration (Moreton 2013); and the tensions that have been observed between 
these  policies’ social goals of inclusion (culture for everyone) and their neoliberal 
economic goals promoting competitiveness, consumption, meritocracy and the 
citizen- consumer (Coates 2001; Oakley 2006).
In Toronto, the Creative City planning model largely provides a ‘brand iden-
tity’ and a ‘unifying language’ to gloss over what are rather conventional economic 
development practices (Grodach 2013). Its strategy is geared towards urban eco-
nomic growth and the instrumentalisation of creativity for economic purposes, sub-
jecting cultural production to performance evaluation while promoting a kind of 
‘creative’ citizenship which entangles notions of authenticity and self- actualisation 
with participation in consumption and entrepreneurship, and the adoption of a 
‘dutiful neoliberal lifestyle’ (Grundy and Boudreau 2008, 351). Culture is val-
ued insofar as it supports economic growth (Catungal et  al. 2009; Finch 2015). 
Emphasis is placed upon the development of major institutions and the produc-
tion of spectacular and exclusionary consumption- oriented landscapes of privilege 
(McLean 2014; McLean and Rahder 2013). Little attention is paid to already exist-
ing grassroots arts ecologies, to informal spaces, to politicised or subversive forms 
of art or to the actual labour involved in cultural production (Finch 2015; Hracs and 
Leslie 2014; McRobbie 2011; Rantisi and Leslie 2010; Reid 2006). In its attempt 
to become ‘creative’ at the beginning of the 2000s, in an initiative known as the 
‘Cultural Renaissance’, Toronto spent over $900 million on culture- led development 
downtown. The Creative City discourse conveniently complemented urban redevel-
opment, revitalising major cultural institutions and sites of tourism and producing 
designated cultural districts through targeted place- making initiatives.
DIY as a place- making tactic
In the face of widespread urban change, DIY has offered a means to stay in place. 
While the term DIY has increasingly come to have a specific meaning and to con-
note particular places, we can understand both Toronto’s and London’s creative 
scenes to have histories of using DIY tactics to establish spatial stability in the city. 
Urban theorist Kimberley Kinder (2016) observes that DIY is a necessary form of 
adaptive self- provisioning in situations of urban disinvestment, filling gaps where 
particular needs are not being met. As a coping mechanism not necessarily directed 
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towards effecting systemic social change, it is nevertheless meaningful. As an indi-
vidual practice that connects with broader social networks, it offers real benefits to 
those who engage in it. In both North American and European cities, we can see 
an increasing turn to collective self- help and mutual aid practices to accommodate 
both informalised working practices and the rise in freelance labour (Merkel 2015, 
2018) – an important yet severely unrepresented part of the creative industries in 
both London and Toronto (Bain and McLean 2013; Mould et al. 2014). As a crea-
tive practice itself, DIY is also frequently associated with amateurism, craft move-
ments and folk traditions (Dawkins 2011; Hawkins 2017). Practitioners are not 
always professionalised or recognised institutionally.
In Toronto, DIY holds a considerable amount of cultural capital due to its 
connection with particular arts scenes. Scenes, as urban cultural theorist Will 
Straw (2015) points out, are ‘publicly observable clusters of urban sociality’ that 
‘perform the often invisible labour of pulling together cultural phenomena in 
ways which heighten their visibility’ (2015, 483). They are dynamic, shifting and 
impermanent. Daniel Silver and Terry Nichols Clark (2015, 425) define them as 
‘multi- dimensional complexes of meaning embedded in material, local practices’. 
Conceptually, scenes connote a fluidity and ‘slipperiness’ (Straw 2002, 249) that is 
lacking in terms such as ‘community’, while also designating a tangible and pub-
licly visible ‘space of enlistment and convergence’ (Straw 2015, 478) wherein peo-
ple connect around particular tastes, practices, people and cultural happenings. In 
Toronto, a number of place- based arts scenes have emerged around DIY practices 
and politics, as well as specific venue or gallery spaces, which have been generative 
of a sense of unity and collective politics.
Over the years, an extensive DIY infrastructure has been established in Toronto 
at the grassroots level, including performance spaces, labels, collectives, online net-
works and studios, although a ‘DIY space’ is commonly presumed to imply a venue. 
Such spaces became highly visible after a wave of high- profile venue closures in 
Toronto’s downtown in early 2017. In recent years, DIY community spaces have 
provided important safe, accessible gathering places and much- needed alternative 
programming for marginalised practitioners who have lacked recognition and rep-
resentation, and the persistent threat of losing them has ignited concern that the 
city’s grassroots arts ecologies are not properly appreciated by policy- makers (Finch 
2015; Ross 2017). Some DIY practitioners believe that the City of Toronto is ‘not 
really interested in the arts’ (Interview, 22 February 2018). Many perceive the City 
of Toronto to be out of touch with their needs, expressing frustrations and disap-
pointment with local institutions. One noted: ‘I don’t know much about any of the 
city’s cultural policies … But do they impact me? Yes. Insofar as some of the venues 
I’ve performed in have been closed or shut down’ (Interview, 6 February 2018). Of 
the city self- identifying as ‘creative’, another observed: ‘It’s very cute. It’s very cute 
that they’re down to identify as that … but being creative involves doing things that 
they are very bad at, which includes turning a blind eye to DIY spaces and noise 
complaints and just allowing these things to exist’ (Interview, 22 February 2018).
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DIY scenes posit competing imaginaries of what a ‘creative city’ might be (Finch 
2015; Worth 2006). Such scenes in Toronto often differentiate themselves from 
dominant institutions and express a sense of alienation from the top- down Creative 
City framework and its orientation around consumption. Nevertheless, while they 
tend to take an oppositional stance, they are also faced with the difficult task of 
maintaining this stance as they become successful or drawn into the mainstream 
(Finch 2015). Much- needed attention from the public and policy- makers can be a 
double- edged sword and can be costly, as visibility draws attention to the ways in 
which many spaces operate outside existing legal frameworks, subjecting them to 
scrutiny and potential closure (Rancic 2016). Practitioners complain that the City 
of Toronto is more inclined to close DIY spaces than to assist in bringing them up to 
code. In recent years, many DIY spaces and studios have had to ‘go underground’, 
becoming ‘hidden’ and ‘less accessible’ to avoid inspection (Interview, 22 February 
2018). The tension between visibility and invisibility will be discussed further below.
Despite the seemingly recent emergence of DIY, Toronto’s creative scenes 
have a very long history of engaging with it. Looking to cultural historian Rosemary 
Donegan’s (1986) accounts of the evolutions of different cultural scenes in Toronto’s 
downtown through the twentieth century, we can see DIY as a long- standing and 
deeply embedded collective practice that is reliant on place- specific factors. Such 
practices were employed by artists forming their own scenes in the Adelaide and 
Yonge Street areas at the end of the nineteenth century. Donegan’s work reveals 
how through the twentieth century there was an increasing shift away from the 
bourgeois club mentality of previous generations, towards a style that pushed back 
against the cultural forms of dominant cultural institutions. Through this period, 
place- based scenes established themselves in Toronto’s downtown around Gerrard 
Village, Yorkville and along Queen Street West (see Figure 15.1), achieving spa-
tial stickiness by relying upon localised and largely informal horizontal networks 
Figure 15.1 Map of different place- based creative scenes in Toronto. Individual 
DIY spaces are not mapped here to protect the privacy of tenants (map by 
L. March)
 
Crit iCAL DiALoguES of urBAN govErNANCE ,  DEvELopMENt AND ACtiv iSM224
of support, as well as a large stock of unused industrial buildings and affordable 
live/ work spaces (Bain 2006; Bain and March 2019; Donegan 1986). Scenes also 
made use of key informal venues or ‘third- spaces’ (Rantisi and Leslie 2010), which 
acted as gateways into various parts of the scenes and were used for networking, 
horizontal philanthropic practices, organising and creative experimentation (Bain 
and March 2019). The Queen Street scene in particular has been described at 
length as a complex social world in which economies of giving and co- creation, 
resource- sharing, anti- capitalist/ anti- state/ anti- art-market political imperatives 
and organisation around self- governance were prevalent amid the usual rivalries, 
divergences, tensions and internal dramas of a scene (Monk 2016; Tuer 1986). 
Many practitioners countered the established institutions they did not see as serv-
ing them, creating a ‘parallel universe’ (Bronson 2014) of organisations, some of 
which took up especially strong stances against the existing state- supported arts 
bureaucracy (Tuer 1986), and many of which are now important cultural institu-
tions and key stakeholders in the Creative City.
Similar phenomena can be observed in the scene that established itself in 
various clusters throughout London’s East End between the 1970s and 1990s. Like 
in Toronto, a large number of disused industrial buildings in the central city were 
able to accommodate a vast number of creative practitioners and a diverse range 
of creative practices (Green 1999; Harris 2012; Wedd et al. 2001). While artists 
were drawn to the existing infrastructure of these neighbourhoods, other factors 
were also at play which allowed place- based scenes to flourish. For example, in 
London, the ‘relaxed planning regime’ (Green 1999, 29)  of the 1970s played a 
large role, allowing artists to more easily acquire real estate. Furthermore, through 
this period various forms of government funding were made available to artists 
in both cities, allowing practitioners to start artist- run centres in Toronto (Bain 
and March 2019) and to start studio provision organisations such as SPACE and 
Acme in London (Green 1999; Harris 2012). Once established, these scenes were 
able to collectively draw upon benefits shared within their place- based networks. 
However, by the 1990s the increasing visibility of London’s East End scene and 
many of its collective antics led to rapid gentrification and extensive reinvestment 
in places such as Hoxton, as the social capital of artists as well as their active court-
ing of the market generated buzz and appeal (Harris 2012). As artists and other 
tenants were gradually priced out, the area went from being ‘the place to be’ (Harris 
2012, 230) to being perceived as populated by ‘posers’ (Pratt 2009, 1056), while its 
artistic identity continued to be used as a selling point by developers and real estate 
agents. Similar waves of gentrification in Toronto’s Queen Street West have dis-
placed artists and arts institutions alike, with members of the scene declaring ‘The 
Queen Street is dead! Long live Queen Street!’ (Monk 2007) years before it was 
deemed one of the world’s hippest neighbourhoods by Vogue magazine in 2014.
Spatial stability has presented a consistent challenge to lower- income art-
ists in Toronto. While unique convergences of land uses, cheap real estate, avail-
able infrastructure, government support and market factors have contributed to 
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the establishment of place- based arts scenes in the downtown in the past, and DIY 
tactics have sustained them, the space of the downtown has been dramatically 
restructured over time in ways that have made this more difficult. Further compli-
cating this is the fact that artists must seek out affordable areas with appropriate 
spaces to conduct their practices (Bain 2006), but tend to make these spaces attrac-
tive to higher- income groups, thus becoming implicated in gentrification and their 
own potential displacement in varied complex, tension- filled and context- specific 
ways (Bain and March 2019; Grodach et al. 2018; Ley 2003; Mathews 2010).
Already in the mid- 1980s, the media were describing a ‘crisis’ of space for 
artists in Toronto’s downtown, as practitioners were pitched into a kind of ‘battle’ 
(Wright 1995) against development that threatened their displacement. At the time, 
many artists were living precariously throughout the downtown in industrial spaces 
that existed in a legal grey area (Yawching 1986). The Toronto Arts Council warned 
that there was a scarcity of affordable spaces and recommended that the City of 
Toronto move to foster the development of studios and facilities for arts organisa-
tions (Hendry 1985). Whereas London’s own scenes produced organisations such 
as SPACE and Acme, Toronto’s Arts Council formed Toronto Artscape Inc. as an 
arms- length institution tasked with addressing the mounting spatial crisis. Artscape 
proceeded by renovating donated heritage properties into arts facilities and studios. 
A series of reports produced for the City of Toronto also encouraged the develop-
ment of policy around artist housing and live/ work spaces, proposing the alteration 
of existing zoning and building codes to allow for mixed uses (Bain and March 2019; 
TAC 1987). With this support, Artscape became heavily involved in so- called creative 
place- making initiatives, eventually becoming a major property developer, a central 
voice advocating for the Creative City at the international scale and a partner in 
many of Toronto’s revitalisation projects (Lehrer and Wieditz 2009).
Meanwhile, in the London case, formalised studio providers largely came 
together as a sector in the early 2000s. The logics behind studio provision which 
emerged during this period very explicitly instrumentalise the creative workspace 
in urban regeneration and community development initiatives and are grounded 
in economic and social benefit rationales (Moreton 2013). Studio providers in this 
context are increasingly professionalised, repositioning themselves as property 
developers, providing spaces that are carefully calculated based on affordability 
but also on goals of revenue generation, while at the same time tending to rein-
force classic romanticised ideals of the artist’s studio: white walls, high ceilings, 
self- contained spaces. As Moreton (2013, 422) observes, these provisioned studios 
represent ‘a spatial reconfiguration of ideas about models of creative/ culture- led 
urban development, cultural labour and value measurement’, and the ability of 
many artists to engage in their creative practices is now largely mediated by rela-
tionships with developers holding these ideas.
As property values in Toronto’s downtown have steadily increased and the 
available stock of appropriate arts spaces has decreased, there has been a mount-
ing demand for the kinds of workspaces provided by studio provision organisations 
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(Bain and March 2019). These kinds of studios both set the standard for creative 
workspaces in the city and are increasingly the only option available. Yet these 
spaces are also costly, difficult for more marginalised practitioners to access and 
inappropriate or off- limits for those with more disruptive practices (such as musi-
cians). These kinds of formalised workspaces have also been criticised for the role 
they play in gentrification and the production of exclusionary space (Bain and 
March 2019; Catungal et al. 2009; Ilyniak 2017).
DIY workspaces: Facilitating labour under the radar
In Toronto, some practitioners have engaged in oppositional politics, mobilising 
against top- down cultural planning and urban regeneration which has threatened 
to dislodge existing pockets of artists (Silver 2012). Several DIY scenes in Toronto, 
such as those centred around Unit 2 or the Blank Canvas collective, have at various 
points mobilised around issues of gentrification and displacement, and have built 
strong grassroots networks in order to maintain a hold in the landscape.1 As noted 
above, in 2017 a strong community reaction emerged against the mounting ‘venue 
crisis’, with artists speaking out at City Hall and organising community discus-
sions around the issue. At the centre of much of the discourse were DIY community 
spaces, the places where people come together and where work is seen. The places 
where work is made were hardly mentioned in these conversations.
On the production side, contemporary DIY workspaces tend to be more indi-
vidualised and thus to generate less political action. This fragmentation could 
potentially be interpreted as a reversion to the individual studio from collective 
spaces that emerged between the 1970s and 1990s, as the downtown’s stock of 
disused buildings with large, shareable spaces has dwindled, options for appropri-
ate third spaces have been reduced through gentrification and the costs of rent-
ing from formalised studio collectives have in many cases become prohibitive. In 
comparison with DIY community spaces, DIY workspaces tend to remain relatively 
invisible in the landscape, often flying ‘under the radar’ (Interview, 24 February 
2018). Many of these workspaces bend legal parameters and policy guidelines, 
necessitating a degree of secrecy about their existence. Many spaces are located in 
practitioners’ homes, an unglamorous and often underappreciated or delegitimised 
site of labour (Black et al. 2019) that often goes unrecognised as an essential part 
of the so- called Creative City. These spaces also fail to adhere to the aesthetic and 
functional standards now set by studio provision organisations. They adhere to no 
particular appearance or typology and are thus not identified as properly ‘creative’ 
spaces. Many of these spaces have been taken up as a last resort because a separate, 
designated studio space is too expensive. The DIY workspace exists out of necessity.
Artists working in these circumstances actively engage in practices to minimise 
the attention they might draw to themselves. These include altering work hours, 
building elaborate work setups to minimise noise and smell (see Figure  15.2), 
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meeting with collaborators exclusively in third spaces, changing media or the 
scale of their work and in some cases changing their practice altogether to reduce 
outside impacts. Practitioners are not only aware of impacts that might get them 
evicted (noise, fumes, etc.), but are also aware of the role they potentially play in 
gentrification. While it is clear that their presence cannot be erased entirely, many 
sacrifices and compromises are made. As a result, in addition to being precariously 
employed, many practitioners work in precarious spatial circumstances, wrestling 
with conditions that are less than ideal. Practitioners often settle for live/ work con-
ditions that are below par in exchange for being able to continue their practice; 
they are willing to put up with more because of their lack of alternatives. As one 
practitioner put it (Interview, 2 February 2018), ‘you find your space and you hang 
on and learn to love it, and you never leave it until you are evicted because it’s 
the only option you have’. This adds further imbalances to already uneven power 
dynamics with landlords, which in some cases results in feelings of fear, helpless-
ness or paranoia about eventual eviction  – affective states which can ultimately 
make or break a creative space (see Figure 15.3).
The intentional obscurity of DIY workspaces in the landscape complicates 
gentrification narratives that identify artistic visibility and aestheticisation as trig-
gers that set its processes in motion (Ley 2003; Zukin 1982). Venue and community 
spaces are arguably often already involved in gentrification at the neighbourhood 
Figure 15.2 A DIY recording studio assembled in a musician’s living room 
in a rental apartment. The studio, in this case, has taken over most of the 
common area in a shared residential space. Note the practitioner’s use of 
foam soundproofing materials and an added curtain to protect against noise 
and vibrations travelling into neighbouring apartments (photograph taken by 
research participant, 2018)
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level, due to the often consumption- oriented nature of their activities and the ways 
in which these attract attention and stimulate desire, contributing to the produc-
tion of affluent playscapes. The necessity of visibility in public struggles over these 
spaces can also draw them further into complicity with the gentrification processes 
whether they like it or not, as ‘buzz’ is generated around them. Meanwhile, with 
DIY workspaces, practices of individual resilience to avoid displacement in many 
cases involve extremely elaborate attempts to draw as little attention to oneself as 
possible. The aim is not to develop a neighbourhood more broadly into a mutu-
ally supportive artistic milieu, but instead to maintain a small place of one’s own 
through determined practices of secrecy. Their atomisation and obscurity make it 
difficult for individual DIY workspaces to generate any sense of community around 
them, or to catalyse political action around issues practitioners face while working 
within these circumstances.
Conclusion
Creative practitioners and cultural planners in so- called creative cities are often 
engaged in very different kinds of place- making, and there are many incongruen-
cies between the concerns and interests of each. The impacts of ‘creative’ place- 
making strategies that focus on revitalisation threaten to drive out many of the very 
creatives they purport to be enticing into the city. Meanwhile, the formalisation of 
Figure 15.3 Boxes of supplies remain unpacked within this workspace, as the 
practitioner occupies the space with the presumption that she will soon have to 
move again (photograph taken by research participant, 2018)
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more collective spatial arrangements has led to the proliferation of developer- like 
studio provision organisations, who hold gatekeeper positions and have unique 
power to shape urban cultural production. In the case of Toronto, practitioners 
who cannot access these spaces, or can no longer afford the exorbitant cost of living 
in the city, migrate to the urban peripheries (Bain 2013), or beyond to nearby cities 
such as Hamilton, where both artist- led and municipally driven property develop-
ment are already dramatically reshaping lower- income, working- class neighbour-
hoods (Bain 2017, 2018). Those who stay are pressured to rapidly professionalise 
and play the competitive game of artistic entrepreneurship or resort to alternative 
practices and the more horizontal support networks of DIY.
In the case of Toronto, DIY is largely taken up out of necessity, as practitioners 
seek more stable living conditions or success within existing Creative City frame-
works which have largely served to render space less accessible to them. In this 
case, DIY might be perceived as an example of practitioners reacting to the ‘individ-
ualisation of risk’ (Bain and McLean 2013; Gill and Pratt 2008) encouraged within 
Creative City discourse, and adapting to rapidly changing dynamics in Toronto’s 
downtown. These practices have tangible impacts on individual practitioners’ work 
and lives and speak to broader precarious conditions of labour in cultural produc-
tion in the city which are distorted by ‘Creative’ policy rhetoric.
DIY community spaces offer a more visible and public centre of convergence 
for political action around arts spaces, with the social benefits they offer marginal-
ised artists backing an excellent argument for increased policy support. DIY work-
spaces remain in the shadows, yet these spaces represent important individual 
efforts to exist outside dominant frameworks in the face of precarity. While art-
ists increasingly seem to be rendered precarious and isolated in such spaces, their 
plight is increasingly one that is shared. There is a collective desire for support and 
action around the spaces of work. Even as this research was conducted, partici-
pants expressed a strong desire to potentially meet each other to discuss challenges 
they face, breaking with established tendencies to shroud their work in secrecy. 
This speaks to a potential to generate action around them. Yet the response of arts 
communities to the Creative City in Toronto overall is complicated and not entirely 
oppositional, as many practitioners are implicated in dominant institutional and 
state frameworks, and many have internalised the Floridian doctrine: ‘be creative 
or die’. Practitioners rarely respond with targeted resistance against ‘Creative’ pol-
icy frameworks that do not serve them.
In the meantime, DIY is an important form of self- provisioning which allows 
practitioners to remain downtown, offering them some freedom to engage with 
creativity on their own terms while the pressures of the art market and of top- 
down policy frameworks and conditions of precarity remain. More research into 
the range of emergent DIY practices in ‘creative’ cities is needed. DIY spaces offer 
means to survive current conditions in these cities while also posing alternatives, 
and they certainly deserve further recognition.
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Note
 1. Unit 2 has notably also been involved in mutual aid organising throughout the COVID- 19 pandemic, direct-
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especially those who are Black, Indigenous or people of colour.
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Pragmatic fix or a farewell to welfare? 
Making sense of and contesting 




Since 2010 the local state in England has been both the subject and agent of a 
Conservative- led project of post- crisis austerity. More than simply the unfortunate 
administrators of fiscal retrenchment bearing the disproportionate burden of a 
zealous attempt to ‘pay down the national deficit’, local authorities have been at the 
vanguard of ‘the most far- reaching and precipitate attempt to achieve fundamen-
tal restructuring in an established welfare state … in recent years’ (Taylor- Gooby 
2012, 61). On the one hand, they are managing unprecedented budget cuts and 
reducing the scale and scope of local public services. On the other hand, they con-
tinue to ‘modernise’ the local state, further opening up services and assets to private 
interests, while also catalysing and speculating on urban development to ensure 
their fiscal futures. In short, a distinctly English version of ‘austerity urbanism’ – a 
process pioneered across US and Canadian cities (Peck 2012) – is being constituted 
by and between the central and local state, producing new powers and liabilities; 
strategic dilemmas and existential exigencies; policy innovations, experiments and 
failures; as well as cause for contestation and politicisation (Penny 2017).
Meanwhile, the local state in London is also at the epicentre of ‘an acute, per-
vasive and socially explosive housing crisis’ (Beswick et al. 2016, 321). Here too, 
the role of the local state is an ambiguous one: London’s boroughs are both sub-
ject, caught in the crossfire of central government policy and real estate interests, 
and agent, actively aligning themselves to, and so helping reproduce, a status quo 
predicated on ever rising land values. A key driver behind London’s housing crisis 
today, the privatisation and de- municipalisation of council housing, was at once an 
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undermine the power of the local state. Indeed, since the 1990s, with grant fund-
ing to build council housing limited and existing stock dwindling, London’s bor-
oughs have been relegated to playing an enabling planning role as part of what 
Samuel Stein (2019), referencing North American cities such as New York City and 
Toronto, has termed the ‘real- estate state’. Rather than directly delivering coun-
cil housing, London’s boroughs enable private real estate development and then, 
through planning gain, try to eke out a ‘commercially viable’ portion of so- called 
affordable housing, which can be up to 80 per cent of market rents (rents inflated by 
those very same developments). Yet while their room for manoeuvre in this context 
is undoubtedly more constrained than in previous times, most London boroughs 
have actively aligned themselves with real estate interests and their inflationary 
and exclusionary logic of land value uplift and extraction. Even before developers 
were able to purchase exclusive access to planning officers, many boroughs were 
reluctant to use the regulatory powers at their disposal to challenge questionable 
viability appraisals. Others have enthusiastically entered into public–private part-
nerships to redevelop public land and housing estates, purposefully inflating land 
and property values at the expense of low- income residents in a process that will be 
only too familiar to those who lived in Regent Park, Toronto.
As these crises converge, London’s boroughs are being transformed and are 
transforming themselves in profound and potentially path- changing ways. In pur-
suit of long- term revenues to fulfil their managerial role of meeting social housing 
and care needs in a zero- grant environment, they are emerging as key entrepre-
neurial actors in the financialisation of public land and housing. Significantly, in 
reconfiguring the use, management and ownership of public land and housing, 
turning the latter from ‘machines for living’ into what a resident on one London 
housing estate called ‘machines for revenue generation’, many councils are eschew-
ing simple fire- sale privatisations of their assets. Instead, hoping to directly capture 
rising land values, they are drawing on the repertoires and operational models of 
property developers, and in some cases entangling themselves in new relationships 
with finance capital, to produce market, affordable and social housing themselves in 
distinctly novel ways. As evidence of this, council- owned local housing companies, 
constituted as special purpose vehicles, are being set up across London,  enabling 
councils to build housing by circumventing fiscal and regulatory constraints, treat-
ing land and property in increasingly speculative ways as a financial asset and, in 
some cases, engaging financial actors through innovative financing models (Beswick 
and Penny 2018).
For many, these local housing companies represent a ‘renaissance’ (Hackett 
2017) in local state housebuilding, a creative fix for the housing crisis and a vehicle 
for publicly directed civic improvement (Morphet and Clifford 2017; Kollewe 2017; 
Wainwright 2017). More broadly, they have also been posited (see Christophers 
2019) as a revival of a pragmatic and progressive municipal interventionism in 
the face of what, to all intents and purposes, looked inevitably like the ‘strange 
death of municipal England’ (Crewe 2016). This optimism is far from groundless. 
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Local housing companies propose to deliver a mix of market, affordable and social 
housing, meeting diverse housing needs; they enable boroughs to both circumvent 
borrowing caps, opening up much-needed fiscal capacity, and bypass right- to- buy 
legislation, which has seen a relentless haemorrhaging of public housing for almost 
40  years; and, of course, they promise fiscal returns which can be spent on any 
number of financially stretched local services – such as social care, community cen-
tres, libraries, parks and the like.
Yet for all their possibilities and promise, the emergence of local housing com-
panies has not gone uncontested. Since 2015, facing the prospect of estate demoli-
tion, a growing number of campaigns have brought people together – in people’s 
homes and community centres, as well as in town halls, the courts and streets – to 
scrutinise and fight against these companies and what, despite the assurances of 
local councillors and officers, some fear they portend: rising rents and living costs; 
a loss of democratic accountability; housing precarity, alienation and displace-
ment; as well as new rounds of accumulation by dispossession (see Sendra and 
Fitzpatrick, Chapter 18).
Building on the above counter- narrative, in this chapter I  critically engage 
with the development of local housing companies and their implications for col-
lective urban provisioning, policy and politics. I do this in three steps. First, taking 
a conjunctural urban political economy approach, I situate the emergence of local 
housing companies in the ‘causal and constitutive’ (Pike et al. 2019, 24) context 
of shifting central–local relations, devolved austerity and a convergence of crises 
unfolding on the terrain of the local state, arguing that London’s boroughs are 
inflating and harnessing already overheated land, property and private- rental mar-
kets in order to produce a more managed austerity urbanism. Second, I interrogate 
in more detail how London boroughs are setting up local housing companies, focus-
ing on their mixed and mutating managerial, entrepreneurial and financialised 
rationalities, strategies and logics (Pike et al. 2019). In this section, I suggest that 
these companies are being designed as flexible governance spaces to circumvent a 
set of constraining rules and regulations. Finally, in the third and concluding sec-
tion, I evaluate whether local housing companies represent a creative, pragmatic 
and ultimately progressive fix or rather a ‘farewell to welfare approach’ (Chatterjee 
2014) with long- term consequences for council housing, low- income renters and 
local government in London and England more broadly.
The urban political economy of local state restructuring in 
London under austerity
In 2013, three years into his premiership, David Cameron felt confident enough 
to state in no uncertain terms what had been clear to many from the outset: that 
austerity, far from being a short- term remedy to a financial- turned- fiscal crisis, 
was intended as a strategically selective project of state restructuring. Speaking 
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on the occasion of the Lord Mayor’s Banquet Speech at the Guildhall in the heart 
of the City of London, Cameron (2013) informed an audience of political, finan-
cial and business elites that ‘we are sticking to the task. But that doesn’t just mean 
making difficult decisions on public spending. It also means something more pro-
found. It means building a leaner, more efficient state. We need to do more with 
less. Not just now, but permanently.’ In step with the North American experience of 
‘downloaded’ austerity, the burden of responsibility for realising this ‘permanently 
leaner state’ has fallen decidedly on the shoulders of the local state. Local councils 
have been compelled to manage swingeing budget cuts at a time of rising need for 
social housing and care services; and they have been summoned anew as a site 
for ‘catalysing latent potentialities for economic growth’ (Ward et al. 2015, 443), 
encouraged to tie their fiscal prospects, and the future of local public services, to 
real estate interests, markets and values.
The most remarked-upon dimension of local government austerity is the deep 
and cumulative budget cuts that it has experienced annually since 2010, and which 
it will continue to be subject to until at least 2020. Set within the narrative of public 
sector profligacy and guided by the political decision to address the perceived pub-
lic deficit crisis overwhelmingly through public expenditure reductions (Innes and 
Tetlow 2015), between 2010 and 2016 the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) saw its budget reduced by over 50 per cent in real terms, far 
greater than in any other government department (Gray and Barford 2018). In a 
context of highly unequal central–local relations, in which the vast majority – over 
80 per cent in some areas – of local state spending is funded nationally through 
DCLG, this reduction is significant. To put these figures into historical context, the 
cuts up to 2015 alone were estimated to be three times the level of those experi-
enced during the previous notable round of austerity in English local government 
between 1978 and 1985 (Newman 2014).
Geographically these cuts have been distributed and experienced unevenly. 
Undermining long- standing commitments to territorial resource redistribution 
and equalisation that compensated, albeit insufficiently, for decades of a spatially 
selective ‘finance- dominated accumulation regime’ (Jessop 2014) favouring the 
South East and London (Massey 2007), the Coalition government’s cuts purpose-
fully severed the link between funding and social need, with predictably regressive 
consequences. The most deprived areas in England, where social need for housing 
and care is highest, have seen the deepest reductions in funding. Boroughs in inner 
London have been especially hard hit. Expressed in real terms, London Councils 
estimates that between 2010/ 11 and 2015/ 16 local government in London saw a 
44 per cent reduction in core funding, the equivalent of some £2.6 billion. A fur-
ther £1 billion has since been cut, representing a 60 per cent real- terms reduction 
from 2010/ 11 (London Councils 2014).
Further cuts since 2010 have come in the form of reductions in capital funds, 
which have fallen by 45 per cent (Hastings et  al. 2017). This has had a marked 
effect on social housing in particular. Between 2011 and 2015, radical cuts and 
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reforms were enacted such that central government investment in social housing 
was terminated in favour of a new ‘Affordable Homes Programme’, where rents 
can be set at up to 80 per cent of market rates (Adam et al. 2015). While upwards 
of £8 billion of public money was funnelled into Help to Buy, supporting middle- 
class homeownership and inflating house prices, investment in this so- called 
Affordable Housing Programme was reduced from £9.3 billion (the amount spent 
between 2008 and 2010 on social housing) to £4.7 billion (Adam et  al. 2015). 
Unsurprisingly, the stock of social housing in England has fallen precipitously since 
2010, which has contributed, along with a suite of punitive welfare ‘reforms’, to 
rising levels of housing insecurity, homelessness and rough sleeping.
Early evidence suggests that some of these austerity measures were, to a lim-
ited extent, absorbed by local councils through back- office efficiencies – or signifi-
cant reductions to council work forces, affecting women and racialised minorities 
first and foremost – and then, with increasing severity over time, cuts to service 
budgets and triaging. Yet councils adopting this incremental approach are fast run-
ning out of road. Most now face the choice between going over a financial cliff- edge 
and fundamentally transforming how they operate (Meegan et al. 2014; Hastings 
et al. 2017). As early as 2013 the Public Accounts Committee (2013, 3) warned 
that ‘if [current financial] trends continue there is a risk that the worst- affected 
councils will be unable to meet their statutory obligations, and that serious ques-
tions will arise about the viability of some councils’. Five years on, in February 
2018, Northamptonshire County Council went as close to declaring bankruptcy as 
legally possible, and the National Audit Office warns others will surely follow.
In London the need for fundamental transformation has been articulated in 
local council policy discourse with growing urgency since 2015. Grant funding is 
rapidly declining as a crisis of social reproduction is developing, with demand for 
social housing and for social care services acute. Indeed, growth in demand for the 
latter alone looks set to fundamentally reorient what and who the local state is for. 
A social care funding gap of £285 million is expected to open up by 2020. Even as 
access to statutory social services is being reduced via triage, leaving thousands 
without adequate support, funding for universal discretionary services, such as 
community centres, libraries and parks, is waning, with long- term consequences 
for the broader legitimacy of the local state as an institution (Penny 2017).
In the absence of grant support from central government, which is set to be 
fully cut by 2020, the (not always clear or coherent) plan for how councils will get 
by and avoid the cliff- edge has entailed a selective set of risk- shifting policies that 
localise fundraising responsibilities and draw the local state closer to real estate 
developers. From the outset, any appetite that local politicians may have had for 
an anti- austerity municipal socialism, funded through increased local council taxes, 
was headed off. Taking the line that ‘the public aren’t going to tolerate … higher 
council taxes’ (Pickles 2013), the Coalition government imposed new rules mandat-
ing a local referendum to approve any council tax increases above 1.99 per cent. 
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Coalition government successfully ‘locked in’ a low council tax regime. Furthermore, 
councils already unable to borrow to pay for revenue expenditure were also blocked 
from borrowing money to directly build council housing through artificially low bor-
rowing caps placed on their Housing Revenue Accounts (HRA; see below).
Instead, notwithstanding vague appeals to ‘do more for less’ by encouraging 
greater voluntary participation in public services at the expense of paid profes-
sional employees, local councils have been compelled to take responsibility for their 
fiscal futures by becoming more entrepreneurial, developer- friendly and specula-
tive in orientation. Since 2010, local councils have been given a ‘General Power 
of Competence’ by central government under the 2011 Localism Act, empower-
ing them to set up new trading companies and generate profits; incentivised to 
promote residential real estate developments that increase their council tax base 
through the New Homes Bonus scheme; and encouraged to catalyse local growth 
through commercial real estate development by allowing them to retain ‘a propor-
tion of the growth in their business rate revenue’ (Sandford 2016, 639) from new 
floor space (Muldoon- Smith and Greenlaugh 2015).
As austerity deepens, the ability of the local state to fund and provide collec-
tively consumed services is being predicated on the capacity of local actors to ‘unlock’ 
the potential of their assets. Significantly this includes exhortations to ‘rationalise’ the 
public estate through one- off asset sales (Besussi 2016), but it also entails inflating 
property and land values in order to extract a share of the surplus from the realisa-
tion of such values either indirectly through permissive pro- development strategies, 
planning gain mechanisms and bonuses, or directly through the creation of local 
asset- backed vehicles capable of generating new forms of long- term ‘fiscal rent’ (Haila 
2016). While the goals of building houses, attracting inward investment and deliver-
ing economic growth are far from new in local government in England, the extent 
to which these activities have become central to the ability of a local authority to 
maintain organisational capacity, fund local services and meet its stated public policy 
objectives arguably is. With redistribution from the centre coming to an end, and as 
‘cities can no longer rely on economic growth in the nation as a source of finance’ 
(Leitner 1990, 154), the realisation of locally derived revenue is becoming the pri-
mary source of income, such that an entrepreneurial outlook and orientation towards 
development will cease to be an important supplementary function to the managerial 
delivery of services (Hall and Hubbard 1996), but rather will be the principal means 
through which services are to be resourced and austerity urbanism managed.
Thinking outside the HRA box
In response to the shifting urban political economy of local state restructur-
ing and increasingly acute crises of housing and social care, London boroughs 
have been actively devising entrepreneurial solutions to generate long- term 
revenues from their local asset bases. One such solution, which has generated 
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significant buzz in recent years as a possible return to municipal intervention-
ism, is the council- owned local housing company. Constituted as special purpose 
corporate entities, local housing companies are designed to enable boroughs to 
act speculatively as real estate developers, building housing on public land for 
market sale and rent while also cross- subsidising ‘affordable’ homes in line with 
planning requirements. In this section I will explore the rationalities, strategies 
and logics that animate these companies, arguing that they are being set up as 
flexible governance spaces, enabling councils to circumvent fiscal/ regulatory 
constraints, treat land in speculative ways as a financial asset and engage finan-
cial actors through innovative financing models. Far from representing short-
lived idiosyncratic innovations, the proliferation of these vehicles (21 London 
boroughs now have them) portends a new mode of austerity- induced urban 
governance – a ‘financialized municipal entrepreneurialism’, as a colleague and 
I have termed it (Beswick and Penny 2018), with under- explored implications 
and risks.
Council- owned local housing companies are corporate entities limited by 
shares that are constituted outside a local authority’s General Fund (the account 
from which the majority of local public services are funded) and the HRA (a ring- 
fenced account for the governance and maintenance of existing, and provision of 
new, council housing). The existence of trading companies is not new in the recent 
history of English local government. Section 93 of the 2003 Local Government Act, 
for example, allows local authorities to trade existing services to generate prof-
its. Local housing companies, however, go beyond this by enabling a borough to 
acquire, build and manage real estate for market sale and rent, including outside 
their own territorial boundaries, and so engage in commercial activities that would 
until recently have been ultra vires. This was made possible in 2011 through the 
Localism Act’s ‘General Power of Competence’, which allows a local authority to 
undertake any activity that an individual or corporation can unless specifically pro-
hibited by central government legislation.
Across the different London boroughs that have set up a council- owned local 
housing company, a consistent set of guiding rationales is articulated. These can 
be summarised as follows. Firstly, councillors and officers emphasise a shared 
desire to build more homes, especially on council- owned land. Here the private 
sector is criticised for slow build- out rates and land banking practices, while the 
broader developer- led planning gain approach to securing affordable housing 
is seen as failing. Secondly, the importance of generating a financial return is 
stressed. The developer- led planning gain approach typically sees profits of 15–20 
per cent written into, and so all but guaranteed by, developer viability appraisals. 
Council- owned housing companies are justified, in part, on the basis that these 
profits can and should be captured directly by the local state to reinvest in ‘afford-
able’ housing or borough General Funds to reduce the impact of fiscal retrench-
ment and promote financial self- sufficiency. Thirdly, and relatedly, the importance 
of public control, managerialism and intervention is asserted in response to market 
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failures in housing affordability, private rental quality (which is notoriously poor in 
London), place- making and design and, in some outer London boroughs, disinvest-
ment. Thus, local housing companies promise a pragmatically progressive pathway 
beyond the facilitative and minimal mode of neoliberal entrepreneurial housing 
governance that has been ascendant since the 1990s.
Yet local housing companies do ‘not signal a simple return to, or revaloriza-
tion of, the public- sector ethos or modus operandi’ (Beswick and Penny 2018, 625). 
While the council- owned status of these companies is emphasised as a virtue, their 
operating strategies and logics ape those of the private and financial sector, sug-
gesting a mixing and mutation of managerial with entrepreneurial and financial-
ised modes of governance. A key feature of council- owned housing companies is 
that they sit outside the HRA, the account that legally governs conventional council 
housing. As such, these companies circumvent a number of fiscal and regulatory 
constraints associated with the HRA, opening up a smooth governance space in 
which boroughs are able to act more flexibly and ‘creatively’. By developing outside 
the HRA, boroughs gain the ability to:
• Build homes speculatively for private sale and rent, with the possibility of 
cross- subsidising ‘affordable’ housing in line with planning requirements, 
which they cannot do within the HRA;
• Bypass tight borrowing restrictions placed by central government on the 
HRA, opening up a range of financing options, from the Public Works Loan 
Board to innovative forms of equity and debt financing, including with insti-
tutional investors;
• Avoid right-to-buy legislation, preventing the enforced subsidised sale of 
properties developed by council- owned companies;
• Set rent levels flexibly, outside those determined by the Treasury formula 
and the Secure Tenancy regime, making it easier to ‘flex’ housing units across 
rent/ tenure or liquidate assets;
• Demolish existing council housing estates, often on high- value public land, 
and transfer council tenants without ballot to new developments, replac-
ing their Secure Tenancies with less secure Assured Shorthold Tenancies 
(ASTs);
• Generate a long- term income stream for the General Fund to pay for local 
public services, which cannot be done within the ring- fenced HRA, and 
become more financially self- sufficient;
• Sell shares in the company to private parties, including institutional investors 
or hedge funds, as part of a joint venture or a takeover.
On the one hand, local housing companies are celebrated as representing an inno-
vative  – ‘out of the box’  – governance fix. They enable London boroughs to cir-
cumvent central government restrictions and move beyond a reliance on private 
developers and housing associations. Boroughs can directly build housing again 
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and pursue broader public policy objectives in a more managerial and interven-
tionist way. According to their proponents, local housing companies may even be 
a way of addressing local fiscal and housing crises. On the other hand, the way 
in which these public objectives are being pursued suggests an ambiguous mixing 
and mutating of managerial, entrepreneurial and financialising modes of govern-
ance. The development of local housing companies signals the active constitu-
tion by the local state of public land and public housing estates as financial assets 
first and foremost. The realisation of public objectives through these companies 
is predicated on the financial success of speculative real estate development, the 
promotion of less secure forms of housing tenure for low- income Londoners and 
a greater exposure to long- term financial risk. As the next section explores, this 
dynamic brings with it a set of tensions and trade- offs with long- term implications 
for council housing, low- income renters and local government more broadly.
Creative financial fix or a farewell to welfare?
If successful on their own terms, council- owned local housing companies will 
increase the number of good- quality homes built in London, including at social 
rent levels; they will prevent the erosion of council- owned homes within these 
companies by withholding the ‘right to buy’; in stark contrast to London’s current 
landscape of amateur landlords, they will intervene in the private rental sector and 
may provide better-quality institutional products; they will encourage private real 
estate investment in areas that have suffered from disinvestment; and they will pro-
vide flexible financial returns to cash- strapped local authorities. In the best case 
scenario, they would represent a creative financial fix to help address the housing 
crisis and manage austerity urbanism.
However, even if this best case scenario unfolds – and in the context of Brexit 
this is far from assured – success would come at a cost. To begin with, as noted 
above, local housing companies treat public land and properties as financial assets 
first and foremost. The generation of public value, for example in the form of social 
housing, is not planned for on the basis of identified social need, as it was dur-
ing the Keynesian Welfare State era. Instead, mirroring the neoliberal real estate 
state model prevalent across North American cities including Toronto, public value 
is predicated on commercial and financial success. This fundamentally shifts the 
role of local authorities; managerialism follows speculative entrepreneurialism. 
The importance of this shift is becoming clear in policy literature on local housing 
companies. While the overwhelming housing need in London is for social housing, 
local housing companies are not expected to deliver significant proportions of this 
tenure. The Smith Institute, for example, estimates that just 10 per cent of local 
housing company housing will be social housing. Given the fact that local housing 
companies rely greatly on council- owned land to develop on, councils risk exhaust-
ing their supply of a shrinking resource with developments that benefit aspiring 
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homeowners and middle- class renters most. Should there be a change of govern-
ment policy in future years and a return to grant funding, the opportunity costs of 
local housing developments may become clear.
Since the commercial viability of local housing companies, and their ability 
to cross- subsidise more affordable homes, relies on rising land and property val-
ues, they also risk a form of state- induced gentrification as rents in general increase 
in nearby areas. In some disinvested boroughs of London this is an explicit policy 
aim, with local housing companies effectively positioned as vanguards to encour-
age private investment and development: ‘Effectively, we are there to take devel-
opment forward, to accelerate growth and development, to both build directly 
and also to catalyse and assist other people in building out’ (Chief Executive of 
BeFirst, Barking and Dagenham). In other cases, more direct forms of state- led 
gentrification are in evidence. In the London Borough of Lambeth, for example, 
the council is planning to demolish up to six existing council estates to clear high- 
value land for mixed- tenure developments delivered by its local housing company. 
Lambeth council stresses that by closing the rent gaps on its estates through mar-
ket sale and rent, more ‘at council rent’ housing can be delivered. The council also 
promises to rehouse all the estates’ current council housing tenants. As resident 
campaigners note, however, the number of additional ‘at council rent’ houses is 
very small and subject to change with unexpected delays, rising construction costs 
and falling house prices; very little support is being offered to leaseholders whose 
compensation will fall far short of the costs of buying a like- for- like home on the 
new developments; and returning council tenants will lose their Secure Tenancies 
and face increased rents and living costs.
The control and flexibility that the local housing company opens up for bor-
oughs, and indeed that is central to their commercial success, comes at the expense 
of the security of existing council tenants and future generations of would- be 
council tenants. Importantly, the affordable and social homes built by these com-
panies are not council homes, even though they are built by a company whose 
sole shareholder is the council. Council housing, with secure lifetime tenancies, 
associated rights and centrally regulated rent regimes, can only legally exist within 
the HRA. The affordable homes built by local housing companies represent less 
secure forms of non- market homes in which rents are set by the companies, includ-
ing on a project- by- project basis, and short- term tenancies (ASTs) can be used to 
‘flex’ a development’s tenure mix over time, either increasing or decreasing the 
proportion of affordable housing. This undoing of council tenants’ security is not 
an unexpected outcome of providing housing outside the HRA; it is institutionally 
expedient as a means of circumventing central government control and it is com-
mercially necessary as a means of ensuring financial flexibility to manage long- 
term risks. As the outgoing leader of the Local Government Association put it: ‘I’ve 
spent all my life as a council leader trying to get out of the HRA … If I didn’t have 
an HRA I wouldn’t go anywhere near it … what’s the advantage? Just set up a pri-
vate company keep all the houses privately and you can choose what level of rent 
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you charge on every single house, there is no way the government can interfere …’ 
(Inside Housing 2019).
Flexibility is an important means by which local housing companies seek to 
manage long- term risks. This is most clearly visible when institutional investment 
has been sought and where the councils in question are contractually obliged to 
pay fixed/ indexed returns to their investors over 20- , 40- and 60- year periods. 
Here, flexibility becomes a means of maintaining sufficient rent envelopes to man-
age adverse fluctuations in interest rates as well as possible issues with voids, non- 
payment and other management issues. Flexibility can also be used as a means 
of generating more income for local authorities as and when the need arises. The 
disadvantages of flexibility are felt predominantly by tenants, whose security of 
tenure is necessarily diluted. Indeed, flexibility is predicated on providing tenants 
with short- term and less  secure ASTs, enabling the landlord to more easily move 
homes across the rental spectrum from social to affordable to market rent levels. In 
addition to moving away from historic associations of council housing with lifetime 
security, this kind of flexibility is also likely to open up a variegated geography of 
tenant security as different councils, in negotiation with their funders, are likely to 
offer different kinds of AST, some with relatively long- term tenancies and others 
without.
Finally, local housing companies carry significant risks for local authorities 
and for the local state more broadly. Local housing companies, due to unfortu-
nate timing, are being developed in a profoundly unfavourable economic context 
in which costs (of labour and materials) can be expected to rise and real estate 
values to fall. While London’s land and property markets rebounded quickly after 
the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, there are no guarantees they will do so again 
should a painful and disruptive exit from the European Union take place. Yet even 
if such an outcome were not to occur, and local housing companies succeeded as 
viable and profitable ventures, the local state as an institution would still likely suf-
fer. Local housing companies are a pragmatic response to the shifting urban politi-
cal economy of local state restructuring. They reflect the turn away from Spatial 
Keynesianism. But they also help to reproduce it. What is good for any one local 
authority may not be good for local government as an institution. Over time, due 
to uneven geographies of investment and land values across England, geographical 
variegation and ‘territorial injustice’ (Gray and Barford 2018) are likely outcomes 
of the approach to local funding that local housing companies sit within. The local 
public services that people can access will reflect not the actually existing social 
need, but the ability of local actors to operate as successful real estate developers 
and managers.
In conclusion, while local housing companies do represent at one level a crea-
tive financial fix, they also represent a vivid example of what Ipsita Chatterjee (2014) 
calls a ‘farewell to welfare approach’. Here, managerial welfare objectives are just 
about ‘kept alive through a discursive life- support system in order to become the 
sleeping partner for municipal entrepreneurialism’. Increasingly, Chatterjee adds, 
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‘welfarism lives in the level of discourse only and is replaced by entrepreneurial 
strategies in practice’. Time will tell if local housing companies are successful as 
companies and whether they are able to deliver some social housing through cross- 
subsidisation. Yet for low-income Londoners, any such success is likely to prove pyr-
rhic as local housing companies demolish existing council housing, take up land 
that could be used for future council housing and erode the security of tenure, low 
rents and democratic accountability that have made council housing a success  – 
despite the decades- long ideological and material war waged upon it.
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Community- based responses to 




Toronto’s socio- spatial polarisation is proceeding at a rate much greater than 
elsewhere in Canada. Spatially, formerly middle- income neighbourhoods are 
transforming into either high or low income (Walks 2014). Toronto is becoming a 
strikingly segregated city, with visible minorities concentrated in low- income neigh-
bourhoods and white residents dominating affluent areas in numbers far higher 
than their share of the population (Hulchanski 2009). In this context Toronto is 
experiencing both sustained gentrification and advanced suburban restructuring 
(Walks and August 2008). As Lehrer has pointed out, Toronto’s urban changes are 
strongly impacted by the global economy exceeding the capacity of local policies 
to govern them (Lehrer 2006). Thus we are witnessing a policy context in Toronto 
where local government is retreating from public investments, giving more room 
to the motives of private corporations. This situation has produced problems for 
the social production of space in the city, as it is now heavily influenced by private 
property interests.
While Parkdale, a neighbourhood in the western downtown area of 
Toronto, was considered one of the last affordable downtown neighbourhoods 
for culturally diverse newcomers to Canada, the situation is rapidly changing. 
An analysis of 2016 census data shows a mutable situation, particularly in South 
Parkdale where the recent immigrant population (people arriving in the previous 
10 years) is shrinking and the non- immigrant population is growing. Similarly, 
the population of low- income persons and recent immigrants has decreased 
while the population of older, Canadian- born working adults has increased. The 
occupations of residents are also shifting away from middle- income blue- collar 
jobs towards business people/ professionals. A  change in residential accommo-
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from the regular rental housing stock and made available for short- term rental 
through services like Airbnb1; advertised rents in the neighbourhood demon-
strate a drastic increase over the 2015–18 period. Overall, simple unweighted 
average advertised rents increased by over $426 per month, or 36 per cent. The 
quickly changing environment of Parkdale is creating a more marked process of 
gentrification, where only households with higher incomes are able to afford to 
live in the neighbourhood.
In Parkdale, low- income people together with populations with mental 
health and addiction experiences, refugees and recent immigrants, and people fac-
ing homelessness are all strongly affected by these rent increases and the resulting 
changes in the nature and use of public spaces in the neighbourhood.2 While the 
inclusivity of Parkdale is at risk, community- based activism to resist and mitigate 
the negative effects of neighbourhood change is getting stronger. In the last few 
years, a social infrastructure that is able to promote the empowerment of diverse 
community members in a condition where land use decision- making is particularly 
market- driven, compartmentalised and privatised (PCED 2016) has been built 
with the collaboration of diverse organisations and community allies. Through 
a case study of Parkdale, this chapter argues that community- based responses 
produce positive outcomes in response to the negative effects of neighbourhood 
change and disadvantage if a grounded and networked social infrastructure that 
can influence decision- making processes regarding neighbourhood development 
and planning is designed and implemented. The effectiveness of community- based 
action is related to the capacity of building on- the- ground and bottom- up govern-
ance mechanisms (Garcia 2010), directed at bringing equity not only to the social 
realm but also to governance and planning systems and practices. Viewed within 
this framework, Parkdale is a relevant case study due to the presence of effective 
neighbourhood organisations (Carrière 2016) that are connected through a multi-
faceted social infrastructure that supports a fundamental rethinking of local plan-
ning policy and practice (Hanna and Webber 2010).
In this chapter, I first provide a brief overview of the literature discussing 
the complex relationship between community- based activism and local govern-
ments. I  then focus on Parkdale’s path- dependent history of community- based 
activism, by exploring its scope and actors as well as the changing forms of 
organisation over the years. The chapter also examines the ability and capacity 
of municipal policies and planning tools and mechanisms to control the nega-
tive effects of neighbourhood change. This is based on field research that was 
conducted in Parkdale between November 2017 and May 2019. The research 
employed a mixed- method qualitative approach through a literature review of 
neighbourhood change and community development scholarship, analysis of 
background data at the City of Toronto and neighbourhood level, interviews with 
key stakeholders, participant observation at public meetings and in key neigh-
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Community- based practices as policy- making
Many scholars have highlighted how community- based practices in the contempo-
rary city raise new questions around the relationship between community- based 
initiatives and local governments. This issue is particularly relevant within the 
context of global neoliberal conditions, where the state’s retraction from social 
welfare provisions has dramatically increased in recent decades (Alford 2009; 
Peck et al. 2013; Savini 2016). Some scholars have argued that it is important to 
consider community- based organising as an arena of opportunities that emphasise 
bottom- up governance (Garcia 2010) and that focus on reconnecting local com-
munities to their governments as well as scaling up processes of change in gov-
ernance practices. This bottom- up approach to reconfiguring community–local 
government relations sits in opposition to the traditional approach to planning and 
activism in communities or neighbourhoods by local governments. As Uitermark 
(2015) explains, in the 1980s and 1990s, urban governments in Europe co- opted a 
great number of moderate activists through targeted neighbourhood policies that 
emphasised partnerships and similar participatory schemes, effectively dividing 
radical and moderate activists while imposing government constraints on groups 
operating within neighbourhood- based social movements. Uitermark points out 
how this approach was used to address new challenges presented by austerity and 
the retraction of the welfare state, but in a way that urban governments could still 
control neighbourhood- based activism and initiatives and ensure that they were 
palatable to government interests. In similar fashion, the analyses of DeFilippis 
and other scholars have warned about the risk of depoliticising community- based 
initiatives when they act as service providers and apolitical moderators between 
citizens and local governments. Instead, they consider community activism as a 
potential source for building community power and changing the root causes of 
social and spatial problems (DeFilippis et al. 2010). Thanks to the agency of more 
empowered local communities, community- based initiatives can build ‘new insti-
tutions’ to enhance democratic control over unfair processes of neighbourhood 
change. This strand of the literature considers community empowerment as essen-
tial for advocating for more responsive local government (Novy and Leubolt 2005; 
Swyngedouw 2005; Garcia 2010; Ostanel and Attili 2018).
Similarly, Sendra and Fitzpatrick (Chapter 18) argue that community- based 
activism in London has had the power to influence decisions, political agendas 
and the policy- making process. Even though it is not possible to present a picture 
of complete victory, activism creates more opportunities for further successes as 
it seems to have a replicating effect in terms of motivating communities to keep 
fighting at different scales and finding policy alternatives to a politics of austerity. 
These practices can be seen as part of a politics of ‘counter- austerity’, with each 
case offering a particular spatial scale of emergent forms of contestation as new 
policy- making (Arampatzi 2017; Sendra and Fitzpatrick, Chapter 18). According 
to this line of thought, conflict and collaboration can be considered as reinforcing 
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elements in an ongoing political process, where conflict is not only unavoidable 
but also a necessary aspect of community participation and engagement. Real- life 
practices of community- based activism can foster and co- produce formal and/ or 
informal changes in how local institutions function (González and Healey 2005; 
Ostanel 2020).
A path- dependent history of community- based activism 
in Parkdale
This section aims to reconstruct the path- dependent and context (place)- bound 
(Moulaert et  al. 2013; Bunce 2016)  history of community- based activism in 
Parkdale (see Figure  17.1). Community activism in Parkdale has continuously 
changed over time, becoming increasingly attentive to the root causes of social and 
spatial inequalities as well as fostering much- needed conversations across scales – 
moving from the micro (everyday resistance to neighbourhood change) to the 
macro level (policy changes and the rethinking of planning regimes). In the fol-
lowing sections, I explore how community activism has championed social equity 
and inclusivity in Parkdale in relation to planning decisions by Toronto’s municipal 
government and neighbourhood change processes.
Competing visions for Parkdale
Contemporary local activism in Parkdale is largely rooted in community work that 
was started in the 1990s, when the growing divide between affluent homeowners 
and lower- income tenants led to a local consultation process guided by the City 
of Toronto government (Barna 2007). Two competing visions for the neighbour-
hood were raised at the time, with relatively affluent residents wanting to fight 
the overconcentration of social services and rooming houses/ bachelorettes in 
the neighbourhood, considered as the cause of drug dealing, prostitution and the 
presence of numerous very poor residents. Gentrification processes were already 
at play, producing noticeable financial reinvestment in residential and commercial 
property and increasing social displacement, evictions and homelessness (Slater 
2004). The gentrification process was actively supported by the City of Toronto 
from the outset (Slater 2004). Public discourse was constructed around the role 
of bachelorettes (very small bachelor apartments) and rooming houses, because 
these inexpensive rental housing options were seen by gentrifiers and local gov-
ernment to ‘threaten the stability of family neighbourhoods’, ‘destroy streetscape’ 
and ‘bring a host of social problems because of the often- rowdy transients they 
attract as tenants’ (Whitzman and Slater 2006). At the same time, some organisa-
tions active in the provision of social services conveyed a counter- vision. In their 
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lack of jobs. They argued there was an increased need for the provision of more 
social services and social housing in Parkdale. In that period, the Parkdale Activity 
Recreation Centre (PARC) was among the most active community- based organi-
sations supporting a different narrative about Parkdale and working in collabo-
ration with other dynamic social agencies in the neighbourhood, including West 
Figure 17.1 The timeline of community activism in Parkdale (organisations’ 
websites and Barna 2007)
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Neighbourhood House, Sistering and Parkdale Intercultural Association (Barna 
2007). The tension between the two competing visions for Parkdale erupted in 
1996 in response to the introduction of the City of Toronto’s ‘interim control by- 
law’ that prohibited any new rooming house/ bachelorette development or con-
version in South Parkdale designed for low- income tenants (Slater 2004).
An immediate effect of this top- down planning decision by the City of Toronto 
was the creation of an alliance of stakeholder groups in Parkdale. The Parkdale 
Common Front in Defense of Poor Neighbors group was established in 1996 to sup-
port the idea that Parkdale should remain a diverse neighbourhood and accessible 
to low- income people. Many non- profit organisations became part of this associa-
tion, including the Bachelorette Owners Association. The City of Toronto’s planning 
decision also resulted in the creation of more unusual alliances between groups in 
Parkdale and citywide organisations, such as the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty. 
The level of concern and conflict was so high that in 1998, the Toronto City Council 
decided to institute a formal conflict resolution process in Parkdale, aimed at open-
ing up a dialogue with all stakeholder organisations in the neighbourhood. With 
the support of an external facilitator, different organisations and City of Toronto 
staff met for 12 months in order to discuss ‘the approach that the City should take 
on the existing illegal rooming houses and bachelorettes in Parkdale’ (Toronto 
Community Council 1999). In 1999, Toronto’s City Council drafted and adopted 
a report with recommendations to legalize rooming houses. A Parkdale Housing 
Committee was created and a ‘Pilot Project Group’ was initiated in the neighbour-
hood. In 2000, the recommendations started to be implemented and 266 illegal 
rooming house properties were identified for potential legalisation (Barna 2007). 
In 2004, however, the City of Toronto abandoned the Parkdale Pilot Project. Barna 
highlights the lack of long- term support by the City, both from a financial and a 
political point of view, as one of the main reasons why the programme was stopped 
(Barna 2007, 37). Slater’s analysis is directed at the City of Toronto’s unwillingness 
to support single- room occupancy housing in the neighbourhood (Slater 2004).
Towards equitable planning in Parkdale: The role of PARC
Since the end of the 1990s, PARC has had a key stakeholder organising role in 
advocating for access to affordable housing. In 2000, PARC created and managed 
10 units of supported housing on the third floor of its offices at 1499 Queen Street 
West. Commercial units were given to charitable or non- profit organisations in 
order to create a local hub for community services, thus promoting the inclusion 
of new community stakeholders (PARC 2007). Starting from a mission related to 
more traditional drop- in community services, PARC has increasingly built efforts 
to advocate for affordable housing and to organise against evictions caused by 
gentrification. PARC’s first mission statement was written in 1994. It stated that 
‘Parkdale Activity- Recreation Centre is to be a stable and meaningful self- directed 
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resource for the community of psychiatric consumer/ survivors and socially 
 isolated  people, a focus for inspiration and a source of pride for every individual 
Member. We aspire to contribute to the health and well- being, comfort of person, 
richness of spirit, and the expression of individual truth of all PARC Members’ 
(PARC 1994,  1). In  2007, PARC changed its mission statement to ‘a community 
where people rebuild their lives’, with a consequent decision to shift part of the 
mission towards supporting equitable development in the neighbourhood. PARC 
subsequently decided to become a landowner in Parkdale, purchasing 1499 Queen 
St West and 194 Dowling St to protect residents from eviction but at the same time 
forming closer links with both the government and the private market through this 
process (Epstein et al. 2017).
Starting in 2010, PARC started to seriously explore how a community land 
trust might work within the context of Parkdale (see Bunce, Chapter 19). In 2012, 
an interim board for the Parkdale Neighbourhood Land Trust (PNLT), hosted 
through PARC, was formed with the contribution of different organisations. In 
2014, a non- profit organisation was incorporated and run by a board of direc-
tors, consisting of local non- profit organisations and groups that represent the 
diversity of Parkdale. These organisations included PARC, the West End Food 
Co- Op, Greenest City, Roncesvalles- Macdonell Residents Association, Parkdale 
Community Legal Services, Parkdale Village Business Improvement Association, 
West Neighbourhood House (formerly St Christopher House) and Sistering. PARC 
actively works with PNLT and other Parkdale organisations to promote community 
participation in guiding how neighbourhood land is used to benefit the community 
and exploring on- the- ground methods to keep Parkdale affordable and diverse. In 
2018 the work of the PNLT pushed for the approval at the City of Toronto level of 
a $1.5 million fund that a non- profit could use to purchase and operate a Parkdale 
rooming house.
Community- based planning: Planning and organising against 
gentrification
The Parkdale Community Economic Development (PCED) Project (now called the 
Parkdale People’s Economy), an initiative of PARC, has the objective of bringing 
diverse stakeholder efforts together to form a common strategy under the umbrella 
of a ‘community wealth building’ approach. Community wealth building is defined 
as ‘a system approach to economic development that creates an inclusive, sustainable 
economy built on locally rooted and broadly held ownership’ (Kelly et al. 2016, 16). 
The community wealth building approach explicitly emphasises the democratisation 
of the ownership of community assets. Starting in February 2015, different organisa-
tions met on a bi- monthly basis through a Neighbourhood Planning Table, facilitated 
by PARC, to develop a plan for action to support community participation in planning 
and organising in the face of gentrification (PCED 2018). As a product of this work, 
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the Parkdale Community Planning Study is a plan to address displacement pressures 
by building decent work, shared wealth and equitable development in Parkdale. 
According to an analysis of meeting minutes, 63 stakeholders were present at the dif-
ferent planning table meetings among community- based stakeholders (both active 
in Parkdale and across the city), different departments of the City of Toronto (City 
Planning, Public Health and Social Development Finance and Administration), 
community services, faith groups and the University of Toronto.3
PCED describes it as a community planning initiative envisaging a range of 
tools for action: (i) community- based research and community development; (ii) 
direct action, demonstrations and community voting; (iii) community benefits 
framework; and (iv) letter writing and media campaigns. In addition to the plan-
ning table, community working groups have been set up to cover the areas of inter-
est envisaged by the planning study, focusing on the following topics: decent work; 
participatory democracy; community finance; affordable housing; food security; 
cultural development; and community health (PCED 2016). The working groups 
were designed to facilitate the direct participation of residents beyond the plan-
ning table. Community groups set up their own agendas and action plans with the 
aim to incrementally implement the planning actions envisaged and eventually 
revise them.
The community planning process in Parkdale has intersected with the 
Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (TSNS) 2020 (City of Toronto 2012),4 
a neighbourhood policy released by the City of Toronto in 2012 and aimed at pro-
viding ‘an equitable set of social, economic and cultural opportunities for all resi-
dents, leading to equitable outcomes across all neighbourhoods’ (City of Toronto 
2014, 2). The Parkdale People’s Economy planning table has been recognised as 
the institutional table of this municipal government strategy in Parkdale, a situ-
ation that seems to facilitate a smooth flow of communication between munici-
pal departments and policies and different community groups. Nevertheless, the 
TSNS appears to have limited room for action regarding the more structural and 
systemic elements that are causing inequitable development in Parkdale, particu-
larly in relation to constraints on affordable housing as well as democratic control 
over neighbourhood change.
Impacts on planning and development in Parkdale
With an increase in gentrification pressures, Parkdale community organisations 
have needed to reinforce their capacity to respond to how official planning and 
development tools and mechanisms are designed and implemented. One of the 
ways this is being done is through the Parkdale Community Benefits Framework, 
developed in 2018 by Parkdale community organisations ‘to center community 
needs and community benefits when planning for neighbourhood growth and 
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(PCED 2018). The vision of the Parkdale Community Benefits Framework is a ‘call 
for equitable development that respects and benefits existing community mem-
bers, that values people’s lives over profits, and that promotes development with-
out displacement’ (PCED 2018). In terms of equitable development, the document 
calls for the use of ‘transparent and fair process that ensures historically margin-
alized community members can share power and meaningfully participate in the 
development process through participatory planning and direct democracy’ (PCED 
2018). In order to ensure accountability, it states that ‘developments can mitigate 
the risk of displacement through tools such as Equity Impact Studies, Inclusionary 
Zoning, and Community Benefits Agreements’ (PCED 2018).
The Parkdale Community Benefits Framework was used in 2019 as a recom-
mendation in the City of Toronto’s consultation process on inclusionary zoning. 
In this consultation, Parkdale residents and organisations asked for a minimum of 
30 per cent permanently affordable housing with commitments to deep affordability, 
accessibility and adequately sized units for families in new buildings (PCED 2018). 
They advocated for the approval of inclusionary zoning by the City of Toronto in 
order to expand housing options for low- and middle- income renters. While the City 
of Toronto’s inclusionary zoning regulation is still being decided, what is interest-
ing is the effort to establish a more strategic and spatial approach to social inclusion 
through the activism of community- based organisations in Parkdale.
Discussion and conclusion
Parkdale serves as an excellent case study for assessing the capacity of community- 
based initiatives to resist or mitigate the negative effects of neighbourhood change. 
Community activism in Parkdale shows the presence of a strong network of com-
munity organising, which is considered a condition for successful collective mobi-
lisation for positive change (Sampson 2004; Lin Cheng- Chen and Peng 2010; 
Carrière 2016). This chapter showed how community activism in Parkdale has 
developed over time and how it is context- specific and place- bounded. Over the 
years, community- based activism in Parkdale has become increasingly attentive to 
the root causes of social and spatial inequalities, as well as fostering much- needed 
conversations across scales – a movement from the micro (everyday resistance to 
neighbourhood change) to the macro level (policy changes and rethinking of plan-
ning regimes). While community- based action is intrinsically related to different 
scales, it is also important that it is multi- scalar and interrelated: from everyday 
activism, to a broader cultural politics and agency of a neighbourhood (Rankin 
2009), and to broader levels of decision- making, such as local government.
In line with this, I suggest that community- based responses such as those in 
Parkdale are more able to control the negative effects of neighbourhood change 
when they acknowledge the importance of how planning and development 
mechanisms are designed and implemented. This is particularly important in a 
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context where the municipal government is weakened in the governance of land 
use decision- making processes because of the interests of private developers and 
where the benefits of improvement are not shared equitably (Walks and Maaranen 
2008). As Sendra and Fitzpatrick (Chapter 18) highlight, community- based activ-
ism in London has contributed to proposing equitable community- led regeneration 
as well as influencing current policies, as evidenced in the cases of the West Ken and 
Gibbs Green communities. In a similar fashion, Parkdale’s social infrastructure has 
pushed for and co- produced an innovative plan to preserve some of the neighbour-
hood’s rapidly dwindling stock of affordable housing (i.e. the pilot project on room-
ing houses). In addition to this, community- based activism in Parkdale is advocating 
for mandatory inclusionary zoning regulations with high ‘set asides’ – defined as 
the percentage of a new residential building that will be made affordable and ide-
ally provide deep affordability. The concurrent work on the Parkdale Community 
Benefits Framework, being inserted into a broader campaign regarding community 
benefits in development, is identified as an important step for envisioning what com-
munity benefits can be gleaned from future developments in Parkdale. Parkdale’s 
social infrastructure has acknowledged that a successful inclusionary zoning policy 
needs to be integrated with the Toronto Official Plan, affordable housing plans and 
local neighbourhood plans, and geared towards the revision of municipal planning 
and development mechanisms. In this sense, Parkdale is particularly interesting for 
its capacity to merge community development practices, such as collective action 
and solutions to neighbourhood- based problems (Carpenter 2015), with commu-
nity organising strategies directed at changes in policies and approaches at the city 
level and on a broader scale (Brian and Speer 2015).
Community- based activism in Parkdale confirms the idea that contestation 
can be considered as a valuable form of policy- making (Arampatzi 2016 in Sendra 
and Fitzpatrick, Chapter 18). In Parkdale, conflict and collaboration are reinforc-
ing elements in an ongoing political process whereby disagreements (between 
community and local government or between competing neighbourhood visions) 
are not only unavoidable but also a necessary aspect of community participation 
and engagement (Ostanel 2020). Parkdale can be considered as a community 
‘trading zone’ (Balducci and Mäntysalo 2013), where the ordinary structures and 
processes of community planning are transformed in alliance with and relation to 
other stakeholders and different scales of decision- making within and outside the 
neighbourhood sphere. The story of Parkdale’s community organising and activ-
ism efforts demonstrates the creation of a strong social infrastructure in response 
and relation to larger institutional and structural processes and impacts. Over time, 
community activism in Parkdale has enabled the development of community- based 
interventions that combine social and economic justice approaches with building 
cohesive plans intended to influence the decisions of Toronto’s government. In this 
way, community action in Parkdale exemplifies a bottom- up, networked approach 
to resisting impactful neighbourhood change, while at the same time challenging 
any detrimental ‘top- down’ municipal government decisions.
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Notes
 1. Data analysis was developed by the Neighborhood Change Research Partnership, 
http:// neighbourhoodchange.ca .
 2. Parkdale is a neighbourhood approximately 4 kilometres west of the downtown core. Queen Street, an 
important commercial artery for both Parkdale and Toronto, runs east–west through the neighbourhood 
and is used as the dividing line between North and South Parkdale. In this study, South Parkdale is the focus 
of the investigation. Data have been collected considering census tracts 4, 5, 7.01 and 7.02. Liberty Village 
neighbourhood has been analysed considering the impact of its transformation into a hub for creative and 
cultural industries in the late 1990s on South Parkdale.
 3. During the field research I had the opportunity to participate in planning tables and working group meet-
ings, observing interactions as well as analysing meeting schedules and minutes.
 4. The TSNT was aimed at providing ‘an equitable set of social, economic and cultural opportunities for 
all residents, leading to equitable outcomes across all neighbourhoods’ (City of Toronto 2014, 2). The 
TSNT assessment identifies 31 out of 140 neighbourhoods ‘below the benchmark’ and defines place- 
based action plans.
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Time to be an activist: Recent successes 
in housing activism in London
pablo Sendra and Daniel fitzpatrick
Introduction
The recent period of entrenched austerity and a deepening housing crisis in London 
have exacerbated the poor living conditions of many people. Decreasing numbers of 
council homes have forced people to rely on the private rented sector, which remains 
under- regulated, unaffordable for a great proportion of people living in London and 
in poor condition. The tragedy of the Grenfell Tower fire in summer 2017, in one 
of the richest boroughs of the UK, has highlighted the contradictions of  housing 
 provision  – with fatal results. In the aftermath, further contradictions emerged 
 during the rehousing of the survivors and neighbours when it was revealed that 
there were some 1,857 vacant dwellings in the Borough of Kensington and Chelsea 
in July 2017 (Shrubsole 2017).
As a result of the politics of austerity imposed by central government following 
the crisis of 2007–8, local authorities have been exploring different ways of ‘sweat-
ing’ their assets in order to meet their housing targets. These strategies include the 
demolition and redevelopment of social housing estates, selling their housing stock 
or partnering with private developers in joint ventures to deliver urban renewal 
schemes. Cases such as the demolition of the Heygate Estate in Elephant and Castle 
in the London Borough of Southwark have demonstrated that such schemes do not 
meet the needs of the local population. Firstly, the number of social- rented homes 
will decrease from 1,194 to 74 when the scheme is completed, a loss justified in the 
developers’ viability assessment (Wainwright 2015). Secondly, a report on the ‘impact 
of overseas corruption on the London property market’ by Transparency International 
UK (2017) found out that all flats sold in South Gardens in Elephant Park were rep-
resented by one single firm of solicitors, which ‘specialises in international property 
investor purchases’ (p.39). Thirdly, the redevelopment scheme has led to the displace-
ment of most of its residents (London Tenants Federation et al. 2014).
The failure of the Heygate Estate was rooted in the way the redevelopment 
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housing; instead, it served investors, private interests and also the council’s prior-
ity of attracting wealthier people into the borough. Furthermore, the typical terms 
used by the local authority (London Borough of Southwark) in presenting the 
development, such as ‘consultation’ and ‘affordable’, created frustration and dis-
trust (see London Tenants Federation et al. 2014). This frustration was not limited 
to the Heygate redevelopment, but has been felt increasingly by many other groups 
of social housing residents across London and has been highlighted by urban schol-
ars critical of regeneration processes across the world (Watt and Smets 2017).
Amid the tragic and fatal dynamics of under- maintenance, under- regulation, 
bad management, redevelopment and the accompanying displacement, expulsion 
and dispossession on a mass scale, there are housing movements coalescing around 
particular themes, including fighting redevelopment programmes and proposing 
alternatives, opposing joint ventures between local authorities and private devel-
opers, and influencing the policy- making process. This rise of activist movements 
can be linked to the struggles that many communities have suffered in relation to 
their housing conditions, particularly exacerbated since the introduction of auster-
ity politics in 2010 (Watt and Minton 2016). As Ostanel (Chapter 17, this volume) 
explains for the case of Parkdale in Toronto, activism and community- led planning 
have become stronger in the context of a decrease of welfare provision by the state. 
In the UK, the decrease in welfare provision was a key part of the politics of aus-
terity, which was an outcome of the Coalition government of 2010 (Conservative 
and Liberal Democrats) and their response to the financial crisis of 2007–8. On 
the surface it was a deficit- reduction fiscal programme, but it had deep social and 
political effects due to the reduction in public service spending and subsequent 
cuts to public service provision especially affecting areas such as housing and local 
government (Tunstall and Pleace 2018).
After nearly a decade of a rise in activism which has resulted in a range of cam-
paigns around housing, many are succeeding in stopping regeneration schemes, in 
reversing the intention of selling public land to private developers, in preventing joint 
ventures and in influencing housing policy. The rise of such activism has emerged as 
part of a broader questioning of and resistance to not only the social injustices caused 
by austerity but also more widely neoliberal capitalism, including financialisation. In 
recent history, housing struggles and resistance to capitalism have generated alter-
native housing provision, in a similar way to that in which the squatting movement of 
the 1970s was linked to the emergence of housing cooperatives (Vasudevan 2017). 
Other examples include the regeneration protests that led to the establishment of 
London’s Coin Street Community as community- led cooperative housing (Tuckett 
1988; Baeten 2000, 2001; Brindley 2000), or the community- owned housing asso-
ciation of Walterton and Elgin Community Homes (WECH) in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s (Bunce 2016; Rosenberg 2011, 2012; Bailey 2012).
This chapter argues that the rise of activism, including denouncing situa-
tions of injustice, has gained momentum and power to shape decisions, political 
agendas and the policy- making process to the point where in some cases there has 
been a reverse of, or indeed the development of policy alternatives to, a politics of 
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austerity. This is within a context in which local authorities in London, who have a 
responsibility to provide housing for their residents, employ decision- making pro-
cesses that either minimise or ignore local communities’ involvement. The chapter 
also argues that these ‘victories’ create more opportunities for further successes, as 
they have a replicating effect by motivating other activist groups to resist and fight 
for their rights, as well as generating knowledge transfer between campaigns.
The chapter concentrates on three particular themes that are related to local 
authority (council) provision of social housing and maintenance of their hous-
ing stock:  firstly, social housing estate redevelopment, which has been widely 
contested across London (Watt and Minton 2016; Lees and Ferreri 2016; Sendra 
2018); secondly, the opposition to joint ventures between local authorities and pri-
vate developers, a common strategy that local authorities are adopting to deliver 
housing in times of austerity (Beswick and Penny 2018); and thirdly, the influence 
that campaigns have had on the draft planning documents published by the Mayor 
of London:  the Estate Regeneration Good Practice Guide (December 2016), the 
Housing Strategy (September 2017) and the London Plan (December 2017)
Three case studies are used to address these three particular themes, reflect-
ing the scale of campaigning intervention: social housing at a neighbourhood scale, 
at a borough scale and at London- wide metropolitan scale (see Figure 18.1). The 
Figure 18.1 Location of case studies and examples mentioned in the chapter. 
Elaborated by the authors from Open Street Map cartography and boundary 
data (© OpenStreetMap contributors. Data are available under the Open 
Database Licence, and the cartography is licensed as CC BY- SA. https:// www.
openstreetmap.org/ copyright)
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first case study is that of West Kensington and Gibbs Green Community Housing, a 
community group that after nine years of campaigning managed to make their local 
authority (London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham) reconsider the sell- off 
of their homes to a private developer for demolition and redevelopment. The sec-
ond case study is the campaign against the Haringey Development Vehicle, a joint 
venture between the local authority (London Borough of Haringey) and the private 
developer Capco, which managed to stop the creation of a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV); and finally, we examine how community groups responded to the consulta-
tion on the planning documents published by the Mayor of London (Mayor’s Good 
Practice Guide for Estate Regeneration, Housing Strategy, the proposed new fund-
ing condition to require resident ballots in estate regeneration, and the London 
Plan). This involves looking at the achievements and limitations of policy proposals 
such as no loss of social housing in redevelopment schemes or resident ballots as a 
Greater London Authority (GLA) funding condition for regeneration schemes that 
involve demolition.
This chapter is part of a research project titled ‘Community- led social hous-
ing regeneration:  between the formal and the informal’, funded by a British 
Academy/ Leverhulme Grant, developed by Pablo Sendra and Daniel Fitzpatrick 
in collaboration with Just Space, a London- wide network of community groups 
and activists. The research project explores, in the context of London’s housing 
crisis and the UK’s politics of austerity, what strategies community groups are 
using to oppose social housing demolition and redevelopment and how they have 
been able to propose alternative community- led plans for regeneration. For the 
research project, residents, community organisers, activists, campaigners, archi-
tects and a diverse range of people involved in campaigning against housing 
estate demolition were interviewed and, as part of the November 2017 Just Space 
community conference on the Draft Housing Strategy, a workshop was organised 
with community groups to develop a collective response to the consultation pro-
cess and to reflect on how estate regeneration could be led by residents or commu-
nities themselves. The authors also contributed to Just Space’s responses to the 
Draft Housing Strategy, the Mayor’s Ballots Requirement to Estate Regeneration, 
and participated in the discussion on the Draft London Plan consultation (see 
also Ferm, Chapter 8).
Stopping the selling of social housing to private  
developers: An important milestone in a long struggle
Most of the campaigners we interviewed, engaged with and/ or studied in this 
research project were facing dispossession and the demolition of their homes. In 
this chapter we focus on one particular case study of a group that has achieved an 
important milestone in their campaign: West Kensington and Gibbs Green estates 
in the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham (LBHF) in west London.
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The residents started to campaign against the council’s plans for redevelop-
ment in 2009.1 The council intended to sell the land to a private developer in order 
to carry out a mega- redevelopment scheme covering a large site in west London, 
specifically in the neighbourhood of Earls Court, which is spread over two local 
authorities. The two social housing estates  – West Kensington Estate and Gibbs 
Green – are within the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, while the 
remaining area of the Earls Court redevelopment scheme is in the Royal Borough 
of Kensington and Chelsea.
The residents approached Jonathan Rosenberg, who joined them as commu-
nity organiser. Rosenberg had succeeded, in the late 1980s, in stopping Westminster 
Council from selling the Walterton and Elgin estates to developers and in complet-
ing the transfer of housing stock from Westminster Council to a community- owned 
housing association – WECH – in the early 1990s, using a piece of legislation that 
did not remain in effect for long, the 1988 Tenants Choice.
One of the first moves of West Kensington and Gibbs Green residents after 
Rosenberg joined them as community organiser was to set up the Community 
Land Trust West Ken and Gibbs Green Community Housing (WKGGCH) with the 
aim of applying for a Right to Transfer. Community land trusts are a practice for 
community- based land stewardship and affordable housing creation (Bunce 2016) 
or, in the case of West Ken and Gibbs Green, protection of social housing against 
demolition. As Bunce further reflects in Chapter 19, the emergence of community- 
based, resident- led and non- governmental organisation- supported actions, in cit-
ies such as London and Toronto, against gentrification pressures has led to people 
finding solutions at the community or neighbourhood scale. In the case of West Ken 
and Gibbs Green, the Right to Transfer legislation was still being passed and there-
fore not in place but was intended to allow residents to acquire collective ownership 
and control of their homes and therefore then to propose their own regeneration 
scheme, as the Walterton and Elgin residents had done thanks to the 1988 Tenants 
Choice legislation. The new legislation was not in place until November 2013, so 
the residents were only able to present a Right to Transfer notice in August 2015. 
In the meantime, they asked Architects for Social Housing to help them draft a 
People’s Plan, which proposed building between 200 and 300 new homes with-
out the need to demolish any existing houses. This notice was rejected by LBHF in 
September 2015 and both LBHF and WKGGCH asked for a determination from the 
Secretary of State. This came on July 2019 and determined that LBHF’s rejection 
of the notice was valid. In March 2020, WKGGCH gave a Right to Transfer notice 
again, and this time it was accepted by LBHF in April 2020.2
Although the transfer has not happened yet, the experience does provide a 
good example of knowledge transfer from past experiences and also serves as an 
example of testing a new piece of legislation. Thus, WKGGCH’s ambition to gain 
community ownership and control of their homes as a response to the threat of 
privatisation and demolition was inspired by WECH’s success in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Campaigns learn from each other and also learn from past experiences. 
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Another campaign in London that has also served notice for the Right to Transfer 
is the group of residents of Cressingham Garden in the Borough of Lambeth (see 
Chapter 3 in Sendra and Fitzpatrick 2020). This experience was also useful to test 
whether the new legislation worked in granting residents ownership and control of 
their homes. In this sense, Rosenberg highlighted the problems of the new legisla-
tion compared with the 1988 Tenants Choice legislation that WECH used in the 
early 1990s.3
At the same time as the community was preparing to serve notice for the 
Right to Transfer, the council was continuing in its plans to sell the land to the 
developer and this was challenged through judicial review by the residents (see 
Chapter  11 in Sendra and Fitzpatrick 2020). While the judicial review did not 
 manage to stop the Conditional Land Sale Agreement (CLSA), it did delay it. In 
2013, the  council signed a CLSA with the developer Capco, with the signing taking 
place a few months before the Right to Transfer legislation was finalised.
Despite it being a long campaign, the West Ken and Gibbs Green community 
remained strong and united for many years and gained support from politicians, 
professionals, scholars, urban planning students and other activists. In January 
2018, as a result of years of campaigning and the use of diverse strategies, planning 
tools and actions (see Sendra 2018), the new council, which had changed from 
Conservative to Labour, demanded that the developers hand back the estate to the 
council. By February 2018, the council launched an investigation into the previous 
administration’s deal which had sold off the site to Capco in 2012 (Prynn 2019).
This was an important milestone in the residents’ effort to avoid displace-
ment and gain control of their neighbourhood’s future. It was also an important 
achievement in that it can influence other councils and residents across London, 
and it provides a demonstration of the positive impact that collective action and 
campaigning can have. While writing this chapter, the authors attended a preview 
screening of a film about the campaign along with a series of other historical films 
on tenants and residents across the UK taking control of housing. The event, held in 
the estate’s community centre, was packed and attended by many residents as well 
as people who had supported or sympathised with the campaign in different ways 
over the years, and the atmosphere of the event was optimistic.
Haringey Development Vehicle: Has it been stopped?
In its attempts to deal with housing shortages and the poor quality of social housing 
stock in the borough, Haringey Council in north London decided to undertake a 
£2 billion deal with a private partner, Lendlease, through which the council would 
provide the land and the developer would undertake a regeneration programme 
of all housing on council- owned land. The SPV set up for this purpose, known as 
the Haringey Development Vehicle (HDV), was approved in July 2017 as a 50/ 50 
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group was chosen following a supposedly lengthy process, despite their reputation 
for having been involved in the plans for the aforementioned demolition of the 
Heygate Estate, in the London Borough of Southwark. The decision to create such 
an SPV as a joint venture was partly so that the council could draw on the devel-
oper’s real estate experience in speculative interventions while maintaining some 
semblance of control, albeit not openly accountable or transparent to the public. 
Furthermore, the logic of the HDV, as in many of the other London cases of housing 
SPVs, was based on developing affordable housing through the cross- subsidies of 
speculative market housing to sell on the private market and treating public land as 
a financial asset (Beswick and Penny 2018).
Local residents, political groups, housing campaigners and other local organ-
isations representing a diverse range of local views came together very quickly to 
create a multi- stranded campaign to prevent the HDV from going ahead. Their 
two main concerns were the lack of social housing in the business plan on which 
the HDV was based and the lack of accountability in the governance of the SPV 
(Chakraborty 2017a). There was also a dimension of local political ideologies play-
ing out within the local Labour Party which ran the council, along lines dividing the 
older, establishment Labour elements in the council, including councillors and the 
leader, and the newer, more grassroots Labour group, which included Momentum 
as the activist wing of the party, as made explicit in the Labour manifesto and gen-
eral election of 2017 (Chakraborty 2017b). However, the struggle did not play out 
as a purely internal Labour Party rift, but echoed the wider concerns of residents 
in most boroughs across London, especially around housing, affected by forms 
of property- led regeneration heavily dependent on financialised and viability- 
dependent modes of planning (Raco and de Souza 2018).
The main concerns about the SPV’s lack of accountability and its govern-
ance began with the process that led to the particular SPV being set up as well 
as the future plans for its governance. The proposed quantity of social housing 
was also unclear: the land to be used by the HDV had around 1,400 social homes, 
and Lendlease was originally proposing to build 6,400 new homes, presumably by 
demolishing large swathes of the existing social housing stock, while only promis-
ing that 40 per cent of new homes would be ‘affordable’, with no explicit provision 
for social- rent housing (Chakraborty 2017a). The council’s strategy was one of 
growth, which the then leader of the council, Claire Kober, described in her letter 
of resignation as ‘the only option for a council like Haringey determined to control 
its own destiny’ (Kober 2017). The question for residents, however, was what form 
this growth would take.
There were also concerns about the ability of the developer to complete the 
job given its failure in the regeneration of the Heygate Estate, if one applies such 
evaluative criteria as increasing social housing provision and having meaningful 
resident participation and engagement in the development process, rather than 
the displacement of original residents. Moreover, there were wider concerns about 
how developers would exploit viability assessments to reduce the number of social 
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housing units provided, as in the case of Heygate (Wainwright 2015), and eventu-
ally transform the schemes into enclaves for wealthier residents (Lees 2014; Lees 
and Ferreri 2016).
In October 2017, the campaign that had coalesced around the StopHDV 
group, a coalition of Haringey residents opposed to the HDV, took Haringey Council 
and Lendlease to court. They challenged the decision to set up the HDV through a 
judicial review. The case was refused by the judge in February 2018. A secondary 
outcome, however, was the resignation of the Labour leader of the council Claire 
Kober, who stepped down..
In the run- up to local elections and as a result of the StopHDV campaign a 
swathe of deselections of local Labour candidates took place and the elections 
in May 2018 resulted in a new administration taking over the council, which 
remained in overall Labour control. In July 2018, the newly formed Labour cabi-
net, in keeping with their election manifesto pledge, voted not to approve the 
formation of the HDV and therefore scrapped the agreement with Lendlease 
(Haringey 2018). This resulted in a claim being filed against the council by 
Lendlease for the expenditure incurred after being picked as partner in the 
SPV. In an out- of- court settlement in February 2019, Haringey agreed to pay 
£520,275 to Lendlease (Jessel 2018).
With greater control over the future regeneration of Haringey’s estates, 
it is unclear what strategy is going to be used to replace the joint venture SPV. 
More recently, concerns have arisen regarding the proposal for a scheme on the 
Broadwater Farm estate which requires the demolition of two blocks – Tangmere 
and Northolt  – being exempt from resident ballots. An application was made 
to the GLA to consider whether Haringey could be exempted from balloting on 
the grounds of safety (London Assembly 2018). Local groups have nonetheless 
expressed concerns over the lack of balloting, not because residents disagreed with 
the options to demolish but, more importantly, they believed that resident ballots 
on schemes involving the demolition of social housing should be carried out as it is 
a decision for tenants to make.4
More serious concerns have been raised over the other regeneration sites 
that were exempt from resident ballots as they had already been scheduled for 
demolition before the mayoral requirement for balloting for estate regeneration 
was approved. In many cases, it would undermine the original concerns that resi-
dent ballots sought to address, namely as an instrument to reinforce the principles 
of participation and greater resident involvement in the decision- making process 
with regard to housing management and regeneration. These are some of the main 
drivers of residents’ involvement and their concerns with the processes of social 
housing regeneration. The way in which these concerns have been articulated can 
be further seen in the case of community groups’ involvement in the consultation 
process at the larger spatial scale of the mayoral draft planning documents, includ-
ing the mayor’s Good Practice Guide for Estate Regeneration, the Resident Ballots 
Funding Requirement, the Housing Strategy and the London Plan.
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Consultation on the Mayor of London’s policy documents: An 
opportunity?
Community groups and housing activists have campaigned simultaneously in mul-
tiple dimensions. Although the aforementioned campaigns may seem isolated and 
disconnected, they are networked and form part of a new conscience for activism 
in London. This network has crystallised in organisations such as Just Space, a 
London- wide ‘informal alliance of ... community groups, campaigns and concerned 
independent organisations’ (JustSpace.org.uk), as well as other groups such as Axe 
the Housing Act, Radical Housing Network, Generation Rent, Demolition Watch 
and other organisations, some locally based. Just Space as a network was born in 
the early 2000s, soon after the formation of the GLA and the election of the first 
Mayor of London in the year 2000, with the aim of uniting the voices of communi-
ties to influence planning in London (Lipietz et al. 2014). This network has played a 
very important role in supporting community groups, sharing knowledge between 
the different campaigns, developing partnerships with academia to establish col-
laborations between communities, researchers and students, and putting together 
collective responses to consultation processes on planning policy documents. They 
have also created their own ‘Community- led London Plan’ (Just Space 2016), 
where they have a series of well- researched policy proposals. As Ferm touches on in 
Chapter 8, the Just Space network has done much work on highlighting the econ-
omy and planning at a local level and changing the approach to industrial land, for 
example, taken in the London Plan, but here we reflect on another strand of Just 
Space’s work focused on housing and regeneration.
In May 2016, Sadiq Khan (Labour Party) won the election for Mayor of 
London. In his campaign he promised to address the housing crisis. As Raco and 
Livingstone explore in Chapter  1, there are a series of ambiguities in the imple-
mentation of policies to address the housing crisis which have resulted in opposite 
effects. This is a result both of the rhetoric used around the governance of residen-
tial development in London and also the unintended consequences of policy imple-
mentation. In reference to estate regeneration, Khan stated that it would only take 
place where ‘there is resident support, based on full and transparent consultation’. 
In the first couple of years of his mandate, he published three draft documents 
to address the issue of estate regeneration:  the ‘Draft Good Practice Guide for 
Estate Regeneration’ (December 2016), the ‘Draft Housing Strategy’ (September 
2017) and the ‘Draft New London Plan’ (December 2017). The Resident Ballot was 
also consulted on as a separate policy within the ‘Good Practice Guide for Estate 
Regeneration’ during April 2018. For each of the documents, the Mayor of London 
opened a consultation process in which individuals and organisations could pro-
vide responses to the documents. In February 2018, the mayor published a revised 
version of the ‘Good Practice Guide for Estate Regeneration’, where he took on 
board some of the comments that were provided in the consultation process. One 
of the most significant changes was to put in place a condition that for GLA funding 
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of regeneration schemes there had to be a residents’ ballot in which the majority of 
the residents have to vote in favour of the regeneration. The mayor opened another 
consultation on this particular change in April 2018 and, in July 2018, the require-
ment that resident ballots must be held for redevelopment schemes that apply for 
GLA funding and involve demolition of any housing association or council-owned 
housing and the construction of at least 150 new homes was approved. However, 
this measure is seen as insufficient by many activists and resident groups since it 
is only a requirement for those that apply for GLA funding. A  freedom of infor-
mation request revealed that many redevelopment schemes that were already in 
the pipeline – such as the demolition of the social housing estate in the Borough 
of Lambeth, Cressingham Gardens – had been granted funding from the GLA just 
before making such consultations obligatory.
Just Space has coordinated and collated detailed and thorough responses 
from community groups to each of the consultation documents.5 One of the most 
significant aspects of the responses is the method they used to formulate a collective 
response, ensuring that as many of its member organisations as possible are involved 
and represented. For each consultation process, Just Space organised a ‘community 
conference’ (two conferences in the case of the London Plan, one of them in collabo-
ration with the GLA), in which the attendees worked in themed groups to address 
particular chapters of the policy document and conclude with key points to address. 
After that, a working group collected the responses and put together a collective 
response, which was sent to all Just Space members before its submission to the 
GLA. This collaborative process, in which diverse community activists representing 
different community groups’ interests wrote a collective response to policy docu-
ments, is unique and demonstrates a strong engagement with wider issues across 
London, beyond the boundaries of each of these communities (of interest and of 
place). The engagement of Just Space with policy- making in London also included 
meeting with GLA staff to discuss policy directions before they were published.
At the time of writing (spring 2019), the results of the consultation processes 
were yet to be declared as the Examination in Public (EiP) of the Draft London 
Plan was ongoing and being led by the Planning Inspectorate (see Figure 18.2). 
However, certain important achievements and limitations can be identified. One of 
the main achievements of the London Plan in regulating the speculation of social 
housing is that redevelopment plans should demonstrate no net loss of floor space 
of social- rented housing and, when demolished, they should be replaced ‘like- for- 
like’. This was already expressed in the draft before the consultation but responds 
to the advocacy of community organisations and housing groups in their attempts 
to prevent regeneration schemes such as Heygate. Another relative achievement of 
the consultation process has been incorporating the requirement that residents are 
balloted for redevelopment schemes in order to obtain GLA funding. However, one 
of the main limitations is that most of the policies do not give statutory power to 
the mayor to stop developments, but condition GLA funding on meeting a series of 
‘good practices’, which may not be strong enough to stop redevelopment schemes. 
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Just Space has also been particularly concerned with the vague language used in 
many instances,6 giving flexibility to local authorities, housing associations and 
developers to interpret the policy. In addition to this, despite mentioning several 
times in the policy documents the need for a transparent consultation process, 
none of the policies consider that residents may want to take the lead on a regen-
eration scheme, as many of the campaigns are claiming.
Emerging cultures of housing activism in London: From 
campaigning to policy- making
The ‘successes’ presented here are not definite victories where residents have man-
aged to gain full control of their housing at neighbourhood or borough levels, 
but they are important milestones that have impeded or delayed redevelopment, 
proposed alternative forms of regeneration, stopped temporarily a joint venture 
between local authority and private developers, and, at a wider scale, influenced 
policy. There are two main points that emerge from these case studies:
• The achievements as a result of campaigning can motivate other activist 
groups to resist and fight for their rights, as well as generate knowledge trans-
fer between campaigns.
• The rise of activism and denouncing situations of injustice can influence policy- 
making and reverse or indeed find policy alternatives to a politics of austerity.
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Regarding the first point, successes from campaigning have a double effect: they 
motivate other groups to keep fighting and they generate knowledge transfer 
between campaigns. Motivation is a key component of every campaign, particu-
larly during long ones such as those that involve resisting demolition and propos-
ing alternative plans. Campaigning requires a lot of time, emotional effort and 
unpaid labour. It is important to have moments of success or to achieve milestones 
so that campaigns are sustained and the participants remain motivated. It is also 
important for campaigners to see that other community groups, in similar situa-
tions, are achieving milestones and successes that indicate campaigning is effec-
tive and that their efforts may be rewarded. Networks and alliances of community 
groups are critical for this knowledge transfer and support between campaigns to 
happen. The creation of alliances between campaigns and different community- 
based organisations is increasingly becoming common in other cities, as Ostanel 
(Chapter 17) explains for the case of Parkdale in Toronto.
Another key driver of the motivation for campaigning is the social infrastruc-
ture it generates. Campaigns such as WKGGCH, which organised events such as the 
film screening, bringing together residents and campaign supporters, develop their 
strength from the social infrastructures built around the campaign.
The cases we have presented in this chapter are examples of campaigns that 
have had varying effects at the neighbourhood scale, the local authority scale and 
at the London- wide metropolitan strategic scale. Their effects can motivate com-
munities to keep fighting at all levels. Ostanel (Chapter 17), when explaining the 
case study of Parkdale in Toronto, highlights that community activism becomes 
stronger when it jumps between different scales, from the micro scale of everyday 
resistance to the macro scale of influencing policy.
In addition to motivation, there is also knowledge transfer between cam-
paigns. For example, WKGGCH learnt two main lessons from WECH’s experi-
ence: (1) how to plan a strategy for community ownership and control of their 
homes; and (2)  how to keep a community together for a collective aim. These 
are two important knowledge transfers that WKGGCH is further developing, and 
thanks to this work, other campaigns will be able to learn from this and take this 
knowledge even further. The same happened with borough- wide campaigns such 
as StopHDV and with the participation of community groups in the consultation 
on the Mayor of London’s planning documents. In the latter case, Just Space has 
kept a record of the process on its website and has collected both the responses 
from many community groups and also criticism of the policies once they are 
approved.
Another important point for this knowledge transfer between communities 
is the collaboration between community groups, scholars, students and profes-
sionals. Both the cases of WKGGCH and of Just Space’s work on responding to the 
consultation on the Mayor of London’s planning documents have had engagement 
with scholars and students, thus contributing to recording the knowledge gener-
ated in each of these campaigns.
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The cases we have explored also offer examples of the way in which forms 
of activism can not only organise people against particular forms of injustice, but 
also influence policy- making processes and shift, reverse or find alternative poli-
cies. This process can be seen as part of a politics of counter- austerity, with each 
case offering a particular spatial scale of emergent forms of contestation as a form 
of policy- making (Arampatzi 2017).
In West Ken and Gibbs Green, the sell- off of public land and demolition in order 
to create a new master- planned neighbourhood was partly prevented. However, 
the contestation at the neighbourhood scale went further as it sought to develop a 
response based on legislation used in similar circumstances by WECH: namely, the 
Right to Transfer. Testing this piece of legislation was important as it demonstrated 
the potential of a policy to increase resident control of housing, but it also high-
lighted the flaws in the legislation as the decision remained stuck for years at the 
secretary of state level. Although the campaign has been able to halt the develop-
ment, and the Right to Transfer notice has finally been accepted by the council, the 
transfer has not been completed yet.
The StopHDV campaign was an important example of a borough- wide coali-
tion of housing and regeneration activist groups working locally and across differ-
ent existing interests and parties to stop the Haringey Development Vehicle. The 
judicial review, although it was lost, challenged the consultation process and the 
wider implications of an SPV set up by the council with a private entity where there 
would be less public accountability and oversight. The judgement, although not in 
favour of the plaintiff as activist organisation, may encourage councils in the future 
to consider more carefully specific decisions concerning regeneration proposals 
and policies.7 It also offers a salutary story of electoral defeat for political parties, 
which could encourage councils to be more tentative or even risk averse. These are, 
of course, only hypotheses at this stage, but they do trace the emergence of some 
elements of influence that housing activism can have at the London borough scale 
in the context of austerity politics.
Finally, the case of the London Plan and the consultation process has involved 
particular forms of activism related to the policy- making process. Just Space, as 
well as other important community networks including activist groups, have been 
able to articulate specific demands indirectly by means of the comments and official 
responses to the different stages and documents, as well as forums, including the EiP. 
Throughout this process, responses have been considered and submissions analysed 
in a laborious process of consultation. However, this has also been an arena for activ-
ist groups to discuss and compare ideas regarding particular policy responses. One 
example was the briefing sessions that Just Space organised at UCL once a month dur-
ing the EiP, which were opened to activists, community group representatives as well 
as researchers and students. These forums for discussion, learning and knowledge 
exchange become spaces for the development of policy contestation and also explora-
tion of new policy ideas. Therefore, they become important emergent spaces for activ-
ists at both physical and spatial level, but also at a discursive and policy- forming level.
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Notes
 1. Interviews with community organiser, housing organiser and resident (2017).
 2. This information comes from interviews and email exchanges with the community organiser Jonathan 
Rosenberg between 2017 and 2020 and from the determination of the Secretary of State available here: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/816103/West_Ken_Gibbs_Green_determination_letter_Redacted.pdf.
 3. This came out in the interviews with Jonathan Rosenberg in 2017 and from two reports he wrote on the 
legislation in 2012 and 2013.
 4. In the case of Tangmere and Northolt, structural surveys had been carried out and revealed serious struc-
tural damage in the panel systems. Strengthening costs were reported to be estimated at £33.6 million and 
rebuilding was estimated at between £32 million and £54 million. The cabinet opted for demolition and 
rebuild (Hill 2018).
 5. See links for consultation documents prepared by Just Space for Response to the Estate Regeneration Guide, 
to the Housing Strategy, London Plan and Resident Ballots at http:// www.justspace.org.uk.
 6. This has come out in various discussions around the London Plan consultation in Just Space conferences and 
meetings during 2018 and 2019.
 7. See Sackman (2020) on the use of judicial reviews to contest regeneration.
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Engagement and activism in community 
land ownership: The emergence of 
community land trusts in London 
and Toronto
Susannah Bunce
London and Toronto are cities that face similar affordable housing pressures and, 
as such, are contexts for the pursuit of alternative and innovative solutions to the 
provision of affordable housing and for a deeper consideration of community- 
based affordable housing needs. As a model and mechanism that combines 
community- based planning and activist practices with community land ownership 
and affordable housing solutions, non- profit and non- governmental community 
land trust (CLT) organisations have been successful in forming in both cities at 
the neighbourhood level. Indeed, since the 2000s, London’s CLT development has 
grown from initial land ownership negotiations for the creation of the East London 
Community Land Trust (ELCLT) in 2007 to the recent emergence of a pan- London 
CLT organisation that encompasses multiple neighbourhood- based and resident- 
led CLT groups. The formation of CLTs in Toronto, comparatively, has not followed 
the breadth and size of London’s CLT activism since the 2000s but has emerged 
in localised ways through informal, relational associations between organisational 
actors within specific neighbourhood contexts. CLTs, in both cities, have formed in 
response to similar challenges, namely the impacts of market- driven urbanisation 
primarily identified through the encroachment of gentrification into traditionally 
affordable neighbourhoods, social displacement, and the difficulties of securing 
and retaining affordable housing in cities with soaring and increasingly elusive 
rental housing and homeownership costs.
In addition to seeking to address these issues in their work, CLT organisations 
in London and Toronto have underlined the CLT model as a community engage-
ment approach that aims to galvanise public discussion about a need for the com-
munity ownership and stewardship of land, local solutions for affordable housing 
and the identification of community needs through participatory engagement. As a 
community engagement strategy that centres the role of community residents in the 
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formation and maintenance of CLT practices, the proliferation of CLT organisations 
and community- based land ownership and stewardship in London and Toronto raises 
important questions regarding the role of community- based, non- governmental 
organisations in affordable housing provision. As non- state entities, CLTs are self- 
directed and fairly autonomous but strategically partner with government actors in 
various ways, particularly in relation to land acquisition, planning approvals and 
funding arrangements. In both Toronto and London, fairly cooperative relationships 
between CLT organisational structures and local government are observed that have 
been cultivated through advocacy on the part of CLT organisations as well as an 
emerging public interest in alternative models of land tenure in both cities.
In the UK, a more comprehensive approach to government support for CLT 
organisations has arisen since the 2000s, primarily as a result of the more direct 
national to local government relationship. A recent outcome of the direct connec-
tion between national and city- level governments for CLT growth has been the 
national government- initiated Community- Led Housing fund that seeks to foster 
local community- led housing efforts, including funding arrangements for CLT 
groups. CLT organising has also benefitted from the presence of a National CLT 
Network that represents CLTs across England and Wales and offers funding and 
technical expertise to emergent CLTs. In the Canadian context, as result of the juris-
dictional arrangements of municipal governance, local governments are regulated 
and funded by provincial- level governments, and therefore there is an absence of 
a direct relationship between city- level politics and nationwide governance. The 
emergence of CLTs in Canada is contained in a localised way as a result, and they 
have more limited relationships with provincial government legislation and poli-
cies and more connectivity with local government structures.
Despite these differences in governance approaches, the emergence of CLTs 
in London and Toronto can be viewed in the light of a similar and growing move-
ment towards community- based solutions to the ever increasing affordable hous-
ing challenges in both cities. It also reflects long- standing interest and activity in 
neighbourhood- based community engagement and activism in both cities. In this 
way, CLTs have a role in fostering participation by and between neighbourhood 
residents in decision- making over community needs for land to be acquired or 
owned by the CLT organisation. In relation to the emphasis placed on ‘community’, 
as underlined in the community land trust model, the participation in the creation 
of equitable decision- making structures and the preservation of the place- based 
connections of neighbourhood residents are integral aspects of CLT activism and 
mobilisation in London and Toronto, and both contexts offer informative examples 
for the study of CLT organising more broadly.
Defining community land trusts
Over the past several decades, there has been an increasing adoption of the com-
munity land trust model across the globe in countries such as the UK (Thompson 
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2015; Bunce 2016; Moore and McKee 2012), Canada (Bunce and Aslam 2016; 
Bunce 2018; Bunce and Barndt 2020), Australia (Crabtree 2010, 2014) and Kenya 
(Midheme and Mouleart 2013). CLT practices first emerged in the United States 
in the 1960s as a way for African- American tenant farmers in Georgia to acquire 
and own land and as a component of the larger civil rights struggle in the United 
States (Curtin and Bocarsly 2010; Davis 2010). The first urban CLT emerged in 
Cincinnati in the early 1980s, in a downtown neighbourhood with a large num-
ber of African-American residents. The CLT was used to protect neighbourhood 
land from real estate speculation and residents from displacement pressures, and 
as a method of advocating for community needs. The urban CLT model, largely 
geared towards these purposes as well as affordable housing provision, quickly 
took hold in American cities; by 2007 there were approximately 250 urban CLTs, 
primarily located in cities in the north- eastern United States (Greenstein and 
Sungu- Erylimaz, 2007).
The Champlain CLT, a community land trust in Burlington, Vermont, became 
known as a key organisation for defining the CLT model and, due to political inter-
est in this particular CLT, its features were embedded in the official definition of a 
community land trust that is articulated in the United States’ federal Housing and 
Community Development Act (Davis 2010). This legislation recognised the general 
characteristics of community land trusts, as non- governmental, non- profit organisa-
tions that mobilise to acquire land that is either donated or purchased with organi-
sational funds. More specifically, CLTs hold land in trust for community purposes 
and place legal restrictions on the future resale of the land and buildings as ways 
to maintain long- term affordability and prevent profit- making from increased land 
value and building prices. Structures on CLT land, such as housing, can be owned 
or leased by members of the CLT organisation, but a firm separation between land 
ownership and the ownership or lease of structures by individuals is articulated in 
a ground lease. This ground lease is created by the CLT organisation and identi-
fies the CLT as the landowner, and prevents profit gains from the resale of housing 
and limits or prohibits rent increases for rental housing owned by the CLT (Davis 
2010). The characteristics of the American CLT model have largely been taken up 
by CLT networks and individual organisations in other countries. Writ large, the 
general directives of CLTs are to hold title to land for an indefinite period in order 
to retain affordability and to de- commodify land; separate land ownership from 
the ownership or lease of any structures on the land through legal contracts; pre-
vent any resale profits; and work with community residents to identify land uses 
through collaborative decision- making (Aird 2010; Bunce 2016; Bunce et al. 2013; 
Crabtree 2010, 2014; Davis 2010; DeFilippis et al. 2018; Gray 2008; Meehan 2014; 
Moore and McKee 2012; Thompson 2015). The dominant focus and outcome of the 
 collaborative practices of CLTs have been the provision of affordable housing for 
homeownership and/ or lease, and more recently the development of social enter-
prises such as small business incubators, community kitchens, community gardens 
and urban farms (Yuen 2014; Yuen and Rosenberg 2013).
ENgAgEMENt AND ACtiv iSM iN CoMMuNity LAND oWNErShip 277
Community land trusts in Canada and the UK (England 
and Wales)
CLT organisations have emerged in rural and urban locations in the UK since 
the 1990s and have grown steadily in numbers since this time, as opposed to the 
development of CLTs in Canada, which have largely formed in Canadian cities in 
more ad hoc ways and in smaller numbers since the 1980s. While housing asso-
ciations in the UK, such as Coin Street Community Builders and Poplar HARCA, 
both located in London, have been active in community- focused redevelopment 
and affordable housing provision, a particularly robust and concentrated emer-
gence of CLTs occurred in the 2000s in the UK. This increase occurred through the 
efforts of Community Finance Solutions, a research centre based at the University 
of Salford, which had developed professional ties with American CLT organi-
sations and the national CLT network in the United States and was inspired by 
the American CLT model. Community Finance Solutions, in conjunction with 
Carnegie UK Trust and Tudor Trust as funding bodies, created two ‘incubator’ pro-
grammes for CLT development in the UK between 2006 and 2010 (Community 
Finance Solutions 2009; Moore and McKee 2012). In addition to the provision of 
support to local CLT organisations, the first programme aimed to raise the profile 
and applicability of the CLT model more broadly and encourage political support 
for CLTs, the latter of which led to the establishment of a statutory definition of 
community land trusts in the Labour government’s Housing and Regeneration 
Act of 2008. Both programmes were able to generate enough interest among 
community- based organisations in the CLT model and jump- start the emergence 
of CLT organisations. The establishment of the National CLT Network in 2010 
marked a further interest in CLT organisational development across England and 
Wales. The National CLT Network’s acquisition of charitable status in 2014 pro-
vided an increase in funding, technical and educational assistance to local CLT 
groups (Scotland, due to differences in land regulations, has its own community 
land trust umbrella called Community Land Scotland). The proliferation of CLTs 
in both rural and urban locations in England and Wales was demonstrated in the 
number of CLT organisations formed over the past decade. By 2013, there were 
100 CLT groups across England and Wales (Moore, 2013) and a recent estimate 
suggests that there are now 290 CLT organisations (National CLT Network 2019). 
Of importance to this chapter, the formation of CLTs in cities since the mid- 2000s, 
in London as well as in cities such as Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool and Newcastle, has 
demonstrated the use of the model as a way to alleviate affordable housing pres-
sures, resist gentrification and displacement processes, and advocate for commu-
nity needs at the neighbourhood scale (Bunce 2016; Thompson 2015).
The growth of CLTs in England and Wales over this period has largely been 
supported by the existence of amenable national and local political contexts and the 
existence of both governmental and private philanthropic funding for CLT forma-
tion. Yet, as a contradictory element of CLT formation, CLT organisations have also 
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emerged within the context of neoliberal austerity policies that have withdrawn 
funding for community- based agencies, ‘big society’ ideas of volunteerism and civic 
engagement, and a discourse of ‘localism’ and the downloading of governmental 
responsibilities to community organisations  – directives that have been under-
lined and advanced by the recent succession of Conservative governments. It was 
Theresa May’s Conservative government, in its support for ‘community- led’ initia-
tives that rely less on public investment and more on partnership- oriented funding 
arrangements with private sector bodies, that created favourable legislative condi-
tions and funding for community- led housing, primarily through the creation of 
the Community Housing Fund – a £163 million start- up fund, to be implemented 
over three years, intended for community- proposed and - led housing initiatives 
(UK Government 2020). This initiative began in 2018 with funding from the 
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (Cooperative Councils 
Innovation Network 2017; Interview with F.  Toomey 2019). The Community 
Housing Fund is delivered by Community- Led Homes, a programme managed by a 
consortium of non- governmental organisations such as the National CLT Network, 
the Confederation of Co- operative Housing, and Locality. In keeping with the gov-
ernmental emphasis on partnerships, the Community- Led Homes programme 
operates concurrently with another programme, Homes in Community Hands, 
that is managed by Power to Change, a trust that has received funds from the UK’s 
National Lottery Community Fund to provide start- up funding to local community 
housing groups in areas that are not covered by the Community Housing Fund.
In London, the Community Housing Fund is administered by the Greater 
London Authority (GLA), which was given £38 million through the Fund until 2023 
(more than the three- year time frame). Community- Led Housing London (CLHL) 
has been allocated £8 million to support new community- led housing groups, with 
the idea that once the group obtains a development site CLHL then transfers the 
project to the GLA to fund the development process (personal  correspondence 
with F. Toomey, 12 February 2020). The funding is intended to be directed towards 
GLA- based community- led housing groups such as community land trusts, com-
munity self- build projects and co- housing groups (Community Led Homes 2018; 
Interview with F.  Toomey 2019). CLHL allocates small loans of approximately 
£40,000 to groups that submit proposals for community- led initiatives. In conjunc-
tion with loan allocations, CLHL also provides technical resource information to 
emerging community- led housing groups.
It is important to note here that although the funding for the Community- 
Led Homes programme originates with the Ministry of Housing, Communities 
and Local Government under the directive of the Conservative government, the 
discourse of the community- led housing movement is socially progressive and 
focused on empowering communities to address affordable housing constraints 
and problems. The Community- Led Homes programme refers to ‘continuing 
headlines of housing targets missed, dodgy landlords, Dickensian conditions, 
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It suggests that community- led housing is ‘borne [sic] out of people all over the 
country who have reached the limits of their own frustration with the housing situ-
ation (either their own, their children’s or the community’s) and have decided to 
take matters into their own hands’ (Community Led Homes 2018). On the topic of 
community empowerment, the programme suggests that ‘community led housing 
isn’t about giving people power, it’s a mechanism for people to take power and 
create something better’ (Community Led Homes 2018). Setting the rationale for 
community- led housing within a context of inadequate housing environments, 
the consequences of luxury flat development and the problems caused by ‘on- the- 
make’ landlords points to a critical stance on the conditions set forth by the austerity 
agenda and neoliberal urban development. It also demonstrates the contradic-
tion that is inherent in the Conservative government’s support for community- led 
housing, where community- led housing projects are funded by the government to 
try to mitigate some of the social problems that have been created by the govern-
ment’s championing of austerity and other forms of neoliberalism. This contradic-
tion, unfortunately, underwrites some of the narrative of CLT  development in the 
UK. For example, the funding and proliferation of CLT projects have occurred at 
the same time as large- scale public disinvestment in council housing. In this way, 
the government’s community- led housing policy aims to offload responsibility to 
community- led housing initiatives such as CLTs to augment this disinvestment 
but also to address the need for affordability. The size and scope of CLT projects, 
however, have been small and localised and are not intended to replace the same 
scale of affordable housing provision as council housing. This also raises a question 
of how effective CLTs (and other forms of community- led housing) are in meet-
ing the wider quantity of need for affordable housing across the UK. However, the 
focus on CLTs as a method of community- led housing – which lends itself to local 
mobilisation around a common issue  – offers an emphasis on community- based 
engagement and development that suggests a range of community benefits and 
new approaches to housing and land tenure. These tensions and contradictions 
point to the complexity of the community- led housing agenda.
In Canada, there is no policy or legislative directive for community- led hous-
ing, and CLTs primarily organise in a localised and ad hoc way, largely in relation to 
informal networks of information sharing between existing CLTs across the coun-
try. Several CLTs in Canada emerged in the 1980s–2000s to acquire land for afford-
able housing, some of which were cooperative housing communities that adopted 
the CLT land ownership approach as a way to protect cooperative housing land 
from potential resale. From the 2010s onwards there has been a notable increase 
in neighbourhood- based CLTs that have organised in relation to affordable hous-
ing problems and gentrification pressures, galvanised by multi- scalar neoliberal 
policies (see Chapter 9), in cities such as Vancouver, Hamilton and Toronto. Across 
Canada, as of 2019, there are approximately 14 CLT organisations in operation 
(Bunce and Barndt 2020). In the jurisdictional absence of federal government 
 legislation, policy and funding to support CLTs, some provincial governments 
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such as British Columbia have created community land trust legislation to support 
CLT development. As a result, CLT organisations operate very locally and are left 
to curate their own relationships with local governments and other community- 
based, non- governmental organisations that share their perspectives. This situ-
ation provides CLT organisations with a certain amount of flexibility in terms of 
being more autonomous and self- directed, but it also raises challenges in terms of 
building organisational capacity as well as securing funding. The absence of policy 
and legislative support, and government funding for CLTs, provides fewer options 
for the necessary acquisition of funding and also creates more piecemeal support 
for CLT development across Canada. CLT organisations are thus primarily left on 
their own to raise their local profile and advocate for public and/ or private land 
donations.
The creation of a non- governmental, cross- Canada network of CLT organisa-
tions primarily based in cities, the Canadian CLT Network, in 2015 demonstrated 
the emergence of broader public interest in and support for the CLT model. The 
Canadian CLT Network provides educational and technical advice to CLT organisa-
tions in a cohesive way and has also started to develop connections with CLT net-
works in other countries, such as the National CLT Network in the United States. 
Importantly, the network is also galvanising necessary discussions on CLTs, com-
munity land ownership and their relationship in the Canadian context to issues of 
settler colonialism and the struggles of Indigenous First Nations communities over 
land rights and justice (Bunce and Barndt 2020).
Community land trusts in London
London- based CLTs have steadily grown in numbers since the formation of the 
ELCLT in 2007, which was the first CLT organisation in London. The ELCLT was 
created as a charitable organisation under the umbrella of London Citizens, a 
member of the UK- wide Citizens UK network which aims to address social jus-
tice issues through the development of organisational and activist networks. The 
development of the ELCLT was unique as it was the first time the CLT model had 
been considered for use in an urban setting in the UK, and the organisation largely 
formed to resist the gentrification of London’s eastern boroughs (ELCLT 2010). 
Other localised issues that the ELCLT sought to redress were growing wait lists for 
council housing, a lack of new build affordable housing and overcrowding prob-
lems in existing affordable housing units in boroughs such as Hackney and Tower 
Hamlets (ELCLT 2010). Through the identification in 2008 of a vacant former 
National Health Service hospital site, St Clement’s, in the Mile End neighbourhood 
of Tower Hamlets (see Figure 19.1), which was under the ownership of the Homes 
and Communities Agency (HCA), the ELCLT mobilised to raise public awareness 
about the CLT model. The organisation conducted extensive community engage-
ment with community groups in the Mile End neighbourhood about potential 
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community uses for the site. These processes were intended to convince the HCA 
to donate or sell the land at a below market value price to the ELCLT (ELCLT 2010). 
What followed in subsequent years were challenging practices of building alliances 
with political actors and raising public support for the CLT (Bunce 2016). A key 
part of the ELCLT’s work was to pursue ownership of the St Clement’s site through 
several public tender bids that were first submitted to the HCA and then to the 
GLA following the devolution of the HCA’s portfolios after the introduction of the 
Localism Act in 2011. The ELCLT was able to secure a ‘land trust arrangement’ 
for the site with the GLA in 2012, as a result of negotiations with the GLA and 
agreements with Galliford Try, a London- based residential development firm, and 
Peabody Trust, a local housing association. This arrangement positioned Galliford 
Try as the primary developer, with the transfer of land title to a ‘to- be- determined’ 
community foundation upon completion of the site development. Galliford Try 
would develop 223 housing units on the site, with 35 per cent of the units for afford-
able rental or affordable homeownership (GLA 2012). The ELCLT would own and 
arrange the sale of approximately 23 of the affordable units, while Peabody Trust 
would manage the affordable rental units (GLA 2012).
The continued advocacy efforts of the ELCLT (now London CLT) have signifi-
cantly altered the shape of the St Clement’s site and, in its most recent formation, 
all the privately developed, rental and CLT homes for purchase are managed by 
residents (through the St Clement’s Resident Management Company) as a way to 
encourage community governance over the site (London CLT 2019). The freehold 
of the site will also be owned on an indefinite basis by the Ricardo Community 
Foundation, a charitable organisation that formed to meet the specifications of the 
original agreement with the GLA and to act as a CLT (London CLT 2019).
Figure 19.1 St Clement’s Site, Mile End, London (photograph by S. Bunce)
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The complex arrangements that were negotiated and undertaken for the 
St Clement’s site underline some of the land acquisition challenges faced by CLT 
groups in London in the light of high land values and a planning culture that gen-
erally supports the sale of public land to private developers. Yet the process of 
acquiring a land trust arrangement for the St Clement’s site has also been pivotal in 
raising public awareness in London about the benefits of CLTs and the role of com-
munity activism in community- owned land and affordable housing. The ELCLT’s 
efforts led to its name change to the London CLT in 2015, and the organisation 
now acts as an umbrella for newly emergent CLTs across London and the region. 
It also acts as a model for newly formed CLTs as to how CLT advocacy can work 
and the types of resources that are required for land acquisition (Interview with 
H. Emery- Wright 2019).
London CLT collaborates with several community- based organising chapters 
(groups) of the national social justice network Citizens UK across Greater London 
boroughs to facilitate land acquisition for CLT use. These groups are located in 
the boroughs of Lewisham, Lambeth, Croydon and Southwark in south London, 
Shadwell in the Borough of Tower Hamlets and the Borough of Redbridge in east 
London. Starting in 2014, the ELCLT began work with Lewisham Citizens to secure 
a small site on the Brasted Close estate in the Sydenham area of Lewisham (land 
owned by the Borough of Lewisham), with the political support of Lewisham’s 
mayor (London CLT 2019). London CLT now acts as a direct developer of 11 units 
of affordable housing on land that was ‘gifted’ by the Borough of Lewisham to 
London CLT on a long- term lease for £1 (Interview with H. Emery- Wright 2019). In 
Lambeth and Shadwell, London CLT collaborates with community groups in each 
area to identify vacant lands owned by Transport for London (TfL) and the GLA as 
potential CLT sites. These efforts have involved requesting the GLA’s Deputy Mayor 
for Housing’s support in negotiating CLT agreements for three TfL sites in Lambeth. 
It has included London CLT’s involvement in a public tender bid, in 2018, for one 
of the sites in Brixton Hill (London CLT 2019). As of late 2019, these agreements 
were not yet finalised but the lands had been ‘promised’ in principle, with London 
CLT attempting to acquire funding from the GLA’s Small Sites Fund to embark on 
planning applications for the sites (Interview with H. Emery- Wright 2019). London 
CLT notes that organising efforts in Croydon, Southwark and Redbridge have been 
slightly different, with the borough councils taking the lead on affordable housing 
development on identified CLT lands and London CLT identified as the eventual 
landowners following development (Interview with H. Emery- Wright 2019).
London CLT has multiple roles in acting as the umbrella CLT organisation for 
a growing number of CLT projects across London. The organisation provides tech-
nical advice and works closely with each of the Citizens UK chapters in the plan-
ning and development phases of the individual CLT projects. It also emphasises 
resident- led social justice and community empowerment through a focus on ‘com-
munity cohesion’ and support for diverse resident representation in CLT initiatives 
(Interview with H. Emery- Wright 2019). London CLT’s activities also emphasise 
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political mobilisation to support community- based CLT work. This has involved 
utilising the existing localised structures of Citizens UK and connecting with the 
social justice organising of London Citizens and Citizens UK more broadly, as well 
as leveraging the public recognition of these organisations to build political alli-
ances. An example of this is the public assemblies that are regularly held by London 
Citizens, which gather over 4,000 attendees and where CLT organising is discussed 
(Interview with H. Emery- Wright 2019). In this way, London- based CLTs are part of 
a larger network of social justice and community organising across the GLA and the 
UK. In relation to this activist and political engagement, London CLT also arranges 
funding for the individual CLT projects through connections with various funding 
sources. Funding for project development has been generated through seed fund-
ing given by philanthropic organisations such as the Oak Foundation, as well as by 
the National CLT Network. London CLT has also submitted a bid to Community- 
Led Housing London for a loan to support community cohesion in CLT organising 
efforts in Shadwell and Lambeth (Interview with H. Emery- Wright 2019). In addi-
tion to external grants and loans, London CLT allows its members to invest in com-
munity shares from £100 upwards. For the Lewisham CLT initiative, this method 
enabled London CLT to raise £500,000 (Interview with H. Emery- Wright 2019).
London CLT’s role as a pan- city umbrella for smaller CLT initiatives provides 
the ability to connect with emergent CLT and community- led housing initiatives that 
are not formal projects of London CLT, such as the Rural- Urban Synthesis Society 
in Lewisham, St Ann’s Regeneration Trust in Haringey and NW3 CLT in Hampstead 
(Interview with H.  Emery- Wright 2019). These projects are independent but part 
of a relational network in which there is awareness of each group’s work (Interview 
with NW3 CLT staff 2019). What is unique about CLT development in London is that 
there are strong, neighbourhood- based rationales for CLT formation that vary across 
the city in relation to a broader citywide CLT movement. While many CLTs emerge 
in relation to gentrification pressures and affordable housing constraints, there is 
a difference, for instance, in the forms of gentrification that CLT organisations are 
addressing. London CLT explicitly works with local groups that are highly diverse, 
with communities that experience racialisation and marginalisation, and in neigh-
bourhoods that have traditionally served the needs of low- income residents. The 
impacts of gentrification in these areas have created less affordable housing options, 
a heavier reliance on shared accommodation and a poorly maintained private rental 
stock (Interview with H. Emery- Wright 2019). NW3 CLT has organised to resist the 
decline in affordable and social housing in Hampstead – an area that is already gentri-
fied but primarily by affluent ‘socially progressive’ professionals – in the light of a new 
and increasing “Chelseafication” of the area (referring to London’s affluent Chelsea 
area). NW3 CLT employs this term to describe the conversion of multi- unit houses 
into single- family homes with luxury basement space and gated walls, intended for 
the very wealthy. Further observed in this process is the rise of ‘buy to leave’ buildings, 
where luxury properties are increasingly being bought and left vacant – a strategy for 
‘parking’ investment finances (see Chapter 9) (Interview with NW3 CLT staff 2019).
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Community land trusts in Toronto
There are two neighbourhood- based CLT organisations in Toronto – Kensington 
Market CLT and Parkdale Neighbourhood Land Trust – that have also  explicitly 
emerged in relation to gentrification pressures and increasing constraints on 
affordable housing in the city. Similar to CLT development in London, they have 
organised in relation to neighbourhood- based issues that are constituted by 
these broader challenges. Two other land trusts, the Toronto Island Residential 
Community Trust and the Co- operative Housing Land Trusts, are also active in 
the city but are not explicitly based on the CLT model and are used to protect 
public land for existent housing and cooperative housing assets, respectively (Co- 
operative Housing Federation of Toronto n.d.; Toronto Island Residential Trust 
Community Corporation 2019). The differences in focus and ad hoc configura-
tion of land trust organisations in Toronto are due to a lessened reliance on the 
adoption of the American CLT model, by comparison with London and the wider 
UK, which has resulted in more land trust experimentations that meet  different 
 organisational and localised needs within the city. This is symptomatic of the 
aforementioned lack of structural support for CLT formation in Toronto and 
across Canada, in terms of the absence of governmental legislation, policy and 
funding provisions that would require a more official definition for CLT organisa-
tions and their practices. Apart from the formation of the Canadian CLT Network, 
there has not been a formal organisational body to represent CLT groups over 
time and there is not a Toronto- wide CLT organisation similar to London CLT. As 
noted, the less ‘top- down’ and more ad hoc nature of CLT formation in Canada has 
provided for more flexible and fluid interpretations and implementation of CLT 
approaches, and this is certainly observable in the Toronto context. The follow-
ing section, however, will outline the Parkdale Neighbourhood Land Trust (PNLT) 
and Kensington Market CLT (KMCLT) organisations as Toronto- based initiatives 
most closely resembling the characteristics of the traditional CLT model.
The PNLT formed as a non- profit, non- governmental organisation in 2014, 
in the western downtown neighbourhood of Parkdale, as a response to increased 
residential and commercial gentrification. These processes have been largely vis-
ible through quickly rising rents and the conversion of single- room occupancy 
housing (‘rooming houses’) intended for lower- income tenants into single- family- 
owned housing (see Chapter 17). Two primary objectives of the PNLT’s work are 
the acquisition of land to remove it from the speculative market and the foster-
ing of community participation in governance and decision- making over the land 
(Bunce and Barndt 2020). In terms of land ownership, the PNLT has acquired 
two properties in Parkdale, the first being a community garden site that was pur-
chased at lower than market value through organisational fundraising efforts. The 
community garden is actively used by newcomer residents and connected with 
local environmental and food justice organisations in the neighbourhood such as 
Greenest City, a Toronto- based environmental group (Bunce 2018). The second 
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site, a 15- unit rooming house, was obtained with capital funding provided for by 
the City of Toronto government. The acquisition of this site was an outcome of a 
neighbourhood- wide planning study conducted by the PNLT regarding the signifi-
cant loss of rooming house units, as well as several years of building political sup-
port for PNLT initiatives (Bunce and Barndt 2020). The rooming house property 
is owned by the Neighbourhood Land Trust (NLT), an organisational arm that is 
allowed to hold land for charitable purposes and lease land to other charities as 
prescribed through Canada’s restrictive federal charity laws (Bunce and Barndt 
2020). In this situation, the rooming house property will be leased by the NLT to 
the Parkdale Activity Recreation Centre to provide very affordable housing through 
their supportive housing programme.
The PNLT has explicitly followed the American CLT model by way of research 
on existing CLT organisations in cities such as Boston, New  York City and San 
Francisco, and it has placed strong emphasis on the role of organisational and 
neighbourhood- wide governance in the CLT approach. This has involved the for-
mation of a democratic organisational structure and community representation 
through membership to Parkdale residents, while at the same time holding a core 
focus on social justice in their work. The PNLT’s work has broadened to taking the 
lead on community planning studies that focus on neighbourhood- wide issues, 
such as the aforementioned rooming house study, as well as on- the- ground activist 
events to address gentrification and affordable housing challenges more broadly. 
This multi- scalar, multi- issue approach has led the PNLT to be at the forefront of an 
emerging CLT movement in Canada, and the organisation has taken the lead in the 
formation of the Canadian CLT Network (Bunce and Barndt 2020).
The Kensington Market CLT, located in the residential and commercial market 
neighbourhood of Kensington in the downtown core of Toronto (see Figure 19.2), 
was formed in 2017 in response to residential and commercial gentrification pres-
sures. The KMCLT emerged as an offshoot of the Friends of Kensington Market, a 
resident- led and neighbourhood- based committee that had been actively engaged 
in protesting the encroachment of ‘big- box’ retail outlets (a Walmart and a Loblaws 
supermarket, respectively) on the arterial roads adjacent to the street entrances of 
Kensington Market. This advocacy was viewed as a way to protect Kensington from 
corporations that would threaten the traditionally working- class, independent 
and counter- culture nature of the neighbourhood (Bunce and Barndt 2020). The 
adoption of the CLT model by Friends of Kensington Market has been utilised with 
a ‘neighbourhood protection’ approach and as a way to retrench neighbourhood 
boundaries in relation to external pressures that negatively impact the traditional 
character of Kensington. An increase in short- term rentals such as Airbnbs, rising 
commercial and residential rents, and displacement of long- term residents as a 
result of more affluent residents moving to the neighbourhood are noted as impe-
tuses for the formation of the KMCLT (Russell in Bunce and Barndt 2020). Over 
the past several years, KMCLT has been developing an organisational structure, 
raising local awareness about CLT practices and identifying resident needs through 
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community meetings. This has also involved building alliances with local politi-
cians in order to garner the support of local government. This approach, akin to the 
PNLT’s organising practices, has allowed the KMCLT to build a stronger rationale 
and context for neighbourhood land acquisition with a focus on attaining land for 
the purpose of building affordable housing.
The PNLT and KMCLT, as two neighbourhood- based CLTs in Toronto with very 
similar purposes and approaches, and which regularly connect with one another, 
are organisations that provide contexts for the formation of other neighbourhood- 
based CLTs across Toronto and perhaps a Toronto- wide CLT network at some point. 
The social justice and anti- gentrification perspectives of both organisations are 
shared by other non- profit community and housing groups in Toronto, and the CLT 
model provides a community- based, resident- led practice for meeting local needs 
for community engagement and affordable housing.
Figure 19.2 Kensington Market, Toronto (photograph by S. Bunce)
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Conclusion
London and Toronto share similar urban challenges of gentrification, rising rental 
and homeownership rates, and a constrained supply of affordable housing; thus 
the everyday contexts in both cities form a strong rationale for the existence of 
CLTs as a community- based and - led response to these problems. This is particu-
larly relevant within the larger context of a problematic decrease in government 
support and funding for social housing in both cities, and a reconfiguration of gov-
ernment support towards community- led housing in the UK context as an outcome 
of localisation and downloading/ offloading. CLTs have emerged as a necessary 
organisational solution to address these challenges in both cities but with differing 
scales and breadths of engagement and influence.
While the impacts of luxury property development and rising residential costs 
in London have exacerbated the need for CLT organisational responses, the repre-
sentation and outlook of CLT engagement and activism across London appears to 
be optimistic and buoyed by a robust CLT structure (London CLT) and a network 
of local CLT projects. This is enhanced by a sufficient national network of organisa-
tional support through the National CLT Network, private and governmental fund-
ing sources such as the Community Housing Fund, and local political will for CLT 
land acquisition. The more ad hoc and informal existence of CLTs in Canada, without 
comprehensive policy and legislative support for CLTs, has resulted in more flexible 
and very localised adoptions of the CLT model across the country. The absence of 
comprehensive political support has impacted funding mechanisms for the creation 
and longevity of CLTs in Canadian cities. In Toronto, however, the PNLT and KMCLT 
have formed in the light of these deficiencies in public support, with an aim to 
redress some of these challenges through advocacy for a Canadian CLT Network and 
by building more public awareness about the benefits of the CLT model in the city.
Community land trust activism and engagement is robust in both London and 
Toronto, although London has a more geographically and organisationally expan-
sive approach to CLT development aided by policy support, while Toronto’s CLTs 
are distinctly neighbourhood- based in the absence of a Toronto- wide CLT coali-
tion. CLTs in both cities have formed in response to the impacts of gentrification, a 
tight supply of affordable housing and inadequate public investment in affordable 
housing, and other policy and planning failures in both cities. In particular, the 
emergence of neighbourhood- based community land trusts in London and Toronto 
demonstrates how residents and activist organisations can collaborate to deter-
mine how land and affordable housing can be stewarded by and for communities 
as well as respond to larger city- wide issues.
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Community, activism and engagement: 
A commentary
Loren March and Susan Moore
Who indeed is activist now?
The chapters in Part III speak to the widening range of actor ‘types’ labelled as 
activist or participating in variegated forms and platforms of activism in Toronto 
and London. From the outlook presented here, the two cities seem to be converging 
with respect to the range of activisms across each city, coming from all walks of life. 
Some maintain their grassroots credentials in the traditional sense of community- 
based and - led mobilisation through protesting, campaigning and lobbying against 
real social inequities of the urban experience. But might we also consider some 
government bodies, such as local authorities (i.e. London boroughs), to be activ-
ists? It is a struggle in many ways to equate March’s (Chapter 15) DIY artists, living 
and producing their outputs secretly in the shadows of the emblematic skyline of 
the ‘Creative City’ that is Toronto, with the special purpose development vehicles 
mobilising from within local London boroughs – the purpose of the latter being 
essentially to capture the market value portion of the ‘affordable housing’ offer in 
order to meet its social housing commitments and more generally sustain long- 
term fiscal integrity in the face of austerity- riven desperation in a zero- funding 
reality. And yet, as we see in these chapters, their motivations, structures, practices 
and ideologies are colliding – or at least ‘rubbing along’ (Watson 2017) – arguably 
out of pure necessity and pragmatism.
Pragmatism appears as a form of ‘making- do’ observed through the manifold 
tactics of resistance to the status quo or to the constant threat of displacement, 
the championing of alternative models of community planning through subver-
sive and persistent social infrastructure development (as per Bunce’s community 
land trusts, Ostanel’s Parkdale, or Sendra and Fitzpatrick’s West Ken and Gibbs 
Green) as well as through repurposing and rebranding neoliberal entrepreneurial-
ism (Penny’s local housing companies) under the dubious guise of a benevolent 
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there is evidence herein of the blurring or hybridising practices of public and pri-
vate actors in the wake of government retrenchment driven by austerity and neo-
liberalism, as well as the evolving nature of activism and planning for long- term 
equity and local survival under such conditions. The advance of austerity- induced 
funding cutbacks and neoliberalism consolidated under the Conservative Ontario 
Provincial Government’s so- called common sense revolution in the 1990s (noted 
in Ostanel and March) has dramatically propelled Toronto into the present, and its 
long- term consequences are still being navigated by local communities and activ-
ists on the ground even as new waves of provincial Conservative cutbacks begin 
to come into effect. Meanwhile, the post- crisis ‘austerity urbanism’ in London 
described by Penny (Chapter  16) and Sendra and Fitzpatrick (Chapter  18) has 
resulted in a wide range of policy and local governance experiments with repercus-
sions, both positive and negative, at the neighbourhood scale but with the potential 
to impact citywide patterns in new housing provision, security of tenure and demo-
cratic accountability.
The chapters in Part III all emphasise the increasing pressure placed on com-
munity actors by the intensifying housing crises firmly embedded in both cities. 
Toronto has now, apparently, outstripped London and San Francisco as the sixth 
least affordable housing market in the world (16th Annual Demographia Ranking 
2020 Survey). The grip of unaffordability in each city may have been fuelled by dif-
ferent governance mechanisms and development cultures (as discussed in Parts I 
and II) but with the ubiquity of this experience comes a type of collective enlighten-
ment that seems to be reinforcing new patterns of mobilisation and activism in the 
name of affordable housing and anti- gentrification, in particular. One could argue 
there is a kind of ‘ambient’ knowledge of planning, development and housing con-
cerns hitherto unseen among the general public.
Some of this knowledge has certainly emerged out of everyday lived realities, 
out of experiences of being evicted or of having to navigate bureaucracies and legal 
or planning frameworks. Tenant organising and coalition- building is an increas-
ingly common phenomenon across both Toronto and London, rooted largely in col-
lective experiences of housing precarity, with many more people acutely affected 
by this with the recent onset of the COVID- 19 pandemic. Social networks and 
 everyday practices contribute to the development of an elaborate ‘human infra-
structure’ on the ground. While infrastructure is often understood in terms of phys-
ical systems of roads, pipes and wires, the human activities that serve to render life 
more liveable might also be thought of as important and invisibilised infrastruc-
tural developments (Simone 2004). Organisers learn from one another, as well as 
from the past, sharing knowledge, tactics and models for survival. Connections, 
solidarities and even interdependencies are formed. Activisms often depend upon 
the functioning of this infrastructure, upon its preparedness and adaptiveness, 
upon the ability and willingness of residents and allies to collaborate or cooperate 
with one another, and upon their adeptness at engaging with complex institutional 
arrangements. Housing becomes a site where such an infrastructure converges, 
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formed out of a multitude of different experiences, skills and practices, and out of 
a shared need and desire to stay in place.
Housing has also arguably become a crisis increasingly impacting not just 
lower- income residents but also the middle classes. In part, then, this cognisance 
might also have something to do with the levels of educational attainment in both 
London and Toronto, the discourse of ‘middle- class’ sensibilities and a generational 
shift to digital literacy. Indeed, the instantaneous and asynchronous formation and 
dissemination of highly context- specific social media (including NextDoor, Twitter, 
Facebook, Instagram, etc.) has arguably changed who and how one is activist now, 
especially in relation to real- time experiences of locality and place. More than ever 
before society can take part in campaigns, protests and lobbying without leaving 
their homes, without interacting with anyone face to face. Digital petitions (e.g. 
change.org) are part of the daily passive diet of social media intake for most of us.
The understanding of social media platforms as experiential infrastructures 
of everyday urban communications (Rodgers and Moore 2020) suggests that we 
might look at the types of activism in London and Toronto as emergent forms of 
a new urban public life. Normally this prompts debates about the emancipatory 
properties of social media to encourage and promote public participation versus 
the ambiguities of the monopolistic algorithmic curation of user contributions and 
meta- data (van Dijck 2013). Beyond the ease of accessing, following or becoming 
part of a local debate by virtue of posting a comment or ‘liking’ a tweet, platform- 
mediated participation is essentially now normalised within the governance of 
urban life. The subtle urban power structures exhibited through social media 
 discourse (i.e. some issues and concerns being hotly contested, antagonistic and 
divisive, others generating consensus and/ or digitally mediated echo chambers 
or filter bubbles) appear to delineate what Margetts et  al. (2016: 34) refer to 
as a new pace and reach of local urban affairs ‘built around tiny acts of political 
participation’:
innumerable, publicly expressed – and often archived – claims, commentar-
ies, anxieties, or bits of content relating to an urban neighbourhood and its 
transformation. These tiny acts particularly in conjunction with mobile tech-
nologies, subsist especially well when users react, comment and share with 
others in apparent ‘real- time’.
But the aggregate impact of these multiple tiny acts of political participation or 
‘ambient participation’ (Rodgers et  al. forthcoming) can also build into forceful 
catalysts and emotional triggers for organised forms of protest and opposition. 
Thus the question emerges as to whether or not activism spurred by social media is 
only activism when it takes shape in face- to- face physical protest. Yet concurrently, 
one could argue, we are witnessing in both cities a resurgence in public contesta-
tion and physical protest in the traditional sense of rallies, marches and strikes. 
London’s 2015  ‘March for Homes’ at City Hall (see Townsend and Kelly 2015) 
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drew thousands demanding a political response from then London Mayor Boris 
Johnson (Prime Minister at the time of writing) to the lack of affordable housing in 
the capital, out- of- control private rent increases and the planned demolition and 
redevelopment of approximately 70 housing estates across London, with a net loss 
in social units. Similar throngs converged on Westminster in March 2016 to oppose 
the controversial Housing Bill.
In Toronto (and other Canadian cities, such as Montreal) increasing public 
and media awareness of ‘renoviction’ (Mancini and Common 2019) practices, a 
neologism for a rent- gap model of gentrification but in high- demand areas (near- 
to- zero vacancy rates spur speculative redevelopment by landlords and severe rent 
increases for sitting tenants), led to tenant protests in late 2019. Rent strikes and 
direct action are tactics now commonly used by tenants against major  property 
management firms seeking ‘above- guideline’ rent increases that go beyond  limits 
imposed by provincial legislation (Goffin 2018; Isai 2018). Concurrently the 
release of the city’s Housing NOW Initiative, which will produce 3,700 affordable 
housing units on 11 sites across the city, is being met with resistance and lobby-
ing from the likes of ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform 
Now), challenging the definition of ‘affordable’ based on average market rents. 
Extensive consultations for the newly released 10- year HousingTO Plan also raise 
the issue of how ‘affordable’ is defined and calculated, the result of which has been 
the city’s stated commitment to adopting a new income- based definition in 2020. 
The  definition of ‘affordable housing’ in the London context is equally controver-
sial – at 80 per cent market rents, the irony of which Penny points out: these rents 
are further inflated by the very same developments being touted by local authori-
ties as flagship regeneration schemes.
All the chapters in Part III mention the lack of affordable housing and the 
increasing threats of residential displacement due to perceived forms of state- led 
gentrification, particularly via large- scale urban redevelopment and regeneration 
schemes. The spectrum of activists and activisms addressed in these chapters all 
foreground the serious challenges faced by policy- makers, communities and activ-
ists alike. Ostanel (Chapter  17) and Sendra and Fitzpatrick (Chapter  18) sug-
gest that ‘successful’ activism occurs when policy is influenced, changed or even 
reversed. In these chapters the social infrastructure development pathway is out-
lined, and Ostanel’s timeline visually demonstrates the piecemeal but tenacious 
process in which policy and programmatic changes in city governance culminated 
in the community benefit impact and inclusionary zoning policy discourse. Sendra 
and Fitzpatrick demonstrate the increasing prevalence of more locally responsive 
policy, precipitating U- turns, rethinks and alternative regeneration strategies. For 
the land trusts discussed by Bunce (Chapter 19), success in the struggle can take 
many forms, from gaining legitimacy, public support and visibility, to success-
ful coalition- building, to a community’s acquisition of land. Bunce speaks to the 
importance of advocacy efforts in shaping community development, pointing to 
a variety of arrangements and agreements between community land trusts and 
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state actors reached largely through the development of broad coalitional support 
and mounting pressure from activists. The cases presented are all high- profile and 
visible at the neighbourhood scale, speaking to the importance of public support. 
Yet the perpetuation of DIY activism described by March reminds us that beyond 
the headline- grabbing cases, there are countless others individually or collectively 
existing in precarity, hidden behind garage doors and in sound- proofed back rooms 
that are still out of the realm of policy influence, and some would prefer it stayed 
that way.
‘Successful activism’ often comes with costs. These chapters speak to the 
challenges activists face as they mitigate the effects of structural issues at the 
local level and attempt to build community capacity both in the absence of real 
local  government action and in the face of top- down government initiatives that 
can sometimes serve to aggravate problems. Many speak to a kind of double- bind 
between the importance of community- based organising in this setting, and the 
resulting implications of this increased and sustained pressure put on communi-
ties and non- governmental organisations. The risks of depoliticisation, absorp-
tion or instrumentalisation of more radical activist communities are evident in 
many chapters. The activists in Ostanel’s Parkdale negotiate a careful line between 
engaging the state and developers and maintaining the local community’s control 
over development. For the community land trusts Bunce explores in both Toronto 
and London, different forms of collaboration and strategic partnerships with state 
actors are often necessary routes to achieving goals. In the case of Toronto’s DIY 
creative communities, as explored in March, alternative scenes, largely occupied 
by creatives, are caught between the potential benefits and drawbacks of both vis-
ibility and invisibility and are deeply entangled in the very processes which put 
them at risk. Meanwhile, in Penny’s exploration of the case of the financialisation 
of council housing in London, we see a very severe case of this, with borough coun-
cils shifting their very functions under intense housing pressures and dramatically 
transforming into entrepreneurial property developers – a step that some herald as 
localism at work and others critique as the end of the welfare state. Indeed, under 
current circumstances ‘success’ takes many forms and may sometimes seem to 
come up short, especially for those who are most affected.
It is important to underline the ways in which the struggles these chapters 
foreground are heavily tinged by compounded issues of race, class, gender, bodily 
ability, mental health and citizenship. In London, the tragedy of Grenfell Tower 
attests to how some of the city’s most vulnerable residents, who are disproportion-
ately racialised, are deemed disposable and funnelled into compromised living 
situations. Arguments for the redevelopment of social housing estates in London 
are entwined with racially charged narratives of places such as the Heygate 
or the Aylesbury as dangerous ‘badlands’ or ‘no- go’ zones that need to be torn 
down (Romyn 2019), just as accusations of ‘social cleansing’ have accompanied 
redevelopment schemes. Yet Bunce (Chapter  19) illustrates how some commu-
nity land trusts in London are explicitly working with diverse, racialised and 
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marginalised low- income communities in the struggle against displacement due 
to gentrification.
In Toronto’s Parkdale, the activist community we find in Chapter 17 includes 
many psychiatric survivors (largely patients discharged from psychiatric hospi-
tals following Ontario’s provincial deinstitutionalisation in favour of ‘community- 
based care’) who have needed and used the local ecology of service providers, and 
who largely make up the tenancy of the neighbourhood’s tiny ‘bachelorette’ apart-
ments (akin to ‘bedsits’ in London) and rooming houses (see also Slater 2004). 
The needs of this community have heavily informed local organising around hous-
ing. We might also consider how, more broadly, Toronto’s urban development is 
deeply entangled with settler colonialism, white supremacy and racism, and how 
the ripple effects of restructuring at the level of the city are always unevenly felt in 
this regard. High- profile local community activists such as Desmond Cole, Sandy 
Hudson, Robyn Maynard and Syrus Marcus Ware, just to name a few, all attest to 
the violence disproportionately suffered by Indigenous people, people of colour 
and especially Black communities in Toronto. Disinvestment, abandonment and 
gentrification in the city can and should be understood as ongoing ‘racialized class 
projects’ (Rankin and McLean 2015). As both Ostanel (Chapter  17) and March 
(Chapter 15) hint, the upscaling of the city’s downtown increasingly pushes mar-
ginalised groups, including refugees, immigrants and people of colour, out to the 
peripheries or to the urban ‘in- between’ (Young and Keil 2014). Community organ-
ising and activism around rights to housing, space and place can be observed across 
many of the surrounding region’s largely underserved suburban tower neighbour-
hoods (March and Lehrer 2019; Parlette and Cowen 2011). Meanwhile, both 
grassroots and individually taken initiatives are important ways to help downtown 
residents hang onto their neighbourhoods, their communities and their individual 
homes or spaces. Yet in the city’s increasingly affluent centre, we might note the 
ways in which the advent of ‘hipster urbanism’ (Cowen 2006) has made activism 
itself highly gentrifiable and potentially consolidated a privileged and ‘enlightened’ 
white middle- class presence in many activist movements (Epstein 2018). Going 
forward, artist- led activism, community- led development and community land 
trusts might be prime sites of survival, resistance and emergence where we ought 
to also critically keep watch for such phenomena, which serve to exclude margin-
alised people.
The important roles of community activism, organising and mutual aid in 
 situations of necessity have been brought to the fore amid the rapid spread of 
COVID- 19. The pandemic itself and the deployed mitigation strategies (which 
largely include the demand to ‘stay at home’) have had serious impacts on residents 
in these cities, especially among the most marginalised communities. In Toronto, 
we can observe increased tenant organising and activism around the question of 
rent (e.g. the Keep Your Rent movement, led largely by Parkdale Organize), as well 
as the proliferation of mutual aid networks across the city, and heightened engage-
ment with DIY practices. Established community organisations and informal 
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networks have emerged to fill the gaps where government policy is falling short. 
In London, where homelessness is on the rise (with the number of persons con-
sidered homeless on any given night in 2019 having increased by more than 2,000 
since 2018), growing concern for how to ensure safe accommodation and isola-
tion zones for the most vulnerable in society has produced a series of emergency 
funding schemes and local campaigns to deliver temporary pop- up ‘safe villages’. 
Local Gofundme campaigns such as ‘Project Parker’ in Walthamstow, east London, 
are occurring across the city to ensure homeless populations are safely housed, 
screened and cared for during the pandemic, to avoid further community transmis-
sion. But there are still thousands of Londoners living on the edge of the poverty 
line who will struggle to avoid debt arrears and the threat of eviction during and 
following the pandemic. For many, foodbanks and the generosity and compassion 
of neighbourhood networks and groups loosely mobilised via platforms such as 
WhatsApp are changing how localised issues of inequality are experienced, shared 
and addressed.
Global- scale processes of restructuring influence and sometimes outweigh 
the power of local policy in cities, undermining local power through trends of pri-
vatisation and capitalist market orientation. But local actors and socio- political 
logics are clearly also at play in urban processes, capable of producing new and 
emancipatory forms of urbanity. The chapters included here speak to activities 
taken up at the city, neighbourhood and even household level to wrestle with (near- 
universal) processes of restructuring. They speak to the very different forms and 
trajectories that agency, action and community activism can take, depending on 
local contexts, and reveal multi- scalar dynamics of power at work in both Toronto 
and London. Some of the examples drawn out in these chapters suggest strong 
forms of resistance and long- term alternative viability, if they can be given the right 
kind of sustained support, while others approach these new governance models 
with scepticism. The field of actors perceived as activists is diversifying, as are the 
types of actions we might perceive in this light. Multiple activisms are emerging in 
Toronto and London, indicative of a broader shift in public resistance to particular 
manifestations of social injustice, austerity and neoliberal governance.
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Conclusion: Critical dialogues on urban 
governance, development and activism 
in London and Toronto
Alan Walks, Susannah Bunce, Nicola Livingstone, 
Loren March and Susan Moore
While comparison is always a fraught exercise, it can produce important insights 
when conducted in sensitive and nuanced ways. In the search for common patterns 
and shared experiences, differences matter as much as similarities. The studies 
represented in this volume, while not seeking to compare like for like in systematic 
fashion, through their focus on unique, locally important processes and practices 
in each urban region nonetheless shed considerable light on the ways in which 
trends in globalisation, neoliberalisation and financialisation have affected urban 
 development patterns. Although differing in scale, history and position within 
global trade and financial networks, London and Toronto share many of the chal-
lenges and experiences associated with contemporary urban change in global cities 
of the developed world. What can be learned from the comparative case studies 
documented in this volume?
There are at least three key conclusions that might be gleaned from our 
analysis of the case studies. Firstly, while the details differ considerably, both the 
London and Toronto case studies demonstrate the fragmentation of urban govern-
ance under neoliberalism and its relationship to contemporary urban development 
processes, as well as the importance of a multi- scalar politics to the ways such frag-
mentation has evolved. Secondly, although again the details differ, both Toronto 
and London have experienced pressures on their land and housing markets related 
to their incorporation into global circuits of capital investment, and this might be 
additionally included as one of the criteria making each place a ‘global’ city, as 
might also the serious social and political challenges that result from this. London 
and Toronto are therefore exemplars of both the successes and the failures of what 
might be called global real estate capitalism. Thirdly, in both London and Toronto, 
radical ambiguities are involved in the political evolution of neoliberal poli-
cies, as well as the political implications of the relationships between the global, 
the national and local politics. Not only is each city at the cutting edge of global 
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processes, but community development and activism in each place are at the cut-
ting edge of contemporary urban social movements, making the outcomes of both 
globalisation and neoliberalism destabilised and uncertain in both cities. Below 
we discuss each of these, highlighting the importance of the case study findings 
for promoting critical dialogues on urban governance, development and activism.
The fragmented nature of neoliberal urban governance  
and the politics of scale
Although it has been articulated in different forms in each city, both London and 
Toronto have witnessed a shift in the ways that urban development and  governance 
are understood under the process of neoliberalisation. In general, the latter has 
been implemented through policies that roll back welfare state protections and pro-
mote privatisation of public assets and services, and that roll out new market- based 
 models which empower private sector actors to profit from taking over selected urban 
functions, including financial firms. Yet neoliberalism and neoliberalisation are not 
monolithic processes, nor a monolithic ideology. The implementation of  neoliberal 
policies has had a number of different implications in each place, but these differ-
ences themselves reveal some general patterns. Regardless, one key outcome has 
been the jurisdictional and spatial fragmentation of planning and governance func-
tions in both cities, with implications for the development of politics in global cities.
Within London, neoliberalisation has been driven in part by austerity agen-
das enacted by the state at the national level which then force local municipalities 
to search for budgetary savings, but also by the state’s agenda to privatise public 
lands and to harness roll- out market- based solutions to traditional urban problems 
such as housing estate regeneration and transportation. There has in turn been a 
rise in private sector firms tasked with previously public sector activities, including 
parks maintenance, housing estate regeneration, transport planning, and hospital 
and school rebuilding, often via public–private partnerships which privilege the 
private actors in the process. The boroughs within Greater London have adopted 
different ways of relating to this larger process, often by creating different planning 
regulations and practices, as well as differing approaches to new infrastructure and 
housing development. Even at the scale of Greater London, as Chapters 3 and 5 (by 
De Souza and De Magalhães, respectively) make plain, a fragmented approach to 
issues that otherwise normally appear as universal and consistent (such as park 
maintenance and management, and/ or private rental housing regulation) has 
arisen in an attempt to find local solutions – often in accordance with the needs 
of local private actors – to citywide problems. This is producing a new hybrid and 
fragmented form of the public realm, in which the degree of ‘publicness’ (to use 
the words of De Magalhães) varies in significant but often subtle ways, and where 
the possibility of public control is elusive and secondary to the security of prof-





time, as Chapter 12 by Short and Livingstone demonstrates, larger common pres-
sures remain, including challenges related to providing sympathetic and appro-
priate regeneration in increasingly obsolete housing estates, and building new 
housing at higher densities to improve housing supply and affordability.
In turn, many of the challenges of the contemporary global city, including high 
levels of inequality, the need for greater transport infrastructure and the shortage 
of affordable housing, become layered on top of fragmented governance systems 
that ultimately work to promote private interests and that continue to displace the 
poor from valuable land. Thus has arisen a politics of scale within London, in which 
local councils and the Greater London Authority devise local policies that attempt 
to walk a fine line between promoting urban development and countering the most 
visible and egregious outcomes of that development. It is somewhat ironic that in 
the ultimate ‘global city’ – dependent on its connections to the rest of the world for 
the livelihood of many of its residents – it helps politically to blame global actors 
for such challenges and to deflect attention from the actions and interests of local 
actors who profit from this development.
Neoliberalisation in Toronto has come with some different flavours than in 
London. Although public–private partnerships have been used in limited ways 
(to build a hospital and a toll highway, and to redevelop a social housing estate 
and a downtown park, for example), such forms of roll- out neoliberalism are less 
advanced in Toronto than in London, and many traditional urban functions (such 
as park maintenance and management, and public transport) remain in public 
hands (either at the local municipal level or at the provincial level). Austerity in 
Toronto has come in select waves, always as the result of the election of a right- 
wing Conservative Party government at the (Ontario) provincial level, which is the 
level of government with ultimate authority over municipalities in Canada. During 
the late 1990s, and more recently with the 2018 provincial election, Toronto faced 
‘roll- back’ attacks on its governance institutions (including regional government in 
1998) and cutbacks to its budget and/ or ability to tax (municipalities in Ontario 
are only allowed to implement taxes with permission of the provincial government, 
which can also mandate what the rates must be and how they are calculated and 
collected). However, the unintended (or perhaps intended) negative effects of such 
roll- back agendas often have not been addressed, but instead have been allowed 
to fester, and this has helped produce more fragmented planning and governance 
systems, as has occurred in London.
For instance, cutbacks to City of Toronto budgets have meant that new funding 
for the repair, regeneration and maintenance of local city infrastructure (including 
parks) usually had to be negotiated through Section 37 agreements with devel-
opers, in which developers agree to make payments in return for permission to 
build (this is similar to Section 106 and the Community Infrastructure Levy in the 
UK). This incentivises municipalities to seek out and prioritise new  development 
(often high- end condominium developments), making them boosters for local 
developers. However, as Chapter 13 by Biggar and Siemiatycki shows, developers 
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often want to build in desirable downtown areas. The result is that infrastructure 
upgrades most often benefit gentrifying areas. This itself creates a fragmented gov-
ernance landscape, in which planning negotiations take on very different tones in 
different neighbourhoods, which have increasingly different social compositions 
(with gentrifying neighbourhoods increasingly white, while less desirable neigh-
bourhoods in the inner suburbs are increasingly racialised). Similarly, although all 
the former municipalities of the old Metropolitan Toronto regional structure were 
amalgamated into one single City of Toronto in 1998, many of the planning regu-
lations and laws of those former municipalities remained on the books, creating 
a fragmented landscape of ‘ghost’ regulations that should no longer exist (given 
those former municipalities no longer exist) but which still ‘haunt’ urban develop-
ment processes in negative ways (such as forbidding rooming houses and second-
ary rental suites in many neighbourhoods, despite a citywide planning regulation 
granting universal and consistent permission). Meanwhile, many of the suburban 
municipalities outside the boundaries of the new City of Toronto have been left 
untouched by such provincial government attacks and neoliberalisation processes, 
mostly because those suburban residents tend to vote for Conservative politicians.
Such fragmented governance landscapes produce a somewhat novel politics of 
scale around urban development. This politics of scale operates both laterally/ hori-
zontally between the central city and the suburbs, and globally/ vertically between 
the local, the national and the global. Laterally, new dichotomies have arisen between 
the interests of suburban locales – both those within the central city and those beyond 
their boundaries – and the inner cores of the central cities. It is the latter in London 
and Toronto that are most targeted by developers for higher- end development, and 
where it is profitable to ‘regenerate’ older lower- income communities (including 
social/ council housing estates) into mixed- income communities. Given global inves-
tors often have familiarity with the downtown, can gauge its value and even often 
want to live there, it is the inner cores that have benefitted the most from global flows 
of investment. National policies promoting neoliberalisation have also promoted gen-
trification of the inner cores by reducing regulations, making finance more accessi-
ble and, with the withdrawal of the welfare state, reducing the ability of low- income 
communities to remain in place. Suburban areas not witnessing such influxes of 
investment, and which often then remain ‘left behind’ and must absorb low- income 
households displaced from gentrifying neighbourhoods, come to resent such pro-
cesses. Even middle- class suburban areas – including those outside the boundaries of 
the central city municipalities – resent the capacity of the inner core to attract develop-
ment that in the past might have gone into new development at the edges, in housing 
but also retail, infrastructure and other amenities. One result is that suburban voters 
elect Conservative governments that promise to attack the so- called liberal elites of 
the central cities, without understanding it is usually Conservative (neoliberal) Party 
policies that have produced the outcomes they resent (see also Walks 2004).
Meanwhile, contemporary urban development processes also produce a new 
politics of scale between the local and the global (and to some extent national) 
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 levels. Global cities such as London and Toronto, as Chapter  11 by Hawes and 
Grisdale (and others) attest, have seen housing units taken off the long- term rental 
housing market over recent decades and shifted into the short- term market servic-
ing tourists and visitors (often through prominent short- term rental sites such as 
Airbnb), at the same time that their rental markets have become severely unaf-
fordable to local tenants. While the COVID- 19 pandemic closed some borders and 
significantly reduced influxes of visitors looking for short- term rentals, the dam-
age had already been done and the rental markets of both cities remain the most 
expensive in their respective nations.
Furthermore, global cities such as Toronto and London derive much of their 
national and global competitive advantage from hosting the largest concentrations 
of financial services firms in each country, financial firms which have increasingly 
made their profits through innovations in mortgage finance, including finance for 
buy- to- let investors purchasing units for the short- term (e.g. Airbnb) rental mar-
ket. The contradictions involved in these dual processes have in turn produced a 
scalar politics that is equally contradictory. Municipal politicians (including those 
of the Greater London Authority), and even politicians at upper levels of the state 
(such as the provincial government in Ontario), have found it politically benefi-
cial to take advantage of what Raco and Livingstone call ‘knowledge gaps’ about 
the planning process, allowing such politicians to make political claims, without 
evidence, but which deflect attention from wider institutional problems and pro-
cesses. For instance, in the Toronto context, politicians have pointed the finger at 
foreign investors and buyers, often through (as discussed in Chapter 9 by Walks) 
special taxes on home purchase by foreign buyers, despite the evidence that for-
eign buyer demand has paled in relation to local demand and investment in hous-
ing, and despite the stated objective of these cities to court foreign investment (as 
noted for London in Chapter 1 by Raco and Livingstone). As cities with tradition-
ally very high levels of immigration and racial diversity, it is not clear how a balance 
between promoting local interests versus global investment and cosmopolitanism 
might be attained within this politics of scale. As noted below, this is one reason 
why the fragmentation of governance in global cities such as London and Toronto 
contains such ‘radical ambiguities’ (Raco and Livingstone’s term) in its potential 
political effects. The political effects of the COVID- 19 pandemic, with borders 
closed and non- locals blamed for importing disease, adds additional layers of com-
plexity to such radical ambiguities.
London and Toronto as exemplars of global real estate 
capitalism and its failures
A key commonality linking London and Toronto, often repeated in the chapters in 
this book, is that they are the financial centres of their respective nations. While 
true, it is important to inquire what this means within contemporary processes of 
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globalisation and financialisation. Just what, exactly, has been most financialised? 
Which asset classes have received the most investment from the many new finan-
cial innovations centred in cities such as London and Toronto? While infrastructure 
such as toll bridges, sewer systems and railways (as noted in Chapters 4 and 6, by 
Enright and Durrant, respectively) have become assetised in the process, and while 
many financial derivatives and other securities were created to facilitate trade with 
nations of different currencies in the context of floating exchange rates (McNally 
2009), by far the largest asset class benefitting from the global flows of capital 
made possible by innovations in finance since the early 2000s has been housing. It 
is housing – for owner occupation, for individual investors in the buy- to- let market, 
as well as increasingly purpose- built rental housing being bought by real estate 
investment trusts and other large- scale financial firms – that is the main recipient of 
the ‘wall of money’ that has flooded into financial markets (Aalbers 2016) and that 
provides investors across the globe with flows of interest payments (Fields 2019).
London and Toronto have attained prominence as global cities, therefore, in 
part because of their role as financial centres in creating a contemporary global cap-
italism based on real estate investment. If it were not for investment into, and appre-
ciation of the value of, housing markets around the world, including (especially) 
their own local housing markets, London and Toronto would not have witnessed 
near the level of growth in employment, population and incomes that they have 
since at least the mid- 1980s. Lefebvre (2003, orig. 1970) presciently suggested in 
1970 that a new form of capitalism was following and supplanting the old one 
based on industrialisation. This new form is based on urbanisation, including real 
estate investment in the cities in what he called a new ‘urban revolution’. London 
and Toronto are the outcome of this new form of capitalism. Indeed, as many of the 
chapter studies in this book reveal, problems related to real estate development are 
among the most cogent and contested planning issues facing both cities, as well 
as the source of struggles facing many of those who work and live in them. Even 
infrastructure development (as noted in Chapters 4 and 6 by Enright and Durrant, 
respectively) is contested mainly on the grounds of how it might affect the trade- 
off between property values and access. Housing investment and development are 
key features of contemporary global capitalism, and global cities are the command 
and control centres not just for global finance, but also (partly because of this) for 
investment in housing.
London and Toronto are not just the products of a global financial system 
promoting investment in housing, they are in turn exemplars and symbols of the 
successes, but also the failures, of such a form of capitalism based on global real 
estate investment. The chapters in this book lay out a number of these successes, 
as well as the many failures, of this system. Both London and Toronto are cosmo-
politan, diverse urban regions in which much economic opportunity has existed for 
in- migrants, with lively and (until the COVID- 19 pandemic hit) largely safe street 
life, night life and arts scenes. Both are (still) among the most tolerant places to live 
in each nation. These are successes, but they have come at a cost. Although London 
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and Toronto have experienced deindustrialisation (see Chapter 8 by Ferm), they 
have prospered while many other cities in their respective nations have suffered 
from job loss, slow or declining investment, rapid economic change and outflows 
of migrants. Often it has been housing and real estate investment that have main-
tained employment in such non- global cities suffering disinvestment in other sec-
tors, but one effect has been to inflate housing costs in those cities too, beyond 
local means (albeit from lower initial levels), and, in turn, debt levels among their 
residents (see Aalbers 2016; Walks 2013). Yet despite gaining significant portions 
of their livelihoods from the financing of housing, both London and Toronto, as 
many chapters in this volume attest, have seen housing costs rise far more rapidly 
than incomes. Very little rental housing has been built to meet demand from ten-
ants, producing rising rents and rendering average incomes insufficient to afford 
average housing costs. Employment in the financial sector, coupled with rising 
employment in low- level services, has produced burgeoning inequality, including 
among those migrants who are unable to insert themselves into the few sectors 
with employment and income growth (such as finance, insurance or real estate), 
a problem that was clearly present early on in the process of global city formation 
(see Sassen 2001). Rising inequality has led to concerns for public safety as a result 
of shootings and mass murder (including murder via automobile) in both cities, 
raising the question of how long these cities will remain as largely safe spaces. And 
the COVID- 19 pandemic has exposed the vulnerability of large, globally connected 
cities to the spread of disease. The arts scenes which have provided these cities with 
their reputations for tolerance and creativity are under threat of displacement, 
as noted in Chapter 15 by March, as a result of gentrification pressures (deriving 
from investment in housing), as well as by the closures compelled by the spread of 
COVID- 19. The chapters in this book suggest that the limited success garnered by a 
finance- led, real estate- based form of capitalism, and evident in global cities such 
as London and Toronto, might not make up for their potential failures, weak spots 
and vulnerabilities, even within those global cities which have seemingly been its 
main beneficiaries.
Contestations, coalitions and political possibilities
A third conclusion deriving from the various chapters in this volume revolves 
around the emergence of contestation and coalitional politics in response to the 
effects of globalisation and financialisation in both London and Toronto. As the 
chapters by Penny (16), Ostanel (17), Sendra and Fitzpatrick (18) and Bunce (19) 
make clear, local residents and communities are contesting dominant real estate 
practices, including not only processes of gentrification and displacement, but 
also the planning apparatus that favours large- scale developers over community 
efforts, and the promotion of commodified housing and land markets that dis-
empower local residents. Rising rents, the residualisation of rental housing, the 
 
Crit iCAL DiALoguES of urBAN govErNANCE ,  DEvELopMENt AND ACtiv iSM304
fragmentation of local political processes and the rise of evictions by large- scale 
financial firms to take advantage of rising rental costs – all are being contested by 
a larger number of groups, and it is in global cities such as London and Toronto 
where the largest ecologies of such groups now exist. We see an increasingly broad 
range of political responses on the ground as residents push back against, navi-
gate and mitigate the effects of global capitalism in both cities. Emergent practices 
range broadly from direct action against developers on the part of residents and 
community organisations, to the creation and proliferation of alternative economic 
development frameworks and forms of housing and land tenure at the neighbour-
hood level, to the development of elaborate everyday habits of dwelling that simply 
make it possible to stay in place in these cities.
As noted in the Introduction, both London and Toronto have a history of 
switching among ideological regimes, typically between those run by Conservative 
Party politicians advocating for reduced regulation, neoliberalisation and pro- 
market development, and by left- leaning regimes intent on dealing with the nega-
tive outcomes of that development, from transport congestion to lack of affordable 
housing. And politicians who come to power at national and upper levels of the 
state often cut their teeth in the local political realm, and sometimes through the 
promotion of local resentments, taking advantage of the politics of scale discussed 
above. As some of the most contested urban sites experiencing both heightened 
redevelopment pressures and some of the most severe urban challenges related to 
growth, the politics of global cities, with their large, diverse and racialised popula-
tions, could go in almost any direction. Organising and resistance emerge largely 
in response to a shifting range of intensifying pressures that are increasingly felt at 
the level of everyday life. Current mobilisations centre on building multiple under-
standings of and relationships to justice; we see organisations working for social, 
environmental and racial justice in both cities. In London and Toronto there is an 
awareness that activists and organisations must work together across boundaries 
and spaces to inform and galvanise intersectional forms of equity and justice, as 
well as an increasing awareness of the challenging nature of coalition- building 
under circumstances where individual sites for targeted activism seem to con-
stantly multiply. It is under exactly such circumstances that the interconnection of 
these sites and the importance of working collectively become apparent.
Efforts to organise and seek out alternatives are evident in communities and 
neighbourhoods of both cities. Yet while there are activist groups committed to 
building community land trusts which would provide for secure, affordable hous-
ing and community participation in the development process (see Chapter 19 by 
Bunce), there are also groups aiming to prevent the building of much-needed pub-
lic transport infrastructure in their neighbourhoods (see Chapter 6 by Durrant). 
Politics is always uncertain, but global cities  – as exemplified by contemporary 
London and Toronto and their many marginalised spaces and left- behind suburbs – 
contain what Walks (2017) calls ‘radically open fields of possibilities’. As crises in 
housing, labour and urban politics evolve, these spaces have the potential to give 
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rise to new transformative urban movements. The COVID- 19 pandemic and the 
many policy measures introduced to limit its spread have only made the future 
even more radically open. For example, the pandemic changed, almost overnight, 
the logic of investment in Toronto’s prime waterfront land by Google affiliate com-
pany Sidewalk Labs. Of course, the future exists as a series of potentialities, and 
it is through political negotiation and contestation that urban politics produces 
new forms of identities and policies (Isin 2002). Given the evolution of politics in 
London and Toronto, one thing we do know is that, going forward, there will be a 
series of alternative perspectives, progressive models for provisioning housing and 
regulating land as well as other ideas that will be engaged with through a myriad of 
community- based political, environmental and social initiatives and actions.
This edited volume has produced critical dialogues about the contested and 
variegated built forms, formal and informal governmental mechanisms and prac-
tices, and policy and community- based responses to contemporary urban concerns 
in two key global cities – London and Toronto. The chapters have contributed local-
ised examples to existing scholarly research in London and Toronto and to under-
standings of global city dynamics. By taking a comparative and dialogic approach, 
this volume provides a platform for a continuing dialogue and a basis for future 
research in both cities.
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